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A bstract
This is a study of foreign policy formulation in 
the Soviet Union and Russia starting in the Soviet era 
and continuing through the end of Boris Yeltsin's first 
term as president. Whereas during the period of rule 
under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko the bureaucratic 
politics model could be applied with some success 
(albeit differently than in the United States), the 
institutional breakdown of the Gorbachev era saw a 
deterioration of the model's explanatory power which 
continued in independent Russia.
For the Gorbachev period and policy formulation in 
the Russian Federation, an alternative model provides a 
more illuminating explanation of the process. The 
transition model emphasizes the particular 
characteristics of democratizing states. By taking into 
account the excessive accumulation of power by the 
executive, the prevalence of winner-take-all solutions, 
the contested and relative nature of laws, the 
instability or absence of procedures, and the influence 
of the military on the political process, the transition 
model offers a better explanation than the bureaucratic 
politics model for the way in which policy was 
formulated in Russia in the period 1991-1996.
Given the hurdles Russia still faces in its 
democratic development, and the frequency with which 
institutions, individuals, and procedures change in the 
upper echelons of the political elite, it appears that 
the transition model will retain significant 
explanatory power for many years to come.
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Chapter 1
The Framework of Theory
An observer of Russian foreign policy in the early 
1990s would be struck by two phenomena: the openness
with which Russian policymakers debated foreign policy 
and the disarray in Russian diplomacy. In contrast to 
the expression of strict unity in Soviet foreign 
policy, Russian foreign policy seemed disorganized and 
fragmented.
How could Russia's foreign policy best be 
explained and understood? And what did Russia's foreign 
policy behavior between 1991 and 1996 (the period 
between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
Yeltsin's first term as president) presage for the long 
term?
This study, which focuses on the period 1991-1996, 
attempts to answer these questions by analyzing how 
Russian governing institutions participated in the 
foreign policymaking process and affected (or failed to 
affect) policy outcomes. Two lines of inquiry are 
pursued. First, can the bureaucratic politics model 
help explain Russian foreign policy? Second, to what 
extent do the patterns of foreign policy formulation 
established during the Soviet period affect post-Soviet 
Russia and how does an understanding of the process of 
transition from communism to democracy help to explain 
Russian foreign policy behavior?
Foreign Policy Analysis
Foreign policy analysis (FPA) attempts to 
understand foreign policy output through the analysis
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of domestic input into foreign policy behavior. FPA 
focuses on the activity occurring below the level of 
the state or international system. It assumes that "in 
the social universe, events often have more than one 
cause, and causes can be found in more than one type of 
location."1 More specifically, it is the recognition 
that within-state processes can sometimes offer 
complementary, if not better, explanations for foreign 
policy behavior than explanations of processes at the 
international level. As Light and Hill put it: "While
not the focal point of International Relations (IR), it
is an indispensable level of analysis."2
As a field of inquiry within IR, foreign policy 
analysis can be traced back to the 1954 study by
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin: Decision-Making as an
Approach to the Study of International Politics.3 What
was new about their approach was their emphasis on the 
domestic aspects of foreign policy behavior. In a 1962 
article refining their work, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 
emphasized the importance of. understanding the makers 
of foreign policy as "participants in a system of 
actions" taken in a specific context which must be
considered to understand a country's foreign policy.4
^■Barry Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International 
Relations," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. International 
Relations Theory Today. (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1995), p. 189.
2Christopher Hill and Margot Light, "Foreign Policy 
Analysis," in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, eds. International 
Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1985), p. 156.
3Steve Smith, "Theories of foreign policy: an historical
overview," Review of International Studies. January 1986, p. 14.
4Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, "The Decision- 
Making Approach," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ed. Die Lehre von den 
Internationalen Beziehungen. (Darmstadt, FRG: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1969), p. 238.
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Thus the emphasis was not on outcome alone but on the 
process that led to that particular outcome.
FPA became more prominent as a subfield of 
International Relations as a result of inquiry into the 
level of analysis problem -- the effort to 
differentiate between policies taken at the level of 
individual, state, and international system. The level 
of analysis problem became prominent in the 1960s, 
having been popularized through the work of Singer.5 It 
reflected the desire to apply scientific rigor, as 
utilized in the study of the natural sciences, to 
social science research.6 By looking at the components 
of the foreign policymaking process in a disaggregated 
form, it was believed that analysis of foreign policy 
outcomes could be made more precise and foreign policy 
behavior more understandable.
Foreign policy analysis seemed particularly useful 
in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, a time 
which saw much questioning of authority and searching 
for reasons to explain what many considered home-made 
fiascoes in US behavior, both at home and abroad. "What 
went wrong?" and "how could this have happened?" were 
questions underpinning the popular debate as well as 
inquiry into US foreign policy undertaken by scholars 
of International Relations.7 These questions yielded 
academic studies such as Robert Jervis's Perception and
5See J. D. Singer, ''The Level of Analysis Problem in 
International Relations," World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1960),
pp. 453-461.
6Barry Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International 
Relations," op. cit., p. 190.
7David Halberstam's, The Best and the Brightest. (Greenwich, 
Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1969), a work discussing the
U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking during the Vietnam War, was a 
bestseller.
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Misperception in International Politics, which 
highlighted the role of perception in the behavior of 
states.8 One point made by Jervis is particularly 
pertinent to this study: There is an exaggerated
tendency to assume that well-laid plans underpin 
policy. While Jervis had in mind the tendency of one 
state to devise its foreign policy toward another state 
on this assumption, observers of Russian foreign policy 
are also well-served by the warning: "Accidents,
chance, and lack of coordination are rarely given their 
due by contemporary observers."9 As the discussion 
throughout the present study indicates, this is an
important point to keep in mind when analyzing Russian 
foreign policy.
Irving Janis's Victims of Groupthink looked at the 
role of psychology in foreign policy formulation. Janis 
recalled in the preface to his book the question
prompting him to undertake the study: "How could
bright, shrewd men like John F. Kennedy and his 
advisers be taken in by the CIA's stupid, patchwork 
plan" to invade the Bay of Pigs in Cuba?10 He argued 
that many of the shortcomings of individual 
decisionmaking are actually exacerbated by group
decisionmaking and that group decisionmaking can cause 
a tendency to take excessive risks. Conformity, which 
is only one feature of "groupthink, " can cause
policymakers to accept policy proposals of a group 
without subjecting them to adequate scrutiny and
criticism.11
8Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
9Ibid., p. 321.
10Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1972), p. ii.
11Ibid. , p . 3 .
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Availability of information about the process 
involved in the making of foreign policy, especially 
American foreign policy, prompted deeper inquiry into 
the decisionmaking' behind foreign policy outcomes. In 
his explanation of factors inducing social scientists 
to analyze the internal aspects of foreign policy, 
Freedman suggested that one reason for the increase in 
insider information might have been the "existence of a 
large number of former bureaucratic practitioners in 
university departments of government after the 
departure of the Johnson administration" in the United 
States.12 Indeed, officials' revelations about 
policymaking in the form of memoir material and 
interviews can offer valuable information for foreign 
policy analysis as long as these are viewed with 
attention to possible bias.
By itemizing the components of foreign policy, it 
was hoped that foreign policy analysis could become 
more systematic. Building blocks of knowledge and 
analysis, if standardized in some way, could facilitate 
cross-country comparisons.13 Furthermore, cross-country 
comparisons could be undertaken more easily if the 
building-blocks of analysis were uniform and could be 
applied across a range of countries.14 Thus, the goal of
12Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy 
Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model,"
International Affairs (London), Vol. 52, No. 3 (1976). p. 434.
13James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and
Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," 
in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley, James Rosenau, eds. New 
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1987), pp. 2-7.
14This was a proposal for future research set out by Raymond 
Tanter, who suggested using international system-level analysis as 
well as foreign policy analysis across a spectrum of similar 
international events. "International System and Foreign Policy 
Approaches: Implications for Conflict Modelling and Management,"
World Politics, Vol. XXIV, Supplement (Spring 1972), pp. 38-39.
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FPA was two-fold: to achieve better explanations of
foreign policy outcomes and to arrive at better 
comparisons of foreign policy mechanisms from one 
country to another.
For both of these purposes, it is useful to 
identify stages in the policymaking process, of which 
decisionmaking is only a part. Potter broke the process 
down into four stages in an attempt to create stages 
which can be compared across time and across 
countries.15 The first is the policy initiation phase, 
or the point at which problems are defined and agendas 
are set. The second stage is the policy controversy 
stage, or the time when the process of bargaining and 
consensus building among policymakers occurs. The third 
stage is the formal decision stage, or the point when 
an authoritative individual or body makes a commitment 
to a course of policy action (which can include doing 
nothing) . The fourth and final stage is the 
implementation stage, or the point at which a policy is 
actually carried out, or not carried out.
At first glance, these stages might appear to 
provide a comprehensive framework for application to 
foreign policy formulation. Yet a strict delineation 
may underestimate the extent to which the stages in the 
process overlap. Such a four-stage division may also 
assume too much specificity in what is actually a much 
looser process.
A different framework has been suggested by 
Zelikow and will be employed to illuminate the
15William C. Potter, "The Study of Soviet Decisionmaking 
for National Security: What is to be Done?" in Jiri Valenta and 
William C. Potter, eds. Soviet Decisionmaking for National 
Security. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 289-305.
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empirical material in the present study. Zelikow has 
pointed out:
During the year of American diplomacy 
associated with German unification, for 
example, President Bush never received 
an options paper. But this did not mean 
that options were not considered.16
Zelikow proposes a set of three streams -- problem 
recognition, politics ("the way choices are made"), and 
policy engineering -- which "interact constantly" with 
each other. Policy engineering includes components such 
as national interest, objectives, strategy, design, 
implementation, maintenance, and review.17 In the case 
of Russia, Zelikow's stages can better accommodate the 
chaotic nature of Russia's foreign policy process. 
Furthermore, the employment of more fluid categories 
offers the advantage of more comfortably comparing 
foreign policy behavior across countries with very 
different patterns of policymaking.
As the discussion of stages illustrates, a 
critical element in employing FPA to compare countries 
is defining the components of the political process. It 
was a disagreement about how to define the Soviet 
political process that made comparisons of Soviet and 
Western foreign policy behavior so difficult during 
much of the Soviet period.
In his 1965 study, Alfred Meyer called the Soviet 
Union a "bureaucracy writ large," a description 
designed to emphasize the preponderant role of
16Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering," 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), p. 156.
11 Ibid., pp. 156-159.
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bureaucracy in the Soviet system.18 This view was widely 
shared by analysts of the Soviet Union, especially 
those who saw great continuity between governing habits 
of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.19 Other analysts 
focused on the presence of conflict within the Soviet 
system of government, referring to the system of 
policymaking as one consisting first and foremost of
the "struggle for power" and linking policymaking 
organically with the succession struggle.20
Yet despite the recognition of the large role of 
the Soviet bureaucracy, analysts were at first
reluctant to do the kind of studies which would break 
down the Soviet system of government into its 
constituent parts to lay the groundwork for the 
application of the bureaucratic politics model. The 
initial scarcity of such studies contrasted with the 
large body of literature using an historical-
descriptive approach to analyze Soviet foreign policy.
It was only in the 1970s that the pluralist 
approach gained some sway in Soviet studies. At the
heart of the discussion was disagreement about the 
nature of the Soviet system. The totalitarian model, 
which viewed the Soviet Union as a state whose central 
feature was the absence of autonomous institutions, was
18Alfred Meyer, The Soviet Policy System. (New York: Random 
House, 1965), cited in Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, 
"Communist Studies and Political Science," in Frederic Fleron and 
Erik Hoffmann, eds. Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: 
Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology. (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1993), p . 8 .
19For example, Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime. 
(New York: Scribners, 1974).
20Henry W. Moreton, "The Structure of Decision-Making in the 
U.S.S.R.: A Comparative Introduction," in Peter H. Juviler and 
Henry W. Moreton, eds. Soviet Policy-Making: Studies in Communism 
in Transition. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 19.
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exemplified in the writings of Wolfe21 and Leites.22 
This model dominated Sovietology until the Khrushchev 
era, and it remained persuasive to many analysts, 
albeit fewer, following Khrushchev's de-Stalinization.
The first major alternative to the totalitarian 
model was pluralism in the form of interest group 
theory. In their 1971 edited volume Interest Groups in 
Soviet Politics, Skilling and Griffiths emphasized
institutional interests.23 While the study was not about 
foreign policy specifically, it aided in the study of 
Soviet policymaking in all areas, foreign policy 
included, by identifying institutional interests. Their 
work on interest groups provided, as Light argues, the 
"impetus for an extension within the bureaucratic 
politics model."24 Griffiths' "tendency analysis"
approach argued that various interest tendencies could 
be identified within Soviet official organs and 
bureaucracies and that such tendencies produced
patterns in policymaking. Specifically, Griffiths 
offered this as an analytical framework which could be 
employed
to examine the activities of party 
apparatchiki, economists, jurists, 
military officers, writers, and other
21Wolfe argued that "the striking difference between 
Communist totalitarianism and all previous systems of absolute, 
despotic, undivided...power" is the "dedication to 'the future'" 
and its "powerful institutional structure which tolerates no rival 
centers of organization." Bertram Wolfe, "The Durability of Soviet 
Despotism," in Alexander Dallin, ed. Soviet Conduct in World 
Affairs. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 266.
22Nathan Leites, "The Politburo and the West," in Alexander 
Dallin, ed. Soviet Conduct in World Affairs. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960).
23H . Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups 
in Soviet Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
24Margot Light, "Approaches to the study of Soviet foreign 
policy," Review of International Studies. (1981), 7, p. 133.
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politically relevant individuals who 
occupy an intermediate position, 
broadly speaking, between the Soviet 
leadership and the mass of the led.25
By the nature of the object of his study, the emphasis 
shifted from the struggle for power and succession 
issues, in the. immediate sense, toward the more 
differentiated target of policymakers below the top 
Soviet leadership. The interest group approach was 
further refined as more information became available 
about the way the Soviet system functioned. This 
information was presented in systematic descriptions of 
the system, with a view to the interests of various 
institutions, in works such as Hough and Fainsod's How 
the Soviet Union is Governed.26
Yet there was no consensus on whether the interest 
group approach could be applied to the USSR. The 
disagreement centered around whether and how observers 
could differentiate between the interests of the 
government, the Party, the military, the legislature 
and the various ministries. Petrov asked rhetorically 
whether the Soviet leadership's increased interest in 
the work of academics might merely signal an attempt to 
line up scapegoats for failed foreign policy 
initiatives.27 Odom argued in 1976 against the interest 
group approach on the grounds that Soviet government 
institutions could not be viewed as interest groups. As 
applied to the United States, interest group theory had 
focused on groups which were unified by a common 
interest but not necessarily by a common organization
25H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups 
in Soviet Politics, op. cit., p. 335.
26Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is 
Governed'. (London: Harvard University, 1979) .
27Vladimir Petrov, "Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," 
Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1973), p. 850.
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or bureaucracy. Odom held that such groups were 
difficult to identify in the Soviet Union and that the 
essential weakness of applying the model to the Soviet 
case was the absence of multiple power centers in the 
Soviet Union capable of receiving the pressure of 
interest groups.28 In his view, this neglected the 
"critical importance of dictatorship and the center's 
policy initiative."29
The debate about interest group theory in many 
ways prefigured and paralleled the discussion of the 
applicability of the bureaucratic politics model to the 
Soviet Union (discussed below). In both interest group 
theory and the bureaucratic politics model, at issue 
was whether models applied to democracies could 
successfully explain an undemocratic system like that 
of the Soviet Union. The politics of anti-communism in 
the United States brought nearly automatic criticism to 
works differentiating between interests in the USSR and 
therefore implicitly downgrading the control of the 
Communist Party. Kolkowicz recalled in a 1985 reprint 
of his 1967 study of conflict and tension between the 
Soviet military and Communist Party how his study 
antagonized those who viewed the Soviet Union as a 
"fully integrated, unified and dangerous system whose 
leaders and institutions are singleminded in their 
design to threaten and ultimately to dominate the West 
and the world."30
28William Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to 
Soviet Politics," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4 (July 1976), 
pp. 542-567.
29Ihid., p . 566.
30Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist 
Party. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) . This was a reprint of 
the 1967 study. See also Alfred Meyer, "Politics and Methodology 
in Soviet Studies," in Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, eds.
17
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The information gap created by the closed nature 
of Soviet society meant that analysis of Soviet 
politics and foreign policy had to be based on 
different types of data than those used in analysis of 
democratic foreign policy. This further removed Soviet 
studies from mainstream political science. But there 
were disagreements as to the extent to which Soviet 
studies was a unique endeavor. Rosenau offered a 
glimpse into the sharp differences of opinion among 
political scientists and Sovietologists:
[I]n trying to fathom modern-day 
Russia, analysts need to come to terms 
at the outset with an overriding 
question: namely, how willing are they 
to treat the Soviet Union as a case 
among many and to what extent are they 
inclined, on the other hand, to treat 
it as a unique polity, with a unique 
history, culture, and circumstances? 
Virtually all of the literature on the 
USSR is crucially shaped by the answer 
to this question. And since it involves 
the proper route to understanding, it 
is a question that divides analysts in 
harsh ways, leading often to fruitless 
disputes that intensify the
divisiveness without clarifying the 
question.31
Rosenau's preferred solution was an amalgam of the 
comparative and single-country approaches with the aim 
of gleaning the best of each. But the debate was not so 
easily settled.32
Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and
Empirical Theory in Sovietology, op. cit., pp. 163-175.
31James Rosenau, "Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign 
Policy: the Case of the USSR," in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley 
Jr., James Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, 
op. cit., p . 58.
32It has even outlived the USSR: New assessments are being 
made about the Soviet period based on the arrival of new data 
about the period.
18
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
After the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as General 
Secretary in 1985, much more information became 
available about how Soviet foreign policy was made, and 
about the Soviet political system in general. The 
influx of information occasioned studies focusing in 
whole or part on the domestic context of Soviet foreign 
policy. Hudson's edited volume contained a great deal 
of new information about how national security policy 
was made under Gorbachev.33 Perhaps the most valuable 
studies resulting from Gorbachev's new era of openness 
came in the form of memoirs by key players, some of 
which are used in the present study.
The Bureaucratic Politics Model
In the classic work on bureaucratic politics, 
Essence of Decision, Graham Allison sought to explain
the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cuban missile crisis through the use of 
three different models. The purpose of using different 
models or lenses for viewing the Cuban missile crisis 
was to sharpen the analysis and highlight the contours 
of policymaking, goals which reflected the larger goals 
of FPA. Allison's three-lens approach made clear that 
the analytic tools used can profoundly affect the 
resulting analytic conclusions.
The first prism was the rational actor model, in 
which each state's actions are viewed as responses to 
those of another monolithic state.34 Since this can be 
said to represent the traditional realist model, the 
weaknesses of which Allison sought to demonstrate, the
33George Hudson, ed. Soviet National Security Policy Under 
Perestroika. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
34Graham Allison, Essence of Decision. (USA: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1971), pp. 13.
19
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rational actor model will not be tested in the present 
study.35
The two remaining models or paradigms, as Allison 
often called them, were the organizational politics 
paradigm and the governmental politics paradigm. The 
characteristics of these paradigms (which were 
ultimately melded into one paradigm)36 are of primary 
interest to the present study because these were the 
new approaches which Allison sought to advocate as an 
alternative to the traditional rational actor model in 
Essence of Decision and subsequent works. The following
is a summary of the core characteristics of the 
bureaucratic politics model:
-- Disagreement in the policymaking process is a 
given: "If a nation performed an action, that action
was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and 
groups within the government."37
"The actor is not a monolithic 'nation' or 
'government' but rather a constellation of loosely 
allied organizations on top of which government leaders 
sit. "38
35Allison made no attempt to show the strength of the 
rational actor model, since it had earned a prior place in 
International Relations theory. Critics pointed to this as a sign 
that his test of the bureaucratic politics models was unfair. See 
Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's 
Models," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 
1992), p. 302.
36The distinct organizational and governmental politics 
paradigms faded into one bureaucratic politics model after Essence 
of Decision. See Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic 
Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World
Politics, Vol. 24 Supplement (Spring) 1972, p. 42.
37Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 173.
3BIbid., p. 80.
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Problems are "cut up and parceled out to 
various organizations."39
Decisions are understood as a mixture of 
conflicting preferences or a resultant of competing 
views among policymakers.40
-- The behavior of government can be understood as 
a series of organizational "outputs" possessing a 
"preprogrammed" character.41
In addition to these core features of 
decisionmaking, Allison identified specific types of 
actions and behavior characterizing bureaucratic 
politics:
-- Standard operating procedures "permit concerted 
action by large numbers of individuals, each responding 
to basic cues." Without these procedures, "it would not 
be possible to perform certain concerted tasks," but 
because of them "certain behavior in particular 
instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and 
often inappropriate." These procedures are "grounded in 
the incentive structure of the organization or even in 
the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes 
and operating style of its members."42
-- The term "action channels," or "regularlized 
means of taking government action on a specific kind of 
issue,"43 focused on the preselection of major players 
and standardized ways of "playing the game" on any 
given foreign policy issue.
39Jjbid. P-
o00
40 Jjbid. P- 145
41 JJbid. P- 81.
42 Jjbid. P- 83 .
43 Jjbid. P- 169
21
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
-- A "dominant inference pattern" was detected: 
"If a nation performs an action of a certain type 
today, its organizational components must yesterday 
have been performing...an action only marginally 
different. . . "44
The bureaucratic politics model did not focus on 
the interplay between the executive and legislative 
branches. Instead, it concentrated on policy conflict 
within the executive branch.
Allison and Halperin were ambiguous as to the 
applicability of the model to authoritarian systems. 
They noted that systems of government are affected by 
factors such as whether central players do or do not 
have a reasonable aspiration to become chief executive, 
whether the government is open to expressions of 
interest and pressures from outside, and whether it was 
freely elected.45 But, at the same time, they seemed to 
expect the model to apply to authoritarian systems such 
as that of the Soviet Union, expressing the hope that
the framework is sufficiently general 
to apply to the behavior of most modern 
governments in industrialized nations, 
though it will be obvious that our 
primary base is the U.S.
government...46
Allison demonstrated his assumption of the model's 
broader applicability with references throughout 
Essence of Decision to "governments" and
"organizations," not "the American government" or 
"American organizations." Ultimately, as is discussed
44JJbid. , p. 87.
45Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm
and Some Policy Implications," op. cit., p. 49.
46Ibid., p . 43.
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in more detail below, these were some of the more 
troublesome points for applying the model to the USSR 
and post-Soviet Russia.
One of the most controversial hypotheses of the 
bureaucratic politics model was the notion that a 
policymaker's behavior is determined by his or her 
institutional affiliation, a concept captured in the 
aphorism, "where you stand depends on where you sit."47 
Each participant in government plays a distinct role 
and has specific responsibilities which are dependent 
on his or her institutional affiliation. Policy 
preferences are thus determined by institutional role 
and responsibilities.
Critics of this aspect of the bureaucratic 
politics argument pointed to the importance of beliefs, 
which may not necessarily depend on a policymaker's 
institutional affiliation. This was the argument made 
in a study of US Navy force posture planning. Rhodes 
found the bureaucratic politics model lacking on the 
grounds that "where decisionmakers stand depends not on 
where they sit or whom they represent, but on what they 
think -- and what they think is independent of where 
they sit."48 While Allison emphasized institutions and 
responsibilities as determining factors in the process 
of "responsible men" fighting "for what they are 
convinced is right,"49 Rhodes' emphasis was on the 
notion that "doing right" was independent of one's 
institutional affiliation.50
47Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 176.
48Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter: Some
Disconf irming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy," World
Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1994), p. 32.
49Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 145.
50Edward Rhodes, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter," op. cit. 
pp. 32-35.
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This conclusion was also implicit in a refinement 
of the bureaucratic politics model offered by Hollis 
and Smith. In a 1990 study, they argued that it is not 
enough to discuss the actions of policymakers in terms 
of their institutional affiliation. Rather, there is a 
relationship between "roles and reasons" which 
indicates that role can be only a starting point for 
analysis of the dynamic process of policy choice.51 In 
addition to role, the bureaucratic politics model 
assumes "normative expectations constituting the role 
of each incumbent of a position," "obedience" among the 
policymakers, and "an area of indeterminacy, governed 
only by a broad duty to act so as to be able to justify 
oneself afterwards and to keep both one’s job and one's 
credibility.1152 This area of indeterminacy could well 
prompt a policymaker to eschew his institutional 
responsibilities in favor of a higher good justified on 
the basis of protecting the national interest.
This raises a related question: how does a
policymaker determine whether or not he is doing the 
right thing? This question underpinned Freedman's 
criticism of the presentation of the bureaucratic 
politics model as somehow being opposite or contrary to 
the rational actor. Freedman argued that it would be 
more correct to view the two models as two points on a 
continuum:
[T]he random clashes of fragmented, 
selfishly motivated actors are, in 
fact, reasonably patterned and linked 
to conceptions of the national 
interest. The structure and patterns 
can only be discerned by standing back
51Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 154- 
155.
52 Ibid.
24
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
from the immediate battles with a long­
term rather than a short-term 
perspective..."53
Freedman thus implicitly viewed the individual 
policymaker as a representative of the state's national 
interest, not as a narrow-minded bureaucrat seeking 
merely to further the goals of his immediate 
organization. In Freedman's view, the bureaucratic 
politics model as described by Allison had included a 
"mis-specification of the core political relationships" 
which focused attention on immediate bureaucratic 
battles rather than on the structure of -- and struggle 
for -- power at the center of the state apparatus.54 
Thus, the framework for interaction stands out as 
consisting not only of the various institutions (and 
their personnel) which participate in policymaking, but 
also of the culture in which these institutions and 
individuals interact.
An important part of that culture or atmosphere, in 
the view of both Freedman and Allison, is what they 
call the "rules of the game." Allison describes them as 
such:
The rules of the game stem from the 
Constitution, statutes, court
interpretations, executive orders, 
conventions, and even culture. Some 
rules are explicit, others implicit, 
some rules are quite clear, others 
fuzzy. Some are very stable; others are 
ever changing. But the collection of 
rules, in effect, defines the game...
Rules constrict the range of 
governmental decisions and actions that 
are acceptable.55
53Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy 
Processes," op. cit., p. 449.
54Jjbid. , p. 437, 444.
55Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 170.
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In Allison's view, the rules of the game are both 
flexible over time and vary from state to state. 
Freedman viewed the rules of the game as background 
elements which participants "take for granted" in their 
day-to-day conduct of policymaking.56 Allison, on the 
other hand, was less explicit. His description seemed
aimed at covering all possibilities rather than finding 
the essence of the elements described. As the 
discussion of Russia in subsequent chapters argues, the 
way in which the rules of the game function (or fail to 
function) can be of critical importance in foreign 
formulation.
Some of the earliest explicit applications of the 
bureaucratic politics model to the Soviet Union were 
undertaken with reference to specific crisis
situations. For example, Valenta's studies of the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia tested Soviet 
decisionmaking against Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model and held that Soviet policymaking indeed 
reflected the same sort of. tug-of-war among Soviet 
officials as described by Allison.57 Valenta argued that 
the shift in the Soviet response to the crisis from 
moderation to the decision to invade represented the 
ability of pro-interventionists to prevail in the
debate among Soviet officials. He noted that other 
factors, in addition to the pulling and hauling of 
bureaucrats, were also at play and had an effect on the 
decision, but that bureaucratic politics was
56Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy 
Processes," op. cit., p. 449.
57Jiri Valenta, "The bureaucratic politics paradigm and the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia," Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 94, No. 1 (Spring) 1979; and Jiri Valenta "Soviet 
decisionmaking and the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis," Studies in 
Comparative Communism, Vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer) 
1975.
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responsible for the shift of the Soviet strategy from 
soft to hard.
Karen Dawisha, notably, did not employ the 
bureaucratic politics model in her study, The Kremlin 
and Prague Spring, opting to focus on how decisions are 
made in a crisis instead.58 In a subsequent study, Karen 
Dawisha argued against the applicability of Allison's 
bureaucratic politics model to the Soviet Union.59 She 
did not agree with Allison's contention that it is 
possible to speculate about Soviet behavior by keeping 
in mind the behavior of the Soviet Union' s American 
counterparts, arguing that extrapolating from American 
experience means overlooking factors unique to the USSR 
which have important bearing on the applicability of 
the bureaucratic politics model.60 She pointed out 
distinctions between the US system and the Soviet 
system, such as the unique role of the CPSU, the 
function of ideology, the amorphous nature of political 
groups, and the peculiarity of Soviet action channels. 
Dawisha concluded that "the distinctive features can 
only be accommodated within the periphery of the model, 
and that the central premises of the model are equally 
peripheral to an understanding of Soviet 
decisionmaking."61
Perhaps the greatest problem area pointed out by 
Karen Dawisha was in the realm of democracy. Allison 
and Halperin had, in fact, placed an important 
restriction on their model when they said that only in
58Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and Prague Spring. (London: 
University of California Press, 1984).
59Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative
Communism Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter) 1980. 
eoIbid., p. 303.
61 Jjbid. , p. 318.
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those systems which are relatively open "as the result 
of elections" will players be subject to pressure from 
a wider circle of individuals, which forces them to
adopt "a larger conception of their own interest."62 
Since free elections were not a feature of the Soviet 
system, it would appear that Allison and Halperin
themselves believed their model could not be well
applied in the USSR. But this was not the case, as the 
foregoing discussion reveals. Moreover, in his comment 
appended to Dawisha's article, Allison pointed out that 
his model was designed to provide "an overall theme" 
for an approach which could be applied to all
countries. Elaborating on this thought, Allison wrote:
I am still convinced that...when people 
who share power disagree, the mechanism 
of resolution will be a process of
political bargaining among principles 
[which] holds true across various 
political systems.63
Thus Allison rejected the notion that his model
contained elements or assumptions rendering it
inapplicable to Soviet foreign policy.
Emphasis on consensus rather than conflict among 
Soviet policymakers provided an interesting alternative
to the bureaucratic politics model. The work of Ross on
crisis decisionmaking stressed factors in the Soviet
polity which were contrary to those raised by Allison:
More than anything else, it is the
emergence of those uncodified norms as 
a means to control conflict that 
reflects (and indeed probably requires) 
the operation of what might be called 
coalition maintenance in the Soviet
setting... For example, the factor
62ibid., p. 301.
63Graham Allison, "Comment," Studies in Comparative Communism 
Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter) 1980, p. 327.
28
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
considered most crucial to the survival 
or maintenance of coalitions is the 
actors' fear of the alternative -- that 
is, the fear that the breakup of the 
coalition may trigger potentially 
devastating results...64
In other words, rather than conflict, Ross found
consensus and a desire to avoid failure (and eschew
risks whenever possible) the most salient elements of 
Soviet foreign policy formulation. The picture of the 
Soviet system presented by Ross was one in which 
entirely different rules of the game were in operation 
than those described by Allison.
The Transition Model
The second line of inquiry follows the first in 
that it attempts to make up for any deficits in the
first by using a different approach. If the first 
question is "is the bureaucratic politics model useful 
in understanding Russian foreign policy," the second
question is "what else must the observer understand 
about Russia?" The answer surrounds Russia's transition 
to democracy.
The growing body of literature about post- 
communist transitions provides a useful starting point 
for this line of inquiry. This literature does not 
generally focus on foreign policy (with the notable 
exception of the relationship between democratization 
and belligerence).65 However, patterns in the behavior
64Dennis Ross, "Risk Aversion in Decisionmaking," in William 
Potter and Jiri Valenta, Soviet Decisionmaking for National 
Security. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 239.
65For example, Easter has examined connections between 
institutional choice and old regime elites. Gerald M. Easter, 
"Preference for Presidentialism: Post Regime Change in Russia
and the NIS, " World Politics, Vol. 49 No. 2 (January 1997), p. 
187. Mettenheim has analyzed the impact of presidential systems
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of states in transition from authoritarianism to rule- 
of-law, democratic systems as discussed in this 
literature can be useful as components of the analysis 
of foreign policy formulation.
The discussion of states in transition in the 
present study focuses on post-communist transitions. 
While these have been compared to democratic 
transitions in South America and southern Europe, 
consensus is emerging that post-communist transitions 
are significantly different than other transitions. 
Bunce summarizes the arguments:
[T]he international context of these 
transitions is very different from the 
context of the recent transitions to 
democracy in Southern Europe and Latin 
America. For Eastern Europe, so much 
more is in flux: national identities,
state boundaries, political-military 
alliances, and the relationship to the 
international economy. Political leaders 
in these new regimes thus face enormous 
international responsibilities.66
The length of the period of authoritarianism is 
another consideration. In the case of Russia, for 
example, there were no participants in the political
on transitions to democracy. Kurt von Mettenheim, "Presidential 
Institutions and Democratic Politics," in Kurt von Mettenheim, 
ed. Presidential institutions and Democratic Politics, (London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 2-15. The effect of 
economic reform on the transition process, and vice versa, is 
also a focus of transition literature. See, for example, Stephan 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of 
Democratic Transitions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995).
66Valerie Bunce, "Presidents and the Transition in Eastern 
Europe," in Fleron and Hoffmann, eds. Post-Communist Studies and 
Political Science, op. cit., p. 173-174. See also, Fred 
Halliday, "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: 
Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions," in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith, eds. International Relations Theory Today, op. 
cit., pp. 38-61.
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process who had lived under a liberal democratic 
system of government. Similarly, the way in which 
authoritarianism was imposed in the first place can 
have an impact on the way that its legacy is 
overcome.67 Finally, Russia stands out as a special 
case of transition because of its weight in global 
affairs and its position as the former center of the 
Soviet empire, characteristics which cannot be found 
in any other state which has made the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.
An exception to the view that post-communist 
transitions belong in a separate category is presented 
in the arguments of Bova. He sees as much variation on 
either side of the non-communist/post-communist 
transition divide. This therefore makes the notion of 
post-communist exceptionalism beside the point, in 
Bova's view.68
As already noted, the relationship between 
democratization and belligerence is one of the most 
studied foreign policy questions under the rubric of 
states in transition. The concentration on this 
question can be explained by the eruptions of 
hostilities within the emerging new democracies. It 
can also be attributed to the important and unresolved 
debate about the absence of war among democracies.
The recent revival of the debate about liberal 
peace, as well as the increasing analysis of a 
connection between democratization and belligerence,
67Patrick H. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional 
Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of 
Hungary," World Politics, Vol. 48 (July 1996), pp. 579-603.
68Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist 
Transition," in Fleron and Hoffmann, eds. Post-Communist Studies 
and Political Science, op. cit., pp. 240-241.
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has occurred because of the established democracies' 
advocacy of democratic systems to replace the collapsed 
communist regimes in the former Soviet bloc. The notion 
of democratic peace, or the proposition that democratic 
states do not fight wars against other democratic 
states, was first presented by Small and Singer in 
1976,69 being based on Kant's theory of perpetual 
peace.70 The revival of the debate over democratic peace 
currently follows two strains of discussion: One
focuses on the debate about liberal peace; the other on 
the correlation between democracy-building and war.
Critics of the proposition of liberal peace have 
argued that the absence of war between democracies 
cannot so much be attributed to democratic institutions 
or culture, but to interests71 if not mere 
coincidence.72 But defenders of the liberal peace 
argument argue that there are elements about democracy, 
such as liberal ideology and democratic institutions, 
which account for democratic peace.73 This is why peace 
among democratic states has been cited by American 
policymakers such as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott,74 to support their advocacy of the enlargement
69Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-proneness of 
Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865," Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 1., No. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69, cited in 
Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 8.
70Howard Williams, International Relations and Political 
Theory. (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1992), pp. 81-92.
71Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic
Peace," op. cit., pp. 5-49.
72David Spiro, "The Insignificance of Liberal Peace," 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-81.
73John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.
74Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the International Interest." 
Speech on the Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and
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of the world's democratic community, especially in the 
former communist bloc.
The nexus of democratization and war brings with 
it a different set of statistics for the international 
relations scholar. Statistically, as has been argued by 
Mansfield and Snyder, the process of democratization is 
associated with a volatile mix of nationalism and 
authoritarian politics which can make countries more 
aggressive and prone to start wars.75
In response to the discussion of democratization 
and war, Malcolm and Pravda examined the case of 
Russia, especially the way in which the "political 
landscape of Russia in transformation" affects foreign 
policy formulation. They focus on the following 
questions:
How vulnerable has the executive been 
to policy pressures from the 
democratizing political environment?
What impact has the electoral success 
of opposition parties using nationalist 
slogans had on the government's 
statements about, and its actions in 
relation to, the 'near abroad' and 'far 
abroad'? In what ways has 
'fragmentation' in the executive 
affected Russian foreign policy? More 
broadly, how dangerous does the current 
constellation of weak government and 
conflicting elite groups appear in the 
light of earlier cases of belligerence 
in a context of democratization and 
regime change?76
Human Rights, 1 October 1997, transcribed in U.S. Information 
Agency Wireless File, 1 October 1997.
75Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and 
War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May-June) 1995, pp. 19-97.
76Malcolm and Pravda, "Democratization and Russian Foreign 
Policy," International Affairs (London), Vol. 72, No. 3 (1996),
p. 540.
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The conclusion reached by Malcolm and Pravda is that 
the effect of democratization on Russia is limited and 
mixed.77 While the bleak scenario of war has not yet 
come to pass, a close partnership based on common 
democratic values has not emerged in Russia's relations 
with developed democracies.
The discussion of democratization and Russian 
foreign policy is also of interest to those concerned 
about democratization and Russia's nuclear capability 
(and whatever remains of its conventional military 
capability). Kissinger pointed to the nexus of the 
problem of Russian foreign policy formulation and war­
proneness when he said:
To base all our policies on the 
assumption of Russian democracy is 
either to be dealing with illusions or 
with a timeframe that is beyond most 
current issues. The problem of Russian 
foreign policy is to see whether it is 
possible to convince Russian leaders 
that their historic pattern of 
identifying security with expansion in 
all directions has only brought 
disaster to the Russian people.78
Kissinger's comments suggest that influencing the 
Russian policymaking community is a top priority among 
American and other Western policymakers. By putting in 
the conditional the matter of influencing these 
leaders ("if it is possible"), Kissinger made clear 
that one of the key problems in coping with this 
volatile mix is understanding how the Russian foreign 
policymaking mechanism works. In other words, it is
77Ibid., p. 552.
78Henry Kissinger, "A World in Turmoil: The Need to Redefine 
Transatlantic Relations," The End of Transatlantic Certainties. 
(Bad Godesberg: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishing, 1997), pp. 23- 
24.
34
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
not enough to view Russia as "an unruly adolescent" at 
a stage of "bewildering transformation from one status 
to another" and exhibiting "patterns of behavior that 
are annoying, even threatening...but not necessarily 
permanent."79 Rather, policymakers constructing 
approaches to deal with Russia must have a good grasp 
of the internal dynamic, as well as notions of the 
best way to work with it.
The foregoing discussion indicates an imbalance 
in the study of the foreign policy of democratizing 
states. The question of the relationship between 
democratization and war has been examined, but the 
rest of the spectrum of foreign policy activity as a 
function of the political transition has been 
neglected -- to the detriment of developing a stronger 
understanding of the elements of Russian foreign 
policy formulation.
The apparent fragmentation of Russian foreign 
policy is the focus of this study, and the underlying 
question is whether this fragmentation can simply be 
explained by the bureaucratic politics model or 
whether it becomes understandable only after factoring 
in Russia's transition to democracy.
Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies 
offers an important discussion about the development of 
institutional procedures and organizational devices 
during transitions. Huntington has argued:
Historically, political institutions have 
emerged out of the interaction among and 
disagreement among social forces, and the 
gradual development of procedures and
79Michael Mandelbaum, "Westernizing Russia and China," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 93-94.
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organizational devices for resolving those 
disagreements.80
Huntington, thus, places emphasis on the incremental 
nature of the process.
In the case of Russia, the creation of new 
institutions and procedures was rapid, starting in the 
Gorbachev era and continuing into the period of 
Russia's second republic. The rapidity of development 
meant that Russia's new institutions and procedures 
faced the dual challenge of creating new identities and 
accumulating authority within the same short span of 
time. As is demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, 
this challenge was not always met.
Several characteristics of the transition from 
communism to democracy are relevant to the study of 
foreign policy:
An excessive use of foreign policy for 
domestic political purposes is one characteristic. As 
Skak has pointed out, foreign policy will always be 
occasionally used for domestic purposes, even in 
established democracies. The danger arises "when 
external considerations are brushed aside in the 
reckless pursuit of popularity at home."81 To this 
might be added -- when external considerations are 
brushed aside in the pursuit of maintaining a grip on 
power at home. Nationalism is thus an omnipresent 
danger.
80Samuael P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 11.
81Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Postcommunist Foreign 
Policy and International Relations. (London: Hurst & Company,
1996), p. 55.
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-- An excessive accrual of power to the 
executive, especially in presidential systems is 
another characteristic. This can be caused by factors 
as diverse as the fear of a military coup, the 
pressure on the executive to produce socio-economic 
improvement, successful political jockeying on the 
part of the chief executive or a deficit of experience 
in the rule-of-law.
-- The stakes in achieving one's policy goals 
tend to be very high. As O'Donnell and Schmitter have 
argued, players are aware "that their momentary 
confrontation, expedient solutions, and contingent 
compromises are in effect defining rules which may 
have a lasting but largely unpredictable effect on how 
and by whom the 'normal' political game will be played 
in the future."82
There tends to be little willingness to 
compromise when conflicts arise within governing 
institutions. Winner-take-all solutions replace the 
bureaucratic politics phenomenon of amalgamating 
solutions.
The "division of functions and authority 
between the executive and the legislature might remain 
highly contested."83
-- Laws are relative and contested.84
82Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies. (London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), p. 66.
83M. Steven Fish, Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and
Regime in the New Russian Revolution. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), p. 226.
84Jjbid. , p. 227.
37
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
-- Legalism substitutes for the rule of law. As 
Ahdieh has argued, the Soviet tradition of the 
supremacy of laws created an intricate network of 
laws, and this pattern of hypercodification continued 
through the Gorbachev era. What was lacking was a 
concept of the supremacy of the law and a respect for 
law by civil society.85 Mommsen has commented that 
Russia's most urgent need at this stage of its 
democratization is a set of legal ethics.86
-- Procedures are ad hoc and not established. 
Some survive from the previous regime, even though new 
institutions are present.
-- Praetorianism can become an important feature 
of the political process. Huntington has highlighted 
the problem of curbing the political power of the 
armed forces and making their focus the protection of 
the external security of the country. Speaking not so 
much about the danger of coups but of rampant 
political participation among the armed forces, 
Huntington offered "Guidelines for Democratizers" to 
curb the political power of the armed forces, 
including clarifying the chain of command and removing 
ambiguities and re-orienting the military for military 
missions.87
85Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia's Constitutional Revolution: 
Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996. 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1997), pp. 36-37.
86Margareta Mommsen, "'Zwei Schritte vorwarts, ein Schritt 
zuruck'?" Internationale Politik, Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1997),
pp. 1-8.
87Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1991), p. 251-253.
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Perhaps the most useful portrayal of the 
characteristics of a state in transition is offered in 
the metaphor presented by O'Donnell and Schmitter -- 
that of a multi-layered chess game which is played by 
an unknown number of players. It is a tumultuous game 
in which certain people will continually challenge the 
rules, cheat, threaten, and perhaps even tip over the 
board. 88
The characteristics of the transition model are 
all, to some extent, present in Russia. Furthermore, 
all have influenced the formulation of foreign policy. 
As the discussion in the following chapters shows, 
consideration of these characteristics of states in 
transition is essential for understanding Russian 
foreign policy. To understand contemporary Russian 
foreign policy, the present study's "transition model" 
represents, to paraphrase Light and Hill, an 
indispensable level of analysis. This study concludes 
that a combination of the two lines of inquiry -- the 
bureaucratic politics model and the transition model -- 
offers the best approach for understanding Russian 
foreign policy.
Russia's transition to democracy is a continuing 
process and one whose difficulty cannot be 
overestimated. It is difficult to predict when this 
process of transition will end and when Russia will 
become a stable, democratic state. O'Donnell and 
Schmitter suggest that the end point is reached when
[T] he transition is over when 
"abnormality" is no longer the central 
feature of political life, when actors
88Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, op. cit., p. 66.
39
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
have settled on and obey a set of more 
or less explicit rules defining the 
channels they may use to gain access to 
governing roles, the means they can 
legitimately employ in their conflicts 
with each other, the procedures they 
should apply in taking decisions, and 
the criteria they may use to exclude 
others from the game. Normality, in 
other words, becomes a major 
characteristic of political life when 
those active in politics come to expect 
each other to play according to the 
rules -- and the ensemble of these 
rules is what we mean by a regime.89
This ensemble also implies an established, functioning 
democracy. While it is not possible to suggest a time 
frame for Russia's completion of its transition, it 
does seem likely that the process of democratization -- 
especially the creation of a rule-of-law system -- will 
continue for some time to come.90 Therefore, analysts of 
Russian foreign policy formulation are served well by a 
framework which takes this process into account.
Structure and Methodology
Information about policymaking and the way the 
Russian government functions is readily available in 
the Russian media. To be sure, the Russian media 
frequently carries "suspicious information" 
sensational reports in which exaggeration and 
conspiracy theories masquerade as news. At the same 
time, though, the media represents a bountiful source 
of "reliable information" such as the texts of Russian 
laws, major policy statements, statutes of government 
agencies, presidential decrees, and extensive question-
89Ibid., p . 65.
90Carothers argues that it will take decades to fix these 
deep shortcomings in Russia. Thomas Carothers, "The Rule of Law 
Revival," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March-April 1998), p. 
105.
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and-answer format interviews with key Russian 
policymakers.91 These types of reliable information are 
used as a significant sources of information in this 
study. When news reports are utilized, care has been 
taken both to discuss the authenticity of particularly 
sensational news reports or simply to avoid them 
altogether.
In spite of the care which must be taken in 
relying on the Russian media, it undoubtedly offers 
more information about policymaking than was available 
during Soviet times. In many ways the heavy press 
coverage makes the functioning of Russia's government 
more transparent than that of its Western counterparts. 
Public discussion of intra-governmental policy 
conflicts among policymakers is also more prevalent 
than during Soviet times and more frequent than in 
Western countries. The public discussion in Russia 
offers a glimpse into the kinds of arguments being made 
by officials and perhaps even the kinds of debates 
which go on behind closed doors (if the statements 
published in the press are an indication of the policy 
disputes which happen outside of the public domain).
On this point, it should be noted that there is a 
tendency to pay more attention in the Russian media to 
dissonance rather than to harmony among Russian 
officials. As in the established democracies, insider 
accounts of policy disputes make interesting reading. 
The relative over-reporting of friction is reflected in 
this study owing to the nature of the data available 
about policymaking in Russia. In an attempt to make up
91In this study, question-and-answer format interviews with 
key policymakers are highlighted in footnotes with the words 
"interview with." My interviews with are denoted "author's 
interview with."
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for the tendency to over-report conflict, one of the 
case study subjects was selected with a view to its 
reflection of broad agreement about policy goals among 
Russian policymakers.
Despite the relatively abundant data about Russian 
foreign policymaking, there are still informational 
gaps, especially in the realm of input into
policymaking by the military and security agencies. 
While this shortage of information makes Russia 
comparable to its established-democratic counterparts 
in many respects, the information that is available 
about the activities of these Russian agencies suggests 
that they are far more involved in devising foreign
policy than Western military and intelligence
organizations. As a result, the informational gaps 
regarding the input of Russia's military and security 
agencies would appear to be more problematic.
The sources of information used for this study are 
a selective reading of the Russian media (with special 
emphasis on official government information and
question-and-answer format interviews with key 
policymakers), Russian memoir materials and Western 
media. A few interviews with key policymakers are also 
used in this study. Secondary sources have been 
examined and acknowledged.
The study begins with the Soviet . era because 
Russia's political structures and foreign policy did 
not develop in a vacuum: While Boris Yeltsin came to
power jettisoning much of what characterized the Soviet 
system, independent Russia's political system 
nonetheless grew out of that system. Furthermore, one 
of the key arguments in this study is that past 
political behavior has an impact on the way that 
democratization proceeds as well as its pace of
42
Chapter 1 The Framework of Theory
success. Thus, chapters two and three discuss how 
policy was made in the era of Brezhnev, Andropov, and 
Chernenko, as well as during the Gorbachev era.
Chapters four and five examine the political 
institutions involved in foreign policy formulation in 
contemporary Russia. The first analyzes policy 
formulation during the first republic, when post-Soviet 
Russia was still living under the amended Soviet-style 
constitution (December 1991 to December 1993) . The 
second analyzes policy formulation during the first 
years of the second republic through the end of 
Yeltsin's first term as president (December 1993 to 
July 1996) . Chapters six and seven are case studies of 
specific foreign policy choices. Chapter six examines 
how various Russian institutions influenced the Russian 
policy on sanctions toward Yugoslavia between 1992 and 
1995, and chapter seven analyzes the input into the 
push for amendment of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty between 1992 and 1996. In contrast to the 
preceding chapters, the case studies provide a 
sustained discussion of individual issues so as to test 
the conclusions and hypotheses drawn in chapters four 
and five. In chapter eight, I compare Russian foreign 
policy formulation to that of France and the United 
States, two countries whose institutions have been 
explicit models for Russia. Chapter 9 discusses the 
outlook for Russian foreign policy formulation.
The emphasis of this study is on foreign and 
security policy, not on foreign economic relations or 
other international financial issues. For this reason, 
and because of limitations of space, the study includes 
no discussion of the roles of business interests and 
banks in the making of foreign policy. While these are 
certainly important in some areas, they are beyond the 
scope of this study. The private sector is represented
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in the discussion of research institutes and advisory 
groups. This exception to the focus on governing 
institutions is made because discussing only 
government-sponsored and run research institutes would 
present an incomplete impression of their input into 
foreign policy.
Throughout the study, the analysis attempts to 
take a broad brush approach in order to capture a 
relatively full picture of the interaction of Russian 
institutions in the making of foreign policy. By 
examining the roles of institutions, such as the 
Foreign Ministry, the legislature, the presidency, and 
others, the focus is on how, if at all, these 
institutions affect the process of making Russia's 
foreign policy. A better understanding of how these 
institutions operate, it is hoped, will yield a better 
understanding of Russia's foreign policy behavior.
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Soviet Foreign Policy Formulation 
under Brez hnev, A ndr o p o v, and Chernenko
Understanding the handling of foreign policy 
formulation in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, 
Yurii Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, the last 
three general secretaries before Mikhail Gorbachev, is 
a necessary starting point for examining how foreign 
policy is formulated in Russia today. In spite of the 
fact that Boris Yeltsin came to power jettisoning the 
chief attributes of the Soviet system, independent 
Russia's political culture has inevitably been 
influenced by the preceding decades of Soviet rule. 
That system has been replaced by an inchoate democracy 
and market economy, but several years after the 
collapse of the USSR, Russia was still coping with a 
difficult recovery from Soviet communism. For these 
reasons, understanding contemporary Russia's polity 
depends on understanding how the Soviet system 
functioned.
The period during which Brezhnev, Andropov, and 
Chernenko ruled, 1964 to 1985, has been chosen to 
provide an overview of Soviet foreign policy 
formulation. The extreme domestic upheavals of the 
Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev periods look anomalous 
in comparison to the subsequent years of "normal" rule 
under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko (although the 
latter period was a shorter span of time) . The issue 
of illness was a recurrent theme during this period, 
just as it was during Yeltsin's rule, a further reason 
to study how Yeltsin's predecessors coped with this
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issue. It is not enough to start with the Gorbachev 
period, with its many political transformations, 
because this period was not typical of the preceding 
decades. Gorbachev's reforms were catalyzed by the 
nearly 20 year-long period of relative calm in Soviet 
politics, known subsequently as the "era of 
stagnation." Thus, the mode of operation during the 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko periods is crucial 
to understanding the environment to which Gorbachev 
responded. The larger inquiry is whether and to what 
extent Russia bears the imprint of operational modes 
established during the era of stagnation.
The Role of the Centra] Committee Membership and
Secretariat
In the simplest terms, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) provided the ideological, 
intellectual, financial, and administrative basis for 
making foreign policy and all other policies. Owing to 
its omnipresence, the Party also enjoyed overarching 
control over the formulation and implementation of the 
foreign policy of the USSR. Starting in the Stalin 
period this control existed in practice, and it was 
codified in the 1977 USSR constitution, which stated 
that "the Communist Party determines general outlines 
for the development of society and the line of the 
USSR's domestic and foreign policy," a statement, 
which if anything understated the role of the Party.1
In the Soviet system there was no meaningful 
choice in elections at any level. This also meant that
1Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh 
Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. Moscow: Juridicheskaya Literatura 
Publishing House, 1987, p. 6.
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the average Soviet citizen had no opportunity to 
influence foreign policy through the ballot box. He or 
she was expected to accept and support the foreign 
policy line pursued by the top leadership of the 
Soviet Union. The same can be said of primary Party 
organizations (the cells of the Party to which all 
members of the CPSU belonged), and local Party 
organizations.
It was only at the regional and republican levels 
that Party leaders might be able to influence the 
making of policy at the pinnacle of Soviet power, and 
this influence derived from their access to all-union2 
bodies and officials. The first secretaries of 
regional and republican Party organizations were 
considered outposts of Soviet central power, a status 
which conferred upon them membership in the CPSU 
Central Committee. A few key republican Party first 
secretaries were regularly included in the Politburo, 
although they could not always play significant roles 
in its regular weekly meetings owing to their distance 
from Moscow.
Notwithstanding this limitation, there is evidence 
of their input in a significant foreign policy 
decision -- to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Top 
Party officials from Ukraine, Belorussia, and 
Lithuania lobbied for intervention in the summer of 
1968, presumably out of a fear that unchecked 
liberalization in Czechoslovakia would make ruling 
their own republics more difficult. This phenomenon
2That is, USSR-wide. The term all-union is preferable to 
"national" level owing to the multinational nature of the Soviet 
Union and better than the term "federal" since the USSR did not 
fit accepted definitions of a federation.
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was cited by Valenta as evidence of bureaucratic modes 
of policymaking in operation in the USSR.3
But using the 1968 invasion as a test case of 
republic Party leaders' influence generally in foreign 
policy matters exaggerates their input. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, the top Soviet 
officials tended to have responsibilities for specific 
areas and did not welcome intrusions from outsiders. 
Therefore, a republican Party chief would normally be 
out of bounds if he concerned himself with everyday 
foreign affairs issues.
Real power in the Party system started at the 
level of the Central Committee. Within the Central 
Committee, there were two groups: first, selected
Central Committee members and, second, staffers of its 
apparatus (apparatchiki).4 Central Committee members
were chosen by the top Soviet leadership by virtue of 
their status in the Party, government, legislature, or 
military.5 As Jerry Hough put it, with the exception 
of 15 or 20 members whose inclusion was mainly 
symbolic, the Central Committee was a "collection of 
the approximately 250 most powerful posts in the 
Soviet system."6 The Central Committee membership held 
plenary meetings twice yearly to discuss overall 
policy and approve important Party decisions. Owing to 
the size of the Central Committee and the six-month
3Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter, Soviet Decisionmaking 
for National Security. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984),
p. 169.
4 In some cases, such as at the higher echelons of the 
apparatus, there was overlap.
5In 1971 there were 241 full and 155 candidate members; in 
1976 there were 287 full and 139 candidate members. Jerry F. 
Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed. 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 457.
eIbid., pp. 455-458.
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spans of time between its regular meetings, it was not 
a suitable body to make day-to-day policy decisions or 
those requiring speedy action.
The Central Committee apparatus acted as the 
Party's main bureaucratic arm and exercised broad 
influence over much of Soviet policymaking. Despite 
the fact that the Central Committee membership was 
nominally superior to the appointed apparatchiki, it
was the latter who held sway over policy because of 
their proximity to the policymaking process. Thus it 
was the apparatus, rather than the Central Committee 
membership, which made most use of the broad powers 
and responsibilities of the Central Committee.
Defined by Party statutes as the "highest organ 
directing the Party in the periods between 
congresses," (which were normally held every five 
years) the Central Committee was the base of political 
leadership and the Party's theoretical and ideological 
center.7 It was responsible for
directing the activities of the 
[central] Party and local Party 
organs, selecting and appointing
leading functionaries, directing the 
work of the central government and 
public organizations by means of the 
Party groups within them;
establishing various Party organs, 
institutions, and enterprises and 
directing their activities, naming 
the editors of the central 
newspapers and magazines working 
under Party control, distributing 
the funds of the Party's budget and 
controlling their distribution. The 
Central Committee represents the
1Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, op. cit. Vol. 28, p.
516.
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CPSU in relations with [foreign] 
parties.8
Given the amount of work to be handled by the Central 
Committee's 20-odd departments (four concerned mainly 
with foreign policy) , it is not surprising that the 
power of the Central Committee bureaucracy effectively 
came to outstrip that of the Central Committee itself.
The Central Committee apparatus was headed by 
Central Committee secretaries, a group of about 12 
officials elected by the Central Committee, and known 
collectively as the Secretariat. The Party rules 
charged the Secretariat with directing work, selecting 
cadres, and verifying the fulfillment of Party 
decisions. In addition, each secretary supervised one 
or more departments of the Central Committee 
apparatus, sometimes serving directly as a department 
head. These departments, in turn, supervised various 
ministries and state committees of the Soviet 
government. In addition, secretaries were charged with 
ensuring that policy decisions were actually 
implemented.
The membership in the Politburo and the 
Secretariat frequently overlapped. It was entirely 
possible for a Central Committee Secretary who sat on 
the Politburo to guide a decision from beginning to 
end. As a member of the Secretariat, that CC Secretary 
had the authority to decide what to do with analyses 
or initiatives issuing from ministries, state 
committees, Central Committee departments, or research 
institutes. If he sought and secured enough support 
for initiating a new policy, it could be taken up by 
the Secretariat and then the Politburo for formal
8Ibid.
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treatment. In these situations, where so much of the 
policymaking process was in the hands of one or a few 
individuals, the policy process was not segmented, or 
"cut up and parceled out," in the sense described by- 
Allison.9 Rather, it could be monopolized by a single 
individual.
One person who enjoyed multiple responsibilities 
was Mikhail Suslov, for many years the Party's 
ideology secretary, head of the Secretariat, 
supervisor of Soviet foreign policy, culture, 
education, and science, as well as the chairman of a 
legislative foreign affairs commission, discussed 
below.10 The story of his telephone calls to Gromyko,
in which Suslov would bark out an instruction and then
hang up without waiting for a response, illustrates 
who was commanding whom.11 Suslov's role gave him the 
authority to dictate many of his foreign policy 
preferences not only to Gromyko but to the relevant 
Central Committee departments. Considering his
authority, it is not surprising that many of his ideas 
on how to spread communism in the Third World, 
especially Africa, held sway. He dismissed the
possibility that Soviet involvement in Angola or 
Ethiopia would have an effect on Soviet relations with 
the United States and Western Europe, and this was the
9Graham Allison, Essence of Decision. (USA: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1971), p. 80.
10Suslov supervised other secretaries, but did not directly 
supervise a Central Committee department. Jerry F. Hough and 
Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, op. cit., pp. 
411, 418.
-^Anatolii Chernyaev, Shest' Let s Gorbachevim. (Moscow: 
Progess, Kultura Publishing Group, 1983), p. 28.
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view that Brezhnev accepted, despite. Gromyko's 
thinking to the contrary.12
Boris Ponomarev was another example of someone 
working in the realm of foreign affairs who held more 
than one significant position. He was the head of the 
International Department (ID), a non-voting member of 
the Politburo, and like Suslov, the head of a foreign 
affairs commission in the Soviet legislature,
positions which enabled him to participate in 
international discussions with other senior 
parliamentarians.13
In spite of their expansive roles, Suslov and 
Ponomarev could be overruled on important questions 
related to the international communist movement, as
they were in their initial opposition to the use of 
force against Czechoslovakia in 1968. Their arguments, 
that the invasion would damage the international image 
of communism, did not prevail.14 So while the examples 
of Suslov and Ponomarev highlight the power that could 
accrue to individuals holding a few important 
positions, the case of Czechoslovakia demonstrates
that they could lose out to coalitions holding other
views. Their numerous "action channels" were no 
guarantee of seeing their preferences through, even in 
critical decision situations such as the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.
12Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence. (New York: Times Books, 
Random House, 1995), pp. 407-408.
13Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 27 
October 1980, p. 22.
14Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: 
Anatomy of a Decision. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1979), pp. 26, 81.
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It may have been the case that their multiple 
roles put them in advantageous positions to conceive 
and realize their own policies, but not to block that 
of others. On the other hand, Suslov and Ponomarev may 
have been perceived by other top Soviet officials as 
authorities on the matter of spreading communism but 
not necessarily as experts on how to maintain the 
cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc, the central issue of 
Prague Spring.
The examples of Suslov and Ponomarev also raise 
the question of what happened to organizational roles 
-- "where you stand depends on where you sit" -- in 
situations where officials held more than one 
significant position. In other words, to which 
organization did an individual owe loyalty? In the 
case of the Soviet Union, where the Party played an 
overarching role, the question of organizational roles 
may seem moot. But at least one anecdote suggests that 
organizational roles were not suppressed completely. 
Ponomarev recalls:
[A]t the end of the 1960s or at the 
beginning of the 1970s, I 
[Ponomarev] was summoned to the 
office one night by Brezhnev, as a 
communist coup was taking place in 
Sudan. 'I was sitting in my 
office...and thinking fearfully: 
what if they really won? They have 
millions of people there, and we 
would have to feed them all. . . This 
was a real nightmare. Luckily for 
us, they lost.'15
15This was related in: Sergei Grigoriev, The International 
Department of the CPSU Central Committee. An occasional paper of 
the Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions 
Project, 1995, p. 26.
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The anecdote, if not apocryphal, suggests that 
Communist Party officials' loyalties might not have 
been as absolute as might have appeared on surface.
Unity and loyalty among top Soviet officials were 
important considerations under Brezhnev, Andropov, and 
Chernenko. The maintenance of a certain equilibrium 
within the Secretariat and the Politburo was 
considered critical to consensus and the avoidance of 
conflicts among top officials. As Andropov told 
Gorbachev upon his election to the Secretariat, "the 
most important thing is unity. 1116 By this, Andropov 
was trying to warn Gorbachev against creating a stir 
by suggesting new approaches which could disrupt the 
delicate equilibrium achieved under Brezhnev.
The Role of the Politburo
It was the Politburo which controlled most 
important decisions of Soviet life for decades. CPSU 
Party rules said relatively little about the 
Politburo's membership and modes of operating, despite 
the power it wielded. Only a few regularities in its 
membership could be traced over time, the most obvious 
of which was the General Secretary's role as the head 
of the Politburo and the second secretary's 
responsibility as the leader of the Secretariat. 
Members of the Politburo frequently included the first 
secretaries of the Party organizations in Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Moscow, sometimes Leningrad, or other key 
regional Party secretaries. Important figures in the 
all-Union and Russian republican governments were also
16Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, (Berlin: Bertelsmann,
1996), p. 36.
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frequently Politburo members.17 Whereas the chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was regularly a 
member, the foreign minister, KGB chief, and minister 
of defense only became regular members starting in 
1973.18
The Politburo's agenda included a large range of 
matters, but major policy debates were not a regular 
feature of meetings during the late Brezhnev era. 
According to the memoirs of former Politburo member 
Yegor Ligachev, meetings lasted for hours with no 
breaks during parts of the Andropov era.19 Such 
discussions took place prior to the meetings among the 
competent Central Committee secretaries and Politburo 
members, and their consensus on the best policy was 
generally accepted in the form of a Politburo 
decision.20 According to one defector:
I would say that eighty to ninety 
percent of the proposals are never 
discussed in the Politburo.... By 
the time of the meeting of the 
Politburo, it's a very routine 
procedure. The Politburo is not a 
place where they fight each
17In addition to the CC General Secretary, the Chairman of 
the USSR Council of Ministers was a position constantly 
represented in the Politburo from 1941 onwards. For lists of 
positions held by full Politburo members between 1941 and 1981, 
as well as for the positions represented in the Politburo from 
1917 to 1991, see John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van 
Ree, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo. (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1992), pp. 88 and 90-91.
18Ibid., p . 88.
19Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin. (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 18-19.
20John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, The 
Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit., p. 88.
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other... [f]or the simple reason 
that there is no time to do that.21
This was especially true during the later Brezhnev 
years and the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum as the 
successive general secretaries suffered from ill 
health.
Voting in the Politburo took place in two forms. 
Decisions were finalized either at meetings via 
discussions and sometimes formal voting or outside of 
meetings through "interrogatory voting" (oprosy)
whereby full members indicated their consent to 
written policy proposals by signing their initials on 
a memorandum circulated to voting members.22 In both 
types of voting, if more than half of the voting 
members expressed support, the decision was considered 
passed.23
Between 1981 and 1986 about 90 percent of the 
decisions were accomplished by the collection of 
initials.24 Of the ten or so items discussed at each 
meeting, the Politburo generally sought to reach 
consensus through discussion rather than deciding 
through a formal tallying of votes. In the case of 
serious disputes, the matter might be settled by 
setting up a study commission.25 For less serious
21Arkady Shevchenko in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukas, Inside 
the Apparat. (Lexington Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1990),
p. 60.
22Candidate members did not have a vote, but were permitted 
to speak at meetings. John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik 
van Ree, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit., 
p. 115.
23Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee, op. cit., p. 43.
24John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, The 
Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit., p. 116.
25Ibid., p . 114 .
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matters of dispute, the Politburo could refer the 
issue back to the Secretariat for review.26
(Alternatively, it sometimes gathered to decide 
matters when a dissenting member was ill or out of 
town.27) After each meeting, a list of agenda items 
and decisions was compiled. From this list, forms were 
prepared for each decision and sent through the 
General Department of the Central Committee to the 
organization or organizations charged with 
implementation.28
Politburo voting behavior during crisis 
decisionmaking -- such as during the period before the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia -- was different. No vote 
was taken in the Politburo with regard to the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia: During the weeks prior to the
decision to invade, some high-level Soviet officials, 
including Suslov and Ponomarev, expressed doubts that 
the use of force would bring the desired results. But 
as the tension increased, Ponomarev later claimed, 
there was unanimity on intervention.29 The decision to 
invade Afghanistan, in contrast to the Czech invasion, 
was made by a subset of the Politburo, and was later 
handed to the Supreme Soviet for ratification30 in
26Mikhail Voslensky, former employee of USSR Central 
Committee apparatus, in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes. Inside the 
Apparat, op. cit., p. 62.
27This occurred, for example, in 1967 when Politburo member 
Aleksandr Shelepin was ill and his protege, KGB chief Vladimir 
Semichastnii, was removed from his position by a decision of the 
Politburo. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The
Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), p. 398.
28John Lowenhardt, James R. Ozinga and Erik van Ree, The 
Rise and Fall of the Soviet Politburo, op. cit., p. 103.
29Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: 
Anatomy of a Decision, op. cit., p. 181.
30Accounts vary but normally include Brezhnev, Gromyko, 
Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov (Defense Minister), and Kosygin
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order to extend responsibility for the decision beyond 
the confines of the Politburo to a much larger group.
Prior consultation in the realm of foreign affairs 
apparently played a key role in making decisions. 
Gromyko submitted draft proposals for major foreign- 
policy decisions to the Politburo only after having 
discussed them and gathered support from senior 
Politburo members.31 This was probably because of the 
role of Suslov and Ponomarev in the Politburo and 
because Gromyko needed the support of others in order 
to stand up to them. It may also have been due to the 
habit of deciding matters among subsets of people who 
had an institutional interest or expertise in a 
specific policy. In foreign affairs, a subset might 
have included Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko, the head of 
the KGB, as well as the Minister of Defense.
Politburo subsets, or "troikas" as they were 
called in Brezhnev's time because they typically 
consisted of three people, were attractive because the 
Politburo often dealt with questions that aroused 
controversy between various sectors of the Soviet 
ruling establishment. Arms control was one such area 
where institutional interests of the MFA, the Defense 
Ministry, and the defense industries could easily 
clash. But once those directly involved in the 
decision could agree, then the outsiders, for example, 
in the agricultural or construction sectors were 
hardly in a position to dislodge accord.
(Chairman of the Council of Ministers) . Jeanette Voas, 
Preventing Future Afghanistans: Reform in Soviet Policymaking on 
Military Intervention Abroad. (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for
Naval Analyses, 1990), pp. 5-7.
31Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 220-221.
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The use of troikas encouraged the development of 
territoriality, and delving into others' areas was 
frowned upon. Gorbachev, reflecting on his time as 
Central Committee secretary for agriculture, referred 
disparagingly to the "amateur agrarians" in the 
Secretariat who expressed opinions in his area of 
expertise.32 As for foreign policy, it was long-time 
Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatolii 
Dobrynin's recollection:
For most Politburo members, America 
and foreign policy were not part of 
their domain; each had his 
bureaucratic territory and would 
not welcome an invasion from 
another member, so they acted 
accordingly in foreign territories 
that were not their own..,33
But the rule was not universal, as Gorbachev's comment 
shows.
In addition to issue areas, troikas appear to have 
been useful for very critical issues, such as top 
personnel appointments. Gorbachev refers to the 
discussions among the "smaller circle" of four top 
Politburo members over the question of filling the 
general secretary's post after Brezhnev's and 
Andropov's deaths in 1982 and 1984 respectively.34 
Likewise, the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 
was also apparently decided by a subset of the
32Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 35. He 
specifically mentioned Ponomarev.
33Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 219.
34The smaller circle deciding on Andropov's nomination as
general secretary included Ustinov, Gromyko, Tikhonov, and
Andropov. Chernenko may or may not have been present. The
smaller circle deciding Chernenko's nomination to become general 
secretary consisted of Gromyko, Ustinov, Tikhonov, and 
Chernenko. Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 215, 
241.
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Politburo and presented to the remaining members as a 
fait accompli.35 Notably, this was not the case in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was handled through 
an enlargement of the policymaking circle, as noted 
above. The difference between the handling of 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan can likely be 
attributed to the differences in the degree to which 
Brezhnev felt comfortable in power in 1968 and 1979 
and the extent to which he could decide matters in a 
smaller circle without experiencing a backlash from 
those excluded.
The power of the general secretary fluctuated 
depending on the leader and the degree to which he had 
established himself in office. Stalin used the post to 
act as a dictator, while Brezhnev, even at the height 
of his power, preferred to amplify his power by the 
achievement of consensus. While Soviet general 
secretaries were theoretically first among equals, 
their influence far exceeded this description. To be 
sure, the deterioration of the terror apparatus meant 
that Brezhnev's power was not as absolute as Stalin's, 
but Brezhnev achieved his own cult of personality by 
constructing a loyal coalition and allowing flattery 
and egotism to influence his policy preferences.
The individual traits of general secretaries were 
also relevant in policymaking. Health, as mentioned 
above, was an important factor: An elaborate system of 
compensating for the general secretary's illness 
developed as a result. Experience was another factor: 
Born in 1906, 1914, and 1911 respectively, Brezhnev,
Andropov, and Chernenko all experienced Stalin's
35Jeanette Voas, Preventing Future Afghanistans, op. cit., 
pp. 5-7.
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terrors and world war as adults and Party officials, 
which meant that they learned how to work in the 
Soviet system when it was characterized by complex 
political intriguing, fear, and paranoia.
Principal officials relied heavily on staffs of 
aides to provide advice and analysis since principals 
could not be expected to analyze all of the 
information originating from the Central Committee 
departments or ministries for which they were 
responsible. These pomoshchniki (aides) were charged
with writing speeches, preparing documents, helping to 
formulate decisions, suggesting participants in 
special groups studying specific issues, as well as 
attending and addressing Politburo and Secretariat 
sessions.36
Starting with the latter part of Brezhnev's rule, 
the role of aides grew. The failing health of 
Politburo and Secretariat members increased 
requirements for assistance. Brezhnev's aides 
reportedly "rescued" him if he failed to reply or 
respond clearly in discussions with foreign 
officials,37 or they "prompted" him during speeches at 
home.38 This situation was exacerbated by the sheer 
ambition of aides who, like provincial leaders and 
others, enjoyed the latitude for action provided by 
the leadership's growing debility. Thus, 
paradoxically, the situation which developed to
36Barbara Ann Chotiner, "Oligarchy and Illness: The Politics 
of the Central Organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, 1978-1985," a paper presented at the annual convention of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. 
Washington, D.C.: 26 October 1995, p. 19.
31Ibid., p. 20.
38Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen. (Munchen: Droemer 
Knaur, 1993), p. 395.
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accommodate the needs of the aging leadership 
ultimately may have had the effect of weakening the 
authority of their posts.39
The role of aides also increased because of the 
sheer workload with which the Politburo had to cope. 
It was involved in all manner of decisions, many of 
which would have been handled at a much lower level in 
Western political systems. The high degree of 
centralization in the Soviet system was one reason for 
this concentration of decisionmaking at the top. In 
some cases, it resulted simply from lower-echelon 
staffers' reluctance to take on more responsibility.40 
Thus the concentration of decisionmaking power in the 
hands of a few at the top was not simply a matter of 
power-mongering by Party hierarchs. Rather, it 
resulted from the inclination of some lower-level 
elites to ensure that they enjoyed plausible 
deniability.
To be sure, it was not the case that every 
policymaker below the Politburo level sought to avoid 
taking decisions. The opposite example is readily 
available in the form of Anatolii Dobrynin's back- 
channel diplomacy. Even accounting for hubris, 
Dobrynin's memoirs suggest that he readily assumed 
responsibility in determining Soviet policy toward the 
United States. This contrasts sharply with the 
depiction of shrinking from accountability described 
above, so perhaps Dobrynin's conclusion that " [t]his 
willingness to improvise was fairly rare in our 
diplomatic service and indeed in our bureaucracy in
39For an elaboration on this theme see Barbara Ann Chotiner, 
"Oligarchy and Illness," op. cit.
40Shevchenko in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, Inside the 
Apparat, op. cit., p. 175.
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general, but I developed it gradually, " can be taken 
at face value.41
For most, Politburo membership meant that the 
highest career stage had not only been achieved but 
had to be retained. Since Brezhnev's preference was to 
decide matters through consensus, this meant that 
members were under pressure to accept the decision 
pre-arranged by the relevant troika. Agreement was not 
the absolute rule, but rather a tendency. Even as a 
tendency, though, the behavior of the Politburo 
contrasts sharply with the character of the US 
president's Cabinet, which frequently confronts the 
president with so many conflicting viewpoints that 
after entering office US presidents progressively 
restrict the role played by the Cabinet in 
decisionmaking.42
Rather than viewing the Politburo as a place where 
the head of each bureaucracy had a say and a chance to 
defend its interests, it is perhaps easier to 
understand the Politburo as a collection of officials 
falling into the category of what Jiri Valenta called 
"uncommitted thinkers," -- people whose interests were 
so varied that they did not represent bureaucratic 
constituencies.43 Another way of viewing the Politburo 
would be to consider it a sort of collective executive 
in which most players had no goal other than to stay 
in their job as Politburo member or to rise within its 
small ranks to general secretary.
41Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 231.
42Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the
presidency: Institutional politics in a separated system. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 267.
43Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: 
Anatomy of a Decision, op. cit., p. 8.
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The Role of the Central Committee Department:a
The Central Committee apparatus, the bureaucratic 
arm of the Central Committee, was the assembly of some 
2 0 departments -- ranging from Agriculture to 
Propaganda -- which ran the affairs of state. The 
departments of the Central Committee played an 
important part in the flow of information upwards to 
the top levels of policymaking.
Four of the Central Committee departments were 
concerned primarily with foreign policy or matters 
related to it. The Cadres Abroad Department (after 
1972 known formally as the Central Committee 
"Department for Work with Cadres Abroad and for Travel 
Abroad")44 was involved in organizing foreign travel 
for Soviet delegations and vetting membership of those 
delegations. The first task consisted of ensuring that 
trips were politically justified; the second, that 
members of the delegation could be trusted from the 
standpoint of security. For the latter, the Cadres 
Abroad Department relied to some extent on the input 
of other organizations, especially the KGB, and the 
International Department.45 The Cadres Abroad was 
significant for those individuals involved in foreign 
affairs because being rejected for travel abroad on 
security grounds, whether for reasons well-founded or 
not, could hinder advancement in a diplomatic career.
The Central Committee's International Information 
Department (IID) was recreated in 1978 and charged
44See the comments of Mark Kramer attached to Sergei 
Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU Central 
Committee, op. cit., 1995, p. 119.
45For a more detailed discussion of the Cadres Abroad 
Department's role, see ibid.
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wijth improving the "timing, responsiveness, and 
coordination of the major overt propaganda channels," 
with an emphasis on the domestic audience more than 
the foreign one.46 Its officials were responsible for 
a range of tasks including writing articles, editing 
speeches of top figures, and generally serving as 
press secretaries for the higher leadership.47 The 
department was not tasked with overseeing the work of 
official Soviet mass media organizations, as this job 
was entrusted to the International Department.48
The I ID reportedly went beyond its brief in the 
198 0s and became a "locus of planning and 
organization" in arms control. It was apparently 
responsible for fueling the failed campaign in Western 
Europe against the deployment of intermediate-range 
missiles.49 IID chief Leonid Zamiatin was connected 
with the Soviet walkout from the intermediate-range 
nuclear forces negotiations in 1983.50 The 
recollections contained in the memoirs of Valentin 
Falin, who for four years was Zamiatin's first deputy, 
indicate that Zamiatin was highly ambitious and 
aggressive, bragging that he reported directly to 
Leonid Brezhnev and hoping to increase the power and
46Interview with Stanislav Levchenko, former KGB officer, in 
Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia. (Oxford: 
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), p. 180.
47Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 
392-394.
48Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, op. 
cit., p. 26. See also Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Policymaking 
Toward Foreign Communists, " Studies in Comparative Communism. 
Vol. XV, No. 3 (Autumn 1982), p. 173.
49Jan S. Adams, "Institutional Change and Soviet National 
Security Policy," in George E. Hudson, ed. Soviet National 
Security Policy under Perestroika. (London: Unwin Hyman, Inc,
1990), p. 159.
50Ibid.
65
Chapter 2 Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko
prestige of the I ID to a position comparable to that 
of the International Department.
Given these traits, it is not surprising that 
Zamiatin was hostile and condescending to the Foreign 
Ministry, an institution with which the IID's 
responsibilities could and did overlap. To Falin's 
comment that the best course of action, and one which 
might benefit the I ID, was to try to have good 
relations with the MFA, Zamiatin reportedly retorted: 
"It is the MFA which should make an effort to have 
good relations with us."51
The Central Committee's Socialist Countries 
Department (formally known as the Department for 
Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of the 
Socialist Countries) was responsible for policy toward 
countries ruled by Communist parties. This task had 
previously been the responsibility of the 
International Department, and what became the 
Socialist Countries Department had in fact been a part 
of the International Department. Even when it became a 
separate entity, the Socialist Countries Department 
never gained as much prominence within the Central 
Committee as the ID.
The International Department's special role as a 
liaison between the Party and the KGB (as is discussed 
in more detail below) was an important factor in 
helping to determine the scope of its work. Freedom to 
express thoughts more freely, more abundant 
information, rigorous debate, and a "democratic 
atmosphere" were things which characterized the 
conditions in parts of the International Department,
51Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 389.
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such as at its Prague-based publication, the World 
Marxist Review, according to the recollections of some 
of its more luminary former staff members.52 Their 
recollections were certainly not without basis. The 
staff of the World Marxist Review was predominately
Soviet, but included nationals from both communist and 
non-communist countries.53 This meant that Soviet 
staffers were in many cases for the first time exposed 
not only to critical information about the real state 
of affairs in their country and in its relations with 
the outside world, but also faced an intellectually 
more challenging environment where arguments were not 
determined by the Party line but by analysis.
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that 
the competence of the ID as a whole, which included a 
component of World Marxist Review alumni, was much
higher that of most other Central Committee 
departments. Former ID staffer Andrei Grachev, who 
later became Gorbachev's press secretary, emphasized 
in an interview that the ID was a "reservoir of free- 
thinking and free-speaking people," and he stressed 
that the opportunity to work at the World Marxist 
Review in Prague was an important factor in shaping 
these ID staffers' views, outlook, and thinking, 
because of contact with foreigners.54
In addition to its official responsibilities, the 
ID acquired a role in vetting MFA policy proposals for
52Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya. (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya publishing house, 1995), p. 226. The 
magazine was known in English and translation by the name World 
Marxist Review. (Translated literally, it would have been called 
Problems of Peace and Socialism.)
53 Ibid.
54Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, Ebenhausen, 
Germany, 18 December 1992.
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virtually any geographic area of the world, approving 
high-level (and sometimes low-level) MFA appointments, 
and as mentioned above, determining the suitability of 
certain individuals for foreign travel.55 As Sergei 
Grigoriev, a former ID staffer, has noted: The ID had 
the exclusive right to prepare the "experts' 
conclusion" on the situation in a given country, and 
the International Department was always included on 
the list of Central Committee departments responsible 
for approving policy initiatives.56 Given these 
expansive powers, the ID had much control over the 
activities of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
Gromyko gained more power to defend his territory 
and approach in 1973 when he was promoted over the 
head of Ponomarev into full Politburo membership.57 
For the rest of his career, Ponomarev remained in the 
candidate status which he acquired the year before 
Gromyko's advancement. But while the International 
Department chief never acquired a vote in the 
Politburo, he did enjoy a seat on the Secretariat, 
which Gromyko did not. Gromyko, on the other hand, 
went hunting with Brezhnev and could count him as a 
friend, whereas Brezhnev not only disliked Ponomarev, 
but reportedly made a point of showing it.58 Given the 
importance of loyalty and access, one can assume that 
Gromyko benefited from his better connections to the 
general secretary. It was perhaps in this connection 
that Brezhnev authorized Gromyko in 1973 to be 
personally in charge of Soviet policy toward the
55Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee, op. cit., p. 26-27.
56Ibid., p. 43.
57Gromyko was never a candidate member.
58Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya, op. cit.,
p. 260.
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United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and 
France.59
But, of course, Soviet policy in the Third World, 
the part of the world where the International 
Department could run its own policy, affected Soviet 
policy toward the countries for which the MFA was 
granted full responsibility. Thus the MFA and ID 
continued to clash, especially as Soviet interest in 
the developing world increased in the 1970s. Anatolii 
Dobrynin, noting that his efforts to improve Soviet- 
American relations were often spoiled by the ID, 
offers this portrait of relations between the 
International Department and the MFA:
In order to understand our 
sometimes bizarre policy in the 
Third World, it is important to 
know how the decision-making 
mechanism in foreign affairs 
operated in the Kremlin. On a day- 
to-day basis it was the Foreign 
Ministry which gave recommendations 
for dealing with current 
problems... But the Third World was 
not [Gromyko's] domain. He believed 
that events there could not in the 
final analysis decisively influence 
our fundamental relations with the 
United States; that turned out to 
be a factor which he definitely 
underestimated. More than that, our 
Foreign Ministry traditionally was 
not really involved with the 
leaders of the liberation movements 
in the Third World, who were dealt 
with through the International 
department of the party, headed by 
Secretary Boris Ponomarev. He 
despised Gromyko; the feeling was 
mutual.60
59Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee, op. cit., p. 124.
60Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 404.
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Dobrynin indicated that the - KGB and military were 
generally supportive of the ID's initiatives in the 
Third World while many professional diplomats opposed 
the deep involvement in these remote areas.
The extent to which the ID trespassed on the 
territory of the MFA has been debated in Western 
literature.61 Dobrynin's comments tend to give 
credence to the view that the ID's influence was 
indeed decisive, especially in Third World policy. 
Dobrynin, after all, could be expected to underplay 
the influence of the ID and overplay that of the MFA. 
Furthermore, as the long-serving ambassador to the 
United States, one would not expect him to concede 
that the US-Soviet relationship had been in some ways 
captive to ID meddling in the Third World unless he 
truly believed it.
The ID's apparent success in controlling Third 
World policy was certainly attributable to its role as 
a liaison between the Party and the KGB. But it may 
have been due to a lack of interest in that part of 
the world on Gromyko's part, as Dobrynin and others 
claim.62 On the other hand, it is also possible that 
Gromyko did not want what he knew he could not have. 
Given the overarching role of the Party, however, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Gromyko was willing for 
this reason to cede this part of the world to the ID. 
Supporting this tentative conclusion is Dobrynin's 
contention that there could be no question of "openly
61See, for example, the discussion in US Department of 
State, The International Department of the CC CPSU Under 
Dobrynin, Washington D.C., US Department of State Publications, 
September 1989.
6201eg Grinevsky, Tauwetter. (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1996), 
p. 50; and Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the 
CPSU Central Committee, op. cit., p. 43.
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objecting when all this was done in the name of the 
party."63 Objection was difficult in light of the fact 
that the ID, hoping to impress Brezhnev with the 
success and importance of its work, had for many years 
falsified data on the size and significance of Third 
World communist movements.64 Therefore, advocating a 
curtailment of the ID's Third World projects would 
have carried with it the unhappy task of disabusing 
the general secretary of the image of a thriving,
Soviet-led international communist movement.
The practice of providing the top leadership with 
the information it apparently wanted to hear was 
rampant throughout the Soviet system, whether in the 
ID, the MFA or any other department. Gorbachev 
recalled his disgust at the atmosphere in the Central 
Committee when he saw how in many cases the "creme de 
la creme" of the Soviet system was "churned into 
butter" upon entering the corridors of the Central
Committee building on Old Square.55 Making matters
worse, some were not very bright but merely had the 
connections necessary to secure these much sought- 
after Central Committee jobs. Salaries were not 
necessarily high, but affiliation with the Central 
Committee meant access to preferred stores, special
medical treatment, exclusive vacation resorts, better 
housing, and many other perquisites, which in the 
Soviet Union money could not always buy.66 This 
suggests that stepping outside of the standard
63Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 405.
64Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee, op. cit., p. 26-27.
65Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 125.
66For a detailed description of the fringe benefits, see 
Mikhail Voslenskii, Nomenklatura: Gospodstvuyushchii klass
Sovestkogo Soyuza. (London: Overseas Publications Interchange
Ltd, 1985), pp. 285-343.
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interpretation of events or promoting a policy which 
would be considered unorthodox could mean not only the 
loss of one's job, but also of one's lifestyle, and 
probably the foreclosure of the opportunity to serve 
in a similar position anywhere else.
An exception to this "butter" could be found in 
members enjoying the elevated staff rank of 
"consultant." In the International Department as 
elsewhere, the Konsultanti were considered the upper
echelon of the staff, producing work which tended to 
be more academic than that of other ID staffers.67 
According to Chernyaev, who directed the ID's 20- 
strong group of consultants for some time, they were 
far brighter than other Central Committee apparatus 
employees.68
While he was the head of the Socialist Countries 
Department in the late 1950s, Yurii Andropov 
reportedly told his consultants: "In this room you can 
come clean and speak absolutely openly, don't hide 
your opinions. Now, once you get outside the door, 
that's different. Then you obey the general rules!"69 
Likewise, Chernyaev reports that the consultants 
observed the Central Committee apparatus "rules of the 
game while outside" -- meaning outside of free 
discussions -- "but they didn't like it."70 Andrei
67Euvgeni Novikov, "Two Levels of Soviet Foreign Policy," 
Lecture prepared for delivery in United States Naval War College 
seminar (unpublished), p. 10; and Sergei Grigoriev, The 
International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, op. 
cit., p. 32.
68Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya, op. cit.,
p. 267.
69Georgii Arbatov, The System: An Insider1 s Life in Soviet 
Politics. (New York, Times Books, 1992), p. 89.
70Anatolii Chernyaev, Moya zhizn i moe vremya, op. cit.,
p. 267.
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Grachev reports that the consultants were the people 
to whom top officials turned when they wanted the 
"real picture" of the given situation.71 Such freedom 
of expression was rare in the Soviet system, and it 
stood in sharp contrast to the prevailing habit of 
shaping data and analysis to fit pre-established 
conclusions and presumed expectations of superiors.
That consultants played such a role seems 
understandable since the top leadership undoubtedly 
needed to have some discrete source of untainted 
information. But it was precisely the peculiar 
environment of the Central Committee which raises 
questions as to how far these consultants' full 
analyses traveled in the information ladder and 
whether they made it all of the way up to the top 
Party leadership. Although consultants were granted a 
sort of immunity in specific settings for presenting 
unorthodox and dire analyses, it is far from clear 
that their superiors would have felt comfortable 
passing on unabridged versions of these analyses to 
the Politburo. The importance of unity at the top 
discussed above would suggest that complete openness 
was not the general rule. The image of the environment 
is further clarified by a comment by Dobrynin:
Members of the Soviet political 
leadership often spoke in the 
language of ideology even when
conversing between themselves, 
falling into the language of
official newspapers, Pravda and
Izvestia. The way and form in which
they expressed their thoughts
inevitably affected its content.72
71Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, 18 December 1992.
72Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 474.
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This suggests that facades did not disappear in closed 
settings at the top.
Dobrynin indicates that the reason for such 
behavior might have been rooted in sheer incompetence 
among some of the country's top officials. Whatever 
the reason, Dobrynin's remarks would suggest that it 
was unlikely that a detailed and critical analysis of 
Soviet foreign policy would have been raised for 
discussion under general secretaries Brezhnev or 
Chernenko. Andropov, who was one of the better-read 
general secretaries, might have been willing to 
entertain such discussions, especially owing to his 
attitude toward free-thinking analysis mentioned 
above. But it is unclear that he was in the same state 
of mind as a terminally-ill and perhaps mentally- 
impaired general secretary as he was in his role as 
the head of the Socialist Countries Department a few 
decades earlier.73
The Role of the Legislature
The Party, which the constitution described as 
"the leading and guiding force of Soviet society [and] 
the nucleus of its political system and of state and 
public organizations," was charged with determining 
the "general outlines for the development of society 
and the line of the USSR's domestic and foreign 
policy."74 But certain responsibilities were assigned
73Valentin Falin's memoirs include bitter and emotional 
passages which suggest that Andropov was overcome by paranoia in 
his final days. Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. 
cit., pp. 391-416. While Gorbachev's memoirs do not suggest that 
Andropov was paranoid, they do portray him throughout as 
weakened and weary from political struggles. Mikhail 
Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, op. cit.
74Konstitutsiya, op. cit., p. 6.
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to the legislature, in spite of the Party's 
overarching role. The USSR Supreme Soviet was named in 
the 1977 Soviet Constitution as the highest organ of 
state power in the USSR. The 1,500-deputy bicameral 
body (consisting of the Council of the Union and the 
Council of Nationalities) held regular sessions only 
twice yearly.
At an initial joint session, the Supreme Soviet 
elected a Presidium to be the "continuously 
functioning agency" of the Supreme Soviet.75 There was 
a distinct parallel between the way the Soviet 
legislature and the Central Committee functioned as 
institutions. In both cases, a smaller body came to 
outstrip the parent body's power by being called upon 
to act on its behalf. The Presidium, not the full 
Supreme Soviet, had the right to ratify and denounce 
treaties, appoint and recall diplomatic personnel, 
accept the credentials of and recall diplomatic 
representatives of foreign states, proclaim general or 
partial military mobilization; and, during the periods 
when the Supreme Soviet was not in session, the 
Presidium could proclaim a state of war in the event 
of attack on the USSR or in accordance with treaty 
obligations of the USSR. (The Supreme Soviet as a 
whole did not have the right to confirm or reject this 
decision.)
The larger question surrounds the relationship 
between the legislature and the Party. There were 
major discrepancies between the constitutionally- 
guaranteed prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet and 
those that it enjoyed in practice, thus resulting in a 
less powerful Supreme Soviet. For example, while it
7SKonstitutsiya, op. cit., 30-32.
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was the only body with the right to enact laws, the 
Supreme Soviet enacted only the laws drafted and 
agreed upon by the Party at Central Committee Plena. 
The most important factor in the Supreme Soviet's
behavior was the significant overlap in the membership 
of its Presidium and top CC organs. There was 
virtually no doubt that the Party's decisions would be
confirmed by the Presidium (or the broader Supreme
Soviet, in the instances when necessary). Unlike the 
Central Committee and its potential role in saving or 
bringing down a general secretary, the Soviet
legislature did not enjoy any such power.
The Role of the Government
The role of the USSR Council of Ministers -- the 
body gathering the heads of ministries and state 
committees as well as the heads of'government from the 
union republics -- was similarly decorative. The 
Constitution described it as the "highest executive 
and administrative body of state power in the USSR, 1,76 
with responsibility (when it did not come under the 
purview of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium) 
for exercising "general guidance in the field of 
relations with foreign states, foreign trade and 
economic, scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries," 
taking "steps to ensure the fulfillment of the USSR's 
international treaties," and "confirming and 
denouncing intergovernmental international
treaties."77 In addition, the Council of Ministers was 
officially empowered to "resolve all questions of 
state administration (where this did not conflict with
76 JJbid. , p . 34 .
77Ibid., p . 36.
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the powers of the Supreme Soviet)," either through its 
full membership or through its Presidium when the 
Council was not in session.
But like the Supreme Soviet, the Council of 
Ministers was captive to the Party in many respects. 
Soviet ministries were closely supervised by the 
apparatus of the Central Committee. In addition, a 
ministry's top positions were often assigned not to 
people on its professional staff but to people making 
careers in the Party. Transfers between top 
ministerial jobs and Party jobs were frequent, 
reinforcing the identification of ministers with views 
represented in the Party.
The Role of the Foreign Ministry
As the foregoing discussion would suggest, the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs' authority in the 
making of foreign policy was limited in important 
respects. Much of the MFA's margin for action and 
initiative was overshadowed by the Party, especially, 
as has been discussed, by the Central Committee 
apparatus. The relevant Central Committee departments 
could formulate foreign policy initiatives and pose 
them directly to members of the Central Committee 
Secretariat or Politburo. They could also execute 
foreign activities independent of the MFA.
As mentioned above, Gromyko was given personal 
control over certain foreign-policy sectors. As a 
Politburo member, he was able to contribute to a 
broader range of decisions. At the same time, he was 
also bound to accept the body's decisions, even if he 
did not agree with them. According to Dobrynin, 
Gromyko did express disagreement, but "once the final 
decision was taken, he would conscientiously and
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stubbornly fulfill all the instructions of the 
Politburo and the CPSU general secretary, not allowing 
himself to deviate from them even an inch..."78 Given
this level of reliability, it is understandable that
Gromyko's breadth of action was expanded by Brezhnev. 
In addition, Gromyko's reputation for fulfilling 
policy to the letter suggests that this was one method 
of staying in good standing in the Soviet system.
Therefore, it appears that tinkering with foreign
policy during policy engineering phase, while 
possible, was a risky thing to do.
A set of underlying assumptions in the Soviet 
system formed the basis of the roles in foreign policy 
as performed by the MFA and, for example, the 
International Department. There was a distinction made 
in the Soviet Union between the terms diplomacy and 
foreign policy. Diplomacy, as defined in the 1960 
edition of the Diplomaticheskii slovar' (Diplomatic
Dictionary) consisted of "the official activity of the 
heads of state, government, and special organizations 
in charge of external policy." Foreign policy, on the 
other hand, represented an extension of domestic 
policy and included the use of military force, 
deception, and other means to defend a country's 
interests.79 Diplomacy was thus merely a part of 
foreign policy. The MFA was in charge of diplomacy, 
not foreign policy. This distinction is critical in 
understanding how the MFA operated and its 
relationship to the International Department.
78Dobrynin seeks to dispel the impression that Gromyko was 
simply a "yes-man" to Soviet general secretaries, noting twice 
that Gromyko did generally express his opinions frankly. Anatoly 
Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 32, 52.
79A. A. Gromyko, S. A. Golunskii, and V. M. Khvostov, eds. 
Diplomaticheskii slovar'. (Moscow: State Publishing House for
Political Literature, 1960), pp. 457-468.
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In the early days following the 1917 revolution, 
the Bolsheviks declared their rejection of traditional 
diplomacy. Trotsky, the first head of the Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs, announced that he would "issue a 
few revolutionary proclamations and then shut up 
shop."80 But as a result of the failure of the 
communist revolution to spread in Europe, the 
Bolsheviks rethought their rejection of diplomacy, 
realizing the practical utility of maintaining foreign 
relations with the outside world. At the same time, 
however, Russia's revolutionaries had not abandoned 
their dream of world communist revolution and their 
intention to do everything necessary to bring it 
about. Thus, at this early stage in the development of 
what was to become the USSR, there already existed two 
parallel lines in foreign relations, the one pursued 
by the revolutionaries and the one pursued by the 
diplomats.81 The influence of these two lines varied 
depending on the period, but both existed until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The division of diplomacy and foreign policy 
highlights the role played by ideology in Soviet 
foreign relations. In the minds of Soviet theorists, 
Marxist-Leninist theory played the important role of 
"organizing, mobilizing and transforming" as well as 
providing the foundation for scientifically-based 
policies in the future.82 While it is clear that
80U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet
Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for
U.S. Diplomacy, Vol. 1. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1979), p. 48.
81Robert M. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry, " in
Ivo J. Lederer, ed. Russian Foreign Policy. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1962), pp. 211-215.
82Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International 
Relations. (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books LTD, 1988), p. 4.
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ideology was often massaged so as to justify policies 
in conflict with the theoretical construct, this fact 
in itself is not sufficient to discount the role of 
ideology. To invoke ideology was to invoke the CPSU, 
and policymakers often had difficulty disagreeing with 
policy proposals made in the name of Lenin or the 
Party. Ideology was effectively trump.
Owing to the overlap of duties between the Foreign 
Ministry and the foreign departments of the Central 
Committee (especially the International Department), 
disputes could and did arise because policies 
sometimes ran at cross purposes. But competition 
between the heads of Smolenskaya Square (the location 
of the MFA) and Old Square over who had the ear of the 
Kremlin was sometimes mitigated by the behavior of 
second- and third-echelon staff. As veterans of the 
Soviet system have observed, both the MFA and the 
International Department took pains to downplay
disagreements.
There are tensions between [the ID 
and MFA], but at the same time both 
are very cautious not to bring
differences to open conflict
because the bureaucrats in the MFA 
understand that the ID is very 
close to the leadership and that 
they are not so close. At the same 
time, the ID... [considers] the MFA 
to be a useful organization...83
Similarly, Grigoriev reports that ID staffers, 
especially those with lower-level jobs, considered 
good relations with MFA staffers important because 
they wanted to hold in reserve the chance of a 
diplomatic posting abroad either in the event of a
83Voslensky in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, Inside the 
Apparat, op. cit., p. 168.
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conflict with their superiors at the ID or "to raise 
personal savings" on the eve of retirement from the 
ID. The same held for securing an MFA job for ID 
staffers' children.84 Shevchenko, referring to the 
settlement of policy disputes, claims that "despite
tensions that sometimes arise from overlapping each 
other's turf, diplomats and ideologues in the Central 
Committee more often than not try to compromise their 
differences rather than let them break into open
conflict that must be arbitrated by the Politburo."85 
These comments suggest that these lower-echelon
staffers managed to reach accommodation through
cooperation rather than a winner-take-all approach.
It is clear that the Soviet system was
institutionally biased in favor of the Party and that 
the MFA was often destined to be sidelined by the ID. 
But at the same time, Gromyko's long time in office is 
a phenomenon which must be considered. The qualities 
that ensured Gromyko longevity in his post, which he 
held from 1957 to 1986,. were apparently his
flexibility in policymaking and his loyalty to the 
leaders he served.86 He was a firm believer in the 
communist system, describing himself even in the late 
1980s as "a communist to the marrow of my bones."87 At 
the same time, Gromyko was apparently content under 
Khrushchev to serve unabashedly as the mere conveyor 
of the foreign policies of the Soviet leadership. 
According to an anecdote from Averell Harriman, during
84Sergei Grigoriev, The International Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
85Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, op. cit., p. 189.
86Adam B. Ulam, "Reflections of a Leninist Lapdog," National 
Review, 3 0 April 1990, p. 42.
87Andrei Gromyko, Memories. (London: Hutchinson, 1989),
p. 344.
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a meeting between Harriman, Khrushchev, and Gromyko in 
1959,
Khrushchev made it abundantly clear 
that Gromyko is nothing more than a 
mouthpiece. While Gromyko sat 
silent and glum at the foot of the 
table, Khrushchev said, 'Gromyko 
only says what we tell him to. At 
the next Geneva meeting he will 
repeat what he has already told 
you. If he doesn't, we'll fire him 
and get someone who does.'88
Owing to his willingness to play this role and his 
agreement with the goals of the Party, Gromyko gained 
considerable latitude in running the affairs of the 
Foreign Ministry. By 1973, when he was made a full 
member of the Politburo, Gromyko was able to command 
considerably more influence within the Soviet ruling 
circle. His relationship with Leonid Brezhnev afforded 
him much more room for influence in policymaking than 
did his relationship with Khrushchev, especially as 
Brezhnev's health failed.
The relationship between Gromyko and the Party 
appeared to suit both sides. Gromyko anticipated the 
Party's wishes and the Party gave him progressively 
more control over the MFA organization. Considering 
the utility of this relationship, it is not surprising 
that Gromyko turned down the offer allegedly made by 
Brezhnev in the early 1970s to take on a job as a 
Central Committee Secretary.89 In such a position, he 
would have lost his own private fiefdom at the MFA and 
would have had to work more closely with his two
88W. Averell Harriman, "My Alarming Interview with 
Khrushchev," Life, 47, No. 2 (13 July 1959), p. 33 as cited in
Robert M. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry," in Ivo J. 
Lederer, ed. Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 238, fn. 66.
"Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, op. cit., p. 188.
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rivals, Suslov and Ponomarev, to whom he would have 
presumably remained subordinate.
The Role of the Military
The strategic goals, worldview, and experience of 
the Soviet state meant that defense was a matter of 
high priority in foreign affairs and in general. The 
influence of the uniformed military and military 
industrialists was variable depending on who occupied 
the post of general secretary and which issues were at 
stake. Generally speaking, owing to the preoccupation 
with secrecy in the Soviet Union, uniformed military 
and military industrialists enjoyed a monopoly on 
information and could pass it to the top leadership 
directly, without the filtration of other official 
departments.
The military's near monopoly on classified 
information about military holdings and programs was a 
key element of the preservation of its influence. 
Soviets involved in the negotiations for arms control 
agreements complained of their lack of access to 
information except that parceled out by the military 
in amounts barely sufficient to conduct negotiations. 
According to Dobrynin: "Not even most Politburo
members were fully informed [of military programs] 
because the Defense Ministry and Defense Industry 
Ministry were only accountable to the general 
secretary, who was also commander in chief and 
chairman of the Defense Council."90 Thus the secretive 
nature of military activities extended upwards through 
the Politburo as well.
90Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., p. 474.
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At the level of policy engineering, however, 
military officials (both in the services and in the 
defense industries) were not necessarily guaranteed a 
vote. Like the foreign minister, the defense minister 
became a full Politburo member in 1973. Ustinov, the 
only defense minister who was a civilian (albeit a 
defense industrialist) retained full Politburo 
membership when he became defense minister in 1976, 
but his successor (a professional military officer), 
was not granted candidate Politburo membership for 
some time, leaving no military representative on the 
Politburo roster until 1985 when the defense minister 
again received candidate membership.91
Brezhnev relied heavily on advice from both 
uniformed officers and defense industry managers. By 
some accounts, he not only deferred to the military, 
he also feared it and sought to avoid confrontation 
with it. Georgii Arbatov, the long-time director of 
the USA-Canada Institute, argues for example that 
Brezhnev was politically indebted to the military, 
having come to the top Soviet leadership after having 
served as Central Committee secretary for the defense 
industries.92 Under Brezhnev, Arbatov contends: "Our
military policy and arms industry had completely 
escaped political control. The leadership made the 
decisions, but the military and the military 
industrial agencies prompted those decisions and even 
managed to 'preprogram' the political leadership." 
That is to say, the military supplied information, 
statistics, and advice that prompted the political
91Ellen Jones and James Brusstar, "The Ministry of Defense," 
in Eugene Huskey, eds., Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The 
Rise and Decline of the Soviet State. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1992), p. 188.
92Georgii Arbatov, The System, op. cit., pp. 174-75.
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leadership to make decisions favored by the 
military.93
A body combining the military and political 
leadership was the Defense Council. The 1977 
Constitution said only that the Defense Council was to 
be formed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet 
and its membership to be confirmed by that body.94 Lev 
Zaikov, formerly Central Committee Secretary for the 
Defense Industries Department under Gorbachev and
presumably a member of Council, said that the Defense
Council's mission was "to implement supreme
organizational, executive, and control functions on 
specific issues of the country's defense capacity and 
security and to coordinate the activities of the 
competent departments."95
While Zaikov's description of the Defense
Council's role suggested that it enjoyed extensive 
powers, the testimony of others offered a different 
impression. According to Soviet defectors interviewed 
in Inside the Apparat, the Defense Council was an
organization whose importance was grossly 
overestimated in Western literature. Voslensky claims 
that the Defense Council existed only to make explicit 
the role of the general secretary as commander-in­
chief of the Soviet armed forces. Shevchenko argues 
that the Council was designed for wartime or crisis 
decisionmaking, and it did not play a role outside of
93Ijbid. , p . 189 .
94Konstitutsiya, op. cit., p. 33.
95Zaikov speech at 28th Party Congress, Pravda, 4 July 1990, 
cited in Harry Gelman, The Rise and Fall of National Security 
Decisionmaking in the Former USSR. (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1992), p. 16-18.
85
Chapter 2 Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko
such circumstances.96 One way of reconciling these 
conflicting reports is to consider the size of the 
Soviet military industrial complex and of the Soviet 
Party bureaucracy as a whole: The Defense Council
could well have done many of the things that Zaikov 
described without accounting for a large part in the 
Soviet national-security policymaking process.
The Role of the Intelligence Services
The role of security organizations in Soviet 
foreign policy is, because of the secretive nature of 
the object of study, perhaps the most difficult to 
gauge. As Waller has pointed out, the role of the KGB 
was almost entirely neglected in some of the major 
studies of Soviet foreign policy formulation.97 Some 
points can be pieced together about the security 
organs' roles in foreign affairs, however.
At the outset, it is important to note that 
oversight of the security organs was more theoretical 
than real. It was performed by the Party (the Central 
Committee Administrative Organs Department), and 
intelligence officers themselves participated in the 
oversight. The absence of institutional independence 
rendered the oversight meaningless and meant that 
security organs had a wide margin for action. More 
generally, the KGB's role as defender and guardian of 
the Party and Party interests meant that the KGB1 s 
direct overseers relied on the KGB's work for their 
survival and were in a difficult position to curb its 
activities.
96Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, Inside the Apparat, op. cit., 
pp. 86-87.
97Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today.
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 10-11.
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Intelligence officers were stationed under 
diplomatic or other cover in Soviet missions abroad 
both to gather intelligence and to monitor the 
activities of compatriots. The First Chief Directorate 
maintained 11 geographical departments and various 
specialized services. In the mid-1980s there were 
12,000 employees in the First Chief Directorate, and 
places among its ranks were much sought after.98 It 
was the most prestigious of the KGB's directorates 
(others being Signals and Cryptography, Economic 
Security, and Counter-intelligence, for example)99, 
and its prestige and high salaries reportedly 
attracted the best qualified recruits -- people with 
not only higher education and language skills, but 
also no small degree of sophistication.100 Thus, KGB 
operatives were serious competition for the Soviet 
diplomatic corps, even excepting their access to 
instruments of violence and terror. Detente saw a 
major increase in the number of Soviet and Soviet bloc 
officials in the West, a trend which was paralleled by 
a marked increase in intelligence gathering efforts of 
the KGB -- especially in the realm of technology.101
There was a great deal of interaction between the 
First Directorate and the International Department. 
Waller characterizes the amount by saying that the 
First Chief Directorate spent "most of its resources 
to satisfy the desires of the CPSU International
98Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside 
Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, op. 
cit., pp. 512-513.
99For more information, see Michael Waller, Secret Empire: 
The KGB in Russia Today, op. cit., pp. 14-17.
100Amy Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet 
Union. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 122, 280-281.
101Ibid., pp. 281-282
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Department."102 A director of the KGB follow-on 
organization said that the ID had been the First Chief 
Directorate's "main consultant and client."103 Former 
KGB officer Stanislav Levchenko described the KGB and 
the ID as being the two main actors in carrying out 
foreign active measures104 -- operations designed to 
weaken foreign regimes.105
In the Politburo, the KGB chairmen holding full 
membership had full rights to contribute to foreign 
policy decisions. But even prior to their acquisition 
of full membership, KGB chiefs were vested with a 
great deal of influence in policymaking due to the 
closeness of the intelligence-police forces to the top 
leadership.106 It was therefore moot to some degree 
whether the KGB chairman was a full member of the 
Politburo or not. Simply by virtue of holding the top 
KGB job, its holder had a respected voice in 
policymaking. Tellingly, the same cannot be said for 
the head of the Foreign Ministry.
102Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today, 
op. cit. , p . 137.
103The official was Vadim Bakatin. see Ibid.
104Shultz and Godson define active measures as: "A Soviet
term that came into use in the 1950s to describe certain overt 
and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, 
and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may 
entail influencing the policies of another government, 
undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, 
disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and 
weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents..." 
Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, op. cit., 193.
105Interview with Stanislav Levchenko in appendix of ibid.,
p. 182.
106Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Security Police," in H. 
Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in 
Soviet Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),
pp. 110-111.
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The KGB was institutionally even more interested 
in domestic policing and acting as the guardian of the 
regime as it was in foreign policy, it was poised to 
play a role in top personnel and succession issues, 
things which had an impact on foreign policy 
formulation. The KGB also had a chance, via its 
intelligence, to ingratiate itself with the Soviet 
leadership. Brezhnev's KGB was later criticized by an 
insider for failing to pay attention to major 
international events and regularly reporting the 
positive reaction of Third World communist parties to 
Brezhnev's speeches.107 Perhaps it was this type of 
reporting which helped to convince Brezhnev of the 
need to expand the KGB's role and presumably budget.
The KGB was one of the key players abroad, and 
this was an important component of foreign policy 
implementation. Involvement of officers ranged from 
participation in active measures and support of wars 
of national liberation to gathering intelligence under 
cover as diplomats, trade representatives or 
journalists. Given the covert nature of the KGB's 
field activity, it would appear that officers enjoyed 
some margin for improvising on orders from Moscow. One 
defector noted that while there "was a great deal of 
room for innovation...we generally would not take the 
initiative without first receiving authorization from 
the center."108 On the other hand, exceeding authority 
in the field was not necessarily easy for the center 
to detect. He admitted, while success of field 
operations was of vital importance in evaluations of 
personnel, "measuring success is sometimes
107Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today, 
op. cit., 137.
108Stanislav Levchenko interview in appendix of Richard H. 
Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, op. cit., p. 183. .
89
Chapter 2 Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko
complicated,"109 which sounds both as if some of the 
"innovation" he refers to could have gone undetected 
and as if officers could have claimed that their 
efforts had led to the occurrence of events abroad 
considered good for the Soviet Union.
The KGB's and ID's common interests -- serving and 
strengthening the Party -- meant that they reinforced 
each other institutionally in influencing foreign 
affairs policymaking. They both had recourse to the 
argument that their actions served the interests of 
extending the influence of the CPSU and Soviet Union 
around the world, an argument that the MFA was unable 
to counter, for example, when MFA officials 
disapproved of some Soviet efforts in the Third World.
The Role of Research Institutes and the Media
Social science research institutes such as the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute for the Study of 
the USA and Canada (hereafter, USA-Canada Institute) 
or the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (known commonly by its acronym from the 
Russian, IMEMO) played only limited roles in Soviet 
foreign policymaking. Specialists served in various 
capacities: as the source of ideas for policy, as the 
exponents of intellectual arguments supporting 
existing policy, and as the publicists of existing 
policy.
Typically, the input of research institutes 
occurred in two ways: on an ad hoc basis, for example, 
after being called upon to produce a report on a 
specific foreign-policy issue or through the research
109Ibid., p. 183.
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output of these institutes, in the form of published 
journals, books, and unpublished analyses.110 These 
publications were sent to the Central Committee 
International Department, which could request specific 
studies111 as well as determine the direction of 
research through participation on the journals' 
editorial boards.112 The MFA and staff of the general 
secretary could also commission work.113 The final say 
over what the institute published was held by the CC 
Propaganda Department, although its role was more of a 
formal nature than one of day-to-day control.114
In addition to the work of academic institutions 
as organizations, some top institute officials enjoyed 
access to the Soviet leadership. A good example is 
Georgii Arbatov, who was frequently called upon to 
advise Brezhnev and his two immediate successors. 
Arbatov, who was also a member of the Central 
Committee and a former consultant in the Socialist 
Countries Department under Andropov, enjoyed access to
110Checkel, Jeffrey T. Organizational Behavior, Social 
Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policymaking, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1991, 
p. 57 .
1:L1Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson,
The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR. (Santa 
Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1982), p. 18.
112Neil Malcolm, Soviet Political Scientists and American 
Politics. (New York: St. Martins, 1984), p. 13; and Lilita
Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, The Media and 
Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., p. 18.
113Neil Malcolm, Soviet Political Scientists and American 
Politics, op. cit., p. 13.
114Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson,
The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., 
p. 18. The Propaganda Department's role was not universally
evaluated by the defectors from which this RAND study draws its 
information. Some claimed that the Propaganda Department was 
responsible for evaluating the impact of foreign affairs
articles on the domestic Soviet audience.
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the top Soviet leadership up to the level of general 
secretary.
Access to policymakers was only one measure of the 
impact of academics on foreign policy. Another 
question was whether these researchers had latitude or 
inclination to tell the top leadership anything other 
than what it supposedly wanted to hear. Here it 
appears much of the analytic output was aimed at 
rationalizing existing policy and finding a basis for 
it in Marxism-Leninism. Such an approach could 
sometimes be attributed to the presence of censorship, 
but other factors could also not be excluded, such as 
the ingrained role of ideology or the researchers1 
preoccupation with retaining access and their prized 
place in academic research, which often featured the 
chance to travel abroad for longer periods.115 Malcolm 
has highlighted the tension between the scholars and 
the politicians, noting that while Soviet society laid 
emphasis on the contribution of science to 
policymaking, the relationship between foreign policy 
specialists and politicians was complicated by the 
systemic pressure to keep advocacy of change to a 
minimum.116
The attractiveness of the academic jobs meant the 
presence in institutes of no small number of children 
of Party officials, and they were likely to remain 
docile and supportive of existing approaches.117 This 
was especially the case of the MFA's own Moscow State 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, the training school for 
Soviet diplomats, and a fertile recruiting ground for
115Neil Malcolm, Soviet Political Scientists and American 
Politics, op. cit., pp. 16, 150-161.
116JJbid. , p. 160.
111Ibid, pp. 16, 150-161.
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the KGB.118 Therefore many of the same problems that 
existed in other parts of the Soviet system could be 
found in the relationship between academic research 
and policymaking: Deviation from the norm was
discouraged.
There were, of course, exceptions to the general 
pattern, as can be found at various times and in 
various institutions. At IMEMO in the 1960s, analyses 
differed in obvious ways from official Soviet thinking 
offering a "more nuanced image of capitalism... a more 
complex view of the international system... [and] 
arguing for a 'scientific approach' to foreign 
policy."119 The latter point may have been aimed at 
increasing the role of researchers' analyses in 
policymaking, just as was the USA-Canada Institute's
encouragement of greater contacts with and knowledge 
of the United States as a method of improving US- 
Soviet relations.
The work of the research institutes would have
benefited by access to diplomatic post, classified
information, and significant amounts of information 
from abroad. Institutes, as a whole, were considered 
too large and insufficiently secure to be entrusted 
with the necessary classified information from which 
to produce realistic analysis.120
Different types of limitations hindered the 
influence by the Soviet media over foreign policy
118Author's Interview with Alexander Rahr, Head of the Study 
Center on German-Russian/CIS Relations, German Society for 
Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 17 June 1997.
119Checkel, Jeffrey T. Organizational Behavior, Social 
Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policymaking, op. cit., p. 61.
120Gregory in Uri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, Inside the 
Apparat, op. cit., p. 117.
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choices. The role of the mass media was to represent 
official views -- either those that originated from 
top Party figures or those which percolated to the top 
from specialists and were sanctioned by top .Party 
figures. The position of editor-in-chief of 
publications was controlled by Party hierarchs (at the 
Politburo, CC Secretariat, or CC Department level), 
and editors-in-chief were primarily responsible for 
censorship.121 General guidelines for the views to be 
published were communicated to senior editors of the 
central press in biweekly instructional conferences 
held by CC Propaganda Department officials.122
The proximity of the media to Soviet officialdom 
could also be seen in career patterns. It was not 
unusual to see top officials traveling in an orbit of 
senior positions in the media, at the Foreign 
Ministry, in research institutes, or in some of the 
Central Committee Departments.123
The use of the mass media as a forum for genuine 
debate of foreign policy issues -- either among top 
officials or among journalists attempting to influence 
policy -- was a relatively rare event. Occasionally, 
debates on specific foreign policy issues were 
encouraged by the top leadership when officials felt 
that alternative policy options might be unearthed and
121Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, A. Ross Johnson, The 
Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., p. 
vi.
122Ibid., p . 15.
1230ne example can be found in Valentin Falin (CC 
Information Department, CC International Information Department, 
Foreign Ministry/Ambassador to West Germany, head of Novosti 
News Agency and Gostelradio, and head of International 
Department).
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that a debate would not harm the situation.124 More 
rarely, splits in the top leadership were argued out 
in the mass media.125 The Brezhnev era leadership 
imposed a strict clearance system on the utterances of 
official statements in public and their publication. 
Any published statements could be assumed to have been 
cleared by central Party officials, and unsanctioned 
leaking of information or showing disunity was a 
serious transgression which could be linked to the 
decline of some top figures during the Brezhnev 
era.126
While obvious, it bears emphasizing that the 
subservience of the media to top officials meant that 
whatever foreign policy move was initiated, the media 
would publish something in support of it. The Soviet 
leadership thus enjoyed a far wider choice of action 
than its Western counterparts, whose policies had to 
be considered in light of the bureaucrat's maxim: 
"Don't do or say anything that you wouldn't want to 
appear on the front page of the New York Times."
How.. Usefu] is the Bureaucratic Politics Model?
This chapter is used as a basis for assembling 
information about the legacy of Soviet foreign policy 
formulation and how it might affect democratizing 
Russia. At the same time, for the relevance of future
124Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, 
The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., 
pp. 63-84.
1250n the behavior of Soviet newspapers and journals during 
the period before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Jiri 
Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of 
a Decision, op. cit., pp. 34-36.
126Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, 
The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, op. cit., 
p. viii.
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discussions, it is useful to analyze the applicability 
of the bureaucratic politics model to Soviet foreign 
policy.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we can expect 
the bureaucratic politics model to aid in the analysis 
of Soviet foreign policy. The way in which 
institutional interests operated in the USSR was 
certainly different than the way they operated in the 
West, mainly because of authoritarian, one-party rule. 
But these differences do not render the bureaucratic 
politics model useless.
The most important element of the Brezhnev- 
Andropov-Chernenko period making the bureaucratic 
politics model a useful tool was the orderly nature of 
intragovernmental conflict. Action channels and 
standard operating procedures, as described by
Allison, could be detected. These, as Allison
hypothesized, gave way to "concerted action by large 
numbers of individuals, each responding to basic 
cues."127 The frank discussions of foreign policy
decisions in the International Department, the habit 
of pre-arranging Politburo decisions through so-called 
interrogatory voting, and the division of labor 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Department all indicated a rather strict 
delineation of functions determining the role played 
by each institution.
While the bureaucratic politics model can be 
applied to Soviet foreign policy formulation, it 
cannot be applied as fully as it has been to US 
foreign policy formulation. The participation of
127Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 83.
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Soviet intelligence officers in the oversight of their 
agencies meant that intelligence organs enjoyed a wide 
range for action unencumbered by serious outside 
oversight.
The potential for decisions to be taken by one or 
a few individuals is another aspect of the Soviet 
system which does not mesh well with the bureaucratic 
politics model. As noted above, the overlapping 
membership in the Politburo and Secretariat meant that 
it was entirely possible for a Central Committee 
Secretary who sat on the Politburo to guide a decision 
from beginning to end -- making decisions, for 
example, ranging from whether to promote or bury the 
Foreign Ministry's analysis of a foreign policy 
problem to deciding whether to lobby for the issue to 
be taken up by the Politburo. In this way, the 
"cutting up" and "parceling out" of decisions, as 
described by Allison,128 would not occur or only occur 
in a much smaller circle of participants. The handling 
of the decision to invade Afghanistan by a subset of 
the Politburo is an example of this phenomenon. The 
pattern of working in policymaking "troikas" also 
exemplifies this shrinking of the circle of
decisionmakers, although the term "troika" undoubtedly 
understates the number of people involved in the vast 
array of day-to-day issues handled by these troikas.
A notable exception to the pattern of small groups 
dominating single foreign policy issues was the
tendency to avoid responsibility and therefore to
distribute it. This derived not only from the element
of fear resulting from the political repression of the
128Ibid., p . 80.
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Soviet system but also from the fact that so much of a 
bureaucrat's livelihood accrued from his position.
There was another important exception to the 
notion that foreign policy issues could be dominated 
by an individual well placed to play a role at all 
three levels of policymaking: Playing multiple roles
was no guarantee to prevailing in the policymaking 
process. As the case of Ponomarev's and Suslov's 
failed opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
shows, influence did not necessary increase in 
proportion to the quantity of responsibilities an 
official enjoyed.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the absence 
of democracy and the rule of law in the Soviet system 
affected the applicability of the bureaucrat politics 
model. Allison and Halperin noted the importance of 
the government being freely elected and open to 
expressions of public interest and pressure,129 and 
Soviet officials were not constrained by public 
opinions.
At the same time, the presence of authoritarian 
rule enhanced the applicability of the model in 
unexpected ways. Authoritarian rule was responsible in 
part for the internal logic of Soviet foreign policy 
formulation system, prompting institutions and 
individuals to function in many of the same ways 
described by Allison. Standard operating procedures, 
action channels, and least-common-denominator 
solutions were all features of Soviet foreign policy 
formulation not because of fear that the media might
129Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic 
Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World
Politics, Vol. 24 Supplement (Spring) 1972, p. 43.
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publicize information about a botched foreign policy 
decision, but because an apparatchik might be held 
accountable for his failures by his superior in the 
Soviet Union's unforgiving authoritarian system.
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Soviet Foreign Policymaking 
under Gorbachev
Between 1985 and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
at the end of 1991, governing institutions changed 
radically in the USSR. All-union structures as well as 
republic-level governing organs were partially 
democratized, the control of the Party was weakened and 
then virtually eliminated, and the circle of people 
involved in policymaking in general, and foreign policy 
in particular, was expanded. It was in this climate of 
change that Russia began to develop its own independent 
foreign policy from the platform of Russian republican 
governing structures.
The changes introduced during the Gorbachev period 
stand out as a watershed in the history of the Soviet 
Union. The breaking down of the old order, even when 
one recognizes the disorganized and halting process 
under which it occurred, meant a sea change for the 
Soviet system unparalleled by any other period of 
reform in Soviet history.
While the process of breaking down the pre- 
Gorbachev structures can be readily analyzed, the 
implications of the process of building up new 
institutions during the Gorbachev period are more 
difficult to judge. There was not one set of changes 
under Gorbachev but many, meaning little time for 
sustained functioning of new bodies and routines. Thus, 
without minimizing the monumental nature of Gorbachev's
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changes, it must also be noted that many of the new 
institutions he established were eliminated by a new 
wave of change before they could be tested. Ultimately, 
the collapse of the USSR meant that the polity created 
by Gorbachev also collapsed before any sustained 
functioning of the new institutions could be observed.
In terms of applying the bureaucratic politics 
model, this situation of rapid and profound 
institutional change is generally problematic, for 
reasons which will become more obvious below. Rapid and 
profound change means the disruption if not elimination 
of standard operating procedures and action channels. 
Allison's maxim, "if a nation performs an action of a 
certain type today, its organizational components must 
yesterday have been performing...an action only 
marginally different,"1 frequently loses its 
descriptive power in analysis of the Gorbachev period 
if only for the reason that organizations did not 
always exist "yesterday" and therefore could not have 
been performing an action "only marginally different."
The handling of foreign policymaking under 
Gorbachev is, in spite of the unfinished nature of the 
reforms, a major point of interest in studying 
contemporary Russia's foreign policy. The Gorbachev 
period, understood as part of Russia's transition away 
from totalitarianism and toward democracy, represents a 
vital historical link between the "era of stagnation" 
and the birth of independent Russia. Furthermore, the 
way that the Soviet system responded to reform is 
instructive in understanding the continuing reform 
process in independent Russia.
1Graham Allison, Essence of Decision. (USA: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1971), pp. 87.
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This chapter analyzes the roles of the dominant 
actors in foreign policymaking first at the all-Union 
level and then at the Russian republic level during the 
last years of the Soviet Union's existence. The primary 
question this analysis seeks to answer is whether the 
process of foreign policymaking under Gorbachev can be 
explained with reference to the bureaucratic politics 
model. In addition, this chapter lays the groundwork 
for understanding how independent Russia's foreign 
policymaking institutions were reformed or created.
The Political Backdrop
"New political thinking" was the term which came 
to stand for the new approach to politics pursued under 
Gorbachev. In foreign relations, its central ideas can 
be summarized as follows: First, the world is living in 
the threat of nuclear war. Second, global problems -- 
including unresolved social problems -- will find 
solution only in joint approaches and solutions. Third, 
the nations of the world are more interdependent than 
ever before. Fourth, the spiraling arms race makes 
conventional and nuclear war more likely. Finally, the 
latter would leave no survivors, thus war can no longer 
be viewed as the continuation of politics by other 
means.2
These broad guidelines, in some cases new and in 
other cases re-tooled, came to dislodge previous 
principles established by the CPSU about how the Soviet 
Union should conduct its foreign relations. It was 
under these headings that other changes were introduced 
into the Soviet Union's foreign relations.
2Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking For Our
Country and the World. (London: Fontana/Collins, 1988).
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In essence, the ideas and writings challenging the 
standard ideological interpretations and approaches had 
the effect of putting Soviet ideology itself, and 
foreign affairs conduct more generally, on the 
political agenda for discussion, debate, and action. 
Thus by turning to such basic questions as these, the 
problem recognition phase of foreign policymaking under 
Gorbachev came to encompass a much larger range of 
issues.
The emphasis on the threat of social problems -- 
ills which were no longer attributed exclusively to 
capitalism and imperialism -- marked a major departure 
from the rhetoric of previous leaders. Major speeches 
by Soviet leaders in the late 1970s or early 1980s 
would have argued that Western countries could expect 
to pay for the problems unleashed by capitalism and 
imperialism. The notion that the arms race was 
increasing the threat of war was not entirely new, but 
it laid the ideological basis for the Soviet Union's 
acceptance of disproportionately large cuts in its 
arsenal in the process of arms control, something that 
would have been unthinkable in the past. It also opened 
the way for the abandonment of the Soviet Union's claim 
to possess an arsenal capable of combating the largest 
coalition of its enemies.
What was entirely new under Gorbachev was the 
concept of joint solutions to global problems, 
notwithstanding the socio-economic orientation of a 
given country. Gorbachev placed particular emphasis in 
his speeches on the need for cooperative solutions for 
environmental problems. With these new principles, 
Gorbachev started to change the Soviet Union's view of 
the world and its own image in world politics.
103
Chapter 3 Foreign Policy Decisionmaking under Gorbachev
Such a radical departure from previous ways of 
thinking did not happen suddenly and could only occur 
after a certain amount of dissatisfaction had built up 
among the country's elite. Gorbachev identified the 
evolutionary nature of new political thinking in his 
book Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the 
World, remarking:
I would like to emphasize here that 
this analysis began a long time before 
the April [1985 Central Committee]
Plenary Meeting. It would be a mistake 
to think that a month after the Central 
Committee... elected me General
Secretary, there suddenly appeared a 
group of people who understood
everything and knew everything.... Such 
miracles do not occur... [T]he energy 
for revolutionary change has been 
accumulating amid our people and in the 
Party for some time.3
Gorbachev thus tapped into the feelings of 
dissatisfaction which he shared with other members of 
the Soviet elite.
The evolutionary nature of the new thinking meant 
that many of the "new" ideas were not altogether new. 
They had been expressed in various publications, often 
obscure ones, and in various shapes, often encoded in 
the form of a new interpretation of history or an 
alternative analysis of problems in another socialist 
country. Some of the best examples of this can be found 
in Soviet analysts' criticism of China, which could in 
many cases be applied to the Soviet Union itself.4
3Ibid., p . 145.
4Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms
of China. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers), p. 57.
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Fyodor Buriatsky, the one-time speechwriter for 
Khrushchev and head of Andropov's Central Committee 
Consultants Group, had been a prime exponent of this 
form of esoteric analysis following his clash with 
Brezhnev's Kremlin. Under Gorbachev, Burlatsky, whose 
star had already begun to rise under Andropov, found an 
attentive ear in Gorbachev.5 Gorbachev is known to have 
read Burlatsky's newspaper commentaries and probably 
took these non-traditional ideas into account when 
forming official policy.
Gorbachev's main method of reforming the Soviet 
system was to move power away from Party institutions 
to new or reconstituted governmental structures. By the 
summer of 1991, the role of the Party in making Soviet 
foreign policy had been curtailed in a number of ways. 
Even before March 1990, when the Party lost its 
constitutional guarantee to a leading role, its 
participation in decisionmaking had been greatly 
reduced because of the transfer of power to other 
institutions.
The Role of the Politburo
The Politburo gradually stopped functioning in the 
way that it had during the Brezhnev-Chernenko-Andropov 
period. Meetings lasted much longer in the first years 
of the Gorbachev era -- up to 10-12 hours rather than 
the one-hour-long meetings which had previously been 
the norm.6 This reflected the vitality of the new 
Soviet leader. Grinevsky recalled the pattern of 
"having the little boys fight and the big boys
5Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina van den Heuvel, Voices of 
Glasnost: Interviews with Soviet Reformers. (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1989) pp. 177-182.
6Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 201.
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intervene."7 By this he referred to a device used by 
principle players to open discussion: They arranged for 
a lower level player (the "little boys") to raise an 
issue in a controversial way. The "big boys" (or 
principal players) would then be forced to intervene, 
providing them an opportunity to express their views 
more openly. Grinevsky described himself as one of the 
"little boys" who was regularly pitted by Gorbachev 
against Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev 
(another "little boy") on arms control issues. 
Grinevsky claims that Akhromeyev ultimately lost his 
temper, at which point Gorbachev would request that he 
rethink his position. This device enabled Gorbachev to 
achieve major arms control cuts, according to 
Grinevsky.8
At a certain point, however, Politburo meetings 
had lost their utility for Gorbachev. In the process of 
reducing the influence of the Party and working toward 
making the Soviet policy more democratic, Gorbachev 
increased the membership of the Politburo. It had 
become, by July 1990, a much larger body including a 
member from each of the 15 union republics. At the same 
time, the Politburo's new composition also excluded 
many prominent, Moscow-based policymakers. This new 
composition inclined the body to meet less frequently 
since most members resided outside of Moscow. Likewise, 
it was more prone to discussing domestic political 
issues not only because foreign policy questions 
frequently followed a timetable set by international 
events rather than by Moscow, but also because the
7Author's interview with Oleg Grinevsky, 17 December 1993,
Ebenhausen, Germany.
8 Ibid.
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question of the republics' relationship with the center 
was all important by this time.
Between July 1990 and April 1991, the Politburo 
reportedly met no more than four or five times.9 But 
even before its enlargement, its impact on foreign 
policy formulation had been reduced. The elimination of 
the Party's leading role largely dissolved the basis of 
the Politburo's claim to power. Furthermore, Gorbachev 
had little use of the advice of a body that included 
some of his staunchest political foes, especially when 
he had created other forums with which he could consult 
and from which he could rule.
As will be discussed in more detail below, 
Gorbachev had assumed control of many major and minor 
foreign policy questions early on, making decisions on 
the spot with foreign partners, often without 
consulting his associates in the Politburo or against 
their preferences. This reflected a number of 
circumstances: the institutional decay which resulted
from the disruption or elimination of action channels 
and standard operating procedures, Gorbachev's desire 
to control the agenda (and even manage his own 
calendar),10 and Gorbachev's personal frustration with 
the domestic resistance to reform. When presented with 
an opportunity in a one-on-one meeting with a top 
foreign leader to push forward on a foreign policy 
issue, Gorbachev's inclination was to do so, sometimes 
in ways that had not been discussed with the top Soviet 
leadership in advance.
9Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen. (Munchen: Droemer 
Knaur, 1993), p. 454.
10Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and 
Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. (London: Harvard
University Press, 1997), p. 12.
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A good example of this can be found in the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in 
April 1987 when Gorbachev agreed, in discussions with 
US Secretary of State George Shultz, to scrap missiles 
that the Soviet side had previously excluded from the 
negotiations (the SS-23s). According to Anatolii 
Dobrynin, who was present at the Gorbachev-Shultz 
meeting,11 Gorbachev alone decided to take this step, 
going against the advice of both Dobrynin and Chief of 
the Soviet General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev. When 
Akhromeyev later asked Gorbachev about the change of 
position, Gorbachev reportedly said that he had 
forgotten about the advice Akhromeyev had given him.12 
Akhromeyev reportedly joked later, at the conclusion of 
the INF treaty talks in November 1987, that "he might 
have to seek asylum in neutral Switzerland," perhaps 
because of his frank opposition to Gorbachev's approach 
to the INF treaty.13
The Role of the Central Committee
The Central Committee's functions were reduced. 
The International Department's role had been disrupted 
by various organizational and personnel changes. The 
appointment of Anatolii Dobrynin in 198 6 to head the ID 
meant that it was abruptly put in the hands of someone 
who had not only been skeptical of its past utility, 
but who was also largely unfamiliar with the day-to-day 
workings of the Central Committee departments and their
11George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as
Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, p.
890.
12Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence. (New York: Times Books,
Random House, 1995), pp. 623-624.
13George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as
Secretary of State, op. cit., p. 1006.
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channels of influence.14 Having spent nearly his entire 
career in the MFA and the previous 22 years as the 
USSR's ambassador to the United States, Anatolii 
Dobrynin seemed not to have known what to do in this 
job. He was reluctant to accept Gorbachev's appointment 
to the position, and at first attempted to turn it 
down.15
Gorbachev's insistence that Dobrynin take the job 
probably had as much to do with the general secretary's 
plans for US-Soviet relations as it did with his plans 
for the International Department. It seems clear that 
Gorbachev wanted to dislodge Dobrynin from Washington 
in order to remove his powerful influence over US- 
Soviet relations. Gorbachev had first attempted to 
bring Dobrynin back to Moscow in 1985, suggesting that 
a position as deputy foreign minister might open up for 
him, a position which Dobrynin diplomatically declined. 
Dobrynin had been the backbone of US-Soviet relations 
for decades and was accustomed to working via the back 
channel with relative independence from Moscow. His 
good relationship with his long-time boss, Andrei 
Gromyko, whose influence was being curtailed by 
Gorbachev, meant that Dobrynin might prove resistant to 
taking instructions from his new bosses, Shevardnadze 
and Gorbachev, both of whom had little experience in 
foreign affairs.
Given the importance of relations with the United 
States and the fact that nuclear arms control was the 
key foreign policy issue in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev 
preferred to have someone in Washington with less 
experience and more inclination to follow instructions
14Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 404-405.
15Ibid., p. 601.
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from Moscow rather than trying to push Soviet policy in 
specific directions of his own choosing. Yurii Dubinin, 
Dobrynin's replacement, was no newcomer to diplomacy, 
but in Washington he was far less experienced than his 
predecessor.16
Dobrynin's disinclination to head the 
International Department was reflected in his 
performance. Former staffers claimed that he never 
became comfortable in the job.17 It appears that since 
he had been an outsider in Moscow for so many years and 
did not value the efforts of the ID, he and the 
organization remained alien to each other. After two 
years he was replaced by Valentin Falin, who had 
experience in both Central Committee and MFA work. 
Falin had worked at the Central Committee's Information 
Department during its two years of existence from 1958 
to 1959. He served as the Soviet ambassador to West 
Germany in the 1970s and then returned to Central 
Committee work as the deputy director of the 
International Information Department.18
Not only did the circumstances within the 
International Department change, the Central Committee 
as a whole was reorganized as well. In 1988, Gorbachev 
created six commissions to supervise a reduced number 
of Central Committee departments. The Commission on 
Questions of International Policy was created to handle 
foreign policy matters, and it was put under the 
leadership of Alexander Yakovlev, a full member of the
16Kto est' kto v rossiiskoi diplomaticheskoi sluzhbe. 
(Moscow: Department of Information and Press of the Russian
Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993), pp. 66-67.
17Author's interview with Andrei Grachev, 18 December 1992.
18Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 25-
26.
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Politburo and Gorbachev's closest adviser. The 
Commission was mandated to meet quarterly and was 
assigned 23 members, all with full-time jobs 
elsewhere.19 Its membership was mixed in terms of 
expertise. Among its foreign policy experts were 
Evgenii Primakov (Head of the Academy of Sciences 
Institute of the World Economy and International 
Relations), Georgii Arbatov (Head of Academy of 
Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada), Anatolii 
Chernyaev (Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser), 
Valentin Falin (Head of the International Department) , 
Anatolii Kovalev (First Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs), Valentin Nikiforov (Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), as well as Yakovlev. Other top 
officials included Chief of the General Staff Sergei 
Akhromeyev, Vice President of the Academy of Sciences 
Evgenii Velikhov, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and 
Izvestiya editor Ivan Laptev. Several members also
represented the republics.
The Commission was charged with analyzing and 
discussing problems of foreign policy, and it was 
expected to make decisions collectively during 
meetings. It was also envisaged that working groups 
could be created to discuss specific issues.20 But in 
practice, the Commission never actually functioned in 
any serious way that could be said to have affected, 
much less controlled, the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
formulation. It met only a few times during its brief 
existence. This example shows that new institutions did 
not simply take up where old ones left off by adopting 
previously-existing patterns of behavior or by
19"0n the Commissions of the Central Committee of the CPSU,"
Pravda, 29 November 1988, p. 2.
20Ibid.
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fulfilling the same or similar policy tasks. Nor, as 
this example shows, were all of the new institutions 
quick to establish new patterns of behavior or even a 
role in policymaking. In such a situation, it is easy 
to understand why new standard operating procedures and 
action channels were never developed.
During the series of reforms in September 1988, 
the International Department took over the functions of 
two other Central Committee departments dealing with 
foreign affairs: the Cadres Abroad Department and the 
Socialist Countries Department. (The International 
Information Department, the fourth of the four CC 
departments, dealing with foreign policy, had already 
been eliminated in a reorganization taking place in 
March 1986 at the 27th Party Congress.21) Thus while 
the ID had become the only remaining Central Committee 
department dealing with foreign affairs, the 
restructuring had thrown the ID into such a state of 
flux that it was unable to mobilize its potential new 
influence over foreign affairs policy and translate it 
into actual policy.
The ID's failure to move quickly into a new role 
was not entirely the result of its institutional 
inertia. The ID was, despite the accretion of its 
responsibilities, also disadvantaged by the concomitant 
exclusion from some of the perquisites it had 
previously enjoyed. Gorbachev's goal of moving power 
away from the Party meant the weakening of Central 
Committee departments. This had a decisive impact on 
day-to-day operations of the International Department. 
Among other things, it stopped receiving diplomatic
21 The International Department of the CC CPSU Under 
Dobrynin, Washington D.C., Department of State Publications, 
September 1989, p. vi.
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cable traffic, meaning it was cut off from valuable 
information about the latest developments and 
undertakings in Soviet diplomacy.22 Over the next two 
years, the number of International Department employees 
shrank to one-third of its size in 1987.23 The final 
blow for the ID as an institution came after the August 
coup, when Gorbachev disbanded the Central Committee. 
What remained of the staff went to the KGB's First 
Chief Directorate, which later became the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service.24
The Role of the Legisl at.Tir-p and Government
The new legislative bodies were the primary 
recipients of the power lost by the Party, making 
lawmakers suddenly meaningful players in the political 
process as opposed to mere pawns of the CPSU as they 
had been in the past. The Congress of People's Deputies 
(CPD) had become in 1989 the new "supreme organ of 
state power," with the exclusive powers, among other 
things, to determine changes in the USSR's internal and 
external borders and to decide the general direction of 
domestic and foreign policy.25 The Congress of People's 
Deputies was mandated to meet only once per year, thus 
the day-to-day legislative work was to be handled by 
the reconstituted Supreme Soviet which was elected from 
the membership of the CPD, to act as "the permanently
22Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 454.
23Ibid., p. 478.
24Author's interview with Euvgeni Novikov, 20 December 1991.
25The amendments to the constitution defining the role of 
the chairman of the Supreme Soviet presidium are found in "USSR 
Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution," Stroitel'naya 
gazeta, 3 December 1988, pp. 1-2. The amendments to the 
constitution defining the role of the USSR president are found in 
"Law on the Creation of the Post of President of the USSR and 
Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution," Pravda, 16 March 
1990, pp. 1-3.
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acting legislative organ of state power of the USSR." 
The composition of the CPD and Supreme Soviet was 
determined by multi-candidate elections and secret 
ballot, making these elections not fully democratic, 
but far more democratic than before.26 When taken as a 
whole, the new procedures for electing legislative 
organs meant that the legislative branch would be more 
representative and more accountable than its 
predecessors. In contrast to the previously-existing 
legislative organs, which did not even utilize their 
limited powers as granted by the Constitution, the new 
legislative bodies were given and utilized actual 
policymaking authority.
Since the day-to-day work of the legislature was 
done by the Supreme Soviet, many practical powers 
relating to foreign policy formulation were vested in 
this body. Its committees became involved in discussing 
foreign policy matters for the purpose of actually 
analyzing foreign policy questions, not simply 
confirming decisions taken by the Party. The Supreme 
Soviet Committee on International Affairs viewed its 
new role as a serious one, far different from that of 
the old Supreme Soviet's committee. As Alexander 
Dzasokhov, the chairman of the new committee, told the 
Soviet journal International Affairs about a year after
the new parliamentary structures had been set up that 
deputies were "working to elaborate, realize, 
prognosticate, and control foreign policy," in contrast
26Secret balloting had been possible under the old system, 
but it was rarely used. Slots were reserved for public 
organizations including a large share for the CPSU, which gave the 
Party a guaranteed bloc of seats.
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to the past, when "serious discussions were confined to 
one sector of the political system, the Party.1127
Evidence that the Supreme Soviet took its role 
seriously could be seen in deputies' lengthy debates 
and sharp criticism of certain policy choices. They 
viewed negatively the Soviet Union's condemnation of 
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
Similarly, they questioned whether the USSR's permanent 
representative to the United Nations was empowered to 
vote in the Security Council regarding the use of 
international force without the Supreme Soviet's 
approval.28 The Supreme Soviet also showed that it took 
its powers of treaty ratification seriously on the 
question of approving the treaties associated with 
German reunification.29
The Role of the President
In some ways, the process of creating an 
independent, democratic legislature with real 
policymaking powers was interrupted by the 
establishment, one year later, of the institution of 
the presidency. Many of the powers assigned to the 
chairman of its Presidium, a position occupied by 
Gorbachev, followed him to the position of USSR 
president, created in March 1990.30
27Interview with Alexander Dzasokhov, "The Soviet Parliament 
and Diplomacy," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 9, 1990, 
p. 119.
28Suzanne Crow, "Legislative Considerations and the Gulf 
Crisis," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 50 (14 December
1990), pp. 1-3.
29Suzanne Crow, "Germany: The "Second Crisis" of Soviet
Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 3 (15 March
1991), pp. 9-12.
30"USSR Law on Changes and Additions to the Constitution, " 
Stroitel 'naya gazeta, 3 December 1988, pp. 1-2, and "Law on the 
Creation of the Post of President of the USSR and Changes and
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The new distribution of powers, related to foreign 
policy formulation, was as follows: The Supreme Soviet 
had the right to confirm, but no longer name, the 
chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. It retained 
the right to deliver votes of confidence in the Council 
of Ministers at its request. It retained the right to 
confirm and oversee the implementation of the state 
budget, to ratify and denounce international treaties, 
and to determine basic measures in defense and state 
security. But it lost to the president the right to 
conduct international negotiations, to declare partial 
or full mobilization of military forces, as well as to 
declare war. As for using Soviet troops to fulfill 
international treaty obligations, the Supreme Soviet 
retained the right to make decisions on this.
In addition to the powers vested in the presidency 
mentioned above, the president also acted as the head 
of the USSR government and had the right to issue 
decrees with mandatory force throughout the territory 
of the country.31 He was empowered to "take the 
necessary measures to preserve the sovereignty of the 
[USSR and its] republics, the security and territorial 
integrity of the country. " He had the right to 
represent the USSR in domestic and foreign relations, 
and he was called upon to "guarantee the coordination 
and cooperation of the highest organs of government 
power and administration of the USSR." The president 
was also made the coordinator of the state security 
organs and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He 
was explicitly empowered to carry out international
Additions to the USSR Constitution," Pravda, 16 March 1990, pp. 1- 
3 .
31 "Law on the Creation of the Post of President of the USSR 
and Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution," Pravda, 16 
March 1990, pp. 1-3.
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negotiations and sign treaties for the USSR, and only 
at the president's discretion could these powers be 
transferred to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet or 
chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Executive bodies were also added to the 
president's purview to aid him in governing. The USSR 
Federation Council, headed by the president, was set up 
to study and make recommendations on the nationalities 
policy of the Soviet government.32 The Presidential 
Council of the USSR, which was attached to the 
president, was charged with "working out measures to 
realize the basic direction of internal and foreign 
policy of the USSR and guarantee the security of the 
country."33 Members were named by the president, the 
only statutory member being the chairman of the USSR 
Council of Ministers. Gorbachev appointed his 16-member 
Presidential Council in March 1990, a few weeks after 
the CPD elected him to the post of executive president. 
It was an eclectic grouping of intellectuals and 
policymakers.34
The Security Council came into operation in March 
1991 and was headed by Gorbachev. It replaced the 
Presidential Council, which, owing to its size and 
composition, had not functioned in the way that 
Gorbachev wanted it to. The Security Council, which was 
chaired by Gorbachev, gathered prominent policymakers, 
who were confirmed by the Supreme Soviet.35 The
. 32JJbid
33 Ibid.
34Gorbachev did not need the legislature's approval for his 
appointees. Elizabeth Teague, "The Presidential Council Starts its 
Work," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 1990), pp. 
1-3 .
35They were Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov, Foreign Minister 
Alexander Bessmertnykh, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Vice
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Security Council was intended to be concerned broadly 
with security affairs. Gorbachev expected it to play a 
major role in policymaking, saying, on the occasion of 
the confirmation of its nine members, that the new body 
would "operate day-to-day with a brief of security in 
the widest possible sense."36 In fact, though, since 
many of its members were later implicated in the August 
1991 coup attempt, the Security Council effectively 
doomed the USSR presidency to short existence.
According to the constitutional amendments setting 
up the body, it was intended to draft recommendations 
for implementing the all-Union policies in the realms 
of defense and security, including questions in the 
realms of economics, the environment, and the law and 
order of the country, thus giving the body extensive 
powers.37 It was also given the authority to set up 
interagency commissions on key issues.38 As it turned 
out, though, the most pressing threat to the security 
of the country was emerging in the domestic political 
arena: separatism. Thus the Security Council's actual
work (with the exception of the August coup attempt) 
between the confirmation of its nine members in March 
1991 and its reconstitution following the August coup 
was coordinating the central government's efforts to
President Gennady Yanaev, Interior Minister Boriss Pugo, Prime 
Minister Valentin Pavlov, former Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, 
Foreign Policy Adviser Yevgenii Primakov, who was rejected on the 
first round of voting. One other candidate (Gorbachev's Chief of 
Staff Valerii Boldin) did not receive confirmation or membership. 
Michael Parks, "Legislature Fights Gorbachev on Security Council 
Nominees," Los Angeles Times, 8 March 1991, dateline Moscow.
36Ibid.
37Boris Zverev, "USSR Supreme Soviet Approves Candidate 
Members of Security Council," TASS, 7 March 1991, dateline Moscow.
38Ellen Jones and James H. Brusstar, "Moscow's Emerging 
Security Decisionmaking System: The Role of the Security Council," 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Vol. 6, No. 3 (September
1993), p. 361.
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hold the union together. A similar problem befell
independent Russia's Security Council, as will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters four and five.
Gorbachev's creation of presidential structures
also included an expansion of his executive staff. 
Valerii Boldin became his chief of staff in early 1990 
after Gorbachev's election to the executive presidency. 
Boldin came to the post from the Central Committee' s 
General Department (where he continued working 
concurrently) . In both positions, Boldin held a great 
deal of sway in terms of determining which information 
would flow to Gorbachev.39 Boldin gained even more 
power when he was named to the Presidential Council and
would have acquired still more had he been confirmed a
member of the Security Council, as Gorbachev sought 
without success.40
As president of the USSR, Gorbachev's reliance on 
personal aides grew. Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, who had 
been the foreign policy adviser to Brezhnev, Andropov, 
Chernenko,41 was dismissed by Gorbachev during his 
first year in power because the veteran adviser had the 
tendency to lecture Gorbachev.42 Instead, Gorbachev 
relied on his own hand-picked team, some of whom were 
quite influential in the reform of the Soviet worldview 
and system. Alexander Yakovlev's role in reforming
39Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, op. cit., p. 210.
40On the first rejection, see "Legislature Fights Gorbachev 
on Security Council Nominees," Los Angeles Times, 8 March 1991. On 
the second rejection, see Izvestiya, 13 March 1991.
41Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency, Directory of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 5. 
Oleg Grinevsky, Tauwetter. (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1996), pp. 20- 
21.
42Anatolii Chemyaev, Shest' Let s Gorbachevim. (Moscow: 
Progess, Kultura Publishing Group, 1983), p. 7.
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Soviet domestic and international policy was paramount 
from the beginning of Gorbachev's term. As a top 
adviser on domestic and foreign-policy issues, Yakovlev 
was from early on the author of many of the ideas that 
went into new political thinking. Significantly, his 
influence over Gorbachev preceded the accrual of a 
significant official role in the Soviet system, 
although this came rapidly as well. (Yakovlev was 
elevated from the position of director of a respected 
Moscow research institute to a full member in the 
Politburo within four years.)
The personal ties between Gorbachev and Yakovlev 
played a significant part in the latter's rising 
influence. Yakovlev had come to know Gorbachev in the 
summer of 1983, when the former was in his tenth year 
as Soviet ambassador to Canada and the latter was on an 
official visit in Ottawa.43 Some observers believe that 
it was Gorbachev who arranged for Yakovlev to take over 
the directorship of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO) in September 1983, a few months after their 
meeting in Ottawa.44 Whatever the genesis of this 
appointment, it soon became clear that Yakovlev was a 
major source of Gorbachev's ideas about reform, 
channeling not only his own ideas but also analyses of 
researchers at IMEMO. Between 1983 and 1985, IMEMO 
began publishing articles more forcefully advocating 
the kinds of ideas that became part of Gorbachev's 
program.45 Even before Yakovlev became a Central
43Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, op. cit., p. 74.
44Jeffrey Checkel, Organizational Behavior, Social
Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policymaking, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1991, 
p. 223.
45lJbid., pp. 240-257.
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Committee secretary in early 1986, he worked closely 
with Gorbachev on policy formation and the writing of 
speeches having to do with domestic and foreign 
affairs.46
Yakovlev's background gave him qualities that had 
previously not been characteristic of top figures in 
the Soviet hierarchy. He had lived for many years 
abroad,47 and had shown a willingness to challenge the 
system both in his early days as a party functionary 
and while running the Soviet embassy in Canada. In the 
1970s, he had lost favor within the Party as the acting 
head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, 
at which point he was honorably exiled to an 
ambassadorial post, by his own request, to an English- 
speaking country.48 Having experienced life abroad, 
Yakovlev could compare the Soviet system to that of 
other countries in the world, especially the capitalist 
world, about which information in the Soviet Union was 
skewed. His early discontent with the Party apparently 
fueled his enthusiasm for domestic political reform.
Anatolii Chernyaev was Gorbachev's foreign policy 
adviser from early 1986 until Gorbachev's resignation. 
Gorbachev and Chernyaev had been acquainted prior to 
1986, but it was Alexander Yakovlev's recommendation 
which determined Chernyaev's appointment to replace 
long-time Kremlin foreign policy adviser Andrei 
Alexandrov-Agentov.49 Chernyaev, like Gorbachev, met 
Yakovlev during a trip to Ottawa; there, Chernyaev 
recalls, he discovered that he and Yakovlev were
46Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, op. cit., p. 106.
47He had also studied at Columbia University in New York.
48Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, op. cit., p. 74.
49Anatolii Chernyaev, Shest' Let s Gorbachevim, op. cit.,
p. 7.
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"kindred souls."50 Chernyaev had been the deputy 
director of the International Department from the early 
1950s following a period of teaching at Moscow State 
University.51 During his time at the Central Committee 
he also worked both as a konsultant and on the staff of 
the World Marxist Review, experiences which exposed 
Chernyaev to uncensored information and to the 
opportunity to speak his mind freely in an official 
setting.52
Georgii Shakhnazarov joined Gorbachev’s staff only 
in 1988, but there is evidence that the work of this 
former Central Committee apparatchik (in the department 
for socialist countries) and leading scholar played a 
part in the development of Gorbachev's reform program 
prior to that. Brown has noted that upon meeting 
Gorbachev for the first time, Shakhnazarov "was 
surprised to discover that the latter already knew him 
from his books, which, quite untypically for a 
secretary of the Central Committee, Gorbachev had 
read."53 Like Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov had served on the 
staff of the World Marxist Review in Prague and had
been a member of Andropov's Consultant's Group in the 
Central Committee's Socialist Countries Department. All 
of these experiences taken together meant that 
Shakhnazarov, like other members of Gorbachev's team, 
approached problems from an untraditional perspective.
50ibid., p. 26.
51Paul Quinn Judge, "Gorbachev's Alma Mater Produces Key 
Officials," dateline Moscow, The Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 
1987, p. 12.
52Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 27 
October 1980.
53Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, op. cit., p. 5.
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Gorbachev's corps of aides grew to a high of some 
20054 people before tapering of to about 50 by the end 
of his presidency.55 His aides were an important source 
for discussions about policy, substituting in many 
cases for the discussions with his ministers and 
legislators. This may be why the latter were 
dissatisfied with Gorbachev's frequent failure to 
consult or to accept their advice. In some • cases,
Gorbachev took the opposite approach after hearing 
advice, much to the disappointment of other Soviet
officials.56 As discussions in subsequent chapters will 
reveal, the tendency by Gorbachev to rely on people
within his presidential staff was repeated in an even 
more elaborate form by Boris Yeltsin.
Offering a post-Gorbachev era review of his former 
boss's personal leadership style, Gorbachev's foreign 
policy adviser Anatolii Chernyaev remarked that
Gorbachev had a "tendency to seek compromise..., bring 
peace everywhere... [and] a readiness to accept what he 
does not really approve of."57 If Chernyaev's analysis 
is correct, this may explain why Gorbachev sometimes 
listened to but then ignored the advice of his 
ministers and aides during discussions with foreign 
leaders.
54Nodari A. Simonia, "Russia's Foreign Policy Priorities," 
in Karen Dawisha and Adeed Dawisha, eds. The Making of Foreign 
Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. (Armonk, NY, 
1995), p. 27.
55Andrei Grachev, Final Days: The Inside Story of the
Collapse of the Soviet Union. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 
183 .
56Anatolii Dobrynin, In Confidence, op. cit., pp. 623-624.
57Anatolii Chernyaev, "The Phenomenon of Gorbachev in the 
Context of Leadership," International Affairs (Moscow), June 1993, 
p. 48.
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The Role o f .the Intelligence Services
The KGB maintained many of its previous channels 
for influencing foreign policy formulation under 
Gorbachev. Security services were virtually untouched 
by reform, despite the reorganization of most other 
domestic structures. Rather than shrinking, additional 
personnel was absorbed from CPSU structures as they 
were scaled back. As was noted above, following the 
August 1991 coup, the KGB's First Chief Directorate 
began taking over some of the staff and assets of the 
International Department. Owing to their close 
collaboration in the past, the First Chief Directorate 
was a natural place for these people to go after the 
Central Committee was disbanded.
The reduction of Soviet interest in the Third 
World presumably meant an overall lessening of security 
organs' operations there, albeit, with some 
exceptions.58 One thing is certain, however: There was 
additional work to be done in other areas. The intense 
warming in relations with the West as a result of 
Gorbachev's new thinking redounded to the KGB' s 
activities in the West. Thus, as with the period of 
detente, the relaxation of East-West relations under 
Gorbachev opened the way for more responsibilities and 
opportunities for the KGB rather than fewer.
The KGB's position as an actor in domestic and 
foreign-affairs policymaking continued to give it a 
unique, dual role. The KGB had an ambivalent 
relationship to Gorbachev's overall reform program: On 
the one hand, the KGB had much to gain in terms of 
international operations through the opening of
58Richard K. Herrmann, "Soviet Behavior in Regional 
Conflicts," World Politics, Vol. 44, April 1992, pp. 460, 438.
124
Chapter 3 Foreign Policy Decisionmaking under Gorbachev
relations with the West. But on the other hand, 
relaxation of the Soviet totalitarian system stood to 
threaten the KGB's domestic status as the guardian of 
the Party. There was KGB resistance to domestic change, 
which had an impact on its contribution to foreign 
policy formulation. For example, the KGB sought to use 
its participation in the foreign policy formulation 
process to influence Soviet domestic politics. 
Gorbachev said that on occasions when he was on the 
verge of a major decision, he would receive warnings 
from both the KGB's First Chief Directorate as well as 
from military intelligence about some dire Western 
threat to the Soviet Union. After a certain point, 
Gorbachev claimed he could predict "absolutely" what 
they were going to send him and when.59 If Gorbachev's 
claims are true, it must mean that at some point KGB 
information became of dubious value to him, causing the 
organization's influence to decline. Thus, the KGB 
reduced rather than expanded its influence.
Significantly, there was not a dramatic increase 
in oversight of security organs' activities. The role 
of the Party in the oversight process was reduced and 
taken up by the newly-formed bodies such as the 
reconstituted Supreme Soviet and the USSR Security 
Council. But both were in their own ways ineffective. 
Legislative committees concerned with intelligence 
oversight were populated by former intelligence 
personnel who were disinclined to place controls on the 
KGB. The USSR Security Council, nearly all of whose 
members either participated in or supported the August 
1991 putsch, proved to be more interested in reversing 
reform rather than moving forward with it. New controls
59Martin Ebon, KGB: Death and Rebirth. (London: Praeger,
1994), p. 37.
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on the intelligence services were thus not a concern 
for the Security Council.
A few months after the August 1991 coup attempt, 
the KGB was officially abolished (in November 1991) and 
five separate follow-on agencies replaced it, but most 
of the staff was retained, even after Russia took over 
control of the KGB's successors in December 1991.60 The 
result was the retention of old personnel.
Without detailed information about how much or 
what aspects of the old KGB operations survived, it is 
difficult to determine how much of the institutional 
memory of the KGB was retained or which established 
patterns of participation in foreign policy formulation 
were carried over. It is possible to surmise, however, 
that the closed nature of intelligence organizations in 
general, and of KGB follow-on organizations in 
particular, meant that they were under no public 
pressure to change patterns of behavior established in 
the past.
The Role of the Military
During the Gorbachev period, the influence of the 
uniformed military and defense industry first went 
through a period of radical decline and then 
resurgence. During the first part of the Gorbachev era, 
the military establishment's role in foreign policy 
formulation was downgraded from its previously 
predominant position in making national security 
policy. Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, was not prone to 
defending the interests of the defense industrial 
complex. Nor did Gorbachev feel beholden to the 
uniformed military during his first years in power.
60ibid., p. 22.
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In practical terms, the expansion of the circle of 
decisionmakers in foreign policy meant that the 
military establishment lost its virtual guarantee of 
political support for its programs. In the realm of 
arms control, where the military had previously enjoyed 
predominant sway, civilians took over most of the 
policymaking.61 Owing to the prominence of arms control 
as an international relations issue during Gorbachev's 
period in power, the Soviet leader took a great 
interest in formulating the Soviet Union's position 
himself, sometimes on the spot with foreign leaders, as 
discussed above. This reflected Gorbachev's dynamism 
and eagerness to achieve breakthroughs in foreign 
policy, a process which could have been slowed-down 
with each additional layer of bureaucracy.
The more decisive role played by Soviet 
legislative bodies under Gorbachev meant that the 
uniformed military's participation in lawmaking took on 
more significance. Some of the Supreme Soviet's best 
known conservative deputies wore the uniforms of the 
Soviet armed forces, a feature of the Soviet system 
which made it stand apart from other legislatures 
around the world.
More significantly, the legislature became the 
venue for intra-military debates about reform. As 
Holoboff notes:
Initially there existed an idea that 
these deputies would form a cohesive 
lobby in the Soviet parliament for 
military interests. However, what 
occurred was in fact the opposite. By 
late autumn [1989] it became clear that
61Scott R. Atkinson, Soviet Defense Policy Under Gorbachev: 
The Growing Civilian Influence. (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1990).
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specific interest groups within the 
military existed, and that this would 
be the main fuel for firing debates on 
military reform.62
Thus, rather than serving as a platform for monolithic 
armed forces interests, the legislature became the 
forum for debating what those interests were.
The military's voice in politics was far from 
lamed by its own internal discussion, even if that 
discussion was one conducted publicly in the chambers 
of the legislature. The fact that Boris Yeltsin chose 
the Afghanistan war hero Alexander Rutskoi to be his 
vice presidential candidate in the June 1991 Russian 
republic presidential elections was a sign that the 
military's politicization could reach high into 
positions of executive power.
The downgrading of the Soviet military in Soviet 
society as a whole and in the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy formulation was radically reversed toward the 
end of the Gorbachev era. As Gorbachev came under 
domestic political pressure, he started making 
concessions to the military, attempting to win its 
support in politics. An example of the impact of 
Gorbachev's politicization of the military can be found 
in relation to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE) . Following the signing of the CFE Treaty in 
November 1990, the military insisted that a large 
portion of CFE-limited equipment be redeployed east of 
the Urals, out of the geographic range of the treaty. 
The Soviet Foreign Ministry fiercely refused to accept
62Elaine Holoboff, The Crisis in Soviet Military Reform. 
(London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 29.
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such a redeployment, but Gorbachev granted the military 
its way.63
The Role of the Foreign Ministry
The Soviet Foreign Ministry became a more 
important player in foreign policy formulation during 
the Gorbachev period. This was in part due to the 
occupant of the post of foreign minister from July 1985 
to December 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze. There were a 
number of factors enabling Shevardnadze to bring the 
Foreign Ministry to the forefront of foreign 
policymaking. At the outset, his closeness to Gorbachev 
politically seemed particularly decisive. Shevardnadze 
shared Gorbachev's disillusionment with the state of 
the Soviet system and could convey to the outside world 
the sincerity of the leadership's desire to change that 
system. Shevardnadze recalled in his memoirs his early 
days with Gorbachev, before either of them reached 
international prominence, when they "scarcely talked of 
anything else" except the "many absurdities of our 
life."64 This statement revealed the continuing 
importance of interpersonal contact among Soviet 
leaders in the process of policy initiation. 
Discussions taking place in the informal setting of a 
vacation resort -- not a high-level policy meeting in 
the Politburo -- were events which shaped the later 
overhaul of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev.
The solidarity between Shevardnadze and Gorbachev 
meant that at least initially, before Shevardnadze 
resigned feeling betrayed by Gorbachev, that foreign
63Harry Gelman, "Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet 
Military Institution," Adelphi Papers, No. 258, Spring 1991, p. 49
64Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom. 
(London: Sinclair-Stevenson Limited, 1991), p. 26.
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partners could see that Shevardnadze was an 
interlocutor close to the top leader. In contrast to 
Gromyko, Shevardnadze was not an inflexible mouthpiece 
of the Soviet government. Rather, he was someone close 
enough to Gorbachev to be able to take initiatives with 
foreign partners, confident, for the most part, that 
Gorbachev would support these initiatives.
Andrei Gromyko's departure from the Foreign 
Ministry itself contributed significantly to the change 
in the Soviet approach to foreign affairs. While 
Gromyko had shown himself willing to support Gorbachev, 
delivering a glowing speech nominating Gorbachev to the 
position of general secretary,65 he exemplified the 
type of foreign relations and international image that 
Gorbachev sought to jettison. Equally important, the 
change of command at the Foreign Ministry meant that 
Gromyko's accumulated personal power there could be 
neatly eliminated and the process of ensuring loyalty 
to someone of Gorbachev's own choosing begun.
One of the early changes at the Foreign Ministry 
was to bring academics and institute researchers into 
the policy engineering phase of the policymaking 
process. The idea behind the creation of the MFA's 
Scientific Coordinating Center was to institutionalize 
the cooperation between institutes and diplomats, 
although this Center never managed to gain much 
influence. Other innovations in the Foreign Ministry 
included the publication of information-rich reports 
about the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, including 
detailed chronicles of Soviet foreign relations and
65See Gromyko's speech to the Central Committee nominating 
Gorbachev as general secretary in Materiali Vneocherednogo Plenuma 
Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS. (Moscow: Political Literature
Publishing House, 11 March 1985), pp. 6-8.
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analysis of topical issues, such as the redefinition of 
Soviet national interests.66 The MFA's structure -- the 
way geographical lines were drawn between departments - 
- also changed, thus dividing the world into regions 
which corresponded more readily to the political map of 
the world as it appeared during the 1980s.67
The MFA's Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations, which used to be the channel for entry into 
a diplomatic career for many children of Party 
officials, eliminated the requirement for enrollees to 
be CPSU or Komsomol members. The Institute also 
officially abolished the quotas designed to ensure 
various sectors of society would be represented 
(collective farm workers, factory workers, etc.) and 
based admission on merit.68
More generally, the upgrading of the MFA in 
foreign policy decisionmaking occurred because the role 
of the Party and its institutions had been downgraded. 
As the above discussion of the International Department 
indicated, this key Party institution lost much of its 
access to top decisionmaking early in Gorbachev's 
tenure. The MFA was thus rid of one of its most serious 
rivals in determining the USSR's foreign policy course. 
Ultimately, though, it was the persistent meddling in 
foreign policy by another rival, the military, which
66Suzanne Crow, "The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Assesses its Course," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 3 (17 May
1991), pp. 7-10.
67For details, see Suzanne Crow, "Vestnik MID: The Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Window on Itself," RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 
Vol. 2, No. 24 (15 June 1990).
68S. Cheremin, "Without the Secret Stamp," Interview with 
Moscow State Institute of International Relations Rector A. I. 
Stepanov, Pravda, 6 July 1991, p. 3. Joint Publications Research 
Service Report, 25 July 1991, p. 2.
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prompted Shevardnadze to give up his position as 
foreign minister.69
The Role of Research Institutes and the Media
Soviet research institutes acquired new roles in 
the Gorbachev era owing to the opening up of the Soviet 
system to increased criticism, information, and input 
from people outside the inner circle of policymakers. A 
major change in the flow of information occurred with 
the partial lifting of secrecy in areas such as data on 
Soviet force levels and defense budget.70 Researchers 
and journalists were poised to benefit from glasnost
and used their fora as platforms to promote new ideas. 
The change did not occur immediately or completely, but 
steadily, meaning that Soviet foreign policy was 
becoming an issue area where outsiders could publicly 
voice opinions and possibly gain a say in policymaking.
In addition to the impact of glasnost, Gorbachev's 
reliance on scholars as advisers meant that the 
academic community was playing a much more active role 
in policymaking than before. For example, a team of 
researchers in the Academy of Sciences headed by 
Vitalii Zhurkin appears to have instigated a discussion 
of unilateral conventional arms cuts, an idea which 
ultimately held sway over policy, against the wishes of 
the military.71 Whereas earlier, scholars received 
requests for reports and studies from top Party
69When Shevardnadze resigned in December 1990, he did so 
with thinly veiled protests about the incursions of the military 
in politics and warnings of dictatorship. See his resignation 
speech in Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, op. 
cit., pp. 201-204.
70Scott Atkinson, Soviet Defense Policy under Gorbachev: The
Growing Civilian Influence, op. cit., p. 21.
1:LIbid. , p. 19.
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officials, academics' work had more clout after their 
former bosses had become part of the ruling elite.72 
The channels between Yakovlev and IMEMO were natural 
ones since he had directed the institute's work, knew 
its researchers, and was open to contacts with them.
Academy of Sciences research institutions were 
guaranteed a bloc of votes in the first round of 
elections to the reconstituted Supreme Soviet.73 The 
aforementioned MFA Scientific Coordinating Center was 
another new channel for researchers to influence 
policymaking. The Center's director, Vladimir Shustov, 
placed emphasis on including more academic researchers 
in embassies and on negotiating teams74, but as noted 
above, this Center did not manage to gain much 
influence primarily because of rapid unraveling of 
control in the Soviet Union as a whole.
The fact that the new leadership in the Kremlin 
was more interested in improving East-West relations 
meant that researchers had the chance to increase 
contacts with the objects of their study -- countries 
in the West. The so-called mezhdunarodniki
(internationalists) who dealt with Western countries 
would better positioned to make trips abroad and 
receive information from foreign counterparts in the 
climate of detente.
Of course, the impact of the Kremlin's policy 
preferences on the output of scholarly research was, at
72"Inside Gorbachev's Think Tank," World Monitor, August 
1989, p. 30.
73Jeanette Voas, Preventing Future Afghanistans: Reform in
Soviet Policymaking on Military Intervention Abroad. (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Center For Naval Analyses, 1990), p. 35.
74Vladimir Shustov, "Diplomacy and Science," International 
Affairs (Moscow), April 1990.
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some level, still being felt. In the broadest terms, 
researchers were still telling the leadership what they 
thought it wanted to hear. The feeling among 
researchers that they were having only a minimal impact 
on policy continued. In some cases, they found 
fulfilling za.ka.zi (orders) for reports from the top
leadership a meaningless exercise because "they don't 
pay attention to them anyway."75 The migration of some 
uniformed military strategists into the institutes to 
study military policy and arms control probably also 
irritated the veteran civilian analysts, who had long 
been sidelined on strategic issues by military 
strategists.76
The sometimes triangular relationship between 
academic research, journalism, and positions in 
policymaking continued to exist in Gorbachev's Soviet 
Union. As before, prominent journalists sometimes 
turned up in academic research and then in official 
policymaking positions. Evgenii Primakov, who went from 
research to journalism and back to research (as head of 
IMEMO) before becoming a full-time policymaker is a 
good example of this.
As was the case in academia, pluralism left some 
of the media feeling excluded from policymaking. New 
newspapers were created either by the government or in 
the small but developing private sector. Moreover, 
existing newspapers, feeling the decrease in government 
control, began to editorialize along political lines 
which were developing in the USSR.
75"Inside Gorbachev's Think Tank," World Monitor, op. cit.,
p. 36.
76Albert Z. Connor and Robert G. Poirier, "The Institutes of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences: An Examination of Their Roles in
Soviet Doctrine and Strategy," Journal of Soviet Military Studies. 
Vol. 4, No. 1 (March) 1991, pp. 70-73.
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The media became the forum for all manner of 
questions, from Stalin's collectivization to the 
invasion of Afghanistan. As Tolz has pointed out, the 
eagerness of the media to tackle difficult questions 
was not surprising given the debates which had taken 
place in samizdat (underground) literature for years.77
To be sure, the Soviet press did not become 
completely free under Gorbachev, and irresponsible 
journalism began to become a problem as state control 
diminished. For example, news stories sometimes 
contained more opinion than fact. But, taken as a 
whole, under Gorbachev the Soviet press was far freer 
to report and offer policy advocacy than it had been in 
the past.
The Russian Republic's Foreign Policy Structures
Thus far, this study has said little about the 
role of the republics in the making of Soviet foreign 
policy. This reflects the fact that for most of the 
USSR's existence, the 15 republics' power to contribute 
to Soviet foreign policy formulation was limited.78
The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR), like the other republics, had acquired in 1944 
the right to maintain foreign relations and to create 
its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.79 In addition, the
77Vera Tolz, "The Impact of Glasnost, " in Vera Tolz and Iain 
Elliott, eds. The Demise of the USSR: From Communism to 
Independence. (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), pp. 94-95.
78Even the Ukrainian and Belarusian republics, which enjoyed 
independent seats in the United Nations, were not able to conduct 
an independent foreign policy contrary to the wishes of the 
central Soviet government.
19Diplomaticheskii slovar', 1985: 222-223 and Edward L.
Crowley, ed., The Soviet Diplomatic Corps 1917 - 1967. Compiled by 
the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany,
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1977 RSFSR Constitution included provisions granting 
limited powers to the Russian republic to maintain its 
own diplomatic relations. Article 75 of the RSFSR 
constitution said: "The RSFSR has the right to enter
into relations with foreign states, to conclude 
treaties with them and to exchange diplomatic and 
consular representatives, and to participate in the 
activities of international organizations."80 Article 
115 elaborated the provisions for actually doing this: 
"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR...ratifies and denounces treaties to which the 
RSFSR is a party; appoints and recalls diplomatic 
representatives of the RSFSR to foreign states and at 
international organizations; accepts credentials and 
letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of 
foreign states accredited to it."81 But the USSR 
constitution made it clear (in Article 73) that the 
Russian republic could take actions only to the extent 
that they did not interfere with the central 
government's preferences. In addition, the margin for 
the RSFSR to conduct its own foreign policy was 
obviously limited due to the strictly centralized 
nature of the USSR, the close identification of goals 
among officials at the USSR and RSFSR level, and the 
RSFSR's legal disadvantage if it sought to take any 
action that challenged the preferences of the USSR 
leadership.
This situation for Russia and the other republics 
changed dramatically during the Gorbachev era, as the
published by Scarecrow Press, Inc. Metuchen, New Jersey USA, 1970, 
p. 190
80Feldbrugge, F.J.M, ed. The Constitutions of the USSR and 
the Union Republics. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff
International Publishers B.V., 1979, p. 295.
81Ibid.
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levers of Soviet power shifted and began to
disintegrate. The RSFSR had the capacity to assert 
control over the bulk of the USSR's wealth, territory, 
and population, and it was able, when the time came, to 
challenge the Soviet authorities for a greater say in 
the making of foreign policy. It was the authority over 
the Soviet Union's budget that gave Russia the 
political power -- including in the realm of foreign 
policy -- which it needed to assert itself on the
global stage. Within a short period of time, Russia was
able to displace the USSR as the master of the Kremlin
and its foreign policy.
The Russian Foreign Ministry was a small and 
rather inconsequential organ until the last years of 
the Soviet Union's existence. Russia had about 3 0 
diplomats during the 1980s, and much of their work was 
limited to preparing for visits between republican 
functionaries and provincial counterparts from other 
federal states. Anything signed on the part of a USSR 
republic contained the notation that the republic was 
part of a unitary state, the USSR, and subordinated its 
policy to that of the central state.82
The Russian MFA was considered a backwater for 
most in the Soviet diplomatic community. Salaries and 
privileges were much lower than those that came with 
jobs at the USSR MFA.83 The Russian Foreign Ministry 
also received very little information: TASS, some of
82Dmitri Rurikov, "How It All Began: An Essay on New
Russia's Foreign Policy," in Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. 
Miller, Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from
Moscow. (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 128-128.
83Ibid., p. 136.
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the special TASS for government officials, and a few 
foreign publications.84
While working there often meant being cut off from 
Soviet diplomatic decisionmaking, positions at the 
level of deputy minister or higher were not entirely 
unacceptable and could be considered a form of 
promotion. Anything lower than that level was to be 
considered a dishonorable demotion.85 Perhaps the one 
attraction of the Russian MFA was the position of 
foreign minister: He was extended the right to sit on 
the Collegium of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But even 
at this level, it was not the RSFSR Foreign Ministry 
work itself which was attractive, but the access that 
this work provided to Soviet institutions.
The Russian Foreign Ministry became a more 
interesting place to work as Boris Yeltsin's reformist 
team in the Russian republic began to challenge 
Gorbachev's central authorities. Russia had declared 
its sovereignty in June 1990, and this declaration of 
sovereignty held the seeds of an independent foreign 
policy. The sovereignty declaration established that 
the RSFSR maintained the "complete authority for the 
RSFSR in resolving all questions relating to state and 
public life with the exception of those which it 
voluntarily hands over to USSR jurisdiction." It also 
asserted "the primacy of the RSFSR constitution and 
laws on the territory of the RSFSR, " deeming those 
Union laws contravening RSFSR laws defunct. Even in 
those areas that Russia decided could be handled by the 
Union, the republic maintained the right to participate
84Ijbid. , p. 127.
85M. Bezrukov, "Forging the Russian Federation Foreign 
Policy," Current Politics and Economics of Russia. Vol. 3 Nos. 1- 
2, p. 46.
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in exercising that power. The sovereignty declaration 
also pointed out that RSFSR borders could not be 
changed against the will of the Russian people and 
confirmed that Russia maintained the right to secede 
from the USSR.86
More generally, Russia and the other republics 
began to assert unilaterally more control over their 
foreign policies during the tenure of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, both as a result of the changes in the 
USSR's political structures and as a result of the 
republican leaders' growing awareness of their ability 
to exert greater control over affairs at the republican 
level. The increasing latitude for the republics to 
determine their own foreign policy lines increased the 
appetites of republican officials for more control. 
Ultimately, as the USSR's demise drew near, the 
republics, especially Russia, went beyond their strict 
legal limits to act. At this point though, the central 
authority no longer had the cohesion to oppose them. By 
the end of 1990, all of the USSR republics had declared 
independence or some form of sovereignty which 
challenged the authority of the center by proclaiming 
supremacy of all-Union laws and republican ownership of 
natural resources.87 Much of their initial foreign 
policy activity occurred between the USSR republics 
themselves, as sovereign and independent republics.
But Russia's sights were also set on the outside 
world. A case in point was the visit of Boris Yeltsin, 
then chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, to the 
Kurile Islands in August 1990. There, Yeltsin proposed
e&Sovetskaya Rossiya, 14 June 1990, p. 1.
87Ann Sheehy, "Nationalism and Personal Ambitions," in Vera 
Tolz and Iain Elliott, eds. The Demise of the USSR: From Communism 
to Independence. (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), p. 14.
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that the islands remain under Soviet control but should 
be demilitarized. This kind of activity showed the
extent of Russia's ambitions in playing a global role 
independent of Soviet central power.
Foreign trade was among the first areas to be
addressed both in Russia's agreements with other Soviet 
republics and in accords with foreign countries. In 
November 1990, the RSFSR signed its first direct trade 
agreement with a foreign government, a five-year accord 
with Malta to exchange surplus Russian coal to that 
country for consumer goods.88 The economic aspect of
foreign affairs, both in terms of what Russia could 
bring in and which of its resources were going out, 
became the focal point of discussions between RSFSR and 
Soviet officials. Russia's new, independent foreign 
policy thus contained a strong domestic political
component.
This became increasingly clear in late 1990, when 
Yeltsin and Gorbachev agreed to hold talks before any 
major new laws and edicts were issued. In December 1990 
the war of the budgets began with the Russian 
parliament voting to cut its contribution to the 
federal USSR budget by some 80 percent.89 As part of 
the settlement in January 1991 between Russian and 
Soviet authorities to increase Russia's contribution to 
the budget, Boris Yeltsin extracted the agreement that 
Russia would be kept informed about foreign agreements 
signed by Moscow, and called for regular consultations 
to be held between RSFSR and Soviet Foreign Ministry 
officials.90 Russia's concern was not only to establish
88Reuters, 4 November 1990.
89AFP, 8 January 1991.
90Radio Moscow, 13 November 1990.
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its authority as a player in global affairs, but also 
to ensure that it would not be burdened with debts 
incurred by central government officials.91 By this 
point, it was unclear where domestic policy ended and 
foreign policy began. The blurring of the lines between 
Russia's domestic and foreign policy was to persist 
well into Russian independence.
As Russia's foreign policy began to develop, so 
did the Russian foreign ministry as an institution. In 
October 1990, the post of RSFSR foreign minister, which 
had been vacant,92 was taken over by Andrei Kozyrev, a 
department director at the USSR MFA. This development 
suggested that the Russian Foreign Ministry was no 
longer considered the backwater that it once had been. 
When Andrei Kozyrev gave up his position as director of 
the USSR MFA's department of International 
Organizations and accepted the post of Russian Foreign 
Minister in October 1990, he did so out of the 
conviction that he was joining the forces that favored 
democracy. In a June 1994 interview, Kozyrev said:
My feeling was that the momentum of 
democratic reform in the country was 
shifting from the group around 
Gorbachev to the group around Yeltsin.
I had not dreamed of the dissolution or 
disappearance of the Soviet Union. But 
I did have in mind a notion of a 
commonwealth or integrated structure of 
more or less independent states 
substituting for the Soviet Union.93
91Statement by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, 
Komsomolskaya pravda, 26 December 1990.
92M. Bezrukov, "Forging the Russian Federation Foreign 
Policy," Current Politics and Economics of Russia, op. cit., 
p. 45.
93Suzanne Crow, Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, "An 
Interview with Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3 No. 
28 (July 1994), p. 1.
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Others apparently had the same feelings. During the 
first half of 1991, the Russian MFA's staff tripled in 
size and three deputy ministers were added. The Russian 
MFA's development accelerated as the Soviet authority 
weakened in all areas following the August coup. By the 
end of 1991, the leadership of the Russian MFA had 
taken control of the Soviet MFA's personnel and office 
space. More importantly, Russia took over the USSR's 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council 
and all of its international commitments.
Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition
Models
During the Gorbachev period, a process of 
political reformation and liberalization was clearly 
underway. Therefore, this chapter serves both as a 
source of possible policy traits in Russia and as the 
beginning of the transition period.
The bureaucratic politics model still holds some 
explanatory power for the Soviet Union during the 
Gorbachev period. In contrast to the situation under 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, foreign policy 
formulation under Gorbachev became progressively less 
of a context in which one would expect the bureaucratic 
politics model to be a useful tool. The institutional 
interests which had existed prior to Gorbachev's 
arrival in power were damaged because of the 
institutional reforms undertaken during his tenure in 
power. The situation became one of governmental chaos.
While Gorbachev declared the goal of developing a 
rule of law state, and some progress in this direction 
was made, the legal framework's development could not 
keep pace with institutional decay and the concomitant 
deterioration of rules and standard operating
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procedures. This meant that the internal logic of the 
Soviet system had dissipated, but had not been replaced 
by features seen in democratic systems such as 
investigative journalism, accountability of public 
officials, and, of course, the rewards and punishments 
dealt out by the ballot box.
Here, features of the transition model are 
instructive. There was, as in transition states, an 
excessive accretion of power to the chief executive. 
Whereas the pre-Gorbachev period had seen power 
concentrate in a top group, this power was re-allocated 
by Gorbachev, much of it ending up in the hands of the 
USSR president.
Systemic change, irrespective of its content, was a 
major factor in the way foreign policy decisions were 
made under Gorbachev. Profound and nearly-constant 
change was the Leitmotiv of the Gorbachev era. This
fact makes it a difficult subject for the bureaucratic 
politics model to explain. With its focus on procedure, 
routine, and patterns of institutional behavior, the 
bureaucratic politics model is deprived of some of its 
strongest inputs because of the institutional flux of 
the Gorbachev period.
It is noteworthy that foreign policy was very much 
a tool of Gorbachev's reform. However, this occurred 
not in a retrograde fashion but in a progressive 
fashion. That is, liberal foreign policy positions were 
among the foremost examples of Gorbachev's 
liberalization. Gorbachev sought to use this 
liberalization simultaneously to convince domestic 
reformers of his willingness to make deep-seated 
reforms of the Soviet system and to convince foreign 
partners of the same.
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Conflict, an essential element of the bureaucratic 
politics approach, was present in foreign policy 
formulation under Gorbachev. In contrast to the
Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko era, conflict over policy 
choice was more pronounced and clearly more public. The 
arrival of new categories of voices in the public
debate about foreign policy, including those in the 
legislature, the media, and the military, added an 
entirely new dimension to the Soviet foreign policy 
discussion.
While there was certainly more policy conflict and 
a more public debate about foreign policy, this did not 
always translate into influence over policy output. 
Gorbachev often took decisions alone, without reference 
to the advice and opinions of his advisors, ministers, 
or deputies in the legislature, and he appears to have
begun ignoring the analysis and warning of his
intelligence services. Thus the role of Gorbachev as a 
lone actor in foreign policy stands out as a difficult 
problem for the bureaucratic politics model to 
incorporate.
Indeed, in some cases Allison's statement, "the 
actor is not a monolithic 'nation' or 'government' but 
rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations 
on top of which government leaders sit,"94 rings 
distinctly untrue when considering Gorbachev's on-the- 
spot decisions with foreign leaders. In such cases, 
decisions were not the resultant of competing views but 
the opinion of a single individual bearing the 
imprimatur of official policy.
94Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 173.
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The Gorbachev period suggests that the bureaucratic 
politics model relies more on the presence of order in 
foreign policy formulation than on the presence of 
bureaucratic conflict. This hypothesis is examined in 
greater detail in chapters four and five, as are the 
other characteristics of the transition model.
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Russian Foreign Policy Formulation 
in the F irst R epublic
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
described the situation in Russia in early 1993 as one 
characterized by a "catastrophic loss of 
manageability."1 Chernomyrdin was probably thinking more 
of the uncollected taxes and the stalemate between the 
president and the legislature, but his description 
would have been apt for the conditions of Russia's 
foreign policymaking as well. Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev offered a glimpse of his frustration with the 
question: "Why is the military deciding the most
important political issues?"2 This question signaled 
that independent Russia was still experiencing problems 
plaguing Kozyrev's Soviet predecessors in the Foreign 
Ministry.
The fragmentation of foreign policy formulation in 
Russia manifested itself in a public competition over 
policy options among policymakers. Russia's foreign 
policy debates took place in the open and in some cases 
even involved foreign partners in Russia's internal 
policymaking struggles. Frequently more than one option 
was pursued simultaneously, making the government of 
Boris Yeltsin appear an unreliable interlocutor.
^■Stephen White, After Gorbachev. Fourth edition reprinted 
with revisions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
p. 274.
2Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992,
p. 3.
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The internal workings of Russia's foreign policy 
formulation were opened up for outside view offering a 
new opportunity to subject Russian foreign policy to 
the kind of analysis that Kremlinologists had been 
unable to perform on Soviet foreign policy owing to 
extreme Soviet secrecy. The fragmentation of Russia's 
foreign policy made it a particularly interesting 
context in which to test the bureaucratic politics 
model because it was this type of "pulling and hauling" 
described by Allison which provided the data to plug 
into the model. The Russian case was especially 
enticing because it offered almost real-time 
information about policymaking, not historical data 
about events of years past.
To a large extent, the faulty or incomplete 
division of powers among Russia's governing 
institutions was to blame for the fragmentation of the 
foreign policy formulation process during the first 
republic. The possession of extensive powers by both 
the legislative and president was compounded in 
independent Russia by competition between the 
ministries and other policymaking bodies. In addition, 
the memory of the collapse of the central Soviet 
authority was fresh enough in the minds of independent 
Russia's official class to leave policymakers 
preoccupied with the acquisition and defense of 
institutional power. Internal Russian power struggles 
within and between the various branches of government 
intensified.
No small part in the conflict over policy was 
played by the dilemma about identity facing the Russian 
government in general and Russian foreign policy in 
particular. Russia set out to remake itself as a state, 
seeking to overcome the effects of a long history of 
totalitarianism. This was an extraordinary undertaking
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by any measure, one that affected all aspects of life 
in Russia, and one that also had important implications 
for Russia's interaction with other states. Russia was 
compelled to redefine its national interests and make 
major adjustments in the sphere of foreign policy. In 
some ways, Russia's search for a new set of national 
interests resembled that of the USSR during Mikhail 
Gorbachev's years in power. In other ways, however, the 
question of national interests was much more 
complicated for Russia than it had been for the Soviet 
Union under Gorbachev. Unlike their Soviet
predecessors, Russian policymakers had to factor an 
entirely new region into their outlook on the world -- 
that comprising the other former republics of the USSR 
in their role as newly independent, often self-
assertive states. These issues had an impact at all 
three stages of the policymaking process -- problem 
recognition, politics, and policy engineering.
These enormous tasks, together with an attendant 
polarization of opinion about how to deal with them,
pitted Russia's policymakers against one another. The 
enormity of the undertaking meant that in many cases
their struggles were not merely over one specific
policy but over which worldview would prevail in 
Russia. Indeed, as Braun has noted, in Russia it is not 
only difficult to predict the future but also to 
'predict the past' -- a reference to the many blank 
spots and cataclysms in Russian history.3
Russia's problems in identifying its national 
interests and elaborating foreign policy did not stop 
with identity and worldview. Exacerbating the situation
3Aurel Braun, "Russia: The Land Inbetween," in Aurel Braun 
and Stephen Scheinberg, eds. The Extreme Right: Freedom and
Security at Risk. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 161.
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was a lack of clear definition of which actors had the 
right to participate in the policymaking process. Lines 
of authority crossed in many areas, and it was unclear 
to what extent, if at all, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the legislature, supraministerial bodies 
associated with the executive presidency, or other 
agencies and groups should be involved in making 
decisions. Russian President Boris Yeltsin himself 
wavered on the question of where jurisdictional lines 
were drawn, thus muddling the situation even more.
Just as the Soviet leadership had experienced 
difficulty in managing the affairs of the country as 
its governing architecture was restructured, Russia's 
leadership encountered similar obstacles to running the 
Russian Federation. These obstacles were to be found in 
nearly all realms of policymaking, foreign policy 
included. The result was a competition between the 
executive and legislative branches culminating in the 
dissolution of the Russian parliament in September 
1993, and the holding of new elections with the 
adoption of a new constitution in December of that 
year.
Thg Distribution of Power
The division of power between Russia's executive 
and legislative branches of government paralleled the 
system of power sharing in place in the later years of 
the Gorbachev era as described in the previous chapter. 
That is, the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's 
Deputies enjoyed significant powers over foreign-policy 
making. At the same time, just prior to the Soviet 
Union's collapse, President Boris Yeltsin was granted 
by the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) 
emergency powers to handle the exceptional situation on 
the eve of and following the collapse of the USSR.
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But as Yeltsin and the legislature continued to 
clarify ambiguities in the situation and distribute the 
powers necessary to run the country, the two branches 
of government came more and more into conflict. The 
Congress of People's Deputies was granted the power to 
determine the general guidelines of foreign policy. The 
Supreme Soviet was responsible for directing defense 
and security policy; confirming candidates for minister 
of defense, security, internal affairs, foreign 
affairs, as well as the prime minister; voting 
confidence or no-confidence in the government; and 
suspending and overturning (with Constitutional Court 
approval) edicts of the president. The president's 
powers included heading the Security Council (which had 
not yet been established); conducting negotiations in 
the name of the Russian Federation, naming candidates 
for minister of defense, security, internal affairs, 
foreign affairs, as well as the prime minister; and 
taking measures to ensure state and public security.
The power to direct and supervise the work of the 
ministries was shared by the Congress of People's 
Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the president. The 
powers required to defend Russia's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity were contested by each of the 
executive and legislative branches of government. In 
the December 1992 version of the Russian constitution, 
the question of which branch had the right to mobilize 
the Russian armed forces was simply left unanswered.4
4Article 29 said only that the defense of the fatherland was 
"a most important function of the state and was the cause of the 
entire people." For the December 1992 version of the Russian 
constitution, see W. E. Butler, Collected Legislation of Russia. 
Booklet I 1-9, Oceana Publications, Inc. London, 1993.
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The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment
The influence of the Russian Foreign Ministry on 
foreign policy formulation was not constant. Recalling 
the situation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry under 
Gromyko, as discussed in chapter two, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry was frequently sidelined on an issue 
by another player. In some situations, for example, in 
Russia's official policy toward the sanctions against 
rump Yugoslavia, Russia's diplomats had a great deal of 
say over how policy was handled. (This is the subject 
of chapter six.) In other cases the Foreign Ministry 
was effectively subordinated to other government 
departments. While foreign ministers in most countries, 
Russia included, cannot claim to be sole decisionmaker 
on foreign-policy questions, their ministries are 
normally the only government institution whose main 
purpose is to study questions of foreign relations, 
suggest foreign policy positions in discussions with 
the chief executive and other key officials, and 
implement policy after it is decided. During Russia's 
first republic, the Foreign Ministry did not, for 
various reasons, utilize its unique institutional 
position.
In terms of exercising leadership in foreign 
policy, the MFA came under constant challenge, and its 
voice was not considered authoritative on foreign 
policy questions. The MFA was unable to coordinate the 
other Russian ministries' actions relevant to foreign 
policy, in spite of the fact that Boris Yeltsin gave to 
the MFA explicit coordinating powers in the form of two 
presidential decrees in 1992. The first decree, signed 
in April, charged the Foreign Ministry with 
coordinating Russia's policies toward the other members
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of the Commonwealth of Independent States.5 The second 
decree, signed by Yeltsin in November, expanded on the 
first set of powers and put the MFA in charge of 
coordinating all foreign policy activity of the Russian 
Federation.6 By December, both decrees had been 
effectively overturned, and the Security Council's 
Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission (discussed 
in more detail below) was formally given the 
coordinating function. Foreign Minister Kozyrev had 
been seriously undermined.
This shift in powers did not boost the MFA's 
already weak institutional identity. In such an 
unstable situation, the creation of new standard 
operating procedures and actions channels was 
depressed. This, in turn, left the MFA less and less 
capable of handling the levers of control which 
remained at its disposal.
In terms of providing information and analysis to 
support its policy goals, the MFA also displayed 
shortcomings. Boris Yeltsin complained in a speech to 
the Foreign Ministry Collegium (a body comprising top 
MFA officials) in October 1992 that the MFA's analysis 
was not "sufficiently analytical and is more at the 
level of high-school students."7 Yeltsin indicated that 
there was simply not enough information coming out of 
the MFA. He also complained that the MFA was lagging
5"Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the 
Coordination of Activity in Relations with Member States of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States," Moskovskie novosti, No. 19, 
10 May 1992, p. 7.
6"Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the 
Coordination of Foreign Activity of the Russian Federation," 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 18 November 1992, p. 7.
7"This is What President Boris Yeltsin Said to the Meeting 
of the MFA Collegium," Krasnaya zvezda, 28 October 1992.
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behind events rather than anticipating them and was 
missing opportunities in foreign affairs as a result.8
Most notably, Yeltsin faulted the MFA for failing 
to show leadership in Russian foreign policy and block 
outside intrusions:
Whatever the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union was, everyone will 
remember that the Foreign Ministry 
set the tone in everything. In this 
connection I would like to commend 
it. As far as everything to do with 
the course of foreign policy was 
concerned, the Foreign Ministry 
cooperated with everyone, but did not 
let them interfere in matters that 
were the responsibility of the 
Foreign Ministry of the former Soviet 
Union [sic.] . Now, however, everyone 
who feels like interfering does so, 
and all the Russian Foreign Ministry 
does is to shut itself up in its own 
diplomatic debates...9
Yeltsin's praise of the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
probably hit a nerve and may have harmed rather than 
enhanced the MFA's command of foreign policy. It likely 
widened any lingering rifts between Soviet and Russian 
MFA staffers, a step backwards for the Russian MFA's 
institutional development. Yeltsin's harsh approach, 
while perhaps warranted, seemed ill-advised if his 
desire was to see the MFA act more authoritatively.
Boris Yeltsin's improvisations while abroad have 
also meant some reversals if not embarrassments for the 
MFA. When Yeltsin announced in Bulgaria that Russia 
would recognize Macedonia, MFA officials were thrown 
off balance and had to admit that they knew nothing of
8 Ibid.
9Radio Mayak, 27 October 1992. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report, 27 October 1992, transmitted electronically.
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the proposal.10 Similar confusion occurred during a trip 
to China in December 1992, when Yeltsin made a surprise 
announcement of a Russian-American summit to be held 
the following month. The announcement seemed to be as 
much of a surprise to the Americans as to policymakers 
in Moscow.11 Yeltsin's reputation for improvisation 
during trips abroad led to press speculation during 
Yeltsin's visit to India in January 1993 that the 
unexpected conclusion of an agreement on India's debt 
was an impromptu decision on Yeltsin's part.12 Yeltsin's 
spontaneous policymaking in some ways resembled 
Gorbachev's tendency to take advantage of his meetings 
with foreign counterparts to bypass or circumvent the 
policymaking function of his government.
If the MFA's influence on President Yeltsin was 
imperfect, its success in securing the legislature's 
support for foreign policy decisions was even more 
limited. At one point, the Supreme Soviet Chairman 
Ruslan Khasbulatov made ratification of START II 
explicitly contingent on Andrei Kozyrev's removal from 
the position of foreign minister, thus personalizing 
the discussion of foreign policy.13 Kozyrev's handling 
of deputies was sometimes arrogant and abusive, which 
reduced further the chances that the MFA and the 
legislature could reach a modus vivendi. But the
problem of the struggle between the president and the 
legislature was a much larger one, and the Foreign 
Ministry's failure to convince the parliament to
10Literatu2maya gazeta, No. 34 (19 August) 1992, p. 9.
11Chicago Tribune, 20 December 1992.
12Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 8 (24 February) 1993, p. 14. The
agreement pledged the two countries to military and technological 
cooperation, Interfax, 28 January 1993.
13ITAR-TASS World Service Moscow correspondent's report in 
English, "Khasbulatov Says No START-2 Ratification Under 
Kozyrev," ITAR-TASS, 13 April 1993.
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support foreign policy decisions was only one part of a 
much larger struggle between "old communists" in the 
legislature, on the one side, and "young Turks" 
appointed by the president, on the other.
In terms of the Foreign Ministry's ability to play 
a key role in setting the foreign-policy agenda through 
policy planning and the drafting of general foreign 
policy goals (i.e., the problem recognition phase), the 
MFA was frequently upstaged by other players. It 
managed to submit numerous drafts of the Foreign Policy 
Concept, the name given to the document outlining 
Russia's foreign policy priorities and goals.14 But the 
Concept was hardly the sole domain of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev only reluctantly agreed on 
the need for such a document,15 probably making it more 
difficult for him to control the final draft of the 
document. Ultimately, the final version of the document 
approved by Boris Yeltsin in April 1993 bore only the 
outline of the Foreign Ministry version with the 
addition of sections on economic and military security, 
defense policy, and modifications and additions on 
basic points prepared by the Foreign Ministry, as is 
discussed in more detail below.16
14Yeltsin described the purpose of the Concept thus: "Until
we understand full well what these [foreign policy] principles 
are, we cannot provide for our state to operate in the 
international arena and pursue our national interests." 
Interfax, 3 March 1993.
15Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking, " in Neil Malcolm, 
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in 
Russian Foreign Policy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), 
p. 39.
16Ibid., pp. 61-69 and Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki 
rossisskoi federatsii, Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as presented to the Committee on Foreign and Foreign 
Economic Ties of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, January 
25, 1993.
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Why the Foreign Ministry was unable to prevail in 
some key policymaking situations during the first 
republic can be explained by a few circumstances. 
First, it possessed imperfect tools. The staff 
consisted of about three-quarters of the former USSR 
Foreign Ministry staff (about 3,000 people), merged 
into the former staff of the RSFSR Foreign Ministry 
(about 24 0 people) . Animosity between some of the RSFSR 
and USSR staff existed for some time because the RSFSR 
staff inherited nearly all of the leadership positions 
within the transformed MFA, sidelining their former 
"betters" from the USSR MFA. Second, when the 40-year- 
old Andrei Kozyrev took over the Soviet MFA apparatus 
and began reorganizing and cutting staff, he and the 
former RSFSR diplomats who had taken over the MFA 
leadership were viewed as unqualified usurpers both 
within the MFA and among a wider circle of Russian 
elites.
Even within the Foreign Ministry, a struggle was 
going on over its assets. Its Committee on Foreign 
Economic Relations, which controlled sizable foreign 
assets in the form of foreign trade organizations 
established during Soviet times, was split off from the 
MFA bureaucracy after a bitter struggle, thus depriving 
the MFA of an important economic base. As Stavrakis has 
noted, this came not only at a time when the MFA was 
having difficulty defending its foreign policy line but 
also as the MFA was trying to define global economic 
integration as a major feature of its foreign policy.17 
It must be noted that this was a relatively new area of 
interest for the MFA. The foreign economic relations
17Peter Stavrakis, "State Building in Post-Soviet Russia: 
The Chicago Boys and the Decline of Administrative Capacity, " 
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Occasional Paper 
No. 254, Washington, D.C., p. 45.
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branch had been added to the Russian MFA's 
responsibilities just prior to the USSR's collapse in 
an attempt to ensure that these assets could, be 
retained by Russia. In the past, foreign economic 
relations had been handled by the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations, not by the Soviet MFA, so 
the brief period in which this was done by the Russian 
MFA was itself an anomaly. Nonetheless, the struggle 
over this competency was important because it was part 
of the overall process of institution- and authority- 
building on the part of the MFA.
Much of the impression of the MFA's incompetence 
derived from negative views about Andrei Kozyrev 
personally. He and his staff had distinguished 
themselves as Russian patriots during the August 1991 
coup, but Kozyrev was considered by many to be
unqualified for the job as Russia's chief diplomat. 
Many of his critics' views have to be considered in 
light of the fact that they wanted the job for 
themselves, but at the same time, given the challenges 
of taking over all of the Soviet Union's international 
commitments, establishing foreign relations with the 
other former Soviet republics, carving out a new place 
for Russia in world politics, and defending the MFA as 
an institution, it is reasonable to speculate that the 
post would have been better filled by a more
experienced diplomat or prominent political figure. As
a person, Kozyrev conveyed a certain amount of
diffidence if not weakness, traits which made him -- 
and his ministry -- seem an easy target for attacks.18
18This was the impression gathered by the author in her 
interview with Andrei Kozyrev, 14 June 1994, Moscow. This 
interview is published: Suzanne Crow, Therese Raphael, Claudia
Rosett, "An Interview with Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 3 No. 28 (July 1994).
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Pay at the Foreign Ministry was very low and many 
of the younger, intellectually more flexible, and 
better qualified staff members left for jobs in the 
private sector. Those who stayed were often forced to 
hold a second job to supplement their incomes. The 
situation of staff posted abroad was not much better; 
in late 1992 embassies were told to seek alternative 
sources of funding such as renting out space within 
embassy buildings and providing mediation services.19 
Such financial problems reduced morale and distracted 
the staff from their work. Considering these conditions 
and staff issues, it is not surprising that the reports 
prepared by MFA staffers were considered so poor by 
Yeltsin.
Another source for the MFA's failures derived from 
the politicization of certain prominent ambassadors and 
their failure to follow the policy guidelines set by 
their superiors in the Foreign Ministry. The most 
visible example was Ambassador to the United States 
Vladimir Lukin, who became well-known in Washington for 
his independent foreign policy line. When a replacement 
for him was sought, it was on the grounds that Kozyrev 
could not rely on him.20
In many respects, the obstacles to the Russian 
MFA's participation in policymaking are not unique to 
Russia. Diplomats in many countries are forced to 
defend their turf from encroachments by other 
ministries. In the United States, for example, the 
prerogatives of the Secretary of State have sometimes 
been usurped by the US President's National Security 
Adviser. In Russia's case, however, there is a
19Interfax, 3 November 1992.
20Interfax# 16 September 1993.
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significant difference in terms of visibility and 
degree. Conflicts among Russian policymakers were open 
to public view, with principal players turning to the 
media and even foreign interlocutors for support in 
struggles with other Russian players.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev was particularly prone to 
showing his disgruntlement in public, and he, in turn, 
was publicly criticized by both the president and the 
parliament. This made the Russian foreign policymaking 
process seem much more open-ended both in terms of its 
participants and in terms of the length of the
discussion period. Rather than achieving a policy 
resultant, as described in the bureaucratic politics 
model, the lengthy discussions about how policy was 
achieved, and whether it was right, gave made Russian 
foreign policy seem at odds with itself.
The Roles of Presidential Structures
Boris Yeltsin offered some general clues about 
policymaking patterns in 1993 when he described his 
typical weekly schedule to a reporter at a news
conference.21 On Mondays he met for one hour each with 
all of the major agencies and services of the Russian 
government. As far as relevance to foreign affairs was 
concerned, this would include the Foreign Intelligence 
Service. On Tuesdays he and the Prime Minister met to 
"consult with each other" and, as Yeltsin put it,
discuss "the questions I want to ask the government and 
the questions the government wants to ask me." On
Tuesday afternoons Yeltsin met with "different
21Boris Yeltsin remarks at news conference, Russian 
Television, 19 August 1993. Translated in "Yeltsin Opens August
19 News Conference," US Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(hereafter FBIS) Daily Report Central Eurasia, 19 August 1993, 
transmitted electronically.
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specialists," depending on the most pressing issue of 
the day. Yeltsin described these meetings as being 
"very, very useful." On Wednesdays he met with either 
the members of the Security Council or with its 
Interdepartmental Commissions. "Thursday is government 
day, " Yeltsin said, apparently referring to meetings 
with the deputy prime ministers and heads of 
ministries. Friday was the day . to work with the 
"presidential services," that is, his aides and other 
officials from the presidential staff. Saturday was the 
day for analysis and meetings "with analysts" and for 
the study of information and analysis. About once per 
month, Yeltsin met with the heads of regional 
administrations and legislatures.
Yeltsin's account of his schedule is very general, 
but his description of a typical week suggests a few 
things. First, it provides information about the 
channels through which the president received 
information from numerous places: the agencies and
services, the prime minister, the Security Council, the 
ministries, the presidential apparatus, specialists, 
and regional leaders. Second, the absence of regular 
meetings with representatives of the legislature or 
Vice President Alexander Rutskoi is noteworthy. Owing 
to the hostile relations between them and Yeltsin, the 
Russian president appears to have been avoiding direct 
discussions with them and possibly sought only to 
receive their views indirectly, through a third party. 
Yeltsin used these channels to block himself off from 
opponents.
The overall situation in Russia during the first 
republic meant that domestic policy questions dominated 
Boris Yeltsin's schedule and therefore much of the 
content of the meetings he described. The most enduring 
policy questions in 1992 and 1993 had to do with the
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struggle between Yeltsin and the legislature, economic 
reform, and the cohesion of the Russian Federation. 
These were urgent issues, far outweighing most foreign- 
policy questions.
Boris Yeltsin's political priorities were 
determined not only by the situation but also by the 
things that he personally found interesting. In 
contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin was not 
drawn to international diplomacy. If it was the 
international stage on which Mikhail Gorbachev thrived, 
it was the domestic stage that quickened Boris 
Yeltsin's pulse. Some of Yeltsin's finest political 
performances were played out not with foreign leaders 
but in the domestic political arena, often during 
crises. His lack of time and interest in foreign 
affairs affected his handling of policymaking and the 
way in which Russian foreign policy was formulated in 
general. Since he was at the pinnacle (albeit, a shaky 
one) of policymaking, it was the way he delegated 
foreign policy questions to others which had the most 
impact on its content and execution.
A good example of Yeltsin's casual approach to 
delegating authority came even before the USSR's 
collapse in the summer of 1991, when Yeltsin ordered 
his spokesman, Pavel Voshchanov, to prepare a statement 
to the leaders of the other independence-seeking Soviet 
republics attempting to dampen their enthusiasm for a 
break with the central Soviet authorities. The 
statement issued in Yeltsin's name warned that Russia 
would reserve the right to reopen discussions about 
borders and disputed territories.
This deeply upset Yeltsin, who told Voshchanov 
that he had "made a grave error" and dispatched 
presidential envoys to Ukraine and Kazakhstan to offer
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reassurances that it was not Yeltsin's intention to 
redraw borders.22 Even accounting for the possibility 
that Yeltsin concluded that the statement was an error 
only after hearing the negative international reaction, 
it is difficult to deny that Yeltsin had been quite 
free in extending his authority to his spokesman.
Presidential Aides and Advisers. The role of 
Yeltsin's aides to some extent epitomized Yeltsin's own 
preference for concentrating on domestic issues. All 
but one of his foreign policy assistants at this time 
served simultaneously as domestic advisers. As examples 
in this and later chapters will show, this situation 
impelled them to use foreign policy issues to solve 
domestic political problems.
Gennadii Burbulis, who had held various positions 
on the Yeltsin team including chief of the group of 
aides, played an important part in both domestic and 
foreign policy formulation in 1992.23 Yeltsin, via a 
February 1992 decree, put Burbulis in charge of 
managing the day-to-day operations of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry.24
Burbulis's role was not simply one of explaining 
Russian foreign policy to the press or defending 
certain foreign policy decisions. In addition, Burbulis 
made official visits abroad. In August 1992, he headed 
a Russian delegation to talk about military and
22John Kampfner, Inside Yeltsin's Russia. (London: Cassell
Publishers, Ltd, 1994), pp. 59-60.
23Burbulis had been first deputy prime minister from 
November 1991 until March 1992. Afterwards, until his dismissal 
in December 1992, he held the post of State Secretary, which 
could be considered the equivalent of presidential assistant or 
aide. The position of State Secretary was eliminated in November 
1992.
2*Rossiiskaya gazeta, 27 February 1992, p. 5.
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political cooperation with Turkey. During this visit, 
he made major pronouncements about the state of 
Russian-Turkish relations and Russia's expectations of 
Turkey, all the while speaking on behalf of the Russian 
president. Burbulis's role in foreign policy questions 
appears to have been one of dealing with the foreign 
policy issues which Yeltsin did not have the time or 
inclination to handle himself.
Sergei Stankevich, who was Yeltsin's adviser for 
political affairs until December 1993 was, more than 
Burbulis, an outspoken advocate of certain foreign 
policy positions. He called for the imposition of 
international sanctions on Moldova in June 1992 because 
of the "genocide" against ethnic Russians.25 
Furthermore, Stankevich did not refrain from 
criticizing the Russian foreign minister in public. In 
a July 1992 newspaper interview, Stankevich accused 
Kozyrev of being "overly defensive" and "inaccurate," 
adding: "The minister is hardly right to claim that the
Foreign Ministry's current 'moderate' line is opposed 
by the 'Party of War.'... There is no such party!"26 The 
criticism of Kozyrev launched by Stankevich came from 
the platform of his position as adviser to the 
president, thus raising questions about the 
cohesiveness of the Yeltsin team or whether the 
criticism was initiated by Yeltsin himself.
Stankevich concentrated his focus on the rights 
of ethnic Russians, especially in the Baltic states, 
and repeatedly threatened Latvia and Estonia with a 
sharp worsening of relations if civil rights issues
25Sergei Stankevich, "Russia Didn't Begin Yesterday and Will 
Not End Tomorrow," Trud, 12 June 1992, p.l.
26Interview with Sergei Stankevich, Izvestiya, 8 July 1992,
p. 3.
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were not resolved to Russia's satisfaction. Stankevich 
used emotional language, characterizing policies in the 
Baltic states as "ethnocratic insanity," and warning 
that ethnic Russians would seek national territorial 
autonomy in the Baltic states if they were not treated 
better.27 Stankevich's rhetoric was not meant only for 
the Russian domestic audience: He also sent a letter to 
the head of the parliamentary assembly of the Council 
of Europe in October 1992, trying to get the Council of 
Europe's attention on the matter.
Stankevich's views influenced Yeltsin. The rights 
of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states was one of the 
few foreign policy issues in which Boris Yeltsin took a 
keen interest. It was probably Stankevich who convinced 
Yeltsin that civil rights issues, which became known as 
"human rights abuses," in Estonia had to be addressed. 
The ostensible occasion for the heating up of the 
campaign came with the September 1992 parliamentary 
elections in Estonia, in which many ethnic Russians 
could not participate owing to the fact that they did 
not possess Estonian citizenship. The citizenship law 
in question had been passed seven months earlier, in 
February 1992, and had granted automatic citizenship 
only to those who were citizens of inter-war Estonia or 
their descendants. The law became a contested matter in 
Estonia because even if non-citizens had applied for 
citizenship, they would not have received it in time 
for the September 1992 parliamentary balloting.28
27ITAR-TASS, 18 November 1992.
28"Russians in Estonia: Problems and Prospects," Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C. 1992, 
pp. 1-3, and Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: The Case 
of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 
46, No. 1, 1994.
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In October 1992, Boris Yeltsin declared that the 
signing of troop withdrawal agreements with Estonia and 
Latvia would be put on hold until the "violations of 
human rights" in those countries had ceased.29. Just a 
few months earlier, in July, he had downplayed the 
potential for friction on the ethnic Russian question 
and stressed that Russians must be defended through 
political, diplomatic means, not through the use of 
force.30
The way that the Russian president1s rhetoric 
changed on the question of troop withdrawals suggests 
that the notion of shifting to a tougher line
originated with Stankevich and was adopted by Yeltsin. 
It is therefore possible to surmise that Boris Yeltsin 
could be convinced to adopt a certain stance on a
leading foreign policy issue by an aide even if it went 
against the advice of his foreign minister.
Another adviser, the only one on Yeltsin's staff 
during his first term as president who worked almost 
exclusively in the foreign affairs realm, was Dmitrii 
Ryurikov, a lawyer in the Russian Foreign Ministry's 
Treaty and Legal Affairs Department prior to the USSR's 
collapse. Based on his background and the low-profile 
he kept as a Yeltsin adviser, Ryurikov appears to have 
played the role of a foreign-affairs technocrat, not 
someone who would be inclined to view foreign policy 
issues in terms of how they could be employed for 
domestic political purposes. It may have been 
Ryurikov's tendency to stay in the background that gave
him such longevity in the job and allowed him to
29Interfax, 8 October 1992.
30Boris Yeltsin remarks during a news conference, Russian 
Television, 4 July 1992. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 4 July 1992, transmitted electronically.
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achieve one of the longest tenures of Yeltsin's 
advisers. But there might also have been a price to be
paid for not playing politics in terms of influence
over Yeltsin. As a technocrat, Ryurikov may not have
been able -- or willing -- to employ nuances and 
domestic political angles to persuade Yeltsin to adopt 
certain foreign policy positions.
The Presidential Bureaucracy. The presidential 
apparatus, the bureaucratic arm of the Russian
presidency, was another contributor to Yeltsin's 
foreign-policy views. The presidential apparatus 
consisted of numerous administrations and staffs which 
were responsible to the chief of the president's 
administration. (The aides, in contrast, reported to 
the president rather than to the chief of the 
administration.) The presidential apparatus included 
the head of the administration and his staff, the 
presidential press service, archives, publishing house, 
information-analytic services, the presidential 
security services, the staff of the vice president, and 
many other arms. It was the hub for Yeltsin's closest 
political allies, who enjoyed, as Russian policymakers 
put it, "direct access to the president."31 Significant 
growth in the presidential apparatus occurred after 
Yeltsin replaced his initial chief of staff (Yurii 
Petrov) with Sergei Filatov in January 1993. Filatov, 
who had been the first deputy chairman of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet since November 1991, was one of the few 
allies Yeltsin had in the recalcitrant Russian 
parliament. It was Filatov who believed that the 
presidential apparatus had to be expanded in order to
31Evgenii Krasnikov, "The Structure of the Russian 
Presidential Administration," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 March 1993, 
P- 1.
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help the president cope with his duties, in the absence 
of a normally-functioning legislature.
The number of analytic centers within the 
presidential apparatus quadrupled by June 1993, five 
months after Filatov took over. In addition to the 
operational-information center created under Petrov, 
three additional centers researched political problems, 
social-economic issues, and "special presidential 
programs." The purpose of these centers was to provide 
information to the president and his presidential 
structures to facilitate policy formulation.32 Despite 
their bland names, the influence of these centers was 
extensive. Their task was to filter and channel 
information going to the president and to prepare 
analyses which could decisively influence his 
preferences. They also wrote policy proposals. Unlike 
the ministries, the presidential staff had the 
advantage of being in or near the Kremlin. In terms of 
political atmospherics, parts of the presidential 
apparatus may have even benefited by the real estate 
they occupied: the former Central Committee
headquarters building at Old Square, the venue of much 
important decisionmaking in Soviet times.
Two structures within the Russian presidential 
apparatus became known for their influence on 
policymaking during the first republic: the
Presidential Council and the Security Council. Like the 
analytic centers discussed above, these structures 
enjoyed proximity to the president. Owing to Boris 
Yeltsin's deficit of time and interest in foreign
32Elena Dikun, interview with First Deputy Chief of the 
presidential administration Sergei Krasavchenko, Megalopolis- 
Ekspress, No. 25 (30 June) 1993, p. 13.
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policy generally, the role of these structures was 
important in influencing his foreign policy views.
The Presidential Council. The Presidential Council 
was a consultative body consisting of top politicians, 
scientists, economists, writers and otherwise well- 
known public figures, all with full-time jobs 
elsewhere, selected by the president to advise him on 
domestic and foreign policy issues. It was created, in 
the official words of the president's spokesman in 
early 1993, to "work out strategic proposals in 
internal and external policy which aid in the carrying 
out of reform in Russia" and to "specify mechanisms for 
pursuing a strategy for national development."33 In some 
ways, the role of the Presidential Council appears to 
have been to represent the public at large (albeit 
through elite figures) in order to replace the excluded 
legislative bodies with which Yeltsin did not or could 
not work. In hindsight, it appears that Yeltsin wanted 
to have a well-respected group of figures in place to 
support him when he took decisive action against the 
legislature.
Since members of the Presidential Council all had 
full-time jobs elsewhere, their membership in the body 
gave them the opportunity to bring to the Kremlin's 
attention matters of interest to them professionally. 
Members like Vladimir Volkov, the Director of the 
Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies; Andranik 
Migranyan, Professor of political science at the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations; or Sergei 
Karaganov, the Deputy Director of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences Institute of Europe, had an opportunity to 
put before the president their own particular policy
33Interfax, 22 February 1993.
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proposals. Migranyan, for example, indicated that his 
arguments had won out over those of the Foreign 
Ministry on the question of whether Russia could afford 
to take sides in any of the armed conflicts in the CIS, 
presumably as a result of his access to Boris Yeltsin 
via the Presidential Council.34 Of course, members of 
the Council had no guarantee that Yeltsin would listen 
to or adopt their proposals, but their access to the 
innermost corridors of policymaking was reason enough 
for them to accept unpaid membership in the body.
The Security Council. In contrast to the 
Presidential Council, the Security Council was a 
standing body, with its own bureaucracy, which 
contributed to the actual making of policy and writing 
of decisions (if not actually taking them). The 
Security Council was established by Section III of the 
Russian Federation Law on Security, promulgated in May 
1992. The envisioned scope of the council's powers 
could be gauged from the following provisions of the 
law:
The council's purpose:
The Security Council is a 
constitutional organ that performs the 
task of preparing decisions for the 
president of the Russian Federation.
Its sphere of jurisdiction:
The Security Council considers 
questions of domestic and foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation in the 
sphere of guaranteeing security: 
strategic problems of the state, as 
well as economic, social, military, 
information, ecological and other types
34Andranik Migranyan, "Russia and the Near Abroad,"
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 January 1994, pp. 4-5, 8.
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of security; preserving public health; 
long-range planning; averting emergency 
situations and overcoming their 
consequences; guaranteeing stability, 
order, and responsibility to the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Federation for the condition of the 
defensibility of the vital interests of 
the individual, society, and the state 
from external and internal threat.35
As these provisions of the law made plain, the 
organization was given authority to become involved in 
almost any sphere of Russian life. But such a broad 
legal mandate promised to bring the council into
conflict with the ministries. Such a situation was 
ironic because both the council and the ministries 
belonged to the executive branch of the Russian 
government.
The membership of the Security Council was 
specified partially by the Law on Security. The
statutory permanent members were the president of the 
Russian Federation (who was the ex officio chairman of
the Security Council), his appointed Security Council
secretary (subject to legislative confirmation), the
first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the 
prime minister. Other members were not specified in the 
law but could come from the ministries and other 
branches of government. Permanent members were given 
the right to vote; non-permanent members did not have a 
vote, but they were permitted a consultative voice. The 
law specified that decisions would be taken by simple 
majority vote "and enter into force after announcement 
by the chairman of the Security Council," that is, the 
Russian president. Owing to the way the law was
35"Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Bezopasnosti," ("Russian 
Federation Law on Security,") Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 May 1992, p. 
5.
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written, the Security Council vote could be considered 
definitive by the president, but it could also simply 
be ignored. Thus, at least initially, the president 
could accept and be sheltered by the Security Council's 
decisions (spreading responsibility or blame to other 
Russian officials), but he was not bound to accept 
their decisions.
Yeltsin said after the first meeting of the 
Security Council that the purpose of the organization 
was to provide "real assistance in implementing the 
course of reform that we are all pursuing."36 He offered 
assurances at the outset that the new Security Council 
would have nothing in common with the "sinister" 
security operations of the Soviet era. In contrast to 
previous security organizations, Russia's Security 
Council would, he guaranteed, Strictly observe the law 
"and nothing but the law."
Related to this pledge, Yeltsin vowed to make it 
his duty "to avoid any conflicts between the Security 
Council and legislative, executive, and judicial 
institutions" and to prevent the elevation or 
domination of the Security Council over these organs.37 
On the contrary, Yeltsin asserted: "The council must
enlist professionals and representatives of the regions 
and of the legislative and executive branches as widely 
as possible in its work and maintain constant contact 
with the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the 
ministries and departments." He also promised that the 
Security Council would be a very small organization 
with no cumbersome structures. These pledges were in 
some ways mutually exclusive, and as time went on it
36Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 May 1992, p. 5.
31Ibid.
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became clear that neither would be fulfilled. The 
Security Council became a tool with which Yeltsin could 
avoid dealing with legislators and ministers, and its 
bureaucracy grew.
The powers of the Security Council grew rapidly as 
well. A major change came in July 1992 with a 
presidential decree increasing the authority of the 
Council and of its secretary. The decree stated that 
all Council decisions would be backed up by a 
presidential decree and that all heads of ministries 
and local governing organs affected would have to obey 
them.38 This change meant that Yeltsin was, in theory, 
obliged to accept Security Council decisions, a 
departure from the original law, as discussed above. 
What is more, the new decree gave the secretary of the 
Security Council authorization to coordinate and 
control the activities of organizations involved in 
carrying out its decisions in order to ensure that 
these decisions were fulfilled.
As for the expansion of the Security Council' s 
membership (as distinct from its full-time staff), two 
new voting members were added to its five statutory 
members, thus bringing the total of permanent members 
to seven in late 1992. Sergei Shakhrai, a close adviser 
of Yeltsin who was serving as deputy prime minister at 
the time, was made a member of the council. Shakhrai 
was charged with running the Security Council's newly 
created North Caucasus Commission. In January 1993 
Yurii Nazarkin, a well-respected career diplomat 
specializing in arms control and disarmament, was also 
made a member of the council.39 Nazarkin was put in
38Kommersant, No. 28 (6-13 July) 1992.
39Shakhrai was also serving as chairman of the State 
Committee for Nationalities Policy and headed a temporary
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charge of the Security Council1s Strategic Security 
Department.40 At the same time, Nazarkin was made deputy 
chairman of the Security Council, a position which 
simultaneously expanded both its membership and 
bureaucracy. In addition to the North Caucasus 
Commission and the Strategic Security Department, the 
Security Council established its own press service to 
handle public relations and liaison with the media; a 
Department of Analysis and Preparation of Foreign- 
Policy Decisions; and an Administration for Strategic 
Security.41 According to Nazarkin, the number of 
principal staff members amounts to "several dozen";42 
all with the attendant support staff.
The person propelling the work of the Security 
Council in 1992 and the first half of 1993 was its 
secretary, Yurii Skokov. A veteran of the Soviet 
military-industrial complex, Skokov, was described as 
"a military-industrial general director to the marrow 
of his bones, " and was chosen by Yeltsin for the post 
precisely because of these credentials.43 He represented 
a link between Yeltsin's administration and the so- 
called power ministries -- defense, security, and
administration for a state of emergency imposed in North Ossetia. 
His nomination to the Security Council was approved by the 
Russian parliament on 24 November. ITAR-TASS, 24 November 1992.
40ITAR-TASS in English, 14 January 1993.
41See references in ITAR-TASS, 25 March 1993; Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 7; and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 
1993, p. 1.
42Nazarkin, as quoted by Rossiiskie vesti, 14 May 1993, 
p. 2. According to some estimates, the size of Yeltsin's 
presidential apparatus (of which the Security Council is a large 
part) exceeded that of the central state and party apparatuses of 
the former USSR. See Victor Yasmann, "The Russian Civil Service 
Today: Corruption and Reform," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2,
No. 16 (16 April 1993), p. 1.
43"Marina Shakina, "Yurii Skokov Tenelyubivii," Novoe 
vremya, No. 32 (14 August) 1992, p. 4.
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internal affairs. This link extended to the factory 
managers associated with the defense industry.
Yeltsin entrusted Skokov, as secretary of the 
Security Council, with a great deal of authority. Among 
other things, Skokov was named chief of a commission to 
approve appointments of high-level officials in the 
Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federation's armed 
forces by a presidential decree signed in September 
1 9 9 2 ;44 and he was given responsibility for coordinating 
and controlling the activities of Russian state 
delegations to negotiations for Baltic troop 
withdrawals by a presidential directive signed in 
October 1992. Besides all this, Yeltsin was rumored to 
have considered Skokov as someone he might choose to 
manage a state of emergency in Russia, if a provision 
for such a contingency were to be introduced.45 As can 
be seen from this list of special assignments, Skokov 
was involved in domestic as well as foreign affairs 
from the outset. This was partially because Skokov 
enjoyed considerable popularity with the Russian 
Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies.46 
But by May 1993, when Yeltsin fired Skokov, it was 
clear that it was precisely the former factory 
director's political ambitions, skills, and duplicity 
that Yeltsin could not accept: Skokov had "found it
quite difficult to throw in his lot with us" Yeltsin
44"Naznacheniya," ("Nominations,") Moskovskie novosti, No. 
43 (21 October 1992), p. 2.
45Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 October 1992, p. 1.
46Rossiiskaya gazeta, 15 December 1992, pp. 1-2, and Manfred 
Rowold "Yurii Skokov, the Most Powerful * Man After Yeltsin," Die 
Welt (Berlin), 17 February 1993.
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said in his memoirs, lamenting that Skokov had not been 
a straightforward player.47
From the standpoint of being able to exercise 
influence on the formulation of Russian foreign policy, 
Skokov's potentially most important assignment came 
with his appointment as chairman of the 
Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission, which was 
set up in December 1992 as an arm of the Security 
Council. The establishment of this Commission 
effectively subordinated the Foreign Ministry to the 
Security Council. According to its statute, " [t]he 
activity of the Commission extends to the whole sphere 
of Russian foreign policy, including relations with the 
member states of the CIS."48 Its tasks were described 
as:
analyzing the situation and tendencies 
of developments in international 
relations from the point of view of 
their influence on the position of the 
Russian Federation in the world 
community and of guaranteeing 
[Russia's] national interests; exposing 
potential and real threats to the 
security of the Russian Federation in 
the international arena and working out 
timely proposals to neutralize them; 
elaborating analysis of crisis 
situations arising at the global or 
regional level and planning action that 
enables their prevention or
localization; coordinating foreign- 
policy moves, the realization of which 
is connected with the activities of 
various ministries and agencies, and 
planning the possible consequences of 
these moves; preparing draft decisions 
for the president of the Russian 
Federation and Security Council of the
47Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia. Translated by- 
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. (New York: Times Books Random House,
1994, 1995), p. 173.
4BSobranie aktov, April 1993, pp. 401-4.
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Russian Federation on foreign policy 
questions; preparing supporting
materials for reports of the president 
of the Russian Federation to the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Federation on questions of foreign 
policy; compiling, analyzing, and 
processing information on political 
situations around the world [and] on 
the functioning of the system for 
implementing the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation and working out 
recommendations for its implementation; 
informing the Security Council of the 
Russian Federation on the course of 
executing its decisions on questions of 
foreign policy and practice.49
In addition, the Commission's mandate specified, among 
other things, that it was to: "control the
implementation of decisions taken by the president of 
the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Federation, and the Security Council of the 
Russian Federation on foreign policy questions." The 
members of the Commission were specified as being the 
head of the following organizations: the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces, Ministry of Security,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations, Foreign Intelligence Service,
Ministry of Justice, State Committee for Economic
Cooperation with the Member States of the CIS. 
Additional members included: representatives of
committees of the Supreme Soviet for questions of 
defense and security, international affairs, and 
foreign economic relations; the permanent
representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations, Yeltsin's aide on foreign policy questions.
49IJbid.
176
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic
The Commission was supposed to meet at least once per 
month.
The decision to create the Commission, itself a 
contradiction of the previous presidential edicts on 
foreign policy coordination discussed above, doubtless 
had to do with the mounting criticism of Yeltsin's 
reformist foreign policy course as personified and 
implemented by Foreign Minister Kozyrev. The decision 
represented an attempt by Yeltsin to put control over 
the coordination of the various competing elements in 
the decision-making process into a supraministerial 
structure. In this respect, the decision was partially 
related to the controversy stirred by Yeltsin's 
resolution of November 1992 granting the Foreign 
Ministry such sweeping powers of coordinating control 
over the relevant work of other ministries, discussed 
above. "The Foreign Ministry is not an agency capable 
of controlling the international activity of Russian 
ministries and departments," a Defense Ministry 
official was anonymously quoted as saying in response 
to the creation of the Commission.50 Discussion of the 
shortcomings of the Foreign Ministry, in particular 
with regard to coordination and control, was also heard 
within the Foreign Ministry itself.
The cause of Yeltsin's decision to remove some of 
the MFA's authority is debatable. There is a case to be 
made that Yeltsin created the Commission in response to 
Kozyrev's so-called shock diplomacy speech at a 
conference in Stockholm.51 In this speech, Kozyrev used 
the podium to create the impression of sharp changes in 
Russian foreign policy. He took the podium again within
50"Itogi," Ostankino Television, 13 December 1992.
51"Andrei Kozyrev's Shock Therapy," Izvestiya, 15 December 
1992, p. 6.
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the hour and retracted the statements, explaining that 
he had attempted to dramatize the conservative threat 
to Russia's moderate foreign policy line.52 The stunt 
undoubtedly put pressure on Yeltsin to relieve Kozyrev 
of some of his power, and the creation of the 
Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission did just 
that.
There is another interpretation which cannot be 
discounted, however. While the edict for the Commission 
was signed two days after Kozyrev's shock diplomacy 
speech, it is fully possible that Kozyrev knew of the 
edict before it was signed and made his speech in 
response to it. In support of this interpretation is 
Yeltsin's calm reaction to Kozyrev's stunt. Yeltsin
said that while he did not agree with Kozyrev's 
actions, he could understand them: "Kozyrev rushed a
little, although it is possible to understand him
psychologically. He was striving to explain to the
world community the size of the threat from the 
reactionary forces."53
Whatever the genesis of the Commission, by January 
1993 Yeltsin had signed an elaborate statute describing 
its work. According to the statute, the Commission
would operate as "a permanent working organ of the 
Security Council" with the purpose of "preparing draft 
decisions on the basic direction of Russian foreign 
policy for the president..."54 Its functions were to be 
wide-ranging, from conducting research into foreign
52Andrei Kozyrev, "The new Russia and the Atlantic 
Alliance," NATO Review Vol. 41, No. 1, (February 1993) p. 3.
53"Troops of the Former Soviet Union Will Be Withdrawn From 
Germany Ahead Of Schedule," Interfax, 16 December 1992.
54The Interdepartmental Foreign-Policy Commission's mandate 
was published in Sobranie aktov, No. 4 (January 1993) pp. 400- 
404.
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policy matters to prioritizing questions of Russia's 
foreign relations and carrying out long-range foreign 
policy planning. Most significantly, the Commission was 
given authority to coordinate the work of other 
ministries in the sphere of foreign policy.
Like the Security Council as a whole, the 
Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission accrued a 
wide range of authority in its area of responsibility 
and held the potential to exert a great deal of 
influence on foreign policy. Also like its parent 
organization, the Commission's broad range of 
responsibilities left the way open for it to trespass 
on the work of the ministries, especially that of the 
Foreign Ministry. The powers of the Security Council 
and the instruments at its disposal meant that it 
could, as it deemed necessary or desirable, circumvent 
the Foreign Ministry and revise Moscow's foreign policy 
stances.
One example of the Council's interference in the 
work of the Foreign Ministry could be found in the 
cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan. 
According to Kozyrev's memoirs, Security Council 
Secretary Yurii Skokov, Vice President Alexander 
Rutskoi, and Security Minister Viktor Barannikov 
succeeded in persuading Yeltsin that he could not be 
protected and called for the cancellation of the trip 
on the grounds that his personal security was the 
"highest interest of national security."55 Kozyrev 
disapproved of the decision and openly stated that the 
official reasons given for canceling the visit 
concerns for Yeltsin's safety -- were specious: "It
55Andrei Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie
Otnosheniya, 1994), p. 299.
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was simplest to say Japan could not ensure Yeltsin's 
security, although it is obvious this was not true," 
Kozyrev said.56
Kozyrev blamed the cancellation of the trip on 
"the failure of our government to get a . hold on the 
apparat. " When asked to clarify his use of the term 
"apparat," which in the past referred to the Central 
Committee apparatus of the CPSU and came to signify 
unreconstructed former Party functionaries, Kozyrev 
said that he meant Yeltsin's presidential apparatus, 
"minus his personal aides." Thus the Security Council, 
the most prominent agency within the presidential 
apparatus, seemed responsible in Kozyrev's view.
He argued that the apparat had managed to 
interfere in the making of foreign policy for the 
purpose of consolidating its own power. Specifically, 
Kozyrev said, in aborting the trip to Japan, the 
apparat wanted (among other things) "to create a 
different image for Yeltsin." Instead of the image of 
Yeltsin standing on a tank in front of the Russian 
White House at the time of the coup, it wanted "an
image of a president who is not even capable of doing 
something that Gorbachev did -- going to Japan." It is 
noteworthy that Kozyrev provided these frank views 
about the decision openly, while he was still foreign 
minister. He seemed unconcerned about the effect of 
exposing what he considered a flawed process, in spite 
of the fact that it meant admitting that he and his
ministry had failed to prevail on this important issue.
Kozyrev was clearly frustrated with the absence of
56Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Moskovskie novosti, No. 38, 
20 September 1992, p. 6.
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clarity as to which institutions enjoyed a role in the 
policymaking process.
The cancellation of the Japan visit marked a 
milestone in the intermingling of Russian foreign and 
domestic policy. As one prominent Russian analyst put 
it, this trip cancellation was a "turning point" in 
Russian foreign policy.57
The forces of conservatism gained their 
first victory since the days of the 
State Emergency Committee [of the 
August 1991 putsch]... This was the 
first indication of the transformation 
of foreign policy into one of the key 
problems in [the] increasing domestic 
confrontation.58
To be sure, there was a domestic political aspect to 
Russian-Japanese relations owing to the fact that a 
territorial dispute -- one involving lands populated by 
Russian citizens but claimed by Japan -- was the focal 
point of bilateral relations. However, the fact that 
"the apparat" (as Kozyrev put it) was able to 
accomplish such a dramatic reversal in policy suggested 
that they were ascendant in a broader sense.
The Security Council had substantial influence 
over the rewriting of the MFA's Foreign Policy Concept, 
discussed above, a document which Yeltsin had defined 
as an essential basis for making foreign policy.59 The 
Foreign Policy Concept was largely re-drafted by the 
Security Council's Inter-Departmental Foreign Policy
57Sergei Rogov, "Three Years of Trial and Error in Russian 
Diplomacy," (unpublished manuscript). Centre for Problems of 
National Security and International Relations, Moscow, 1994, 
p. 3.
58Ibid.
59"Russian Security Council Session on Military and Foreign 
Policy Doctrines," Interfax, 3 March 1993.
181
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic
Commission, after several drafts had been penned by the 
MFA.60 A sign that finalizing this document did not
represent a truce among Russian policymakers was
evident in the Foreign Ministry’s continued
disgruntlement with the contents of the document and
its reluctance to take responsibility for the Concept 
before parliament.61 The completion of the Concept did 
not mark the conclusion of the debate about Russian 
foreign policy priorities and certainly did not
represent any sort of 'peace treaty1 settling the 'war 
of ideas' and providing the basis for common approaches 
in the future.
The Security Council's influence was at points 
strong but the body did not sustain this level of 
involvement in foreign policy formulation. After
peaking in late 1992, the Council's influence began 
rapidly to dissipate. It had fallen out of favor with 
Yeltsin because of his disagreements with Yurii Skokov 
and Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. In his 
book The Struggle for Russia, Yeltsin dates his
alienation from Skokov from the end of 1992.62 Yeltsin's 
aide for defense industry conversion Mikhail Malei said 
that Skokov had frightened Yeltsin by running the 
Security Council secretively and apparently trying to 
use its vast authority against Yeltsin.63
Precisely the greed for power which induced Skokov 
to embellish the Security Council with levers of 
authority brought about his undoing and the effective
60 Ibid.
61"Foreign Ministry Tells Ambartsumov to Turn to National 
Security Council," Interfax, 25 May 1993.
62Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 173.
63"Yeltsin's Executive Branch After Parliament's 
Dissolution," Trends, (a publicaton of the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service), 22 October 1993.
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laming of the Security Council. Meetings of the 
Security Council thus became sporadic starting in early 
1993, departing from the weekly schedule, as the 
dispute between Yeltsin and the legislature grew worse. 
The position of Secretary remained vacant for brief 
periods before the appointment of Skokov's successor 
(Evgenii Shaposhnikov), his rapid and unexpected 
departure, and before the appointment of Yeltsin crony 
Lobov in the fall of 1993. These personnel decisions
suggested that Yeltsin sought to keep the potential 
authority of the Security Council in the hands of 
someone who enjoyed the president's trust.64
It is clear that the Security Council was not 
guaranteed a weighty voice in policymaking. For 
example, there is some evidence that the Council's 
objections to parts of the draft military doctrine were 
simply ignored by the Ministry of Defense, which 
enjoyed the backing of the president on the issue.65
It is probable that Yeltsin not only sought to 
avoid contact with his political foes in the Security
Council, but also simply did not have the time to meet
with a body which would be of so little use to him in 
his struggle with the parliament. It was only after the 
denouement -- Yeltsin's dissolution of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet in September 1993 and the subsequent 
political disquiet -- that the Security Council got
back to work. Its new leader was Oleg Lobov, a long­
time political ally of Yeltsin who could be trusted not 
to use the extensive powers of the Security Council
640n this point, see Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making,"
in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, 
Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 111.
65IJbid. p. 156 note 51.
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secretaryship to take actions which would displease 
Yeltsin. As in Brezhnev's time loyalty had become a 
paramount consideration in the Kremlin.
After Yeltsin's defeat of the Supreme Soviet, he 
appointed new members to the Security Council and it 
resumed its weekly meetings, which indicated that
Yeltsin was again interested in using the body in the 
aftermath of the defeat and his political foes' 
departure from office. The number of members was 
increased to 14.66 But the legality of the Security 
Council had become questionable since one of its
statutory member's jobs (that of the vice president) no 
longer existed, there was no sitting legislature (nor 
one by the name mentioned in the original law) to 
confirm the members. It also appears that the
distinction between permanent members (those with a 
vote) and ordinary members (who did not have a vote) 
was simply ignored starting at this point, a situation 
which continued into the second republic and through 
Yeltsin's first term as president. A literal reading of 
the old law would have meant that Yeltsin, Lobov, and 
Chernomyrdin were the only ones with a vote, a strange 
and unlikely situation in which the body seems unlikely 
to have operated.
66Those listed in a Fall 1993 decree were: First Deputy
Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, Security Minister Nikolai Golushko, 
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Minister for Ecology and Natural 
Resources Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, Interior Minister Viktor Erin, 
Minister of Justice Yurii Kalmykov, Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, Minister of Public Health Eduard Nechaev, Director of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service Evgenii Primakov, Vice Premier 
and Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, and Vice Premier and Head of 
the State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation and 
Nationalities Sergei Shakhrai. "Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation on the Members of the Security Council," 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 October 1993, p. 1.
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This murky legality was significant in terms of 
policymaking because it contributed to the climate in 
which the law was viewed as a malleable commodity. The 
fact that this kind of climate existed after the defeat 
of the parliament, when a fresh start could have been 
made -- if only to make clear that Yeltsin's illegal 
dissolution of parliament was the end of actions of 
this sort -- set a precedent that precisely this kind
of behavior would remain the order of the day.
More generally, it signified that the previous 
mishandling of the law had not been a reaction to the 
extreme situation, one in which the legislature and 
president could not work together, nor had it been a 
temporary phase following the shedding of decades-old 
Soviet habits. Rather, it loomed as a tried and proven 
way of using governing structures. This climate of 
illegality and neglect for procedure emanating from the 
presidential structures was to become the most profound 
influence on foreign policy formulation for years to 
come.
Yeltsin's proclivity to create a large executive 
apparatus, parallel and in competition with the
ministries, suggested that the legacy of dual power 
established during Soviet times persisted in Russia. As 
was discussed in chapter two, it was a situation in 
which an oversized executive apparatus (the Central 
Committee, its Departments, and the Politburo and
aides) tended to trespass on the work of the various 
ministries.
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The Role of the Int.p.ll i gence Services
Russia had assumed control over the five KGB 
successor agencies in December 1991.67 Despite the 
general impetus after the August 1991 coup to dismantle 
the Soviet KGB, substantial curtailment of most of the 
KGB's foreign and domestic functions did not take 
place.68 In addition, new forms of international 
contacts, such as cooperation with intelligence 
services of former adversaries, became commonplace, 
giving intelligence officers in independent Russia the 
opportunity to affect foreign policy in new ways.
Of most relevance to foreign affairs was, as 
before, the foreign intelligence operation. The First 
Chief Directorate (in charge of foreign intelligence) 
had been separated from the KGB in November 1991 and 
was renamed the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) in 
December 1991.69 Evgenii Primakov, who had become the 
head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate in September 
1991,70 remained the head of the FIS, signaling further 
the continuity with its role during the Soviet period. 
While the question of whether Primakov had actually 
worked as a KGB operative or had merely provided 
information to the KGB from early in his academic and 
journalistic career remains unanswered, it seems likely
67Prior to the takeover, Russia's intelligence operations 
were effectively nil: Russia had created its own KGB only a few 
months earlier, and it had a staff of less than 30. Michael 
Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1994), p. 30.
68JJbid. , pp. 61-64.
69For approximately one month between the partition from the 
KGB and the takeover by Russia, it was known as the USSR Central 
Intelligence Service. Primakov was the single director of the 
variously-named bodies from September 1991 until January 1996.
*70"The Four Lives of Yevgeny Primakov," Moscow News, No. 23, 
16 June 1993, p. 7.
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that Primakov, as Waller put it, was "the perfect 
'outsider'" to head foreign intelligence.71
In a significant break with past practice, Yeltsin 
made professionalism rather than loyalty the main 
criterion for his choice of head of foreign 
intelligence. Primakov was the only key figure from 
Gorbachev's team retained by Yeltsin. It was a sign of 
Yeltsin's preoccupation with retaining the favor of 
foreign intelligence officers as a group when he put 
the choice to them of whom they favored as a boss 
during a convocation of staffers at FIS headquarters. 
While less powerful than during Soviet times, this was 
a sign that the intelligence community remained a group 
to be cultivated by the top leadership. Primakov 
received a resounding vote of confidence.72
The FIS, like the First Chief Directorate, 
continued to operate under dubious outside oversight. 
Yeltsin's assurance in late 1992 that the service was 
"openly subordinate to the president and sincerely 
reliable" was hardly credible given Yeltsin's 
inclination to generously delegate authority.73 Despite 
the passage of the Law on Security in 1992 putting the 
intelligence services under the control of the 
president, legislature, and prosecutor-general, there 
was still no clear idea among top policymakers of how 
day-to-day activities of the intelligence bodies would 
be monitored.74 Moreover, an overview of the Supreme
71Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today,
op. cit., p . 70.
72Ibid., p. 132.
73Russian Television, 1720 GMT, 10 November 1992 and 
"Address by Russian President to British Parliament," ITAR-TASS 
in English, 11 November 1992.
74Alexander Rahr, "The Revival of a Strong KGB," RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 20 (14 May 1993), pp. 76, 74-79.
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Soviet's debates in 1992 and 1993 revealed little 
preoccupation with the activities of the security 
organs. This fact, and the ambiguity surrounding the 
laws on intelligence oversight, reflected the impact of 
voices of former KGB staff in the legislature. It 
further suggested that intelligence agencies' 
activities in foreign policy were being ignored by 
legislative bodies. The peculiarity of the situation 
was captured by the fact that Filipp Bobkov worked 
directly for Supreme Soviet speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. 
Bobkov had been a deputy to ex-KGB chief Vladimir 
Kryuchkov, the mastermind of the August 1991 coup 
attempt.75 Had a climate of seeking to uproot and 
eliminate the legacy of the secret police prevailed, 
such an appointment would not have been possible for 
someone possessing such experience.
The FIS shifted its emphasis in the post-Cold War 
world toward industrial espionage, a move which 
paralleled a post-Cold War shift seen in Western
countries. This was understandable since FIS foreign 
agents lost some of their platforms in the Third World 
as a result of the closing of many consulates and some 
embassies there. By the end of 1993 more than 30
foreign stations had been closed.76 The sharpened focus 
on. industrial espionage also reflected the FIS's desire 
to take advantage of the continuing relaxation of East- 
West relations after the collapse of the USSR. It may 
also have been the case that the FIS could bring in
more funding for itself if it succeeded in these
The first law on Foreign Intelligence was published in Vedomsti 
Syezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Verkhovnogo 
Soveta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, No. 32, 1992, p. 1869.
75Alexander Rahr, "The Revival of a Strong KGB," op. cit., 
p. 76 .
76"Russian Intelligence Closes Thirty Branches Abroad," 
Interfax, 23 November 1993.
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missions. Finally, Primakov found the new focus on 
companies easily justifiable on the grounds of national 
security: "We have stepped up our activities in support 
of economic measures that are helping the protection of 
our country. We must have knowledge about critical 
technologies.1,77
Most significantly, in terms of foreign policy 
formulation, the FIS emerged as a strong voice in long- 
range thinking about foreign policy strategy. It was 
the FIS, not the Foreign Ministry, which followed up on 
an October 1992 meeting in Moscow with US Director of 
Central Intelligence Robert Gates with a publication in 
January 1993 of a report on nuclear proliferation 
called "The New Challenge after the Cold War."78 What 
made this report distinct from the routine analytic 
reports prepared by the FIS, was that a public version 
of it was issued and presented at a press conference. 
The report seems to have become the leading policy 
statement on the questions on non-proliferation which 
were broached during the Gates visit.79 More 
significantly, the FIS reportedly issued the report 
entirely on its own initiative and without either the 
instruction or prior knowledge of any other government 
agency, thus effectively starting its own public 
diplomacy campaign.80 That the FIS took over this issue 
from the Foreign Ministry showed the extent to which 
the foreign intelligence apparatus was a player in
77The Sunday Times (London), 27 September 1992, p. 24.
78"Russian Intelligence Presents Its First Open Report - On 
the Serious Danger of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," Interfax, 28 January 1993.
79"FIS, CIA To Cooperate in Areas of 'Common Concern,1" 
Interfax, 30 July 1993.
80Michael Kozakavich, "The Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service: Politics and Missions," Jamestown Foundation Prism,
Vol. Ill, No. 8, May 1997. Transmitted via Internet.
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strategic thinking alongside, if not above, the Foreign 
Ministry.
The frequent travels of Primakov around the world 
also showed him to be a key player in foreign policy 
matters since only some of these trips dealt with 
cooperation on intelligence issues. For example, when 
Primakov traveled to Tehran in August 1993, he met with 
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi, not with someone whose 
title was similar to his own. The purpose of the visit 
was also more in line with foreign policy than with FIS 
work: to discuss Iranian cooperation to settle the
conflict in Tajikistan. They also discussed the 
situation in the Middle East and Russia's views on that 
part of the world.81 Given Primakov's academic 
specialization in these areas (the Middle East and 
Iran, among other Oriental topics), it is logical to 
conclude that Primakov was sent there by Yeltsin as a 
special envoy not because of his role as Foreign 
Intelligence Service chief but because of his academic 
background, connections, and previous experience as a 
special envoy during the Gorbachev era, and possibly 
earlier.82
In general terms, the role of FIS director 
Primakov in foreign relations was much more public than 
was typical of KGB leaders in the Soviet period, both 
under Gorbachev and earlier. In comparison to the 
behavior of his counterpart in the United States (the 
director of the CIA), Primakov's public presence in 
foreign policy formulation was much more evident. Not 
only his agency's analytic reports but also his high-
81Islamic Republic News Agency in English, 1 August 1993.
82Michael Kozakavich, "The Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service: Politics and Missions," pp. cit.
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profile foreign affairs announcements (such as the 
pledge not to spy on other members of the CIS) and 
visits (such as his call on Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milosevic in January 1993) made him a regular and 
forceful contributor to Russian foreign policy 
discussions.83
Primakov's background as an academic and 
journalist with a specialty in oriental studies and 
fluency in English and Arabic most likely contributed 
to his tendency to function as a diplomat. Having 
worked in and headed two of the Soviet Union's most 
prestigious research institutes, Primakov had, as he 
put it, spent his "whole life dealing with 
international matters."84 It was his background as an 
academic which compelled him to "strengthen the 
analytical accents" of the FIS's work.85 Primakov's 
inclination to play a high-profile role in foreign 
affairs prior to 1996 might also have been due to a 
perception on his part that Kozyrev's MFA was not 
coping well with all issues. And, of course, Primakov's 
appointment to the position of foreign minister in 1996 
was a further sign of his skills and desire to function 
as a top representative of Russian diplomacy.
Despite his leading role in foreign affairs, 
Primakov, as head of the FIS, was not officially on a 
par with the foreign minister or any other minister for 
a few key reasons. Primakov's agency did not have 
ministerial status, and he was himself not a member of
83Interfax, 23 November 1993.
84"Yegor Yakovlev," About a New, Long-Familiar Job," 
Interview with Evgenii Primakov, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 2 (18-24
January) 1996. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 
22 January 1996, transmitted via Internet.
85Interview with Evgenii Primakov, Pravitel'stvennyi 
vestnik, No. 50 (December 9) 1991.
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the government. Nor was he a voting member of the 
Security Council during the first republic. His 
contribution to this body's work could only be made 
informally, via voting members or via his own
membership in the Security Council's Interdepartmental 
Foreign Policy Commission. That said, his personal 
authority probably made up for any deficit in terms of 
legal claim on participation.
Before closing the discussion of the role of 
intelligence agencies in policymaking in the first
Russian republic, a word must be said about FAPSI, the 
Russian acronym for the Federal Agency for Government 
Communications and Information (Federalnoe Agentsvo 
Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii) . It grew out of 
and exceeded the significance of its KGB predecessors, 
the Eighth Chief Directorate and various other smaller 
directorates of the KGB.86 In addition to being
responsible for signals and cryptography work, 
controlling some 16,000 communications troops as well
as satellites, and maintaining its own analysis and 
information section, FAPSI was put in charge of all 
intragovernmental telecommunications. Considering that 
the Eighth Chief Directorate alone used to be allocated 
one-quarter of the entire KGB budget, FAPSI's
significance should not be underestimated.87 It 
continued to be the electronic eyes and ears of
Russia's intelligence efforts and was in the powerful 
position within the Russian political scene of
overhearing communications between the various parts of 
the government. Former presidential spokesman 
Vyacheslav Kostikov referred to the "acoustic
86It was known from November to December 1991 as the USSR 
Government Communications Committee.
87Martin Ebon, KGB: Death and Rebirth. (London: Praeger,
1994), p. 105.
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transparency of the Kremlin" and noted that top 
officials regularly pass each other notes to evade the 
security service's microphones.88 The implication was, 
that FAPSI was using its knowledge to meddle in the 
policymaking process. Thus, here, too, there existed a 
potential for using foreign policy issues to fight 
domestic political battles.
The Role of Legislative Bodies
The most public challenges to the role of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry and to Russia's foreign policy 
coherence in general was mounted by deputies in the 
Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet. Most 
of this opposition was put forth in the form of non­
binding resolutions expressing dissatisfaction with the 
government's handling of (or failure to address) a 
specific foreign policy question. Examples of this 
included the Supreme Soviet's July 1993 resolution 
claiming that the Crimean port of Sevastopol belonged 
not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and the 
Supreme Soviet's numerous resolutions pleading with the 
Russian government to halt Russia's participation in 
various international sanctions.89
The Supreme Soviet also issued orders for the 
Russian government to take certain actions, as in July 
1993 when deputies ordered the Russian government to 
suspend withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and 
impose "a complex of measures" in the political and
88Excerpt from Vyacheslav Kostikov's book Farewell to the 
President, reproduced in Argumenty i fakti, No. 3, January 1996, 
p. 3. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, January 
1996, transmitted via Internet.
89For the text of the resolution on Sevastopol, see 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 13 July 1993, p. 1.
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economic sphere.90 The Supreme Soviet was dissatisfied 
with Estonia's treatment of the Russian community 
there. The Russian government's response was simply to 
ignore the legislature's orders, at first, and downplay 
the question. Only later did Yeltsin order a halt to 
the troop withdrawal, apparently under the influence of 
Stankevich, as described above.
The Russian legislature also attempted to put 
forth its own foreign policy on occasion by addressing 
foreign counterparts (or governments) to request that a 
certain foreign policy action be taken. The crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia was a favorite theme of the 
Russian deputies. They criticized the Foreign Ministry 
for pursuing what they regarded as an uncritically 
anti-Serbian policy that was a consequence of excessive 
emphasis on cultivating good relations with Western 
Europe and the United States. Besides this, they called 
for a reconsideration of UN sanctions against the rump 
Yugoslavia, demanded that Moscow veto any proposals for 
military intervention in Bpsnia, and proposed that 
Russia provide humanitarian aid to Serbia.91 The Supreme 
Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Relations issued an advisory "On the Attitude 
of the Russian Federation toward the Yugoslav Crisis," 
specifying the above concerns and calling for the 
Foreign Ministry to heed deputies' recommendations. The 
document was adopted in the form of a resolution by an 
overwhelming majority of the Supreme Soviet.92 But the
90"Edict of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on 
Measures in Connection With the Violation of Human Rights on the 
Territory of the Republic of Estonia," No. 5311-1, Moscow, 
Russian House of Soviets, 1 July 1993, published in Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 7 July 1993. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 7 July 1993, transmitted electronically.
91Izvestiya, 18 December 1992, p. 4.
92 Ibid.
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Foreign Ministry rejected the legislature's proposals, 
saying only that they could not be implemented for 
various, unnamed reasons.93
Direct foreign policy action was taken during 
deputies' trips abroad, when they made promises to 
foreign leaders on various issues. In mid-April 1993, a 
Supreme Soviet delegation headed by the chairman of the 
Committee for International Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Relations, Evgenii Ambartsumov, traveled to 
the former Yugoslavia. The stated purpose of the trip 
was to gain more information about the situation with a 
view to supporting efforts to find a peace settlement. 
The delegation met with deputies from the Socialist 
Party of Serbia, parliamentary leaders, and military 
and Defense Ministry officials. While there, 
Ambartsumov gave assurances of Moscow's willingness to 
stand by Belgrade. Taken aback by the UN Security 
Council's vote on 17 April in favor of tightening 
economic sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia, he 
sought to reassure Serbia, saying that the decision 
would "not be the world community's last word" on the 
subject and expressing confidence that it would be 
revised.94 He added that any international military 
intervention under the auspices of NATO would be an 
unprecedented adventure in the history of this 
international organization.95
93Parliament Decree on Yugoslavia Crisis Will Hardly Be 
Carried Out," Interfax, 18 December 1992.
94Aleksandr Kondrashev, "Delegation Holds Talks With 
Yugoslav Parliamentarians," dateline Belgrade, ITAR-TASS in 
English, 19 April 1993.
95Aleksandr Kondrashev, "Delegation Discusses Problems with 
Yugoslav Leaders," dateline Belgrade, ITAR-TASS in English, 20 
April 1993.
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Upon returning to Moscow, Ambartsumov called a 
news conference at which he demanded that Russia use 
its weight in the UN Security Council to bring about a 
moratorium on the imposition of additional economic 
sanctions.96 He also stated his belief that Russia would 
resort to using its veto power in the UN Security 
Council to prevent any international military action 
against the rump Yugoslavia. Ambartsumov was quickly 
rebuffed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vitalii Churkin, 
who rejected the proposed moratorium, indicated that 
military action could well enter the realm of 
possibility, and allowed that Russia would not oppose 
it. Undeterred, Ambartsumov and his parliamentary 
committee drafted a resolution calling sanctions and 
military intervention "counterproductive." In
particular, the resolution warned that military action 
would lead not to a reconciliation and a settlement but 
to "a continuation of the conflict and possibly a new 
European war."97
In one instance, Kozyrev balked at the 
parliament's issuance of a resolution that called for 
the government to give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
specific instructions for devising new policies on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.98 "The resolution appears to 
constitute direct interference in the affairs of the 
executive authorities," Kozyrev said, adding:
96Sergey Ryabikin, "Russia to Veto UN 'Military Action' in 
Yugoslavia," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 23 April 
1993 .
97Sergei Nikishov, "Russian Parliament Resumes Discussion," 
ITAR-TASS in English, 28 April 1993.
98The resolution called for the extension of sanctions to 
all three warring parties in Bosnia, the use of veto power in the 
UN Security Council in the event of the introduction of military 
force, and the start of humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia in the 
form of supplies within a period of two weeks. See Izvestiya, 18 
December 1992, p. 4.
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"President Yeltsin himself never gives [the Foreign 
Ministry] such detailed instructions."99 Such a 
statement probably strengthened deputies' conviction 
that their participation in the foreign policy 
policymaking process was necessary.
The Russian legislature's actions during the first 
republic appear to have been aimed primarily at the 
Russian domestic audience. Deputies sought to show 
their patriotism and increase their chances of being 
re-elected by sounding alarms about the treatment of 
ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union or by 
warning that Russia's international prestige and honor 
were being slighted by Russia's official foreign 
policy. In its zeal to participate and influence 
policy, the Russian parliament sometimes seemed bent on 
establishing authority above and beyond that of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry and even that of the Russian 
president. Kozyrev, while himself guilty of dramatizing 
domestic infighting, warned:
It is important for us to ensure that 
our domestic political battles do not 
spill over into clumsy attempts by 
various politicians to settle accounts 
with their opponents by pursuing their 
own foreign policies in the
international arena, without giving a 
second thought to the fact that they 
are thereby undermining respect for and 
trust in their own country.100
But it appeared that deputies, like many other official 
Russians, were more concerned with immediate gain at
99Izvestiya, 18 January 1993, p. 2.
100Pavel Shinkarenko, "Russia's Foreign Policy - Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Kozyrev: In the Republic's National Interest,"
Rossiiskie vesti, 3 December 1992, p. 2, FBIS Daily Report, 3 
December 1992.
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home than with the way domestic struggles made Russia 
appear on the world stage.
To his credit, Kozyrev did on occasion seek to 
reconcile differences with the legislature by drawing 
some of its members into the Foreign Ministry's 
policymaking process. For example, Kozyrev invited the 
chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and 
Foreign Economic Relations, Ambartsumov, to travel with 
the Russian delegation to the conference on the crisis 
in the former Yugoslavia that was held in London in 
August 1992; and even asked Ambartsumov to take part in 
formulating Russia's position on the situation. By his 
own admission, Ambartsumov was at first reluctant to go 
because he did not want, as he put it, "to become a 
captive of Kozyrev's approaches."101 Kozyrev reportedly 
told Ambartsumov that no such thing would happen and 
that he might even play a role in "modifying Russia's 
policy." In fact, as Ambartsumov later claimed, 
Russia's policy had become "more adequate" as a result 
of his presence at the conference, meaning that he felt 
that Russian policy had moved more into line with the 
positions preferred by himself and other members of the 
Supreme Soviet. Ambartsumov was so satisfied with 
Moscow's diplomatic shifts in the fall and winter of 
1992-1993 that he rejected the deputies' continued 
attempts to bring about the removal of Kozyrev and 
objected to efforts by some of his colleagues to 
maintain a constant level of confrontation with the 
ministry: "One should not treat Minister Kozyrev as a
Carthage that absolutely must be destroyed."102
101Yevgenii Burmistenko, "The Main Thing Is the Interests of 
Russia," dateline London, Trud, 3 September 1992, p. 3.
102Interview with Ambartsumov by announcer Nosovets, 
Parliamentary Herald Program, Russian Television, 1500 GMT, 3 
April 1993.
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Ambartsumov advocated instead that problems should be 
"solved by practical work." He also expressed 
confidence legislators' views were having an impact on 
Russian foreign policy, a view which over time would 
appear to have been too optimistic.103
Whether deputies in 1992 and 1993 were actually 
expressing the sentiments of their electorates is 
questionable. Polls of deputies' attitudes toward their 
roles as representatives of constituencies showed very 
weak feelings of obligation to represent constituents' 
opinions. When asked whether they viewed themselves as 
delegates bound to carry out the wishes of their 
electors or trustees who should follow their own 
consciences rather than the strict opinions of their 
electors, deputies generally identified with the latter 
category.104 Furthermore, contact between lawmakers and 
constituents was not particularly intense.105
A small portion (14%) of the deputies surveyed 
said they relied on information from public opinion 
polls.106 But there was a gap between the deputies' 
statements and respondents' opinions. In 1993, polls 
showed that the public was far less strident on foreign 
policy questions than was the Supreme Soviet on certain 
foreign policy issues. Only seven percent of the 
Russians polled in a December 1992 survey said that 
Russia should pursue a rigid policy toward the Baltic 
states. In a separate question, there was an equal
103Sergei Nikishchov, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 13 March
1993 .
104Timothy J. Colton, "The Constituency Nexus in the Russian 
and Other Post-Soviet Parliaments," in Jeffrey Hahn, ed. , 
Democratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative
Institutions. (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 59-60.
105JJbid. , pp. 62-63.
106Ibid., p. 61.
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three-way split between those who thought the troops 
should be withdrawn as quickly as possible from the
Baltic states, those who thought withdrawals should be
halted, and those who had no opinion.107
While it is rather doubtful that deputies were 
expressing the views of a broad segment of the Russian 
population, it seems likely that their continual 
harping on themes about the humiliation of Russia and 
the need to protect ethnic Russians in the near abroad 
could gradually have an impact on the foreign policy 
debate in Russia and on public opinion. The kinds of 
actions taken by deputies and the sheer repetition of 
their arguments in the media helped to define the 
parameters of debate in society and to determine which 
issues are politicized.
The Role of the Military
While the Russian parliament's and Security
Council's jockeying for influence over foreign policy 
was exposed to general view and knowledge, what is 
known about the role of the Russian military
establishment in this realm is of a much more anecdotal 
nature. This makes the extent of that role difficult to 
assess. For the most part, the influence of military 
officials on Russian foreign policy is discernible in 
cases of trespassing by individual military officials 
on what properly should be Russian diplomats' sphere of 
responsibility. In addition, it can be inferred from 
various initiatives taken by military officials that 
Yeltsin condoned these actions. Sometimes he even 
authorized interference by the military in foreign 
policy matters.
107The poll was done by the respected Russian Center for 
Public Opinion and Market Research. Interfax, 23 December 1992.
200
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic
One area in which Russian military officials 
regularly encroached on the work of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry was in policy toward the other members of the 
CIS, especially in places where the Russian military 
viewed bases as important, such as in Moldova and in 
the Caucasus. The explanation for this could only 
partially be found in the emergence of new security 
questions in the aftermath of the USSR's collapse. 
Further explanations could to be found in the failure 
of many of those in uniform to have developed a 
sufficient appreciation of the status of the other 
former Soviet republics as independent states and the 
MFA's institutional weakness, frequent inattention to 
the region, and lack of expertise in dealing with these 
countries.
That negotiations on how to settle the conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh 
took place in September 1992 under the direction of 
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was highly 
unusual, but it was indicative of the military's 
growing influence in the making of foreign policy.108 As 
Grachev himself said the day after an agreement for a 
new two-month-long cease-fire had been announced: "We
deliberately set out to have a meeting behind closed 
doors, away from the press and with the participation 
of only a limited circle of experts."109 The group 
taking part in the talks seems indeed to have been very 
small, and the fact that it had been formed at all took
108Those present at the talks were Grachev, Azerbaijani 
Defense Minister Rahim Gaziev, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh 
Sarkisyan, Russian Security Minister Viktor Barannikov, and 
Georgian Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani. Krasnaya zvezda 
Correspondent Chupakhin interview with Pavel Grachev, Krasnaya
zvezda, 24 September 1992, p. 1.
109 Ibid.
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some high-level Russian diplomats by surprise.110 
According to Grachev, he had been working on 
instructions from the Russian president "for some 
time," having started by holding separate talks with 
each of the defense ministers involved. Grachev sought 
to de-emphasize the political aspects of the agreement, 
presumably out of concern that he might be criticized 
for doing the work of diplomats: "There is not one
political statement in our agreement. We talked about 
purely military aspects."111 But obviously, he 
understated the political elements.
Grachev and other top military officials were 
active in Georgia as well. Numerous meetings took place 
there between high-level Russian military officials and 
either military or political officials from Georgia to 
discuss the conflict in Abkhazia, a breakaway region of 
Georgia.112 In January 1993 Russian Deputy Defense 
Minister Georgii Kondratev declared that high-level 
talks on the status of Russian troops in Georgia would 
have to be held before an interstate treaty between 
Russia and Georgia could be concluded, thus interposing 
himself between the Russian Foreign Ministry and its 
Georgian counterpart.113
The work of the Russian Foreign Ministry was 
complicated further by a trip of Defense Minister 
Grachev in February 1993 to Abkhazia and also to 
Adzharia, another separatist region, both of which
110Author's interviews with former First Deputy Foreign 
Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev on 14 and 15 January 1993, 
Munich.
111Krasnaya zvezda Correspondent Chupakhin interview with 
Pavel Grachev, Krasnaya zvezda, 24 September 1992, p. 1.
112See ITAR-TASS, 20 September 1992, 3 October 1992, and 13
January 1993.
113RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 8, 14 January 1993.
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Tbilisi suspected were receiving Russian military 
support. Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze protested 
that the Russian defense minister's visit to these 
sensitive areas was made without consultation or 
notification of the relevant Georgian authorities.114 By 
citing the Russian military's out-of-turn activity, 
Shevardnadze was confirming the sense of Kozyrev's 
complaints about the military's trespassing in the 
affairs of diplomats. Thus, Shevardnadze, an outsider, 
effectively became a participant in the internal 
Russian policymaking process.
By the summer of 1993, the Georgian military had 
suffered major defeats by the Abkhaz forces. In the 
early fall, the Abkhaz launched an offensive to 
recapture areas under the control of the Georgian 
military, an attack which Shevardnadze accused Russia 
of instigating, organizing, and coordinating.115 
Shevardnadze's allegation of Russian military aid to 
the Abkhaz was confirmed by Russian sources: A former
Russian military intelligence commander has offered 
detailed data about equipment transferred to Abkhaz 
units by Russian forces, presumably done with the idea 
of economic gain in mind.116 According to estimates by 
Evgenii Kozhokin, the director of the Russian Institute 
of Strategic Studies, the Abkhaz used no less than 
1,000 railway cars of military supplies, most of which 
came from Russian forces' supplies.117 According to 
Trenin, "the Russians assisted in the Abkhazian seizure
114Izvestiya, 27 February 1993, p. 2.
115Evgenii Kozhokin, "Georgia-Abkhazia," in U.S. and Russian 
Policymaking and the Use of Force, (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1996), p. 64. Transmitted via Internet.
116Cited in Ibid., footnote 2.
117Ibid.
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of the capital, Sukhumi, and the expulsion of 
Georgians.1,118
It was not only in the former Soviet Union that 
the Russian military went beyond its mandate and got 
involved in politics. Grachev also showed that he was 
either unwilling or unable to appreciate the
distinction between the duties of a defense minister 
and those of a foreign minister in an interview in a 
South Korean publication. Asked about the possibility 
of military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul being 
expanded, Grachev boldly replied: "I am willing to
exchange opinions and cooperate with all Asian 
countries and their military leaders on all issues 
falling under the jurisdiction of our business." He
went on to say he believed that, even in those 
instances in which politicians and diplomats were at a 
loss to solve problems between two countries, soldiers 
were capable of finding common ground within the 
framework of military cooperation between the two.119 
Such a philosophy opened a number of questions: Were
Russian military officials becoming the preferred 
interlocutors of foreign partners? Were military-to- 
military relations driving bilateral political 
relations? Was the military developing the capacity to 
spoil bilateral political relations? If these questions 
could be answered in the affirmative, this would 
provide further evidence that the military was becoming
118Dmitrii Trenin, Russia's Use of Military Forces in 
Intra-State Conflicts in the CIS. (Bonn: Bundesinstitut Fur 
ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1996), p. 26.
119Tong-a Ilbo Correspondent Chang, "Russian Defense 
Minister Discusses Military Influence on DPRK," Interview with 
Pavel Grachev, dateline Seoul, Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul), 4 April 1993, 
p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report, 4 April 1993, transmitted 
electronically.
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or had become an agent rather than a tool of Russia's 
foreign policy.
On security matters, Yeltsin showed a willingness 
to grant military officials a say in the formulation of 
foreign policy both because of his habit of loosely 
delegating authority and because his domestic political 
struggles required him to curry favor with the 
military. An example of this can be found in his 
acceptance in July 1992 of a proposal from the Ministry 
of Defense that it negotiate military cooperation 
agreements with the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, 
Romanian, and Czechoslovak Ministries of Defense. 
Yeltsin signed over the authority that Russian military 
officials needed to conduct such negotiations, 
explicitly giving them approval to conclude defense 
agreements with their East European colleagues. The 
proposal also stipulated that these negotiations could 
take place irrespective of the state of progress in 
negotiating political treaties with the respective 
countries.120 The handling of the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty, the subject of chapter seven, represents 
an even better example of Yeltsin's politicization of 
the military and the effect of this on foreign policy.
Defense Minister Grachev was not the only official 
in uniform with political convictions and a desire to 
steer Russian foreign policy in new directions. Major 
General Viktor Filatov of the Russian General Staff 
traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a fact-finding 
mission so that he could subsequently "convey to our 
comrade officers and generals in Moscow that true 
aggression has been launched against the Serbs, whose
120'iYeltsin Accepts Defense Ministry Proposal," Interfax, 31 
July 1992.
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position is good but who need the help of the
Russians. "121
Another example was General Aleksandr Lebed, who 
as commander of Russia's Fourteenth Army in Moldova,122 
issued inflammatory statements and military support for 
the breakaway "Dniester Republic."123 Chisinau even 
submitted official protests to Moscow over some of
Lebed's pronouncements. Notwithstanding his
contravention of official Russian policies in Moldova, 
Lebed was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 
orders signed by Yeltsin in September 1992.124 His
effective dismissal in 1995 could be explained more by
his growing popularity as a Russian politician and his
potential threat to Boris Yeltsin's hold on power than 
by the general's actions in Moldova.
The military establishment was accused not only of 
interfering in the making of Russian foreign policy 
but, in some instances, of having sole control over the 
policymaking process on certain issues. Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze accused Yeltsin on a
number of occasions of becoming captive to the Russian
military and of frequently not even being aware of what 
actions his generals were taking on their own
121Dateline Zagreb, Novi vjesnik (Zagreb), 8 November 1992, 
p. 7. Translated in FBIS Daily Report, 8 November 1992, 
transmitted electronically. Russia's ambassador to Croatia, 
Leonid V. Kerestedzhiyants expressed regret over Filatov's 
remarks and said that they did not reflect the position of the 
Russian government.
122The Fourteenth Army's military support of Russified 
separatists in the self-proclaimed "Dniester Republic" stood out 
as an example of military interference in Russia's official 
policies. For a discussion of this topic, see Vladimir Socor, 
"Russian Forces in Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 
34 (28 August 1992), pp. 41-42.
123Ibid.
124RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 181, 21 September 1992.
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initiative.125 Kozyrev sharply reproved the military for 
pursuing a political course out of line with the 
political direction of Russia. "The party of war, the 
party of neobolshevism, is rearing its head in our 
country," he remarked, adding:
Maybe we need a radical reform of our 
strong-arm structures, the former KGB 
and the military departments...
Wholesale transfers of arms are taking 
place in the Transcaucasus and in 
Moldova. A certain quantity of arms is 
indeed making its way to Moldova from 
Romania, but the bulk comes from the 
army. Under what agreement is this 
effected, I would like to ask: Who
signed such an agreement? Why is the 
military deciding the most important 
political issues? When tanks become an 
autonomous political force, this is a 
disaster!126
Kozyrev, like his predecessor Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze, was showing intense frustration about the 
chief executive's failure to keep the military out of 
foreign-policy affairs. Both foreign ministers had to 
cope with the military's participation in foreign 
relations as an independent agent rather than as a tool 
of diplomacy. In contrast to the situation of foreign 
ministers in Western Europe or the United States, 
laments about the military's trespassing in foreign 
affairs had become commonplace in Moscow, an indictor 
of the institutional chaos which reigned.
125Shevardnadze accused the Russian Defense Ministry of 
having "created its own military state" in Abkhazia and said the 
Russian generals may be acting without the Russian president's 
sanction. ITAR-TASS in English, 5 October 1992 and Novosti 
program interview with Eduard Shevardnadze on Ostankino 
Television, 5 October 1992, 1800 GMT, FBIS Daily Report, 5
October 1992.
126Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992, p.
3 .
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In such a situation, it is important not to 
underestimate the role played by the military's 
possession of instruments of force. The willingness of 
Russian commanders regularly to take actions abroad 
which were not in line with Russian foreign policy gave 
them a far more important voice in the policymaking 
process than their counterparts in the West. In terms 
of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, this element 
must be factored into the analysis. Allison had 
assessed the military's weight in the policymaking 
process primarily in terms of the inflexibility of its
routines. The conduct of the military could be
characterized by the larger bureaucratic problem which 
Allison summed up in the statement: "organizational
procedures and repertoires change incrementally."127 In 
the case of Yeltsin's Russia (and Gorbachev's Soviet 
Union), the military's weight in the policy-making 
process is of an entirely different magnitude.
There was also a pattern of opposition on the part 
of the Russian military to proceeding with troop
withdrawals. Such opposition affected and may have led 
to the reversal of certain decisions made by political 
leaders. For example, resistance in the upper echelons 
of the armed forces to troop withdrawals from bases on 
the Kurile Islands (and to the return of those disputed 
islands to Japan) evidently played a role in changing 
the Russian government's proposed timetable for a 
phased withdrawal from these islands.128 In turn, owing 
to the centrality of the Kurile Islands question in
127Graham Allison, Essence of Decision. (USA: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1971), p. 91.
128For a review of the military's stance on the Kurile 
Islands dispute, see Stephen Foye, "The Struggle over Russia's 
Kuril Islands Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 36, 
(11 September 1992).
208
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic
Russo-Japanese relations, the military's contrary 
stance on the troop withdrawals may also have played a 
supporting role in the last-minute cancellation of 
Yeltsin's trip to Japan.
With regard to the Baltic States as well, defense 
officials' objections to political decisions on troop 
withdrawals are a matter of public record129 and 
probably helped Yeltsin to become convinced of the 
staunch positions promoted by his aide, Sergei 
Stankevich. A few weeks after the signing of an 
agreement between Russia and Lithuania in the fall of 
1992, the Collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense 
announced that it was going to suspend the pullout of 
troops from the Baltic States because "proper 
conditions" had not yet been created for them in the 
areas to which they were to be redeployed.130 Two weeks 
later, Yeltsin signed a directive temporarily stopping 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States 
and tasking the Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs, the Russian Security Council, and officials at 
local levels with resolving questions related to troop 
disengagements.131
It is, of course, important to distinguish between 
rhetoric and practice, especially on the question of 
troop withdrawals from the Baltic States. Military 
officials often asserted that the withdrawal of troops 
from this area could not and would not be rushed. But
129Stephen Foye, "Russian Politics Complicates Baltic Troop 
Withdrawal," RFE/RL Research Report., Vol. 1, No. 46 (20 November 
1992) .
130Krasnaya zvezda, 21 October 1992, as reported by ITAR- 
TASS in English, 21 October 1992.
131"Boris Yeltsin Suspends Withdrawal of Russian Troops from 
the Baltics," Interfax, 29 October 1992.
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while making these statements, the withdrawals 
continued apace.
The Role of Other Government Members
A prominent role in the conduct of Russia's 
foreign relations was played by members of the 
government including the vice president, the prime 
minister, and his deputies. Russian Vice President 
Aleksandr Rutskoi on occasion showed himself to be an 
outspoken opponent of Kozyrev's conduct of foreign 
policy. One of the most striking examples of this was 
Rutskoi's advocacy of the use of strong-arm tactics 
against Moldova and his expression of support for the 
breakaway "Dniester Republic."132 The vice president 
even publicly called for Kozyrev's dismissal.
Deputy prime ministers and Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin were also frequently involved in foreign 
policy questions, not so much as public critics, but as 
assistants. There was simply more foreign-affairs work 
than the Foreign Ministry alone could handle: The
continuing divorce process among former USSR republics 
involving many unresolved financial questions, as did 
the attempt to repair broken economic ties. Top members 
of the government were thus involved in the various 
foreign affairs issues in this region. Complaints from 
the Foreign Ministry about their involvement were not 
heard, suggesting that the MFA welcomed this 
assistance.
132"visit of Alexander Rutskoi to the Dniester Authorities," 
Izvestiya, 6 April 1992.
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The Role of Researnh Tust-i tut^s and the Media
Research institutes came to play an entirely new 
role in independent Russia. Many of the changes in the 
role of institutes had to do with the shortage of 
public money to support, or pay adequately for, state 
research institutes. Similarly, the market for analysis 
increased as foreign and Russian businesses' 
requirements for political analysis grew. Thus, private 
research institutes became more prevalent in Russia.133
A unique advocacy group, the Council on Foreign 
and Defense Policy, was established during the first 
republic and gathered together prominent businessmen, 
former officials, media commentators, and foreign 
policy analysts. The group seemed intent on influencing 
foreign policy. Members of the Russian Council on 
Foreign and Defense Policy included people such as 
Evgenii Ambartsumov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
Committee for International Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Relations; Georgii Arbatov, the director of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences' USA and Canada 
Institute; Sergei Yegorov, the president of the 
Association of Russian Banks; presidential adviser 
Sergei Stankevich, and Sergei Karaganov, the Director 
of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and the 
deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' 
Institute of Europe. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was also 
a member, although considering that the Council was 
mainly preoccupied with advocating a foreign policy 
line different from the one being pursued officially 
(and advocating to some extent a change of command at
1330ksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and 
Their Role in Political Decisionmaking. An occasional paper of 
the Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions 
Project, 1996.
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the Foreign Ministry), it seems unlikely that Kozyrev's 
participation in the group was regular or intense.
In August 1992 several members of the Council for 
Foreign and Defense Policy, published in Nezavisimaya 
gazeta an extensive report under the headline, "A 
Strategy for Russia," which was intended to supply a 
comprehensive program for Russia's international 
relations. The report was designed to challenge the 
Russian government to make public a comprehensive 
document on Russia's foreign policy goals which would 
serve as a reference in all stages of the policymaking 
process. As a contributing author and council member, 
Vitalii Tretyakov said in his foreword to the report:
There is a certain provocative aspect 
to this publication in its relation 
to the authorities.... Even their 
silence (the most likely anticipated 
reaction) would mean something quite 
definite -- above all, agreement.
However, it would naturally be more 
interesting and useful to hear 
comments on the various theses.134
The authors seem to have hoped that their blueprint for 
Russian foreign policy would prevail over the drafts of 
the Foreign Policy Concept being prepared by the 
Foreign Ministry and later by the Security Council.
It is difficult to assess whether the Committee 
had a direct impact on Russian foreign policy at this 
time. But as an assembly of many prominent people 
interested in foreign affairs, it was in a good 
position to influence not only the public debate but 
also the official debate about foreign policy.
134"A Strategy for Russia," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 August 
1992, p. 4.
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The appearance of the Council on Foreign and 
Defense Policy's report in a major daily newspaper 
reflected a change in the Russian media. The media had 
become the forum for opposing ideas, and more 
importantly, the source of far more information than in 
the past. To be sure, there were imperfections in the 
operation of the Russian media which accompanied its 
liberation from Soviet rule: As James F. Brown
described the problem indigenous to democratizing 
states in the region in 1992:
[There is an] excess of opinion over 
fact, vilification over criticism, 
tendentiousness over moderation, and 
rumor over reality. Much of the 
trouble lies with communist
propagandist tradition, whereby the 
journalist's job was to harangue 
rather than inform and the whole 
profession became debased (much of it 
willingly) beyond recognition.135
Since many of the journalists active in Russia had 
learned their profession in Soviet times, their work 
was influenced by past practices. As was noted in 
chapter one, however, if care is taken to avoid 
hyperbole and sensationalism, the Russian media can be 
a bountiful source of information.
Another important aspect of the media's work was 
the use of it as a forum for policymakers to discuss 
their views, to elaborate about policymaking in detail, 
and often to continue policy debates. Interviews with 
the foreign-policy elite were prevalent in the media 
because of the linkage between Russia's foreign 
relations with its self-image, its national pride, and
135James F. Brown, Introduction to issue on the media in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 39 (25 September 1992), p. 1.
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its status in the world. Foreign Minister Kozyrev was 
especially eager to give interviews to explain and 
defend his much-maligned policies. Thus, the Russian 
media became a major source of information about 
policymakers' views and policy debates.
As during Soviet times, in independent Russia 
there continued to be movement of specialists between 
academia, politics, policymaking, and media.136 In 
Russia, though, policy entrepreneurs needed to find 
access to policymakers within a much more competitive 
marketplace for the ideas of policy entrepreneurs.
Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition
Models
In chapter one, a series of characteristics 
identifiable in the bureaucratic politics and 
transition models were enumerated. How applicable are 
these characteristics to the first Russian republic? 
Based on the foregoing analysis of Russia's foreign 
policy formulation process, the following conclusions 
can be drawn.
Allison took disagreement in the policymaking 
process as a given: "If a nation performed an action,
that action was the resultant of bargaining among 
individuals and groups within the government."137 In the 
first Russian republic, disagreement was a basic 
component of the policymaking process. But the interim 
step between disagreement and policy outcome was all 
too often not intragovernmental negotiation to 
harmonize disparate programs or paste parts of them
136Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," in Neil Malcolm, 
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in 
Russian Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 41.
137Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 173.
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together into a single policy. Rather, two different 
patterns were evident in Russia.
The first and more prevalent pattern -- a "winner 
take all" situation -- fits clearly into the transition 
model. The "loser's" policy preference was completely 
and often publicly rejected. Examples of this pattern 
can be found in the decision to cancel the Yeltsin 
visit to Japan and the Security Council's fundamental 
redrafting of the Foreign Policy Concept. This pattern 
indicated an unwillingness to compromise on the part of 
Russia's policymakers, perhaps out of the belief that 
the stakes are so high in the making of foreign policy 
that even the slightest compromise would be detrimental 
to the future of an individual career or an 
institution's authority.
The second pattern was one in which actors pursued 
multiple foreign policies. This meant that the result 
of intergovernmental disagreement was a situation in 
which various Russian actors pursued a position which 
suited them the best, as could be seen in the
military's assistance to separatists in the Caucasus, a 
policy which contradicted that of the MFA.
This second pattern could also be linked with an 
attribute of the transition model -- praetorianism.
There was a clear tendency in the behavior of the
Russian armed forces -- especially its habit of playing 
its own game on the international stage, irrespective 
of Russia's official policy. The ascendancy of the 
armed forces in democratizing Russia was different from 
the phenomenon seen during the Soviet period in that it 
was unclear to what extent the Russian military enjoyed 
the support of the chief executive. While evidence is 
difficult if not impossible to come by, the overall
picture of Russian foreign policy suggested that the
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behavior of the armed forces was more closely linked 
with political disorder and the absence of clear-cut 
procedure (as discussed by Huntington138) than to the 
wishes of the commander in chief.
This meant that conflicts over foreign policy 
choice did not conclude with compromise or agreement 
between the various Russian ministries. Conflicts often 
simply moved to a new venue, such as the international 
stage (as was shown by Kozyrev's shock diplomacy 
speech) . As with the problem of winner-take-all 
solutions, this posed the danger that disagreements 
between policymakers could accumulate and spill-over 
from one issue to another. This type of behavior 
indicated that the process of consolidation -- reaching 
the end of the transition process -- could actually 
become more distant because of the ill-will produced by 
the traumas of foreign policymaking during the 
transition. Indeed, the process of settling down could 
not be expected merely to occur with the passage of 
time.
This practice of maintaining more than one of
foreign policy approach on a single issue gave Russia's 
foreign policy the flavor of being at odds with itself. 
As will be seen in chapter five, the pattern of
pursuing multiple policies was to become more prevalent 
as time went on. This, too, could be affected by
elements of the transition. As was noted in chapter 
one, the danger of nationalism and belligerence are 
ever-present ones in the process of democratization. 
Both nationalism and belligerence can be intricately 
connected with questions of identity and prestige of a
138Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1991), p. 251-253.
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state. The pursuit of a disorderly foreign policy on 
the world stage could well impact on a country's 
prestige and add to the list of complaints launched by 
nationalists against reformers, thus further limiting 
the chances of settling down and stabilization in 
foreign policy.
The structure of the Russian government during the 
first republic itself did not favor turning 
intragovernmental disagreements into policy resultants. 
The division of power was unclear (for example, on the 
question of who enjoyed the prerogative to deploy 
troops abroad). Power was also distributed in a faulty 
manner (as could be seen in the possession of extensive 
and overlapping powers by the executive and the 
legislature). Rather than providing checks and balances 
on each other, the executive and legislative could each 
make a claim to control policymaking. Finally, the 
presence of the dual executive, consisting of the 
ministries and the extensive presidential apparatus, 
meant a great blurring of the delineation of duties 
within the executive branch. The situation was not 
remedied by the numerous decrees defining which agency 
was in charge of foreign policy because actors had 
little incentive to follow procedure or even observe 
the law. In short, there was no fixed system forcing 
actors to work together to make policy.
All of these problems are characteristics of the 
transition model. As is discussed in chapter one, laws 
are relative and contested, legalism substitutes for 
the rule of law, there is an excessive accrual of power 
to the executive, procedures are ad hoc and not 
established, and the division of power between the 
executive and legislature are highly contested.
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Allison said: "The actor is not a monolithic
'nation' or 'government' but rather a constellation of 
loosely allied organizations on top of which government 
leaders sit."139 This statement is partially descriptive 
of the first Russian republic. To be sure, Russia was 
not monolithic, and its organizations were numerous, 
conjuring up the image of a constellation. But it is
difficult to imagine them as being even "loosely 
allied" owing to their struggles to preserve or create 
institutional identities.
These struggles, thus, went far beyond the budget 
battles and wrestling to control various issues, things 
which can be seen in virtually any government 
bureaucracy. The bureaucratic infighting in Russia's 
first republic was sometimes a matter of institutional 
survival (as in the case of the Security Council and 
its Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission). These 
characteristics are all components of the transition 
model, which discusses the problem of the very high
stakes to be won or lost in the policymaking process.
Even if an institution's existence was not 
strictly or immediately at stake, there was the 
potential for negative precedents, as the transition
model noted: Could the continuous trespassing on the
turf of independent Russia's first Foreign Ministry set 
a precedent for the future? Such a question would not 
normally be asked in a country whose foreign ministry's 
institutional identity was fixed and could only be
slightly altered, depending on events or on the holder 
of the office of foreign minister.
139Ibid.t p. 80.
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In Russia, however, there was a danger of negative 
precedents which could sideline the MFA from 
policymaking on certain foreign questions, (such as in 
policy toward the Caucasus). What is more, the history 
of the Soviet MFA's exclusion from Third World policy 
during the period of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko 
loomed over the Russian Foreign Ministry. As all of 
these points demonstrate, the new and weak identities 
of Russia's governing institutions played a powerful 
role in the way that Russian officials dealt with each 
other. More significantly, it influenced the way that 
they viewed policy choices.
Allison argued that problems are "cut up and 
parceled out to various organizations,"14° creating the 
image of foreign policy being mechanically put together 
on an assembly line. The chaotic nature of interaction 
between Russia's governing institutions does not 
support this description. There appears to have been 
too little organization and too little clarity about 
who was in charge to expect this kind of division of 
responsibility. In addition, Yeltsin's laissez-faire 
management style and tendency to let his dual executive 
fight problems out among themselves sooner suggested an 
image of a cock fight rather than one of an assembly 
line.
Allison argued that the behavior of government can 
be understood as a series of organizational "outputs" 
possessing a "preprogrammed" character.141 In Russia's 
first republic, this was only minimally on display. (An 
example can be found in the military's continuation of 
the troop withdrawals from the Baltic, apparently
140IJbid. , p. 80.
141JJbid. , p. 81.
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because of the difficulty of even temporarily stopping 
a process of such complexity.) Far more often, however, 
Russia's foreign policy seemed not preprogrammed but
unprogrammed and unpredictable not only to the outside 
observer, but also to high-level Russian foreign
policymakers themselves (as the military's agreement on 
the Russian troop withdrawals from Lithuania made 
clear) .
In addition to these core features of
policymaking, Allison identified specific types of 
actions and behavior characterizing bureaucratic
politics. Among them, Allison discussed standard
operating procedures, which "permit concerted action by 
large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic 
cues."142 Without these procedures, "it would not be
possible to perform certain concerted tasks," but 
because of them "certain behavior in particular 
instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and 
often inappropriate." These procedures are "grounded in 
the incentive structure of the organization or even in 
the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes 
and operating style of its members."143 Such standard 
operating procedures were not characteristic of 
Russia's first republic, owing to the chaotic
organizational and political situation. The day-to-day 
operation of the Foreign Ministry was one example. In a 
situation of internal institutional chaos, rapid 
personnel attrition, budgetary instability, and weak 
institutional identity, it is difficult to imagine the 
creation of standard operating procedures. Even under 
the best of organizational conditions, such procedures 
are by definition formed only over time. In the case of
142Ibid., p. 83.
143JJbid. , p. 83.
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the first Russian republic, the conditions for creating 
such an array of procedures simply were not present. 
The absence of these standard operating procedures had 
precisely the profound effect on policy that Allison 
expected: Without these standard operating procedures, 
"it would not be possible to perform certain concerted 
tasks. "144
Allison's "action channels," or "regularized 
means of taking government action on a specific kind of 
issue,"145 focused on the preselection of major players 
and standardized ways of "playing the game" on any 
given foreign policy issue. In Russia's first republic, 
the selection of players was extremely fluid and the 
means of taking action could sooner be depicted as "ad 
hoc" rather than "regularized." An example of this can 
be found in the handling Of the decision to cancel 
Yeltsin's visit to Japan. This type of behavior was 
more in keeping with the characteristics of the 
transition model, which stressed the ad hoc nature of 
procedures -- indeed, the absence of them.
Finally, Allison's "dominant inference pattern" -- 
" [i] f a nation performs an action of a certain type 
today, its organizational components must yesterday 
have been performing...an action only marginally 
different..."146 was not prevalent in Russia. Foreign 
policy actions taken 'today' might have had far more to 
do with the identity of the person with President 
Yeltsin's ear than with a previous foreign policy 
action. Further, today's action might simply reflect 
the impulse of an agency to get involved. (Examples of
144Ibid., p . 83.
145JJbid. , p. 169
146Ibid., p. 87.
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this could be found in the Foreign Intelligence 
Service's public diplomacy campaigns and the tendency 
of its director to strike a profile while abroad more 
reminiscent of that of a foreign minister than that of 
Foreign Intelligence chief.)
To some extent, this type of behavior can occur in 
any country -- even in well-established democracies. In 
Russia's case, the deviation from the dominant 
inference pattern was excessive and public. Therefore, 
analyzing Russia's foreign policy in terms of the 
transition model -- an its emphasis on disorder and 
lack of procedure -- offers more insight into the 
Russian foreign policy formulation process.
Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, 
one would expect the bureaucratic politics model to 
offer little explanatory power for understanding 
foreign policy formulation during the first republic. 
To be sure, conflicting policy priorities among Russian 
officials were present, in keeping with the 
bureaucratic politics model, but the way that
policymakers coped with their conflicting goals did not 
match Allison's description of the way that
bureaucratic conflict is typically played out. The 
defining characteristic of foreign policy formulation 
during this time was its chaotic manner, not one of 
persistent procedures and excessive
compartmentalization.
The bureaucratic politics model is less applicable 
to Russia's first republic than it was to Gorbachev's 
Soviet Union. The model became less enlightening 
because of the continuing and deepening institutional 
disorganization, the weakening of presidential 
leadership in foreign affairs (except for isolated
cases of spontaneous activity), and the incomplete or
222
Chapter 4 The First Russian Republic
faulty division of power among Russia's governing 
institutions. The underdevelopment of standard 
operating procedures and action channels meant that 
policymaking was chaotic and unpredictable. The rule of 
law offered little or no recourse for settling 
intragovernmental disputes because of the tendency to 
view the law as a tool of convenience.
By employing the transition model, Russia's foreign 
policy formulation becomes more explainable. The 
cancellation of Yeltsin's trip to Japan takes on added 
contours when one views the decision not simply as a 
standoff between the president's men and the diplomats, 
but as a foreign policy issue which was intricately 
bound up with domestic political questions, 
institution-building, the prestige of the president, 
and the prestige of the nation.
Kozyrev's motives in giving his "shock diplomacy" 
speech are more easily clarified if one thinks of the 
foreign policymaking process as the multi-layered chess 
board described by O'Donnell and Schmitter. Kozyrev's 
speech seems not so much to be an anomaly but, rather, 
appears to be a natural reaction to the frustration 
attendant to being a player in such a chaotic game.
Much of this chaos continued in the second 
republic. While Russia's political order would be 
codified in a new constitution, the instability of the 
political establishment persisted.
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Russian Foreign Policy Formulation 
at the Start of the Second R epublic
In December 1993, Russia elected a new legislature 
and adopted, via referendum, a new constitution. The 
elections resulted in a surprisingly strong showing for 
the ultra-conservative Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDP), headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. With the 
LDP winning 22.9 percent of the popular vote, it 
appeared that Boris Yeltsin's forceful attempt to break 
the deadlock between his pro-reform forces in the 
executive branch and the conservative forces in the 
legislature did not bring the sort of radical change in 
Russia's political landscape that he sought. With pro­
reform parties capturing less than one-third of the 
seats in the new State Duma (the lower house of 
parliament), Yeltsin could not count on reformers to 
carry the legislature. Indeed, it was unclear whether 
the Duma's pro-reform deputies would be able to unite 
enough to vote as a bloc.1
While the new constitution clarified the division 
of power, the polarization of Russia's political forces 
was not resolved, and in some ways it was exacerbated, 
by the new delineation of authority. The constitution 
of the second republic was written with a view to the 
existing political challenges faced by Boris Yeltsin.
^-Michael McFaul, Understanding Russia's 1993 Parliamentary 
Elections. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace, 1994), p. 11.
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It was not so much an attempt to set up a political 
system which would withstand controversies and provide 
the legal basis of political life for decades to come. 
Rather it was an attempt to ensure that Boris Yeltsin 
would not encounter serious challenges from the 
legislative and judicial branches of government.
Controversies over foreign policy questions 
continued through the end of Yeltsin's first term as 
president. As before, they derived from a lack of 
agreement within Russian society and among Russia's 
elites as to the nature of Russia's identity: Was
Russia a part of the East or the West? Was capitalism 
or socialism Russia's destiny? Was Russia still a great 
power or merely a failed superpower? In a 1994 poll, 
Russian elites, including members of the executive and 
legislative branches as well as the military, were 
split as to whether Russia was moving in the right or 
wrong direction.2 This was a sign of the polarization 
of Russia's elite and society which continued to weigh 
down the foreign policy debate, adding gravity to 
issues which were far from grave and sustaining 
disputes over policy issues which could otherwise have 
been resolved.
The New Division of Authority
Generally speaking, the Russian constitution of 
December 1993 shifted power from the legislature to the 
executive branch of government. Among the powers of the 
Russian president directly relevant to foreign policy 
formulation were: determining the basic guidelines of
2The responses were "Right Direction" - 36 percent, "Wrong
Direction" - 32 percent, "No Direction" - 19 percent, "Don't Know" 
- 13 percent. Michael Haney, "Decisionmakers Divided," Transition, 
11 August 1995, p. 60-64.
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country's foreign and domestic policy, representing 
Russia in international relations, conducting
international negotiations, exercising leadership in 
foreign policy, appointing Russia's diplomatic 
representatives, forming the Security Council and the 
presidential apparatus, and issuing edicts. The 
president's right to appoint the prime minister was 
practically unencumbered by the need for legislative 
approval because, if the Duma rejected his candidate 
three times, it put itself at risk of dissolution.3 The 
president's power to write and enact his own laws, in
the form of decrees, made Russia's one of the most
powerful presidencies in the world.
The powers of the State Duma (directly relevant to 
foreign policy formulation) included ratifying 
international treaties, writing laws (which required 
the president's signature), and providing non-binding 
advice on the president's diplomatic appointees. The 
upper house, or Federation Council, had jurisdiction
over the utilization of Russia's armed forces beyond 
its borders, as well as the right to examine the Duma's 
handling of treaty ratification.4
While Russia's new system featured a president, a 
prime minister, and a parliament, this could not be 
described as a semi-presidential system as much as a 
presidential one. Russia's second republic lacked the 
strong parliament characteristic of a semi-presidential 
system: The Russian parliament had the authority to
vote no-confidence in the prime minister only at the
3"Constitution of the Russian Federation," Vybory 1995.
(Moscow: RAU Corporation: 1995), pp. 29-32, 40.
4JJbid. , pp. 36-40.
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risk of being dissolved itself by the president.5 It 
was the weakness of the new Russian legislative bodies 
as much as the strength of the presidency which stood 
out in the first years of the constitution of the
second republic.6
The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment
The Russian Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev did not 
significantly improve its control over Russian foreign 
policy in the second republic. While the new
constitution gave greater powers to the executive
branch vis-a-vis the legislative, Kozyrev's MFA did not 
routinely benefit in practice from the new delineation 
of authority. As one critic of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry's work put it: "Foreign policy...is under
terrific pressure from all sorts of lobbies [including] 
the Foreign Ministry lobby.... That lobby is one of the 
most civilized but not the most influential."7 The 
writer included the military as one of more powerful 
"lobbies" because it could alter the Foreign Ministry's 
policy line toward any given country in the former USSR 
with relative ease. But other influential "lobbies" 
could be found in the presidential apparatus, other 
parts of the Russian government, and the legislature, 
as well.
The institutional difficulties of the MFA 
continued. While Yeltsin allocated extra funding to the
5Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-
Presidential Government," in Arend Lijphart, ed. Parliamentary 
Versus Presidential Government. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 142.
6The cut-off point for this study is the end of Boris 
Yeltsin's first term as president, July 1996.
7Vitalii Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya gazeta in 
a roundtable discussion, "Russia's Foreign Policy Should Be 
Multidimensional," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5, 1994.
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Foreign Ministry in early 1994, the attrition of 
diplomats continued. The additional budgetary support 
was designed to bring salaries up to levels more 
competitive with the private sector. In fact though, 
pay remained extremely low, even for someone with the 
rank of ambassador.8
The MFA1s institutional status changed once again 
in early 1995 when Yeltsin signed a decree putting the 
ministry under direct presidential oversight. 
(Previously, the MFA had been subordinate to the prime 
minister.) In addition, the decree said that the MFA 
was authorized to coordinate and control any actions 
taken by other federal, executive-branch organs 
dealings with Russia's foreign relations.9 This aspect 
of the decree resembled past attempts to define a chain 
of command for foreign policy formulation. As in 1992, 
the MFA was charged with coordinating the foreign- 
policy actions of other ministries. The 1995 attempt 
was approximately as unsuccessful as the previous 
attempts: Kozyrev complained in late 1995, prior to
leaving his position as foreign minister, that one of 
the main problems in foreign policy was the lack of 
presidential control over various ministries. From 
Kozyrev's point of view, his coordination of the other 
ministries' actions in foreign relations could only be 
effective if it was backed up by presidential power. 
Kozyrev cited as an example, the Defense Ministry's 
interference with Foreign Ministry work in Georgia, 
where military officials both blocked the conclusion of 
a Russo-Georgian treaty and spoiled relations between
8I. L . "Diplomats To Rake in Some Money," Moskovskie novosti, 
No. 7 (29 January) 1995, p. 3.
9"Russian Federation Statute: On the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation," Text of decree, Rossiskaya 
gazeta, 31 March 1995, p. 5.
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the two countries by aiding separatists in the Georgian 
breakaway region of Abkhazia (discussed in chapter 
four) .10
Policy toward the CIS continued to be one of the 
most controversial in Russian politics and therefore 
one of the most difficult for the MFA to steer. This 
was especially true of the question of the Russian 
Diaspora. Attempting to have its say on the subject, 
the MFA presented a report in mid-February 1994 
outlining a program for the protection of ethnic 
Russians in the former Soviet Union. The report was 
drafted by the MFA's Department of International 
Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights and presented 
at a news conference.11 Among other things, it called 
for applying economic sanctions to states where the 
rights of Russians were violated. In addition, the MFA 
program made Russian loans to its neighbors contingent 
on one-third of the funding being used for the 
development of Russian-language schools and aid to the 
Russian Diaspora. The content and presentation of the 
report suggested that the MFA was attempting to retain 
control over the most significant political aspect of 
Russia's policy toward the CIS -- the question of 
ethnic Russians.
During the run-up to the December 1995 
parliamentary elections, in which Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev was a candidate, Kozyrev began increasingly to 
view foreign policy through the narrowest prism of 
domestic politics. The visit to Russia by NATO's North
10Interview of Kozyrev by Sergei Dorenko on "Versions" 
program, 2120 GMT, NTV television (Russia), 30 November 1995. FBIS 
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 30 November 1995, transmitted via
Internet.
11"Russia's Foreign Ministry Drafts Program for Protecting 
Ethnic Russians," Interfax, 16 February 1994.
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Atlantic Assembly gave Kozyrev the opportunity to 
assert his opposition to NATO enlargement for reasons 
possibly related to his political career. Referring to 
NATO enlargement as a "killer" of Russian-Western 
partnership, Kozyrev explained that he would have great 
difficulty drawing support for it from his constituents 
in Murmansk, who included a large number of men in navy 
uniform.12 His statements contrasted sharply with his 
position of a few years earlier, when he warned 
Russia's new leaders that they "cannot think, for 
instance, of NATO as Russia's adversary."13 It was at 
that time that Kozyrev spoke of NATO as an organization 
which Russia itself wanted to join.14
Kozyrev's metamorphosis on NATO paralleled a much 
more general hardening of his foreign policy views 
during his tenure as foreign minister. Nowhere was this 
more evident than on the question of the treatment of 
ethnic Russians in the CIS. In 1992, Kozyrev warned 
that playing the ethnic Russian card could backfire on 
ethnic Russians in the near abroad, "giving rise to 
Russophobia -- a real national treason committed by 
national patriots."15 But in 1995, a year of 
parliamentary elections, he himself played politics 
with the ethnic Russian question, warning that "there
12"Summary and Brief Account of Visit to Moscow by [North 
Atlantic Assembly] President Karsten Voigt," North Atlantic 
Assembly International Secretariat, Brussels, March 1995, pp. 4-5.
13Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," Foreign
Affairs. Vol. 71 No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 15.
14Kozyrev said that Russia did not "view NATO as an 
aggressive military bloc but as one of the mechanisms of stability 
in Europe and in the world in general. Therefore it is our wish to 
cooperation with this mechanism and to join it." "Press Conference 
of Burbulis, Shakhrai, and Kozyrev," Diplomaticheskii vestnik, No. 
1, January 15, 1992, p. 11.
15Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 1 July 1992,
p. 3.
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may be cases when the use of direct military force will 
be needed to defend our compatriots abroad."16 Both the 
Russian and Western media picked up on the shift in 
Kozyrev's position, poking fun at what they considered 
an attempt to show that Zhirinovsky does not have a 
"monopoly on nationalism," as one Western diplomat put 
it.17
In parallel with Kozyrev's personal metamorphosis, 
the MFA began to pay more attention to the question of 
a common CIS foreign policy. In February 1994, Kozyrev, 
who was the head of the CIS Council of Foreign 
Ministers, wrote to UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali requesting that the CIS be granted 
observer status at the UN General Assembly.18 He also 
promoted the idea of having the CIS recognized as a 
regional structure by the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the European Union.19 In March 
1994, Kozyrev wrote to other CIS foreign ministers 
reminding them of the need to circulate CIS documents 
to the United Nations.20 Russia's diplomats probably 
reckoned that Russia, owing to its preponderance in the 
CIS and its status as a world power, would continue to 
play an overarching role in the CIS region and 
organization, and the ascendancy of the CIS as an 
international organization could only amplify Russia's 
voice in world affairs.
16"Kozyrev remarks on use of force fuel fears in ex-Soviet 
states," Financial Times, 21 April 1995.
17Ibid. See also, "Andrei Kozyrev: The Fading Allure of Mr. 
Yes," Moscow Times, 27 June 1995, p. 1.
18"Briefing at Russia's Foreign Ministry," Interfax, 10 
February 1994.
19"Kozyrev Sends Message to CIS Foreign Ministers," Interfax,
4 March 1994.
20 Ibid.
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Policy toward the CIS had become a matter of heated 
debate within Russian politics. The frequent criticism 
of Kozyrev's attention to the "far abroad" was a 
comment on his allegedly excessive attention to the 
established democracies. But it was also a complaint 
about his relative inattention to Russia's "near 
abroad." By paying more attention to the CIS 
organization and region, the Foreign Ministry was 
showing that this home to ethnic Russians was taken 
seriously in Russian foreign policy.
The MFA's heightened attention to the CIS as a 
region may also have been occasioned by the upgrading 
of the State Committee for Cooperation with the Member 
States of the CIS to ministerial status in January 
1994.21 (The new ministry, the Ministry for Cooperation 
with the Member States of the CIS, is hereafter 
referred to as the CIS Ministry.22) Its elevation to the 
status of ministry might have raised concerns in the 
MFA that those responsibilities might be increased, 
especially since critics of Kozyrev's foreign policy 
had been calling for responsibility for relations with 
the CIS to be removed from the Foreign Ministry. In 
fact, though, the CIS Ministry did not pose a threat to 
the MFA's policy toward the region because it concerned 
itself with economic questions, an area not typically 
managed by the MFA. It appears that the CIS Ministry 
was itself controversial and did not start functioning 
fully for some time.23 Notwithstanding what became (or 
did not become) of the CIS Ministry, the MFA may have
21Text of Edict on Federal Restructuring, ITAR-TASS, 10 
January 1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 10 
January 1994, transmitted via Internet.
22Ibid.
23There was no full-time minister initially and very little 
press coverage of the ministry's work.
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been prompted to increase its activity toward the CIS 
region in response to the potential threat from the new 
ministry. This would suggest that the mere threat of 
change in foreign policy formulation resulting from the 
creation of the CIS Ministry could have an effect on 
Russia's foreign policy behavior.
The coordination question remained an issue after 
Andrei Kozyrev's departure from the post of foreign 
minister and the arrival of Evgenii Primakov in January 
1996. Primakov said in one of his first interviews as 
foreign minister that one of the top duties of the MFA 
would be to coordinate the foreign-policy actions of 
the other ministries: " [The Foreign Ministry] should
coordinate all other agencies with regard to foreign 
policy matters. It won't do if every ministry carries 
out its own international policy."24 Primakov based his 
judgment on the evidence of foreign policy 
fragmentation which occurred under Kozyrev during the 
previous few years.
Another decree putting the MFA in charge of foreign 
policy coordination was signed by Boris Yeltsin in 
March 1996. With the new decree, it became mandatory 
for foreign policy proposals initiated by federal 
bodies other than the Foreign Ministry to receive MFA 
approval before submitting these proposals to the 
president.25 Similarly, the decree called for MFA 
representatives to be present within all commissions
24Yegor Yakovlev, "About a New, Long-Familiar Job," Interview 
with Evgenii Primakov, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 2 (18-22 January)
1996. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 22 January 
1996, transmitted via Internet.
25Presidential Edict No. 375 "On the Coordinating Role of the 
RF MFA in Implementing the Unified Foreign Policy Line of the 
Russian Federation," signed by Boris Yeltsin on 12 March 1996, 
published in Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 March 1996, p. 4.
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and working groups within federal bodies dealing with 
foreign policy issues.26 Only certain top officials in 
the MFA were permitted to make public statements on 
general foreign policy questions; others could make 
public statements on specific issues, but only if what 
they said reflected official policy.
The March 1996 decree went further than previous 
decrees in attempting to regulate foreign policy 
formulation by pinpointing areas of difficulty in 
foreign policy coordination. Rather than simply stating 
that the MFA was responsible for coordinating foreign 
policy, the decree laid down specific guidelines for 
behavior. The content of these restrictions suggested 
that Primakov himself, in the interest of defending his 
position as foreign minister, pushed Yeltsin to impose 
such restrictions to ensure that the MFA would be able 
to coordinate foreign policy.
It seems to have been the case that the situation 
required someone of Primakov's stature to secure 
Yeltsin's signature under such a detailed set of 
instructions as the ones contained in the decree. One 
Russian media commentator compared Kozyrev's pleas to 
Yeltsin for better foreign policy coordination with 
Primakov's action, saying: "The example of Evgenii
Primakov shows that authority is not given, it is 
taken."27 In other words, Kozyrev's inability to control 
Russian foreign policy was not a matter of lacking the 
requisite official authority, but of lacking the 
ability to obtain others' respect for his authority.
25 Ibid.
27Leonid Gankin, "Volleys of the Reserve Front," Moskovskie 
novosti, No. 25 (25-30 June) 1996, p. 10. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 3 0 June 1996, transmitted via Internet.
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The Role of Other Government Members
The role played by Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin in foreign affairs began to increase 
during the second republic. It became noticeable early 
in 1994 that Chernomyrdin was voicing opinions about 
foreign policy matters with which he had previously not 
concerned himself. More importantly, his views on these 
matters differed from those of Foreign Minister
Kozyrev. One of the early examples of divergence could 
be found in early 1994 over Moscow's handling of the 
use of air-strikes on Bosnian Serb targets. Whereas
Kozyrev's approach had been to express the opinion that 
air-strikes could not be ruled out, Chernomyrdin's 
stance was to oppose fiercely the use of air-strikes.28
Another example could be found in the issuance of 
an edict, signed by Chernomyrdin, on the "Main Areas of 
Russian Federation State Policy in Respect to 
Compatriots Resident Abroad," which listed immediate 
measures to be taken in the former Soviet Union 
including the creation of a government Commission for 
the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad, to address, among 
other things, the popular political issue of ethnic 
Russians' rights. The Commission was to be entrusted 
with coordinating the activities of Russian government 
organs towards protecting ethnic Russians. The effect 
of this edict was to subordinate the work of the 
Foreign Ministry to the Commission.29
28Maksim Yusin, "Viktor Chernomyrdin Makes Modifications to 
Andrei Kozyrev's Stance," Izvestiya, 3 February 1994, p. 4.
29Edict of the Russian Federation Government of 31 August 
1994 "On Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad," Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 22 September 1994, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report 
Central Eurasia, 22 September 1994, transmitted via Internet.
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It appeared that in early 1994, having one eye on 
the results of the December 1993 parliamentary
elections and one on the post-Yeltsin presidency, 
Chernomyrdin was attempting to distinguish himself by 
becoming more involved in foreign affairs. Since 
Chernomyrdin was nominally superior to Kozyrev and 
weighed in with significantly more clout than Kozyrev 
both at home and abroad, the prime minister could
easily enjoy the influence over foreign policy 
formulation which he apparently sought. Chernomyrdin 
was careful to deliver his unequivocal support of Boris 
Yeltsin, especially during the run-up to the 1996 
presidential elections. At the same time, though, 
Chernomyrdin probably realized that his foreign-policy 
activities strengthened his political stock at home and 
would help him as a presidential candidate, whenever 
his political career would require a more presidential 
posture.
By working with US Vice President Al Gore in the 
so-called Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission30, Chernomyrdin 
became one of the key interlocutors in the Russian-
American dialogue. The Commission had held six sessions 
as of January 1996, giving Chernomyrdin regular 
opportunities to influence Russia's handling of
bilateral questions such as the disposal of nuclear 
weapons and materials, financial aid and assistance, 
and security questions.31 The prime minister's heavy 
involvement in Russian economic matters, trade 
questions, and financial assistance issues, meant that
30It is formally known as the Russian-U.S. Intergovernmental 
Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.
31"Gore, Chernomyrdin View Results of Commission Talks," 
dateline Moscow, Gore and Chernomyrdin had signed some 120 
agreements as of January 1996, ITAR-TASS, 31 January 1996. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 31 January 1996, 
transmitted via Internet.
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he met regularly with foreign leaders, situations which 
gave him the opportunity to make general foreign policy 
statements and to offer statesman-like assurances about 
Russia's progress toward reform and stability as a 
state. In these situations, Chernomyrdin acted much 
like a second head of state.
Other members of the Russian government, such as 
the first deputy and deputy prime ministers, also had 
contact with foreign partners, but to a lesser extent 
than Chernomyrdin. Deputy prime ministers sometimes 
also accompanied Boris Yeltsin on state visits, to 
provide expert advice on economic issues.32 When 
traveling without Yeltsin, their discussions did not 
normally exceed the limits of economic questions, and 
owing to the fact that they occupied lower-level 
positions than the prime minister, they were not 
normally called upon to make broad foreign-policy 
statements or to assume the statesman-like posture of 
the prime minister.
The Role of Presidential Structures
Owing to the expansion of presidential authority in 
the second republic's constitution, there was initially 
a substantial increase in the size and duties of 
presidential structures. The growth of the apparatus 
was legitimized by the reference in the constitution to 
the president's right to "form the administration of 
the president,"33 a vague expression which emboldened
32See, for example, the visit of Oleg Soskovets to Norway 
with Boris Yeltsin in March 1996. Igor Pshenichnikov and Andrey 
Shtorkh, "Soskovets: New Commission Vital for Russian-Norwegian
Ties," dateline Oslo, ITAR-TASS, 25 March 1996, Translated in FBIS 
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 25 March 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
33"Constitution of the Russian Federation," Vybory 1995. op. 
cit., p. 30.
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Yeltsin and his top aides to increase massively the
size and duties of the staff. Since neither the
constitution nor any other law limited the size and
functions of presidential structures, the reference in 
the constitution effectively gave Yeltsin and his team 
carte blanche to develop the presidential bureaucracy
in any way they saw fit. Some structures were carried 
over from the first republic, such as the Security
Council and the Presidential Council. Yeltsin also 
retained a group of aides, including foreign policy 
adviser Dmitrii Ryurikov. New organizations were also 
created, including the office of the Russian Federation 
National Security Adviser and the President's Foreign 
Policy Council. In addition to these, the presidential 
apparatus was expanded to include numerous 
administrations and directorates dealing directly or 
indirectly with foreign policy issues.
The pattern of expansion in the presidential 
apparatus marked a worsening of the trend toward 
executive sprawl already present in the first Russian 
republic. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
pattern paralleled the situation of dual executive 
power seen during the Soviet period. The persistence of 
the problem suggested that it was a durable legacy -- a 
form of political normalcy in Moscow which would 
therefore be difficult to overcome.
Boris Yeltsin himself continued to be far more 
interested in domestic politics than in foreign 
affairs. His preference for the domestic political 
scene, which was evident during the first republic, was 
if anything more pronounced during the first years of 
the second republic, when he was under political 
pressure to regain the confidence of that portion of 
the population which disapproved of his handling of the 
October Events.
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Yeltsin recognized that his popularity at home 
depended on his attention to domestic problems. He 
recalled in a May 1994 interview that Mikhail
Gorbachev's popularity as Soviet leader had suffered 
because of the amount of time he spent abroad and on 
foreign affairs: "[Gorbachev] paid more attention to
foreign policy than to his people's internal problems. 
That is why, moreover, our people feel less respect for 
him than foreigners [do]."34 In addition, Yeltsin 
continued to appear to be more comfortable on the
domestic stage than on the international one.
The Security Council. During the second republic, 
it continued to be evident that the role of the
Security Council depended to a great extent on who
occupied the position of Security Council Secretary. 
Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov had significantly 
less desire to control foreign affairs than his 
predecessor, Yurii Skokov, and Lobov was more inclined 
toward involvement in economic-industrial issues. The 
Interdepartmental Foreign-Policy Commission fell into 
disuse. Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Commission, 
said in October 1995 that the Security Council 
Secretary had not called a meeting for 18 months.35 
Overall, this meant that the issues the Security 
Council studied depended not so much on the provisions 
of its statutes but on the preferences of its 
leadership.. This circumstance had the effect of 
politicizing policy. In terms of the bureaucratic
34Franz-01iver Giesbert, Pierre Bocev, Irina de Chikoff, 
"Boris Yeltsin: 'No, the Former Soviet Empire will Never Return,1"
Interview with Boris Yeltsin, Le Figaro (Paris), 2 May 1994, p. 2. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Western Europe, 2 May 1994, 
transmitted via Internet.
35Tamara Zamyatina, "Kozyrev's Replacement Discussed More 
than Once," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 19 October 
1995, transmitted via Internet.
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politics model, the heavy impact of personality on the 
functioning of the Security Council meant the stifling 
of the development of standard operating procedures and 
action channels.
For the most part, Lobov can be said to have 
favored a low-profile for the Security Council,
something which Yeltsin probably preferred given his 
experience with the ambitious Yurii Skokov. There were 
some instances of Security Council involvement in 
foreign policy issues. For example, the Security
Council staff drafted Moscow's approach on the
questions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.36 In addition, the 
Security Council was put in charge of elaborating 
Moscow's approach to the G-7 summit on terrorism in 
Moscow.37 But under Lobov, the Security Council's 
involvement in foreign policy declined, and there was 
no hint of realizing the foreign-policy ambitions for 
the body developed by Skokov. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, Skokov's goal was to make the 
Security Council a significant power base to serve 
himself, not the president. Lobov's priority, on the 
other hand, was Boris Yeltsin.38
36Vladimir Orlov, "How to Leave a Quixotic Era Behind,"
Interview with Valerie Manilov, Deputy Secretary of the Russian 
Federation Security Council, Moskovskie novosti, No. 26 (16-23
April) 1995, p. 15. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 16 April 1995, transmitted via Internet.
37Vasiliy Safronchuk, "Prestige in Abeyance: What Did
Russia's President Gain by Cajoling the G-7 in the Kremlin?"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 April 1996, p. 3. Translated in FBIS Daily
Report Central Eurasia, 23 April 1996, transmitted via Internet.
38Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making," in Neil Malcolm, 
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in 
Russian Foreign Policy. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996),
p. 111.
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One reason for the Security Council's limited 
involvement in foreign policy issues may have been the 
war in Chechnya. The decision to invade Chechnya . had 
been finalized at a Security Council meeting, 
apparently in an attempt by Boris Yeltsin to distribute 
responsibility for the invasion among other top members 
of the government.39 The continuation of discussions 
about Chechnya at Security Council meetings was one way 
to ensure that the blame for the botched military 
campaign would not be placed on Yeltsin personally. At 
the same time, though, the domination of Security 
Council meetings by the Chechnya issue meant that what 
Russia considered among the most important foreign 
policy issues -- NATO enlargement -- had not been 
assessed at the Security Council even as late as April 
1995 .40
Considering the amount of energy Russian 
politicians put into addressing and opposing NATO 
enlargement, as well as their blurring of Russia's 
position by making contradictory remarks on the issue 
(some linked it with the CFE treaty, others with the 
START II treaty, others with a new military alliance in 
the CIS), Russia's position might have benefited by 
some discussion at Security Council meetings.41 The 
Security Council's neglect of the NATO enlargement
39Aleksandr Gamov, "Security Council Votes First and 
Discusses Later," Interview with former Justice Minister Yurii 
Kalmykov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 20 December 1994, p. 3. Translated 
in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 20 December 1994, 
transmitted via Internet.
40Aleksei Pushkov, "Russia - NATO: Dangerous Games in Verbal 
Fog," Interview with Yurii Baturin, Moskovskie novosti, No. 22 (2-
9 April) 1995, p. 13. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 5 April 1995, transmitted via Internet.
41Aleksandr Yerastov, "How Not to Bring Down the 'Ceiling'," 
Trud, 6 February 1996, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report 
Central Eurasia, 6 February 1996, transmitted via Internet.
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issue suggested that the pendulum had swung too far in 
the opposite direction: In contrast to its stance
during the first republic, the Security Council 
appeared to have too little interest in important
foreign policy questions in the first years of the 
second republic.
As the example of NATO enlargement demonstrated,
such a situation encouraged foreign powers to decide 
which voices in Russia were the legitimate ones, as US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did when she 
invoked the opinion of "ordinary Russian citizens," and 
their lack of concern about NATO enlargement, as a sign 
that the alliance was correct to pursue enlargement.39
The appointment of General Alexander Lebed to head 
the Security Council following the first round of 
presidential elections in June 1996 was significant for 
a number of reasons. First, Lebed's desire to hold the 
post -- effectively his price for sending his
supporters to Yeltsin in the runoff election -- showed 
that the power of the Security Council, while not fully 
exploited under Lobov, was still desirable to a 
politician with a seemingly bright political future. 
Lebed thought that he could accomplish something from 
his position in the Security Council. Second, it is 
telling that Lebed wanted to combine the position of 
Security Council Secretary with that of National
Security Adviser.40 Apparently Lebed wanted not only to
39Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," 
The Economist, 15-21 February 1997.
40Lebed also asked to be made Chairman of the Military 
Commission, a body responsible for bestowing military ranks and 
determining military personnel policy. Andrey Shtorkh, "Yeltsin 
Appoints Lebed Chairman of Military Commission," dateline Moscow, 
ITAR-TASS, 25 June 1996, Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 25 June 1996, transmitted via Internet.
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have the power of the Security Council at his disposal, 
but also to ensure that he would have regular and 
direct access to Yeltsin (something that came with the 
position of National Security Adviser).
The handling of the Lebed appointment was 
illustrative of the larger legal problem surrounding 
the functioning of the Security Council in the second 
republic. The Lebed appointment was passed by a vote of 
the Security Council membership,44 despite the fact that 
there was no requirement for such a vote.45 If any body 
was required to approve Lebed's candidacy, then, 
extrapolating from the original law on security, it 
would have been the legislature, since the Supreme 
Soviet was charged with confirming the person in this 
position.
The weak legal basis of the Security Council was 
noteworthy for its illustration of the lax attitude 
toward the rule of law which persisted in the second 
republic. The December 1993 constitution said that the 
president "forms and heads the Security Council of the 
Russian Federation, whose status is defined by federal 
law, "46 but there was no rush to modify that law or 
delete the parts of it (such as references to the vice 
president and Supreme Soviet) which could no be longer 
applied in Russia's second republic.47 The distinction
44Andrey Shtorkh, "Yeltsin Presents Lebed to National 
Security Council," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 20 June 1996. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 20 June 1996, 
transmitted via Internet.
45See "Law on Security," Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 May 1992,
p. 5.
46"Constitution of the Russian Federation," Vybory 1995. op. 
cit., p. 30.
47Vladimir Shumeiko said in January 1995 that a new law was 
being drawn up. Lyudmila Yermakova, "Shumeiko on Role of Security 
Council in Russia," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 20
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between voting and non-voting members was simply 
dropped, and the head of the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service was included in its membership 
without legislative confirmation, as specified in the 
original law.48
The way that the vote was taken on Chechnya was 
itself remarkable and might signal how the body would 
operate in a foreign-policy crisis situation of that 
magnitude. Yeltsin reportedly insisted that the 
Security Council vote on the invasion before discussion 
was held, a circumstance which made more obvious the 
use of the Security Council as a political shield 
rather than as a responsible, consultative body. The 
notion of voting before discussing the decision seemed 
to be an attempt to bully members into supporting the 
invasion. It apparently worked since, according to one 
member present, no one dared to vote against it, 
although some suggested variations to the military 
response in the discussion that followed.49
January 1995. No amendments to the law had been observed by mid- 
1996 .
48As of January 1995, the members included Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Security 
Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, Federation Council Speaker Vladimir 
Shumeiko, State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, First Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Shakhrai, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Defense 
Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, Federal 
Counterintelligence Service Director Sergei Stepashin, Foreign 
Intelligence Service Director Yevgenii Primakov, Commander of the 
Border Guards Andrei Nikolaev, Minister for Emergency Situations 
Sergei Shoigu, and Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov. Only the 
first five members had permanent member status. ITAR-TASS in 
English, 25 January 1995, transmitted via Internet.
49Justice Minister Yuriy Kalmykov said in an interview after 
resigning from his position and membership on the Security Council 
that "when the official Security Council session was held, all the 
documents had already been prepared and the Security Council 
members only had to vote -- to either adopt or reject the 'force 
option.' This very much surprised me. I said -- 'let's discuss 
things first, I want to speak. ' But I was told that we would vote 
first. I again tried to put my view. The president again said --
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The Presidential Council. The Presidential Council, 
consisting of prominent experts, politicians, 
scientists, writers, and economists, continued to 
function during the second republic, and initially at
least, in much the same way as before.50 For example,
its members, who had full-time positions elsewhere, 
consulted with the president and offered him ideas on
domestic and foreign policy with the aim of
strengthening civic accord. They were expected to 
explain and justify the president's policies to the 
public. Presidential Council members occasionally took 
on a more direct role in the policymaking process 
during the second republic, for example, by serving as 
an advance team for presidential travel, as several of 
them did prior to Yeltsin's visit to the United States 
in September 1994. The delegation included foreign- 
affairs professionals Sergei Karaganov and Emil Pain. 
According to Pain, the goal of the advance team's visit 
was to "persuade the American general public that 
Russia has resolutely taken the course of democracy."51 
The deployment of Presidential Council members to do 
this work rather than employees of the Foreign Ministry 
was a sign that Yeltsin continued to feel comfortable 
turning to his own presidential apparatus, which
let's vote on it. I had to agree -- well, this was the most 
important point, let's go ahead.... And I voted in favor. So did 
everyone. And then we started discussing it..." Aleksandr Gamov, 
"Security Council Votes First and Discusses Later," Komsomolskaya 
pravda, 20 December 1994. Translated by FBIS. Other accounts 
indicate that only half of the members voted in favor. See Neil 
Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making," in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, 
Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign 
Policy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 154, note 33.
50For a list of Presidential Council members, see Appendix 2.
51Tamara Zamyatina, "Advance Team to Address US Public," 
dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 19 September 1994, 
transmitted via Internet.
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continued to operate parallel to his ministries and 
unaccountable to the public.
The invasion of Chechnya changed the function of 
the Presidential Council somewhat because some of its 
prominent members were fiercely opposed to the invasion 
and eager to distance themselves publicly from that 
decision, even at the cost of losing whatever access to 
the top Russian leadership which was offered by 
Presidential Council membership. Aleksei Salmin, 
director of the Center of Political Technology, along 
with seven other Presidential Council members, wrote a 
letter to Boris Yeltsin requesting a meeting to discuss 
their opposition to the invasion of Chechnya.52 
Similarly, Emil Pain, gave a number of interviews 
criticizing the use of force against Chechnya.53 Several 
members resigned. Pain charged in an interview that the 
military was taking actions without informing the 
Kremlin.54 The fact that some Presidential Council 
members began acting more like the opponents rather 
than the supporters of Boris Yeltsin suggests that at 
some point some of them realized that membership did 
not offer the kind of influence they thought that they 
had and that their positions might just as well be used 
as platforms for criticizing what they considered 
faulty policy.
52Maddalena Tulanti, "Do Not Expect a Coup with Tanks," 
Interview with Aleksei Salmin, L'Unita (Rome), 8 January 1995, 
p. 15. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 8 January 
1995, transmitted via Internet.
53For example, Yelena Dikun, "An Adviser Whose Advice is Not 
Sought," Interview with Emil Pain, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 9 (2-8
March) 1995, p. 8, Translated in FBIS Daily Report 20 March 1995, 
transmitted via Internet, and ITAR-TASS, 27 December 1994.
54Ravil Zaripov, "Kremlin Briefing," Komsomolskaya pravda, 
14 December 1994, p. 2.
246
Chapter 5 The Second Russian Republic
By 1995, the situation in the Presidential Council 
returned to the way it had been before the Chechnya 
invasion. To be sure, some Presidential Council members 
had left its ranks, unwilling to serve as the promoters 
of Yeltsin's program as long as it included the use of 
force against Chechnya. Others, however, must have 
become satisfied once again that they were having an 
impact on policymaking, at least in some areas. Those 
involved in foreign policy matters were, for example, 
included in discussions about who should be the 
replacement for Foreign Minister Kozyrev.55 Doubtless, 
some of them promoted themselves for the job, such as 
Sergei Karaganov, who urged that the new foreign 
minister should be someone who would be accepted by the 
diplomatic corps, who could be counted as a 
professional, and who would not "cause an allergic 
reaction in the world outside."56 Karaganov1s 
description of his ideal candidate sooner fit himself 
rather than Primakov, whose appointment did cause some 
controversy in the West.57
More generally, the chance of having some influence 
on policymaking was something that kept members 
interested in staying on the Council. As Emil Pain put 
it:
Frankly I do not really know what my 
functions are in the area of political 
decisionmaking... I get all sorts of 
papers marked 'Urgent!' which require 
that I evaluate and analyze a 
particular proposal. What happens to
55According to a statement by Sergei Karaganov, see Tamara 
Zamyatina, "Kozyrev's Replacement Discussed More than Once," 
dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 19 October 1995.
seIbid.
57Lothar Ruhl, "Starkung fur Jelzin," (Strengthening for 
Yeltsin) Die Welt (Berlin), 11 January 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
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this analysis next, and how it will be 
used in decisionmaking, that I do not 
know. Sometimes, though, I have a 
feeling that I do have some indirect 
influence on political
decisionmaking... I always realized 
that people who hold rallies at Pushkin 
Square have no influence on events.
Even with the uncertainty of my status,
I have immeasurably more levers of 
influence.58
It was probably with this in mind that Presidential 
Council members lent their support to Yeltsin in the 
presidential elections. Likewise, it was their 
potential to bring him a victory which probably 
inclined Yeltsin to ignore members' criticism of 
Chechnya and not simply to dissolve the Presidential 
Council. The Presidential Council's influence on 
foreign policy was nonetheless diminished because of 
its preoccupation with achieving a peace plan for 
Chechnya and Yeltsin's re-election campaign.
Presidential Aides and Advisers. In January 1994, 
the new position of national security adviser was 
created, supposedly modeled on the position of the same 
name in the United States. But whereas the US national 
security adviser is primarily concerned with foreign- 
policy and security issues, in Russia he and his staff 
spend more time dealing with domestic issues.59 This is 
probably simply due to the fact that some of Russia's 
most serious security concerns in recent years have
58Yelena Dikun, "An Adviser Whose Advice is Not Sought," 
Interview with Emil Pain, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 9 (2-8 March)
1995, p. 8, Translated in FBIS Daily Report 20 March 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
59See, for example, the national security adviser's report on 
Russia's national security prospects. Alexander Zhilin, "Russia's 
National Security Prospects," Jamestown Foundation Prism 
(Washington, DC), Vol. 2, No. 1 (12 January) 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
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been of domestic origin. Examples include the reform of 
the armed forces, the situation in Chechnya, nuclear 
proliferation, and the maintenance of Russia's 
territorial integrity. Another of the main tasks of the 
national security adviser was to coordinate the work of 
the intelligence agencies and ministries commanding 
sizable troops. He was also supposed to function as 
these agencies' link to the president.
Yeltsin filled this important post with Yurii 
Baturin, who was Yeltsin's legal adviser at the time of 
the appointment. Baturin was widely considered one of 
the most democratically-minded members of Yeltsin's 
team. Therefore, Baturin may have been selected by 
Yeltsin in order to function as a sort of fire wall 
between the so-called power ministers and the 
president's office. This would prevent situations 
similar to the one that occurred in December 1992 when 
Yeltsin, about to board a plane, was rushed a set of 
papers to sign by interim Soviet Interior Minister 
Viktor Barannikov. The papers included an order to 
merge a number of security service organs, a disastrous 
organizational change which was ultimately reversed by 
Yeltsin.60
But Baturin does not seem to have been entirely 
effective in preventing Yeltsin from endorsing other 
such ill-conceived documents: As Baturin himself noted 
in 1995:
Some politicians bring to the 
decisionmakers proposed solutions....
Those of us who work with the president 
suffer because of these cases, not only 
because we do not monitor the documents 
but because this places in an awkward
60Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today.
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 101.
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situation the head of state, who signs 
insufficiently worked out decrees 
without guarantees concerning the 
negative consequences.61
It thus appears that Baturin's filtering roles ended up 
being more theoretical than real. As Baturin lamented
after over one year of working as Yeltsin's aide, "the
process of making political decisions is confused, 
complicated, and to some extent unknown."62 Baturin 
concluded that the unpredictability of policymaking by 
the country's hierarchy loomed as one of the main 
threats to Russia.
Baturin lost the position of national security 
adviser in June 1996 when Alexander Lebed took over the 
job. Lebed's time in this position prior to the runoff 
election (the cut-off point for this study) was too 
brief to offer significant insights into how the post 
was used by this prominent politician. It is
noteworthy, though, that Yeltsin retained Baturin as a 
close adviser after his departure from the post of 
national security adviser. Bearing the title of 
"presidential aide," Baturin continued to function in 
much the same way as he had as national security
adviser.
Dmitrii Ryurikov continued to serve as Yeltsin's 
foreign policy adviser in the second republic. He dealt 
with a range of matters such as working out agreements 
between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia 
and Georgia, or participating in meetings between 
Yeltsin and foreign leaders. Ryurikov continued to be
61Pilar Bonet, "Kremlin's Unpredictability is Threat to 
Russia's Future," interview with Yurii Baturin, El Pais (Madrid),
27 February 1995, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 27 February 1995, transmitted via Internet.
62 Ibid.
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the only senior aide dealing with foreign policy who 
was not regularly involved in domestic politics. 
Ryurikov's only known involvement in domestic politics 
came with regard to Chechnya and the 1996 presidential 
campaign. He was charged with revamping Russian foreign 
policy in the run-up to the election campaign starting 
in December 1995. This meant that he spent more time 
than previously giving interviews to the media and 
writing his own articles on the president's foreign 
policy priorities.
Perhaps the most significant observation to be made 
about Yeltsin's foreign-policy and security advisers in 
the first years of the second republic is that his 
reliance on them seemed not to be related to the person 
occupying the position of foreign minister. Yeltsin 
appears to have consulted his advisers just as much 
under the strong Foreign Minister Primakov as under the 
weak Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
The Foreign Policy Council. The perception that 
Primakov was in a stronger position to manage Russian 
foreign policy perhaps explains why the presidential 
Foreign Policy Council failed to materialize as an 
operating institution between its creation in December 
1995 and July 1996, the cut-off point for this study. 
The Foreign Policy Council was established by a 
presidential decree in December 1995. The stated 
purpose of the Council was to "increase the 
effectiveness of Russian Federation foreign policy and 
to implement the Russian Federation president's powers 
in determining the main areas of the state's foreign 
policy. "63 It was to consist of the heads of the
63Edict No. 1304 "On the Foreign Policy Council Under the 
Russian Federation President," signed by Boris Yeltsin on 26 
December 1995. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 13 January 1996, p. 6.
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Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Foreign 
Economic Relations, Cooperation With Member States of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Finance, as 
well as the Federal Security Service, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service, the Federal Border Service, and 
the president's foreign policy assistant. Decisions 
were to be taken by simple majority.
The idea of creating a Foreign Policy Council was 
probably inspired by the failure of foreign policy to 
receive sustained attention in the Security Council, 
the Presidential Council, or by some of Yeltsin's own 
security-policy staff. Thus the Foreign Policy Council 
was to be given its own Secretariat, a standing body 
which was to administer the work of the Council and 
provide a repository for discussion papers, proposals, 
and decisions.64 But it was precisely the reasoning 
behind the creation of the Council which prevented it 
from beginning to meet and act as it was intended to: 
Few top decisionmakers beyond Primakov had time to 
devote sustained attention to the full gamut of 
Russia's foreign policy issues. While the Foreign 
Policy Council Secretariat began functioning, no 
meetings of the Council itself were reported between 
its creation and the presidential elections.
The Foreign Policy Council's pattern of development 
echoed some of the institutional developments seen 
under Gorbachev. As during that period, the creation of
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 13 January 1996, 
transmitted via Internet.
64Edict No. 1305, "On the Secretariat of the Russian 
Federation President's Foreign Policy Council" and the Statute of 
the Secretariat, signed by Boris Yeltsin 26 December 1995. 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 13 January 1996, p. 6. Translated in FBIS 
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 13 January 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
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new institutions was sometimes not followed by the 
actual, functioning of those institutions as planned. 
The Central Committee Commission on Questions of 
International Policy was one such example. This 
suggests that Moscow policymakers had become accustomed 
to the process of overhauling the system in word but 
not in deed, a situation which posed a further obstacle 
to the establishment of accountable and effective 
institutions.
The Presidential Bureaucracy. The Foreign Policy 
Council and Secretariat were but two of many new bodies 
created within the presidential bureaucracy during the 
first years of the second republic. So many new 
directorates and administrations emerged under the 
heading of the president's administration as to 
constitute a new branch of government -- the
presidential branch. Most of these bodies were involved 
in domestic political issues, and foreign policy 
matters figured only peripherally in their work. For 
example, in late 1993 a new analytic center to process 
information going to the president and to identify core 
problems was created.65 This body enjoyed a significant 
gatekeeping role in channeling information, ideas, and 
solutions to the president. The creation of the 
Presidential Administration's Directorate for 
Interaction With Political Parties, Public
Associations, Groupings, and Deputies of the Federal 
Assembly in mid-1994 was another innovation which 
expanded the size and responsibilities of the
presidential administration. The purpose of this new
organ was to research public opinion and to explain the 
president's decisions to society.
65ITAR-TASS, 12 December 1993.
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In fact, though, the bureaucratic sprawl in the 
presidential apparatus had a great deal to do with 
personal rivalries and bureaucratic empire-building of 
the most extreme form. The price was, of course, 
effectiveness.
The Russian media was becoming more critical of the 
presidential apparatus by this point. The newspaper 
Kuranty argued that "half of the functions for which
the newly-created directorate is responsible are 
normally fulfilled by a free press, " and the paper 
blamed the mammoth size of the presidential 
administration for the ineffectiveness and delays in 
executive-branch policymaking.66 The paper's analysis 
seemed to be accurate but neglected further dangers of 
the new presidential organ: that through it the
presidential administration would increasingly be used 
for the purpose not of helping the president to run the 
country but for the purpose of getting him re-elected. 
It also neglected to note the danger posed by the split 
of the executive branch into two full-blown and 
competing sources of policy, a situation which weakened 
the government and the country.
Analytic intelligence structures also grew up 
within the presidential guard, which was not only 
directly subordinate to the president, but also 
physically nearby in order to provide for the 
president's personal protection. Boris Yeltsin had for 
many years relied on his body guard, Alexander 
Korzhakov and made him the head of the Main Protection 
Directorate (commonly known as the presidential
66Kirill Varov, "Will the Directorate Help the President Make 
Friends with Parliament?" Kuranty, 31 August 1994. Translated in 
FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 31 August 1994, transmitted via 
Internet.
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security service). But it was the growth of an analytic 
apparatus within Korzhakov’s realm which was new and 
had become influential in domestic policymaking and 
presumably in foreign policy formulation as well. These 
analytic intelligence structures were controversial 
both in terms of their ready access to Yeltsin and in 
their access to sensitive intelligence information.
The fact that these structures were present at such 
a high level in the Russian policymaking community was 
reminiscent in some ways of the role played by the 
International Department in the Soviet era. Both the ID 
and the analytic intelligence structures enjoyed a 
combination of special privileges: access to sensitive 
intelligence information and proximity to the top 
leadership.
Both of these privileges suggested the particular 
danger of groupthink tendencies in policymaking. The 
compartmentalization of the analytic intelligence 
structures (and therefore deficiency in terms of policy 
oversight) meant that policy initiatives could spin out 
of control. While there was no overarching ideology 
through which to impose groupthink, the lack of 
accountability and compartmentalization were factors 
which still meant that it was an ever-present danger.
Korzhakov's first deputy and the second in command 
of the Presidential Security Service, Georgii Rogozin, 
enjoyed the reputation of being the gray cardinal in 
the Kremlin because of the analysis produced by his 
unit. Rogozin, who had worked in Soviet and Russian 
intelligence structures (primarily the KGB) for some 3 0 
years, was trained as a lawyer, and specialized in 
computerization and the protection of state secrets. 
Rogozin's unit reportedly received information from all 
of the security organs and turned out reports which
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were different from those of other departments in that 
they did not shy away from reporting "reliable
information to the president."67 Such a statement
suggests that the problem of telling the top leader 
what it was thought he wanted to hear was still a 
problem, as it had been in the Soviet period.
The fact that the unit enjoyed access to so much 
information, and that it was located physically so 
close to the president, meant that it was in a good 
position to have input, if not influence, in 
policymaking. There was no guarantee of influence
though: Its advice against invading Chechnya was
reportedly not heeded.68
One reason for the growth in size of the 
presidential apparatus was the rivalry among Yeltsin's 
top aides. That they were Yeltsin's oldest and most- 
trusted political allies did not mean that they could 
get along with each other. Thus each worked toward 
building up his own fiefdom, a factor contributing to 
the bureaucratic sprawl. The constant reorganization of 
the presidential staff was also apparently the result 
of intra-elite infighting. Owing to the complexity of 
the organism, it was difficult even for Yeltsin to 
control.69 It is not even clear whether Yeltsin tried. 
The Russian president's staff even outgrew the 
substantial office space once occupied by the entire 
Central Committee headquarters at Old Square. Apart 
from regular assurances that reorganizations of the
67Afanasiy Brynochka, "Kremlin Secrets. How 'Our Man' Became 
the Gray Cardinal," Komsomolskaya pravda, 7 April 1995, pp. 4-5. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 7 April 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
58 Ibid.
69Bolsheviks Failed to Cope with Bureaucracy: Democrats Seem 
no More Successful," New Times, No. 7 1994., p. 3
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presidential staff were underway and that reductions 
were planned, the impression left by the steady stream 
of decrees establishing new presidential structures, 
all signed by Boris Yeltsin, was growth rather than 
shrinkage of the presidential bureaucracy.
The Russian president's apparatus differs 
substantially from that of the American president. The 
Russian president is not beholden to his ministers as 
the American president is to his cabinet, many of whom 
personify, represent, or satisfy the wishes of the 
political benefactors who helped the US president get 
elected. More specifically, the history of a parallel 
power during Soviet times (in which the strong Party 
bureaucracy worked parallel to the government 
ministries) has made the situation of parallel 
bureaucracies the norm in Moscow. Most importantly, 
there is no regulation or limitation of the number of 
new organizations which can be created within the 
presidential staff. This raises questions not only 
about the ability of the government to govern in such 
mercurial conditions, but also about democratic 
representation and the accountability of Russia's 
governing class.
The absence of legal accountability among a large 
and influential part of the Russian political class is 
difficult to analyze through the lens of the 
bureaucratic politics model. The model's bureaucrats 
act according to standard operating procedures and 
rules of conduct, among other things, because of the 
threat of exposure if their actions do not conform to 
statutes governing their agency and enacted by the 
legislature. While many of the Russian presidential 
structures are governed by statutes, these were decrees 
signed by the president and subject only to his 
approval.
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In such a climate of bureaucratic proliferation, it 
is not difficult to understand why foreign policy 
formulation was so chaotic. The situation was worsened 
by the fact that Yeltsin was prone to delegating 
foreign policy decisions to many different people, a 
situation which seemed to be aggravated in proportion 
to his ill health -- the worse his health, the more he 
delegated.
Yeltsin's continuing health problems meant that 
many of the procedures and habits of dealing with an 
ailing Soviet leader could be transferred to 
independent Russia. For example, the pattern of going 
to extreme lengths to downplay health problems had 
clearly survived from Soviet times and been put to use 
in Yeltsin's Russia.
Another Soviet-style method of coping with an 
ailing leader could be found in the transfer of 
executive authority in some situations to members of 
the presidential staff. This could be seen in Yeltsin's 
use of his chief-of-staff, Sergei Filatov, in 
elaborating and executing foreign policy. He made 
official visits abroad on Yeltsin's behalf, as was the 
case when he traveled to Germany in both 1994 and 1995, 
and he met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.70 Filatov 
was also responsible for a major diplomatic debacle 
when he secured, in April 1994, Yeltsin's signature on 
a document which proposed creating military bases in 
the CIS states and Latvia. The publication of the 
document caused an uproar in Moscow and Riga and was 
only worsened by the complaints of the Russian Defense 
and Foreign Ministers that they had allegedly not been 
consulted about the proposal. The Kremlin managed to
70Tamara Zamyatina, ITAR-TASS in English, 6 April 1995.
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resolve the situation by claiming that it had been a 
drafting error.71 It was, nonetheless, clear that the 
haphazard policymaking mechanism was to blame.72
The Role of the Military
Yeltsin's reliance on the military to solve his 
political problems in the fall of 1993 meant that the 
armed forces had acquired additional political clout. 
As will be discussed in the case study on the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in chapter seven, 
military preferences were having even more influence on 
Russian foreign policy. This was a long-familiar 
pattern which had been well-established in Soviet 
times, especially under Brezhnev, as discussed in 
chapter two.
The military also showed some shrewdness in
supporting topical political issues. Prior to the
invasion of Chechnya, the military made the question of 
protecting ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union a 
priority issue. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev asserted 
Russia's right to defend ethnic Russians in various 
"hot spots" of the region militarily, despite the fact 
that the Russian military doctrine and constitution 
referred to protecting citizens, not simply ethnic 
Russians.73
Problematic relations between the diplomatic and 
military establishments were persistent in the first
71"Defense Ministry Statement on Military Bases in Latvia," 
ITAR-TASS in English, 7 April 1994.
72"Nine Questions for the Russian President's Team," 
Moskovskiye novosti, No. 15 (10-17 April) 1994, p. A14. Translated 
in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, transmitted via Internet.
73"Grachev Thinks None of Former Soviet Republics Has Proper 
Army," Interfax, 23 February 1994.
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years of the second republic. Grachev became more 
active in establishing contacts with foreign partners 
without consultation with the Foreign Ministry. In 
keeping with his practice in earlier years, Grachev's 
foreign interests extended beyond the confines of the 
former Soviet Union and into Asia, where he visited and 
concluded agreements with top military leaders. In 
1994, he traveled to South Korea and proposed setting 
up a new collective security system in Asia.74 At a 
press conference in May 1994 he claimed that no 
international actions could succeed without Russia's 
cooperation and approval, as the situation in 
Yugoslavia showed. He also argued that without Russia's 
participation, NATO's Partnership for Peace program 
could not succeed.75 It was commonplace for Grachev's 
meetings with foreign partners to include not only 
military counterparts but also top political leaders.76
As before, Yeltsin appears to have approved of this 
situation. It was Yeltsin who dispatched Grachev to 
Georgia to mediate between the Georgian and Abkhaz 
sides in September 1994. As Grachev put it, his 
instructions were to "get the leaders together and to 
sort out once and for all what we are striving for."77 
Not only did this sound like the kind of activity for 
which a diplomat would be better suited, it seemed, 
given the allegations that the Russian military had 
previously exceeded its orders on behalf of the
74ITAR-TASS in English, 29 April 1994.
75Vladimir Klimov, "Proposing Our Own Partnership Program," 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 7 May 1994, p. 1.
76For example, he met with Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin 
in May 1995 during a trip to Beijing. Grigory Arslanov and 
Vyacheslav Tomilin report, dateline Beijing, ITAR-TASS in English, 
16 May 1995.
77Vladimir Gondusov report, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in 
English, 16 September 1994.
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Abkhaz,78 as if the defense minister was not the most 
suitable person to serve as the president's envoy. 
Grachev seemed all the less appropriate for the mission 
considering that he had scathingly criticized Eduard 
Shevardnadze by name only a few weeks earlier for the 
"profound political mistake" of promising the Soviet 
army's withdrawal from Germany within four years.79 
Grachev's clear grudge against Shevardnadze may have 
contributed to the obvious political convictions which 
drove the Russian defense minister to exceed his 
mandate and become involved in Georgia's domestic 
political affairs.
A sign that relations between the Foreign and 
Defense Ministries continued to be characterized more 
by rivalry rather than by cooperation came in early 
1995 with the transfer of Deputy Defense Minister, 
Colonel-General Boris Gromov, to the position of Chief 
Military Expert at-Large as an adviser to the Russian 
foreign minister. Gromov was to be in charge of 
managing military cooperation with the other former 
Soviet republics.80 He was also involved in the 
discussion of military issues with other countries 
outside of the CIS, as his participation in an MFA 
delegation to Japan in March 1995 demonstrated.81 From 
Kozyrev's perspective, Gromov's primary qualification 
was probably his hostile relationship with Pavel 
Grachev. In addition, Gromov's past experience in the 
Defense Ministry made him an asset because he was a
78Yelena Dikun, "An Adviser Whose Advice is Not Sought, 1 
Interview with Emil Pain, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 9 (2-8 March)
1995, p. 8, Translated in FBIS Daily Report 20 March 1995, 
transmitted via Internet
79Vladimir Gondusov report, dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 1 
September 1994.
80ITAR-TASS in English, dateline Moscow, 13 February 1995.
81ITAR-TASS in English, dateline Moscow, 3 March 1995.
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former Defense Ministry insider who knew how the 
organization operated and would know how it might have 
an impact on Russian foreign policy in the future.
Gromov’s presence did not appear to have made a 
major improvement in consultation between the 
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Kozyrev 
remained in the dark about Defense Ministry actions. In 
November 1995, an exasperated Kozyrev told the press 
that he had learned of the Defense Ministry's 
agreements with Ukraine via the media and lamented that 
in this instance Grachev had once again spoken directly 
with Yeltsin, bypassing and not even informing
Kozyrev. 82
The Role of Intelligence and Security Services
Intelligence services continued to have an 
important voice in the making of Russian foreign policy 
in the second republic. The Foreign Intelligence
Service's (FIS) work became more prominent due to the 
personal engagement of Evgenii Primakov, its director 
until January 1995. His official status rose when he 
was named a voting member of the reconstituted Security 
Council in early 1994.83 (Significantly, Primakov's
successor as the head of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, did not receive voting 
status in the Security Council when he was made a 
member in February 1996.84) More significantly, Boris 
Yeltsin expressed unalloyed praise of the work done by
82"Moscow, Kiev Close to Agreement on Military Issues," 
dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 24 November 1995.
83"Yeltsin Makes New Appointments to Security Council," 
Interfax, 1 February 1994.
84"Yeltsin Reshuffles Security Council," dateline Moscow, 
ITAR-TASS, 7 February 1996. Translated in FBIS Daily Report 
Central Eurasia, 7 February 1996, transmitted via Internet.
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the FIS and Primakov during a visit to Foreign
Intelligence Service headquarters in April 1994.
Yeltsin said that the Foreign Intelligence Service's 
ranks
boast top-notch specialists with rare 
and valuable skills -- people who have 
confirmed their lofty patriotism and 
devotion to Russia... Your work
requires exceptional efforts. For my 
part, I wish to assure you that the
state will provide every possible 
support for the FIS.85
Yeltsin's fulsome praise rang both of sincere 
appreciation and of concern for keeping the ranks of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service on his side.
Building on the success of its first public report, 
discussed in chapter four, the FIS made another major 
contribution to Russia's foreign policy debate in late 
1993 when it published its second major report, an 
analysis of the question of NATO enlargement. It 
effectively took issue with the MFA's nuanced handling86 
of the question, declaring NATO's eastward expansion a 
threat to Russia's national interests. The fact that 
the report openly criticized the Foreign Ministry is 
remarkable, as is the fact that the FIS was playing a 
public role -- not a typical stance for an intelligence 
agency.
Another example of the FIS's public role came in 
September 1994 when Primakov unveiled the report, 
"Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Need
85"Speech by B. N. Yeltsin to Leadership and Staff of the 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 29 
April 1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 29 
April 1994, transmitted via Internet.
86See, for example, Andrei Kozyrev, "What Should We do with 
NATO?" Moskovskie novosti, No. 39, 26 September 1993, p. 7a.
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Correction?1,87 As the title itself indicated, the FIS 
authors were addressing foreign partners directly in 
the hope that the report would result in a change of 
attitude in the West toward Russia's attempts to 
increase integration with CIS partners. Naturally, the 
report was intended for Russian policymakers as well, 
since it was released just prior to a visit by Boris 
Yeltsin to the US and Great Britain.
The quality and quantity of the FIS's routine 
analysis (that is, analysis that was not meant for 
public consumption and debate) continued to exceed that 
produced by the Foreign Ministry, according to 
important indicators. For example, Boris Yeltsin 
himself highlighted the value of the FIS's analysis, 
which contrasted with his negative comments about MFA 
analysis at the MFA Collegium in 1992.88 According to an 
interview with an unnamed Security Council staffer, FIS 
reports were valuable to the Security Council, whereas 
the MFA "didn't send any materials at all."89 The MFA's 
denial of information was probably an effort to better 
control policy by keeping information to itself and 
away from the hands of its competitors.. But it appears 
that the effect of the approach was sooner to deny the 
MFA influence among other key policymakers: Without
8701ga Semenova and Andrey Shtorkh, "Primakov Unveils Report 
on CIS, West," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 21 September 
1994, transmitted via Internet.
88Speech by B. N. Yeltsin to leadership and staff of the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service published in Rossiyskaya
gazeta, 29 April 1994; and Ekho Moskvyi Radio (Moscow), 27 October 
1992 .
89Interview with unnamed Security Council staffer by Roman
Podoprigora, "Shannon Airport: Yeltsin Sleeps, Soskovets Holds
Talks. Security Council: Lobov Remains Silent, Yeltsin Soberly
Assesses Situation," Komsomolskaya pravda, 17-20 February 1995, p. 
5. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, February 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
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providing its own analysis (and information) , the MFA 
could scarcely expect to have its say in a policymaking 
process in which agencies other than itself were 
involved.
FIS Director Primakov continued to be active in 
what would be traditionally understood as a diplomat's 
turf. He traveled and met with foreign leaders,90 in 
addition to meeting his opposite numbers in 
intelligence operations. The former category of 
official visits was peculiar in the sense that Primakov 
was meeting foreign partners with positions 
significantly higher than his own. This came about in 
part simply because of the situation ensuing after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union when former colleagues 
(and sometimes subordinates) had become top officials 
in the other newly independent states. But it was also 
a sign that Primakov had a great deal of say in the 
making of Russian foreign policy, even before he became 
foreign minister.
There were attempts to make intelligence oversight 
more effective in the second republic. As noted above, 
a new position of national security adviser with 
responsibilities for coordinating and overseeing the 
work of the military and security services from the 
vantage point of the presidential administration was 
created in early 1994. Baturin was initially confident 
of his position and his ability to make a difference, 
commenting in early 1994 that "the new office of 
security adviser marks the beginning of civilian 
control over Russia's army and security structures."91
90See, for example, Primakov's visit to Turkmenistan in 
December 1994.
91"We Remain a Great Power," interview with Yurii Baturin, 
Der Spiegel, 7 February 1994, pp. 123-125.
265
Chapter 5 The Second Russian Republic
But it was questionable whether the task of overseeing 
these ministries and agencies could be tackled by a 
single individual. Even with a staff of about 100, it 
seems unlikely that Baturin would have been in a 
realistic position to oversee these ministries 
adequately.
Baturin's task was not only extremely large, it was 
also not adequately governed by law. The legal 
mechanism on which Baturin needed to rely to control 
these ministries was an exceedingly weak construct. 
Oversight continued to be a problem of the intelligence 
and security services generally. A law governing 
federal security services in general was adopted in 
April 1995, and the president, government, legislature, 
and judiciary were all given some say in intelligence 
oversight. But the provisions of the law discussing 
when and how the security services could act to protect 
state security were so vague as to make virtually any 
activity legally defensible.92 In late 1995 the Duma 
passed a law on the Foreign Intelligence Service, but 
its provisions were also vague enough to give the FIS a 
broad margin for conducting its activities.93
As during the first republic, the ability of the 
intelligence services to function under few outside 
restraints meant that they could, in theory, act
92Russian Federation Law No. 40-FZ "On Organs of the Federal 
Security Service in the Russian Federation," adopted by the State 
Duma on 22 February 1995, signed and dated by Boris Yeltsin 3
April 1995, published in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 April 1995, pp. 9- 
10. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 12 April
1995, transmitted via Internet.
93See "Law on Foreign Intelligence, " adopted by the State
Duma on 8 December 1995 and signed by Boris Yeltsin on 10 January
1996, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17 January 1996, pp. 4-5. Translated in 
FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 17 January 1996, transmitted
via Internet.
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without the knowledge of other members of the 
government. This was in keeping with the mood set by- 
Russia's leaders at the time: Rather than stepping back 
from the legacy of the police state left by the Soviet 
Union's KGB, Russia's intelligence services were called 
upon to act with renewed vigor to ensure Russia's 
security. As Boris Yeltsin told the Foreign 
Counterintelligence Service in May 1994:
I categorically disagree with the view 
that the information and analysis work 
of the counterintelligence service 
should be performed only on 
instructions from above... I demand 
that you act energetically, boldly, and 
decisively.94
As these comments and the balance of Yeltsin's speech 
made clear, he was not intent on curbing the activities 
of the intelligence services or increasing outside 
oversight of their activities. This situation makes it 
difficult to employ a bureaucratic politics model to 
explain Russian foreign policy formulation. The
excessively wide margin for action among Russia's 
intelligence services meant that their position in 
policymaking was significantly removed from the
characteristic "pulling and hauling" of players in 
Allison's model.
The Role of the Legislature
The second republic did not solve the problem of 
frequent conflict between the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Russia had a new system of 
government, but the December 1993 elections produced a
94 "I Demand That You Act Vigorously, Bravely, And
Decisively," Yeltsin Address to Counterintelligence Service, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 28 May 1994, p. 1, 4. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 28 May 1994, transmitted via Internet.
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lower house, the State Duma, dominated by opponents of 
the president, a situation which did not change after 
the December 1995 elections. Since it was the lower
house which had the most day-to-day contact with
foreign policy issues, its actions are treated here as 
having more relevance to foreign policy formulation 
than the work of the Federation Council, the upper 
house.
The first major souring of relations between the 
executive and legislature occurred in February 1994 
when the Duma voted to amnesty the participants of the 
1991 coup attempt as well as the anti-Yeltsin forces of 
the so-called October Events (the armed clashes in 
Moscow which followed Yeltsin's dissolution of 
parliament in September 1993). These amnesties showed 
that the new legislature would be no less difficult to 
work with than the old Supreme Soviet.
The fact that the Duma created four committees
concerned with foreign policy and security issues (the 
Committee on Defense, Committee on International 
Affairs, the Committee on CIS affairs and Relations
with Compatriots, and the Geopolitical Affairs 
Committee set up independently by the Liberal 
Democratic Party) could be explained by the competing 
foreign policy preferences. But it also indicated that 
foreign affairs would figure prominently in the Duma's 
work. Committees not only maintained their own staffs 
to study foreign policy issues, they also utilized and 
became the channel for studies done by various research 
institutes in Moscow.95
95Interview with Georgii Arbatov, director of Russian Academy 
of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, Rabochaya tribuna, 14 
December 1994, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 14 December 1994, transmitted via Internet.
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The reduced role of the legislative branch as 
prescribed by the new constitution produced 
disgruntlement among many of the deputies. Duma members 
felt disadvantaged by the distribution of powers and 
began immediately to search for ways to increase their 
influence over policy. Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the 
Duma's Committee on Legislative Affairs and Juridical 
Reform, pointed out the constitution's provision that 
the president determines foreign policy "in accordance 
with federal laws, " and tried in April 1994 to unite 
deputies around the idea of securing more influence 
over foreign policy by passing laws on foreign policy 
issues.96 For example, he proposed making participation 
in the NATO Partnership for Peace program subject to 
Duma ratification. Ultimately the vote fell nine votes 
short of achieving a simple majority.97 In other cases, 
though, the Duma did muster the majorities required to 
pass laws aimed directly at changing Russian foreign 
policy, such as those passed in August 1995 on the 
situation in Yugoslavia.98 But these majorities were not 
always strong enough to overcome a presidential veto.99 
The Duma's August 1995 law on humanitarian aid to the 
rump Yugoslavia was one of its few laws demanding a 
specific action in foreign affairs which was not 
blocked or simply ignored by the executive branch.100
96"Joining Partnership for Peace Must Be Ratified by State 
Duma," Interfax, 14 April 1994.
97"Communists, Nationalists Fail to Quash Partnership," 
dateline Moscow, AFP, 22 June 1994.
. 98Ivan Novikov, "State Duma Adopts Laws on Former 
Yugoslavia," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 12 August 
1995, transmitted via Internet.
""Yeltsin Vetoes Laws on Dropping Bosnian Sanctions," 
dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 15 September 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
100Vladimir Isakov, "Parliamentary Diary: Social Gathering,"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 15 August 1995, p. 2. Translated in FBIS Daily
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The bulk of the Duma's activity in foreign affairs 
took the form of non-binding resolutions, or statements 
about foreign policy which did not require the Russian 
government to take any particular action. These 
resolutions criticized Moscow's handling of policy or, 
in some cases, its failure to address a certain issue. 
In keeping with the Duma's role, these resolutions were 
frequently addressed to other parliaments around the 
world, as was the case in the April 1995 Duma 
resolution on the crisis in former Yugoslavia.101
The Duma's non-binding resolutions on foreign 
policy matters frequently had domestic political aims, 
such as deputies' apparent efforts to preserve Russia's 
great power status and national honor. This was the 
case in March 1996 when the Duma passed two resolutions 
regarding the dissolution of the USSR. The first 
canceled the 12 December 1991 decision of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet which scrapped the 1922 agreement 
forming the USSR.102 The second instructed the Russian 
government to "take the necessary measures to preserve 
a single economic, political, and information area and 
to develop and strengthen integration ties among the 
states created on USSR territory," pointing to the 
legality of the 17 March 1991 Russian referendum on the 
preservation of the USSR as evidence that the Russian
Report Central Eurasia, 15 August 1995; and Andrey Urban, 
"Spokesman Rules Out Use of Force in Former Yugoslavia," ITAR- 
TASS, 12 August 1995. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 12 August 1995, transmitted via Internet.
101,,Russian Federation Council Appeal to the World 'On the 
Crisis in Former Yugoslavia,'" dated 12 April 1995 published in 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 April 1995, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 26 April 1995, transmitted via Internet.
102i t a r-t aSS in English, 15 March 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
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people favored the preservation of the USSR.103 These 
actions were aimed at hurting Boris Yeltsin's re- 
election campaign by appealing to nostalgia among the 
Russian electorate and reminding voters of the current 
leadership's role in the dissolution of the USSR.
The international reaction to the Duma's 
resolutions showed, though, that actions designed for 
the domestic Russian audience nonetheless had resonance 
abroad. Many of the new independent states responded 
harshly to the Duma's vote, telegramming Yeltsin to 
condemn the action.104 Russia's executive branch quickly 
put out a statement by Boris Yeltsin assuring that 
Moscow favored integration, but only through voluntary 
measures, and that it rejected "politically explosive 
and juridically unsound unilateral decisions."105 
Chernomyrdin said simply of the Duma's action that he 
"didn't take it seriously."106 Once again the executive 
branch was not only publicly at odds with the 
legislature, but was in the position of reassuring 
international partners that what the Duma called for 
would not be heeded by the Kremlin.
In the end, the Duma's resolutions damaged its own 
prestige in the eyes of many at home and of foreign 
partners as well. The Russian news agency ITAR-TASS
103Draft Decree "On the Legal Validity for the Russian 
Federation - Russia of the Results of the USSR Referendum of 17 
March 1991," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 March 1996, p. 6.
104Aleksandr Gamov, "Can The Bison Be Driven Into the Forest 
Again?" Komsomolskaya pravda, 19 March 1996. Translated in FBIS
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 19 March 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
l°5"Yeltsin Rejects Duma Decision on USSR," dateline Moscow, 
ITAR-TASS in English, 16 March 1996, transmitted via Internet.
106"Interview with Chernomyrdin," Radio Rossii Network, 17 
March 1996. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 17 
March 1996, transmitted via Internet.
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parodied the Duma1s vote by issuing an April Fool1s 
story claiming that the Duma was drafting a document on 
the reactivation of the Warsaw Pact.107 NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana told one Duma member, in response 
to criticism about NATO's planned enlargement, that 
"you have not done very much to maintain the balance in 
Europe through your decision to restore the USSR 
either."108 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
called the vote "highly irresponsible" and warned, 
while visiting Ukraine, that "any attempt to change 
[the] status of [these countries] should be rejected by 
the international community.1,109 The international 
reaction to the Duma's resolutions indicated that in 
spite of Yeltsin's assurances that the Duma's 
resolutions did not represent Russia's official policy, 
foreign partners took the Duma seriously enough to 
respond. So while the Duma did not have direct impact 
on the policy engineering stage of Russian foreign 
policy formulation, it did have a direct effect on the 
way foreign partners viewed Russia.
This example demonstrated that the Duma could 
indeed make the Foreign Ministry's work more difficult. 
It was the Duma's strident tones in foreign policy 
which occasioned Foreign Minister Kozyrev to call 
deputies opposing him "traitors" and "political
107Aleksandr Nechayev, "Duma 'Experts' Drafting Documents to 
Restore Warsaw Pact," dateline Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English, 1 
April 1996.
108HTwo General Secretaries," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 March 
1996, p. 3. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 23 
March 1996, transmitted via Internet.
109Ed Zwirn, "Christopher, Kuchma Criticize Duma Vote on 
USSR," dateline Kiev, Intelnews, 20 March 1996. Translated in FBIS 
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 20 March 1996, transmitted via 
Internet.
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bastards" seeking to "return Russia to isolation."110 
Whether Kozyrev's comments were justified at some level 
by the Duma's actions is open to debate, but his sharp 
words did little to encourage deputies to take more 
responsible and constructive positions.
Despite generally bad relations between the
executive and legislative branches, there continued to 
be instances when the MFA attempted to lobby and cajole 
deputies to cooperate. The executive branch recognized 
that the Duma could have an impact on public opinion 
through its issuance of emotional decrees and
resolutions. As the Russian foreign minister made
clear, while he and probably other members of the 
Russian political elite did not understand the feelings 
of sympathy toward Serbia in the wars of Yugoslav 
succession, these feelings on the part of the Russian 
population had to be considered: " [W]hatever the reason 
is, it is a fact of life that a considerable part of 
Russian public opinion believes that Serbs are the 
closest peoples to Russia in the Balkans, and they have 
to be protected. We have to take that into account."111 
If Kozyrev's impression of public opinion was correct, 
the public support for Serbia he detected could well 
have derived from the legislature's continuous harping 
on the need to protect Serbia.
Another example of harmonious relations between the 
Duma and the executive can be found in the postponement 
of US-Russian joint military exercises in Totsk 
training ground in Russia. The Duma had asked Yeltsin
110"Kozyrev Blasts 'Political Bastards' Opposed to NATO 
Pact," dateline Moscow, AFP, 27 June 1994.
n i Suzanne Crow, Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, "An 
Interview with Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3 
No. 28 (July 1994).
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to reconsider holding the exercises, and Yeltsin 
expressed his "understanding" and asked his defense 
minister to hold additional consultations with the US 
and to reconsider the matter taking due regard of the 
Duma's and Totsk citizens' opinion.112 In the end, the 
exercises were held two months later than originally 
scheduled, with assurances to the Duma and the public 
that they would not damage Russian security or 
environment.
These examples may suggest a process of settling
down in the conflict between the executive and the 
legislature. Clearly, recent Russian history had seen 
enough of such conflict, and the new legislature's 
reduced powers brought an end to its claims on 
contested power.
But, at the same time, these examples may overstate 
the executive's interest in taking the Duma's foreign- 
policy views into account. Just after these two 
examples of executive interest in cooperation, the Duma 
voted in favor of the draft budget for 1994, something 
that the executive branch needed and wanted. Russian 
observers identified a pattern prior to Duma budget
votes in which the executive attempts to ingratiate 
itself with the Duma.113 This example shows that foreign
policy as well as domestic issues can be used by the
executive branch as bargaining chips at budget time.
The Duma and Federation Council each have a part to 
play in the ratification of international treaties,
112"Yeltsin Understands Duma Position on Joint Exercises," 
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 April 1994, p. 3. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 28 April 1994, transmitted via Internet.
113Vladimir Isakov, "Parliamentary Diary: Burden of Choice," 
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 25 July 1995, p. 2. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 25 July 1995, transmitted via Internet.
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which represents a powerful instrument by which the 
legislature can exercise influence over foreign policy. 
The Duma, supported by the Federation Council, 
successfully blocked the implementation of the START II 
treaty by refusing to ratify it.114 (Signed by Boris 
Yeltsin and George Bush in January 1993, START II had 
not been ratified by mid-1998.) In addition, a Duma 
deputy linked START II ratification to NATO 
enlargement, making NATO's eastern expansion a reason 
for the Duma to refuse START II ratification.115 Thus, 
the Federal Assembly has also attempted to use its 
powers regarding treaty ratification to influence other 
issues.
In some cases, the Duma's use of its ratification 
and budgetary powers fell short of success. The Duma's 
policies were overturned twice with regard to the 
treaty between Russia and Moldova on the withdrawal of 
troops. The Federation Council rejected the Duma's law 
providing additional funding to keep Russian troops in 
Moldova.116 Moreover, the executive branch started to 
withdraw some of the withdrawal of troops contrary to 
the treaty's provision that withdrawal start upon 
ratification of the treaty.117 Thus, not only can the 
Duma run into obstacles put up by the Federation
114Ekho Moskvy Radio (Moscow), 17 July 1995. Translated in 
FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 17 July 1995, transmitted via 
Internet.
115ITAR-TASS, 6 February 1996. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 6 February 1996, transmitted via Internet.
116Ivan Novikov, "Duma Passes Law on 14th Army," ITAR-TASS in 
English, 21 June 1995. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 21 June 1995, transmitted via Internet.; "At the 
Federation Council," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 13 July 1995, p. 5. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 13 July 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
H7"Trains Head East, Withdrawal of Russian Equipment and 
Troops Begins," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 February 1996, p. 1.
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Council's review of its work, the executive branch can 
circumvent the Duma's ratification powers by proceeding 
with policies that have not yet been ratified.
A persistent problem of the Duma and Federation 
Council has been the frequent departure from rules of 
procedure. According to a study of legislative activity 
between 1993 and 1995, there were frequent instances of 
repeat voting on one and the same subject, voting on 
behalf of absent colleagues, and failure to consult the 
government on federal spending issues, none of which 
are allowed according to the Russian constitution.118
A question which arose at the start of the second 
republic was the attitude of the public toward foreign 
policy. The December 1993 election showed a sizable 
portion of the Russian electorate supporting Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky and other conservative opposition 
politicians. It was not immediately clear whether these 
voters were supporting these politicians for their 
foreign policy views, their domestic policy views, or 
simply out of a desire to punish the incumbent 
government for the pain of domestic economic and 
political change.
Public opinion polls do not support the notion that 
these conservative politicians were elected for their 
foreign policy views. Public views on foreign policy as 
reported by Russian polling agencies tended to be more 
moderate in nature and almost always featured a sizable 
percentage of respondents without any opinion on a 
given foreign policy question. For example, when asked
118Lev Olegovic Ivanov, Die Gesetzgebungstatigkeit der 
Foderalversammlung der RuSlandischen Foderation 1993-1995. (Bonn: 
Bundlesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale 
Studien, 1996), pp. 29-30.
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in 1994 what kind of position Russia should take in 
response to the NATO air-strikes on Serb targets in 
Yugoslavia, 47 percent said that Russia should remain 
neutral, 21 percent said that Russia should support the 
Serbs, eight percent indicated that Russia should 
support NATO, and 24 percent said they did not know.119
Furthermore, it remained questionable whether 
deputies took their representational roles any more 
seriously in the second republic than they had in the 
first. Then, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
it was clear that deputies imagined their mandate to 
consist not so much of being a delegate representing 
public opinion but of being a trustee of public 
opinion, a position in which they were expected to vote 
according to what they considered right, not 
necessarily according to what their constituents 
preferred.
Research Institutes and the Media
The situation for Russian research institutes 
during the first years of the second republic remained 
a difficult one. Their ability to influence foreign 
policy was decreased by the proliferation of analysis 
units within the presidential apparatus. While these 
new organs often hired top people from the former 
state-run research institutes, there were far more
119Interfax and Public Opinion Fund poll, Interfax public 
opinion report, 4 May 1994. In another poll, 30 percent of 
Russians polled said that Russia should not interfere in the 
conflict between Crimean and Ukrainian authorities, 35 percent 
said it should, seven percent said they did not know, eight 
percent said they did not care, and 20 percent said it was 
difficult to answer. Interfax and Public Opinion Fund poll, 
Interfax public opinion report number 24, June 1994.
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people who were left behind.120 Russian analysts were 
frequently in a situation of needing to supplement 
their meager incomes by doing research for private 
consulting firms. This meant that they had that much 
less time to try to find paths to participate in the 
official policymaking process.
One avenue for analysts to participate in the 
problem recognition stage was through conferences and 
meetings sponsored by the Foreign Ministry. Such 
meetings became more prevalent during the second 
republic, apparently because of the MFA's continuing 
search for a modus vivendi with the many critics of its
policies. The MFA held a conference on the situation of 
the Russian Diaspora in the former Soviet Union in mid- 
1995. To it were invited not only those specializing in 
the Eurasian region but also researchers interested in 
other parts of the world. For example, the director of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, A. 
M. Vasiliev, was invited to offer a comparative 
perspective and because of his institute's 
methodological experience.121
The experience of the Africa Institute, which has 
been transformed into a center for the study of Muslim- 
majority CIS states as well as Africa, was typical of 
that of other government sponsored institutes. They 
were forced to get away from highly specialized 
analysis and to treat a much larger range of issues in 
order to stay competitive. As Vasiliev noted, his
120Oksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and Their 
Role in Political Decisionmaking. An occasional paper of the 
Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 
1996, p. 4.
121"Speeches by Discussion Participants," Diplomaticheskii 
vestnik No. 5 (May) 1995, pp. 54-56. Translated in FBIS Daily 
Report Central Eurasia, 20 July 1995. transmitted via Internet.
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institute had redirected a good portion of its research 
to the problems of relations with the former Soviet 
Union. The reason for this was obvious -- many of 
Russia'a most pressing foreign policy issues were now 
in the former Soviet Union, not in Western Europe or 
the United States. But as Light has noted, the Russian 
academic community was unprepared for this development, 
having been concerned during the Soviet period with 
Soviet foreign policy, none of which included what 
became the former Soviet Union in 1991.122 Now, those
researching this part of the world could be termed the
vast majority.123
The group of top institutchiki which did enjoy 
access to the government, for example, through 
membership in the Presidential Council or through 
working directly for the presidential apparatus, was 
perhaps the best channel for other analysts to have a
voice in policymaking.124 Those with access to
policymakers effectively had a foot in each world and 
could convey research findings to the people whose jobs 
consisted of regular participation in the policymaking 
process. Whether their findings actually had an impact 
on policy was another matter entirely.
The Russian media's influence in the policymaking 
process during the first years of the second republic 
was not radically different than its role during the 
first republic. The media, continued to be much freer 
than during the Soviet period. It remained a forum for
122Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking," in Neil Malcolm, 
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in 
Russian Foreign Policy. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), 
p . 42.
123 Ibid.
1240ksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and Their 
Role in Political Decisionmaking, op. cit., p. 4.
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policy advocacy from foreign policy entrepreneurs. The 
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy published a 
second long treatise on foreign policy, elaborating and 
refining points it had made two years earlier, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.125 Most 
significantly, the media became an even more bountiful 
source for insider accounts about policymaking through 
interviews with participants in the policymaking 
process. The most useful of these were done in 
question-and-answer format and therefore not distorted 
by editorial comment.
Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition
Models
Referring to the series of characteristics 
identifiable in the bureaucratic politics and 
transition models enumerated in chapter one, the 
following conclusions can be drawn.
Allison's argument that " [i]f a nation performed 
an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining 
among individuals and groups within the government,"128 
continued to provide little explanatory power in the 
second republic. As in the first Russian republic, 
disagreement continued to be a basic ingredient of the 
policymaking process. But the interim step between
125"A Strategy for Russia (2)," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 May 
1994, p. 4.
126Dirk Sager, "The Unfulfilled Hope," Internationale 
Politik, Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 44-45.
127"The President's Third Shock Construction Project," 
Rossiya, No. 47, 7 December 1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report
Central Eurasia, 7 December 1994, transmitted via Internet.
128Graham Allison, Essence of Decision. (USA: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1971), p. 173.
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disagreement and policy outcome continued to follow a 
pattern different than the one described by Allison. 
Rather than parts of policy preferences being melted 
into a single policy amalgam, there appeared to be more 
evidence of the Foreign Ministry being sidelined from 
the policymaking circle. While akin to the "winner- 
take-all" situation seen in the first republic, this 
exclusion of the MFA seemed more subtle and was 
certainly less public. One example was Kozyrev's claim 
that the MFA had learned only through the media of the 
Defense Ministry's agreements with Ukraine in November 
1995.
The transition model explains these winner-take- 
all situations in terms of the sharp struggle over 
policy options within the democratizing state. Stakes 
in achieving one's policy goals tend to be high because 
of the power the transition period holds for setting 
precedents for future policymaking.
The second pattern seen in the second republic, 
one in which actors pursued various foreign policies, 
also continued to be a problem in the second republic. 
One example could be found in the contradictory remarks 
about possible repercussions of NATO enlargement. As 
before, this meant that the intragovernmental 
negotiation process had failed. This problem was 
connected with the deficit in procedures and the 
failure of policymakers to stick to a shared set of 
guidelines for discussing policy in public. Without a 
mechanism for developing and using such guidelines, the 
pursuit of multiple foreign policy positions is an 
ever-present risk. It is noteworthy that mechanisms do 
not simply have to exist, they also must be respected 
by the players. This is one aspect of an established 
bureaucracy which makes it function more effectively.
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The blurred lines of authority of the first 
republic were replaced by greater clarity in the 
delineation of power in the second republic. But, there 
were new problems in the Russian polity brought on by 
the new constitution, including excessive powers 
accruing to the president, the unchecked growth of the 
presidential apparatus, and the related problem of 
competing centers of power within the executive. 
Additional decrees defining which agency was in charge 
of foreign policy continued to offer no remedy for a 
situation in which the chain of command was unclear. 
There continued to be no fixed system forcing actors to 
work together to make policy. All of these 
characteristics can be accommodated by the transition 
model.
Allison's description of "a constellation of 
loosely allied organizations on top of which government 
leaders sit,"129 remained unsuitable in the second 
republic. The size of the presidential apparatus grew, 
creating additional struggles to preserve or create 
institutional identities. The bureaucratic infighting 
in Russia's second republic continued to be perceived 
by players as a matter of institutional survival (as in 
the case of the rivalry between the MFA and the CIS 
Ministry) -- not simply winning or losing this or that 
policy battle. As had been the case in the first 
republic, these institutional rivalries were more 
pronounced in Russia than in other established 
democracies because Russia's institutions had not yet 
become established and had not developed procedures to 
fit together in a predictable policymaking environment.
129Ibid., p. 80.
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Allison's depiction of problems being "cut up and 
parceled out to various organizations,"130 continued to 
be out of harmony with the chaotic nature of 
interaction between Russia's governing institutions. 
There remained too little organization and too little 
clarity about who was in charge to expect this kind of 
division of responsibility. In addition, Yeltsin's 
declining health in the second republic meant that his 
laissez-faire management style became even freer. This 
increased his tendency to let members of his dual 
executive fight problems out among themselves. Yeltsin 
was quite comfortable putting his appointed aides -- 
who enjoyed no popular mandate or were not accountable 
to the public -- to work in making Russian foreign 
policy, as could be seen in his dispatch of 
Presidential Council members to the United States as an 
advance team for his presidential visit in September 
1994, and his chief of staff's representation of him 
abroad.
Allison argued that the behavior of government can 
be understood as a series of organizational "outputs" 
possessing a "preprogrammed" character.131 In Russia's 
second republic, it was difficult to detect any action 
of this nature. Far more often, Russia's foreign policy 
seemed random and unprogrammed. As was made clear by 
Baturin's statement -- "the process of making political 
decisions is confused, complicated, and to some extent 
unknown"132 -- even those at the highest echelons of
130Ibid., p. 80.
131Ibid., p. 81.
132Pilar Bonet, "Kremlin's Unpredictability is Threat to 
Russia's Future," interview with Yurii Baturin, El Pais (Madrid), 
27 February 1995, p. 4. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 27 February 1995, transmitted via Internet.
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power were not privy to the intricacies of how policy 
was made.
Allison's standard operating procedures, which 
"permit concerted action by large numbers of 
individuals, each responding to basic cues, 1,133 remained 
undeveloped. Such standard operating procedures were 
not characteristic of Russia's first republic, owing to 
the chaotic organizational and political situation, and 
this situation persisted into the first years of the 
second republic. While Russia had had more time to 
develop as an independent state in the two years 
between the collapse of the USSR and the start of the 
second republic, this time was far too short to have 
seen much progress in creating these procedures. 
Furthermore, the political upheaval involved in the 
transition from the first to the second republic was a 
trauma to the polity which probably damaged any 
procedures that had managed v to take hold between 1991 
and 1993. It was also a trauma to the creation of a 
rule-of-law society.
The development of "action channels," or 
"regularlized means of taking government action on a 
specific kind of issue,"134 continued to be inhibited by 
extremely fluid and ad hoc involvement of personnel in 
foreign policy issues. The military continued to 
trespass on the MFA's organizational turf, as could be 
seen in Grachev's travels abroad and discussion of 
subjects which would sooner belong to a diplomat's 
agenda (for example, Grachev's proposal for a new 
collective security system in Asia, in 1994) .
133Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 83.
134JJbid. , p. 169.
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Finally, Allison's "dominant inference pattern" -- 
" [i] f a nation performs an action of a certain type 
today, its organizational components must yesterday 
have been performing...an action only marginally 
different..."135 remained undescriptive of foreign 
policy formulation in the second republic. There was 
still too much instability in Russia's governing 
structures for patterns to be identified. The unchecked 
growth of the presidential apparatus -- which saw the 
president's security services become involved in policy 
analysis and policymaking -- meant that much of the 
activity took place among people and within agencies 
removed from public view and accountability. 
Standardized decisionmaking depends to a great extent 
on the presence of enforceable, legal mechanisms, and 
these were simply not present within the presidential 
structures.
The executive also operated largely unchecked by 
legislative or judicial oversight. This was especially 
a problem with regard to the work of the intelligence 
agencies. New laws purporting to make them more 
accountable were written, but they were too vague to 
exert serious control over the actions of intelligence 
agencies.
The foreign policy formulation mechanism became 
more entangled in domestic politics in the second 
republic, a characteristic of the transition model. 
Policymakers grew inured to the situation in which 
intragovernmental disagreements were aired in public 
and debates behind closed doors were finished on the 
pages of the press. The metamorphosis of Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev's views, as seen in his shift on NATO
135JJbicf., p. 87.
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enlargement, could be traced to his ambition to be re­
elected as a deputy. The legislature made the most 
blatant use of foreign policy for domestic political 
gain, as was clear in its emotional appeals about the 
war in former Yugoslavia and its resolutions on the 
restoration of the USSR. While such activity may occur 
in any country, it is worthy of note in Russia’s case 
because it is part of an already-pronounced pattern of 
domestic politics being played out in the international 
arena.
Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, 
one would expect the transition model to offer much 
more explanatory power than the bureaucratic politics 
model for understanding foreign policy formulation 
during the second republic.
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C ha pt er 6
Case Study On e :
Sanctions A gainst Rump Yugoslavia
A Russian lawmaker commented in early 1993 that 
"it is clear that only two persons in Russia make 
decisions" on the Russian position toward sanctions 
against the rump Yugoslavia: President Boris Yeltsin
and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.1 The clarity with 
which this Russian deputy viewed the situation was 
lacking among other observers, namely, the anonymous US 
policymaker who in late 1992 described Russia's policy 
toward Bosnia as being "indecipherable."2 The two 
statements indicate the complexity of the policymaking 
situation in Russia on the question of sanctions 
against the rump Yugoslavia between May 1992, when the 
United Nations Security Council imposed an 
international economic embargo against the rump 
Yugoslavia, and November 1995, when the same body voted 
to lift these sanctions.
In May 1992, Russia voted in the United Nations 
Security Council to support the international economic 
embargo against the rump Yugoslavia.3 This decision 
marked a controversial step in Russian foreign policy,
^Interfax, 15 February 1993.
2Column by Evans and Novak, The Washington Post. 16 December
1992.
Resolution 757 said "...that all States shall prevent: (a)
The import into their territories of all commodities and products 
originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present 
resolution." Transmitted via Internet from United Nations.
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arguably independent Russia's first major challenge in 
foreign affairs. During the three years that followed, 
when the sanctions question was revisited by the UN 
both for tightening and lifting, it became clear that 
the issue evoked conflicting responses from the various 
branches of the Russian government. It also became 
clear that Russia's policy toward this key issue in the 
wars of Yugoslav succession would become intertwined 
with Russia's day-to-day domestic political infighting, 
much more that it did in other countries involved in 
brokering a settlement in the Balkans. This chapter 
discusses how prominent Russian actors influenced 
Russian policymaking on the sanctions issue between 
1992 and 1995 in an attempt to test the conclusions 
about the bureaucratic politics model drawn thus far.
The Role of Presidential] Institutions
Throughout the period in question (1992-1995), 
Boris Yeltsin made relatively few public statements 
about the sanctions question. In one of his first 
statements, the president showed an unhesitating 
willingness to voice support for the use of sanctions. 
In late 1992, during a state visit of German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl in Moscow, Yeltsin said:
In connection with Yugoslavia, that 
is, in particular with Serbia, I 
would like to state that we, together 
with the international community, are 
prepared to fulfill the UN 
resolutions, although naturally we 
hope for peace and that Serbia will 
end its advance there.4
4NTV television (Germany), 16 December 1992. Translated by US 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report Western 
Europe, 16 December 1992, transmitted electronically.
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Yeltsin's statement was noteworthy not only because he 
did not waver on the sanctions issue, but because he 
singled out Serbia as the aggressor in the region, a 
stance that many politicians in Russia argued against. 
Yeltsin's posture could be explained as an attempt to 
harmonize with the position of Germany, Russia's most 
important bilateral relationship in Western Europe. 
Harmonization with Germany did not require too much 
stretching of the Russian position since the German 
government at the time was adamantly opposed to German 
participation in the use of military force5 and had 
been urging the use of diplomatic methods to solve the 
crisis.6
By early 1993, the deteriorating situation in the 
former Yugoslavia had prompted the Vance-Owen Peace 
Plan7, which Russia supported. But in Washington, 
President-elect Clinton, who had campaigned pledging a 
more active US policy in Bosnia, was talking about the 
need to become more assertive if ethnic cleansing did 
not cease.8 The popular sentiment in Germany, which was 
experiencing increased flows of refugees, was also
5"Kohl Clearly Rejects German Military Deployment," 
Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt am Main), 13 August 1992, p. 1.
6Deutschlandfunk Radio (Cologne) interview with German 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 17 August 1992. Transcribed 
by German Federal Information and Press office, Press 
Release No. 1133/92.
7Named after Cyrus Vance and David Owen and outlining a 
three-part package of ten constitutional principles, a cessation 
of hostilities agreement and a map delineating a ten-province 
structure reconstituting Bosnia-Herzegovina. For more information, 
see, David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, (London: Indigo, 1996), pp. 94-
95.
8Uwe Knupfer, "On the Question of Bosnia, Clinton is Between 
Stools," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 5 February 1993; and David Owen, 
Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 101.
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shifting toward more sympathy for the use of military 
force.9
It was against this backdrop that Yeltsin began 
several weeks later to couch his stance on the 
sanctions question with more sympathy toward the Serb 
side. He contrasted Russia's support of the sanctions 
with its staunch rejection of the international 
community's use of force against Serb targets.10 In 
addition, Yeltsin stressed that Russia's attitude 
toward the sanctions was more "restrained" than that of 
its international partners. He refrained from blaming 
Serbia singly, and made a point of positioning Russia 
as Serbia's protector.11
Yeltsin's shift in stance could be explained by a 
number of factors both internal and external to Russia. 
Increased US attention to the conflict12 -- especially 
the debate about lifting the arms embargo which 
disproportionately hindered Bosnia's defense capability 
-- likely meant an increase in US involvement in peace 
settlement efforts. The situation in Bosnia, especially 
around Srebrenica, was deteriorating rapidly,13 itself 
an indication that action might come forcefully and 
swiftly. The question of the use of air-power to stop 
Serbia was particularly troublesome
9See, for example, comment by Lothar Ruhl, "Eingreifen ist 
moglich" ("Military Intervention is Possible,") Die Welt (Berlin), 
5 January 1992.
10ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1993.
11Ibid.
12The White House was the home of a lame-duck president 
between early November 1992 and late January 1993.
13"The War in Bosnia is Heating Up," Frankfurter Rundschau 
(Frankfurt-am-Main), 2 February 1993.
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Sensitive to questions of Russia's international 
status, Yeltsin hoped to distinguish Russia's position 
clearly from that of the US. Significantly, Yeltsin was 
also bringing himself in line with a popular and vocal 
pro-Serb stance within Russia (discussed in more detail 
below).
By March and April 1993, when the issue became one 
of whether the UN should tighten sanctions, Yeltsin 
linked Russia's position on the matter to his domestic 
political situation. Russia's support of the sanctions 
had become a controversial subject in Russian politics 
and was being barraged by criticism in the more 
conservative Russian media and in the Supreme Soviet 
(discussed in more detail below).
This was a bad time for Yeltsin to deepen Russia's 
commitment to a foreign policy decision which would 
undoubtedly be unpopular with Russia's pro-Serb voices, 
the Russian parliament being the leading home of these 
voices. Yeltsin was about to go to the Russian public 
for support of his program and his presidency in the 
form of a referendum. In addition, Yeltsin had suffered 
a domestic political blow the previous.month when the 
Congress of People's Deputies passed resolutions 
intended to limit Yeltsin's decisionmaking authority in 
economic and personnel questions.14 Yeltsin needed to 
find ways of distancing himself from criticism that his 
administration was being too obsequious toward the 
United States and the West in general.
14For a discussion of this and the April referendum, see 
Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal
Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996. 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press,
1997), pp. 56-58.
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It was therefore both for domestic political 
reasons and in the context of international maneuvering 
that Yeltsin sent a letter to US President Bill Clinton 
on 11 April 1993 requesting that the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) vote be postponed until one day after 
the Russian referendum, which was scheduled to take 
place on 25 April.15 Such a delay would prevent Russia's 
voting behavior on the sanctions question from having 
an impact on the referendum.
The linkage between Russian domestic politics and 
the UNSC vote was denied by Russian diplomats.16 This is 
not surprising considering their natural inclination to 
have foreign policy issues viewed on their merits, not 
to become hostage to unrelated (domestic) subjects.
The stance of Russian diplomats might also be 
attributed to a difference of opinion between them and 
the presidential apparatus, with diplomats rejecting 
linkage and elite of the presidential apparatus 
favoring it. As the discussion in previous chapters 
illustrates, it is within the realm of possibility that 
Russian diplomats had been sidelined by the 
Presidential apparatus on the decision to write the 
letter. As already noted, Yeltsin's foreign policy 
aides frequently doubled as domestic politics advisers, 
a situation which impelled them to view foreign policy 
issues excessively in light of their impact on domestic 
political problems. The fact that the sanctions vote
15"Yeltsin Presses Clinton on Vote," The New York Times, 12 
April 1993. In the referendum of April 25, voters were asked 
whether they approved of Yeltsin's presidency and whether there 
should be new elections. It was an attempt to break the deadlock 
between the president and legislature, and Yeltsin claimed victory 
despite an ambiguous result. Wendy Slater, "No Victors in the 
Russian Referendum," RFE/RL Research Report, No. 21, 21 May 1993.
16Yulii Vorontsov said, "We are not coupling [the vote with] 
any type of problems at home." Reuter, 13 April 1993.
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would not be put off (apparently owing to French 
adamancy)17 until after the referendum thus enforced the 
inclination to view Russia's vote in a domestic 
political light.
Irrespective of whether it was the Foreign 
Ministry or the Presidential apparatus which wrote the 
Yeltsin letter, the Russian position (an abstention) 
turned on the question of Russian domestic politics.18 
Meanwhile, Serb assaults on Bosnian targets continued, 
making Russia's abstention look like obstructionism to 
critics of the policy.
Shortly after the UN vote, Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic signed (with reservations) the Vance- 
Owen peace plan after much delay, bringing new, if 
cautious, optimism into the peace process.19 The 
discussion of the use of force centered around an 
international contingent put in place to guarantee the 
fragile peace agreement. Russia, along with the United 
States, France and Great Britain, was willing to 
provide troops.20 At the same time, Russia continued to 
reject proposals for the use of air strikes to convince 
the Bosnian Serbs to ratify the peace plan.21 (The plan 
was scheduled to be put to a referendum.) This
17According to Lord Owen, the French, unlike the British and 
Americans, were not willing to let the Russians have an extra day. 
David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 144.
18Lucia Mouat, "UN Stiffens Sanctions Against Yugoslavia," 
Christian Science Monitor, 19 April 1993, p. 1.
19"After Clinton's Threat, the Peace Plan is Signed in 
Athens," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt-am-Main), 3 May 
1993 .
20"Russia Wants to Send Troops," Die Welt (Berlin), 6 May
1993 .
21"Grachev is Against Airstrikes," Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (Frankfurt-am-Main), 12 May 1993.
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continued to be the case even after Bosnian Serb leader 
Karadzic declared the Vance-Owen plan "dead. 1122
In the spring of 1993, a gap between the positions 
of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian 
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had become perceptible. 
Milosevic was critical of Karadzic's reservations and 
had urged the Bosnian Serbs to back the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan.23
The change in Serbia's stance gave Russia a reason 
to shift its position on sanctions once again. In 
August 1993, Yeltsin suggested that the lifting of 
sanctions be raised at the UN.24
In addition to the change in the situation on the 
ground in former Yugoslavia, there were also domestic 
Russian political reasons for Russia's shift in stance. 
Yeltsin knew that he would soon enter a fierce battle 
with the Supreme Soviet, a battle which came to pass 
with his September 1993 dissolution of that body. 
Yeltsin therefore sought to show himself favorable 
toward a position considered popular with many in 
Russia (especially among his political opponents) 
the lifting or easing of sanctions against rump 
Yugoslavia.25
In late February 1994, the use of NATO air strikes 
became a further factor to be considered by Russia in 
its making of sanctions policy. Air strikes were used
22"Karadzic: The Vance-Owen Plan is Dead," Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung (Munich), 18 May 1993.
23David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 163.
24Interfax, 19 August 1993.
25Boris Yeltsin The Struggle for Russia, Translated by 
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. (New York: Times Books Random House,
1994, 1995), p. 135-139.
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the first time against Serb planes flying in a UN- 
declared no-fly zone, a scenario which Russia had 
agreed to when it supported UN Security Council 
resolution 836 in June 1993.26 But when Serb planes were 
actually hit, Yeltsin was adamant that the air strikes 
stop, warning that they could lead to a wider war.27 
Yeltsin's discomfort with the use of punitive force by 
NATO was undoubtedly connected with concerns that NATO 
was becoming operational in ways that could have an 
impact on Russian security and internal affairs. This 
broader desire to curb NATO's activity inevitably made 
itself felt in terms of Russia's treatment of sanctions 
-- namely to make the lifting of sanctions a catechism 
of Russia's policy toward the former Yugoslavia.
The creation of the Contact Group28 in April 1994 
helped to institutionalize Russia's participation in 
decisionmaking on the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia. While decisions (for example, on military 
action) continued to be taken by members without prior 
consultation with Russia, the Contact Group did give 
Yeltsin and his ministers a forum for voicing views on 
all subjects related to the former Yugoslavia, 
including the sanctions question.
It is noteworthy that Boris Yeltsin's policy 
statements on the sanctions question and the range of 
issues related to the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia did not tend to emphasize arguments about a 
special relationship with Serbia. Yeltsin took no
26Resolution 836 authorized UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force 
in Bosnia and Croatia) to use force to reply to bombardments in 
safe areas. The resolution was adopted on 4 June 1993.
27"Yeltsin Warns Against Further NATO Airstrikes," 
Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt-am-Main), 13 April 1994.
28The Contact Group included Russia, Germany, France, Great 
Britain and the United States.
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particular pains to make statements like those of 
Russian nationalists about Russian-Serb kinship. One 
example of Russian nationalist rhetoric was provided by 
Aleksandr Sterligov, head of the ultra-nationalist 
Russian National Assembly and a former KGB general, who 
claimed that " [v]olunteer battalions, which will help 
out our brothers in Yugoslavia, are being formed by 
advocates of Slavic nationalism.1129 Sterligov also 
warned that in the event of UN-sponsored military 
intervention in Yugoslavia, "a vast number of 
volunteers ready to protect their Slavic brethren" 
would emerge in Russia.30 Other examples included 
Russia's more conservative newspapers, which published 
appeals for Russians to help their fellow Slavs in 
Serbia.31 Yeltsin, on the other hand, downplayed the 
historical ties that many in Russia had made a focal 
point of their political platforms.
For example, Yeltsin said in August 1995 that
the ideas of the "Slav alliance" belong 
to the past. But even at that time they 
never held dominant positions in 
Russia's foreign policy. And they are 
not in any way related to the conflict 
in question. After all, the war in 
Bosnia is waged exclusively between 
Slav peoples -- Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosnian Muslims. They are all close to 
the Russian people.32
Yeltsin's statement is noteworthy because it shows how 
clearly he refused to take up the rhetoric of his
29Interfax, 18 December 1992.
30Interfax, 21 December 1992.
31See, for example, Pravda, 21 January 1993, p. 5; and 
Literatumaya Rossiya, No. 3 (21 January 1993), p. 4.
32Interview with Boris Yeltsin, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 10 August 
1995, p. 1. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 10 
August 1995, transmitted via Internet.
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opponents. His statements in support of Russian-Serb 
friendship were positive, but restrained. By pointing 
out that the pan-Slav alliance was a thing of the past, 
he debunked one of the core concepts of Russia's 
nationalists. Yeltsin's behavior gave the impression 
that he was being pushed by the parliament and perhaps 
public opinion, but that he could only be pushed so far 
in his pro-Serbia rhetoric.
Not to be entirely discounted in considering the 
overall explanation for Yeltsin's stance was his poor 
personal relationship with Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic. The Serb leader had expressed support for 
the putschists during the August 1991 coup attempt in 
the USSR, placing himself directly opposed to Boris 
Yeltsin's reformist opposition. It may have been 
Yeltsin's personal contempt for the authoritarian 
Milosevic, along with his lack of belief in the 
historic, Russian-Serb kinship, which impelled him to 
stop short of adopting the kind of rhetoric about 
Slavic kinship which would have been well received 
among Russia's vocal nationalists.
Yeltsin's goal seems to been to do just enough to 
please Russia's pro-Serbia contingent -- be they in 
parliament or in the public at large -- but not to do 
any more than necessary to avoid alienating them. For 
example, the decision to abstain from the sanctions 
tightening vote in April 1993 was clearly driven by the 
Russian referendum scheduled for the next day. But 
when the Russian State Duma voted in the summer of 1995 
for Russia to unilaterally lift the sanctions, Yeltsin 
responded with his veto powers.33
33ITAR-TASS, 14 September 1995.
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Another example can be found in the a decree 
enabling trade between Russia and rump Yugoslavia to 
resume -- a decree which was signed by Yeltsin only on 
28 December 1995, a full month after the United Nations 
Security Council voted to suspend sanctions with 
immediate effect.34 Rump Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje 
Kontic was puzzled at the Russian delay, expressing 
surprise on behalf of his government.35
Yeltsin's actions were driven to some extent by 
the debt to Yugoslavia which Russia inherited from the 
Soviet Union. Payments had not been made owing to the 
sanctions, and by resuming trade, Russia would reopen 
the debt issue. A further possible explanation for the 
delay in resuming trade might be in the profit that 
could be made by breaking the embargo, a situation 
which would end when the embargo was lifted. While 
there is only anecdotal evidence of this (as is 
discussed below), the possibility must be factored into 
an analysis of Russia's sanctions policy.
The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment
There was a strong similarity between the 
positions of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev on 
the sanctions question. Kozyrev, too, viewed askance 
the arguments of special Slavic ties between Moscow and 
Belgrade. In a June 1994 interview, Kozyrev elaborated 
at length:
Somehow it is a common belief, or it 
seems to be a common belief, that 
Russia has a particular interest or
34Yeltsin had been recovering from heart problems in November 
and December 1995, but he had signed other decrees during this 
period. He signed the sanctions decree one day before returning to 
work. ITAR-TASS in English, 29 December 1995.
35ITAR-TASS in English, 1 February 1996.
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particular historical ties with the 
Serbs. That's probably true. My first 
reaction to that though was that in 
the 45 or 50 years since the Second 
World War, Yugoslavia, which was 
dominated by the Serbs and Belgrade, 
was a bad name. Some portrayed it as a 
fascist regime; some portrayed it as a 
not-so-good communist regime; others 
called it a dissident communist 
regime. So it was badly criticized and 
treated with a kind of scorn in 
Moscow. Yet all of a sudden recently, 
people have started to love Serbia, 
that is, Belgrade. But you know that's 
probably what happens. Historical 
memories come back after 40 years. You 
have to take it into account. The 
opposition has succeeded in 
exaggerating this feeling toward the 
Serbs, toward Belgrade. Now, whatever 
the reason is, it is a fact of life 
that a considerable part of Russian 
public opinion believes that Serbs are 
the closest peoples to Russia in the 
Balkans, and they have to be 
protected. We have to take that into 
account.36
Kozyrev was referring to the fact that there were a
number of indicators in recent history which
contradicted the theory of a special relationship with 
Serbia. The decades-long rift between Moscow and
Belgrade was healed under Gorbachev only in the context
of the larger East-West rapprochement.37 Serb leader 
Slobodan Milosevic, in addition to having supported the 
August 1991 putschists, had expressed support for the
36Suzanne Crow, Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, "An 
Interview with Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3 
No. 28 (July 1994).
37It was in March 1988 that Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to 
Yugoslavia and admitted that the diplomatic rift between the two 
countries, which began in 1948, had been the fault of the USSR. At 
the end of the visit the two countries signed a declaration saying 
that neither would impose their concepts of "social development" 
on the other and that they would also refrain from interfering in 
the affairs of other states.
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Supreme Soviet after Yeltsin dissolved it in September 
1993, actions that made him a difficult figure for 
Yeltsin or Kozyrev to embrace.38 Kozyrev's and 
Yeltsin's views about the nature of the Russian-Serbian 
relationship were strikingly similar, suggesting close 
contact and agreement with each other on how to handle 
the sanctions question.
That Kozyrev enjoyed the trust of Yeltsin on this 
issue was also suggested in the way the Russian 
position for the initial sanctions vote was handled in 
May 1992. Much information about the processing of the 
decision was contained in a telegram written by 
Russia's permanent representative to the United 
Nations, Yulii Vorontsov. The telegram was classified 
as "secret," but copies of it were leaked to the ultra­
conservative Russian weekly, Den' (Day), which
published it in June 1992.39 Virtually all concerns that 
the newspaper's account was a forgery can be put to 
rest by the facts that the Russian foreign minister 
made little if any attempt to deny the authenticity of 
the cable and implicitly confirmed it, among other 
things, by scorning the newspaper's publication of a 
secret document.40 The ministry's spokesman reacted 
similarly calling the publication of the cable "a 
flagrant violation of the law" and "a crime."41
38"Yugoslav Crisis: On Threshold of Balkan War? Boris
Yeltsin and Slobodan Milosevic Propose Solution to Political 
Deadlock in Balkans," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 Augusut 1995. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 12 August 1995, 
transmitted via Internet.
39"Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!" Den', No. 23 (7-13
June), 1992.
40Russian Television, 4 July 1992. Translated in FBIS Daily
Report, 4 July 1992, transmitted electronically.
41AFP, 10 June 1992.
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In the cable, dated 28 May 1992, Vorontsov 
discusses his meeting that day with the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council on the question of a 
draft resolution on sanctions against rump Yugoslavia. 
He explains the positions expressed by the United 
States and Western Europe to the effect that a full 
economic embargo against Serbia-Montenegro including 
oil supplies should be introduced because Belgrade had 
shown itself to be the aggressor in the conflict. He 
notes that during the meeting, China indicated that it 
would have to seek instructions from Beijing before 
making a move. Vorontsov, too, told his counterparts 
that the draft resolution would have to be looked over 
by his superiors in Moscow, a point which was later to 
become a matter of major debate by Russian opponents of 
the sanctions resolution.
The cable warned that "many delegates have, in 
conversations with us, made it clear that Russia's 
continuing support of Belgrade in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and UN will 
be incorrectly interpreted by Belgrade as encouragement 
for its attempt to create a 'Greater Serbia.'" 
Vorontsov concluded that the only action appropriate 
for Russia to take would be to vote in favor of the 
resolution. Only this approach would provide 
unambiguous proof that Russia was not supporting 
Serbia. He added that
it is very important for us not to 
oppose the Western countries and the 
United States on this point, where 
public opinion is decidedly against 
Milosevic, the 'last communist leader 
in Europe.' We should by no means allow 
' our country to be associated personally 
with him, especially on the eve of the
301
Chapter 6 Case Study One: Sanctions
[16 to 17 June 1992] summit in the 
United States.42
What Vorontsov did not mention, but what must also have 
been factored into the analysis of Russian 
policymakers, was the Group of Seven (G-7) meeting in 
Munich in early July, to which Russia sought an 
invitation.
Vorontsov assured his readers that the vote in 
favor of sanctions would hardly mean a total break in 
the dialogue with Belgrade. This had not occurred as a 
result of Soviet votes with regard to UN decisions 
regarding Iraq and Libya, he noted, in support of his 
argument. He also noted that any Supreme Soviet 
opposition to the Russian vote in favor of sanctions 
could be dealt with by reminding the Russian 
legislature that even if Russia were to abstain, it 
would still have to abide by the UN embargo. With his 
full analysis in place, Vorontsov asked for 
instructions, noting that the vote was scheduled to 
take place on 3 0 May.43
The Den' publication showed a note attached to the 
Vorontsov cable, which, judging by the contents, was 
the Russian Foreign Ministry's reaction, most likely 
the foreign minister's, given the content. (Hereafter 
it will be referred to as the "Kozyrev note.") The 
"Kozyrev note" included suggestions about how to sell 
Russia's support of the sanctions against Serbia to the 
Russian public, arguing that Russia should make clear 
that it had done more for Serbia than other country, 
but that it had simply run out of patience. "Russia is
42"Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!" Den', No. 23 (7-13
June), 1992.
43Ibid.
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a great power, something even its friends have to 
reckon with," the note argued. Both statements sounded 
like the suggestions of someone who had personally been 
frustrated by the Serb refusal to make peace, a
category which would have included, prominently, 
Kozyrev. They also appeared to be an attempt to preempt 
the arguments of Russian nationalists who would argue 
that Moscow had succumbed to pressure from the United 
States and Western Europe.
The "Kozyrev note" concluded that the Foreign 
Ministry considered it expedient to agree with the
assumptions of Vorontsov's cable. It advised that "if
no other instructions are received, we will vote 
tomorrow in favor of the resolution." (The annotation 
did not indicate who its intended recipients were or 
where instructions might be expected to come from, but 
it appears that the "Kozyrev note" was circulated to 
the same list of people who received Vorontsov's 
original cable.)
If the reprinted cable and note are authentic, as 
seems likely, a few interpretations are possible. One 
is that the matter had been discussed thoroughly before 
Vorontsov's cable arrived, thus enabling Kozyrev simply 
to confirm Vorontsov's analysis and suggested action 
plan. An alternative explanation is that Kozyrev 
effectively decided alone to give Vorontsov his 
approval without input from other ministers or the 
Russian president.
Supporting this explanation is the fact that
Kozyrev was aware of Yeltsin's trust in Vorontsov and 
his opinions. Yeltsin's favorable view of Vorontsov was 
evident in August 1992, when Yeltsin named him adviser
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to the president for foreign affairs.44 Vorontsov was 
rumored on a number of occasions to have been in the 
running to replace Kozyrev as foreign minister but was 
said not to have been interested in returning to 
Moscow.45 After his posting at the United Nations, he 
was named ambassador to the United States, one of 
Russia's most important embassies and a position which 
would go only to someone enjoying the Russian 
president's confidence.
The text, processing, and policy outcome of the 
Vorontsov cable provide important information about the 
way the first sanctions decision was handled. So, too, 
does its list of addressees. In all, there were some 35 
recipients listed on the address list including all top 
foreign ministry officials, Yeltsin, his chief of 
staff, the vice president, the speaker and deputy 
speaker of the Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, as 
well as the heads of the following: the Security
Council, Ministry of Security, the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Defense 
Ministry. The fact that so many officials were listed 
as recipients was itself significant. If all were 
expected to take part in the policymaking process, and 
if all were granted an equal voice in the matter, then 
Russia's circle of top decisionmakers was large enough 
to be cumbersome, burdening rather than easing the 
process of making policy choices.
44ITAR-TASS, 12 August 1992. Vorontsov either never accepted
the job or played this role remotely from New York without giving 
up his position as Russia's permanent representative to the UN.
45"A Lot of People Want Kozyrev's Job," Moskovskie novosti, 
No. 32 (9 August), 1992.
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An alternative interpretation might be that the 
cable was expected to be taken as information only by 
some of the recipients. It is difficult to imagine, for 
example, that the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, 
who was an addressee, would have been asked to voice an 
opinion about the Vorontsov cable. He would, on the
other hand, have benefited by having access to 
Vorontsov's analysis and information about affairs at 
the UN Security Council when facing journalists' 
questions.
To judge by the time the cable was sent, it did
not reach very many of its addressees before the UN
vote. As the copy published in Den1 shows, it was
dispatched from New York only on Friday, 29 May, one 
day before the question was to come to a vote before 
the UN Security Council. Even if the cable had been 
sent from New York at 9:00 a.m. local time, it would 
not have arrived in Moscow until after the close of 
business in Russian offices. While this hardly seems to 
have been intentional, since it is unlikely that 
Vorontsov controlled the timing of the UN meetings and 
vote, it may explain why so many officials were 
included on the addressee list: because Vorontsov
expected to miss many of them.46
The timing of the cable as well as the arguments 
in the cable and "Kozyrev note" suggest that the point 
of including such a large list of addresses was not to 
involve them in the policymaking process but to sell 
them on a decision which was ultimately made by a much 
smaller group. Three of the addressees from the Supreme 
Soviet were clearly targeted by these remarks in the
46This assumes that Russian diplomats, like their American 
counterparts, determine who will be included on the list of 
addressees accompanying the cables they write.
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hope of winning their support. (As is discussed below, 
the attempt failed.) There were probably more than 
three who needed convincing among the 3 5 addresses. The 
fact that the cable and "Kozyrev note" were leaked to 
the press was itself an indication that at least one of 
the addressees disapproved.
On 3 0 May 1992, Russia, like the US, France, 
Britain and nine other permanent and non-permanent 
members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of 
UNSC Resolution 757, the first sanctions vote. Had 
Russia abstained, it would have been in the company of 
only China and Zimbabwe; no country voted against the 
resolution.
Kozyrev came under swift criticism in the Russian 
media and legislature for the Russian support of 
Resolution 757. The MFA countered protests that Russia 
was losing money because of the sanctions with the 
argument that had Russia vetoed the sanctions, it would 
have not been offered Western aid or the chance to 
defer and restructure its debt payments.47 This, of 
course, left the MFA open to criticism that it had sold 
out Russian interests to Western creditors. Within a 
few months, Kozyrev was under so much pressure from 
nationalist opponents both inside the Supreme Soviet 
and in Russian public organizations to abrogate the 
decision that he began to talk about the need to ease 
the sanctions.48
Kozyrev quickly grew frustrated with the friction 
caused by Russia's support of Resolution 757. The 
sanctions question was one of the key features of his 
so-called shock diplomacy speech in Stockholm delivered
47ITAR-TASS, 27 November 1992.
48ITAR-TASS, 10 October 1992.
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in December 1992, in which Kozyrev mouthed sharp 
changes of policy. In that speech, Kozyrev said:
We demand that [the sanctions] be 
abolished, and if this does not 
happen, we reserve the right to take
necessary unilateral measures in
protecting our interests, especially 
as the sanctions are inflicting 
economic damage upon us. Serbia can 
count on the support of great Russia 
in its struggle with the current 
government.49
Kozyrev returned to the podium within one hour of
making these and other statements to say that they had
been designed to dramatize the danger of conservative- 
nationalism in Russia. The speech made clear the 
origins of Kozyrev's other attempts to distance Russia 
from the sanctions.
The fact that Kozyrev felt the need to appeal to 
an international audience in order to make a point to 
his domestic political foes (to show them the negative 
response to their views) was itself telling of the way 
the Russian policymaking process worked ;—  or at least 
of Kozyrev's perception of it. This was one of the many 
examples of attempts to involve participants from 
outside Russia in the foreign policy formulation 
process.
The continuing problem of mixing domestic politics 
and foreign-policy choices was evident during spring of 
1993 when relations between Yeltsin and the Supreme 
Soviet worsened. Following Russia's abstention in the 
UN Security Council vote on tightening the sanctions in 
April 1993, Kozyrev seemed to link Yeltsin's struggle
49"Andrei Kozyrev's Shock Therapy," Izvestiya, 15 December 
1992, p. 6.
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with the parliament to Russia's abstention. Yeltsin's 
claimed victory in the 25 April 1993 referendum on his 
presidency, meant, according to Kozyrev, that the 
voters' support of Yeltsin signified their support of 
his foreign policy course. Kozyrev said that the 
referendum results "should give us confidence to act in 
the international arena," a statement which presaged a 
return to his previous enthusiasm toward using the 
sanctions instrument against rump Yugoslavia.50
Kozyrev expressed regret at the intrusion of 
domestic politics into Russian foreign policy, saying 
he was "sick at heart" at Russia's abstention. 
"Although in principle it was the right decision [to 
abstain], in the future Russia must side with the world 
community, not with the nationalists who are escalating 
the war in former Yugoslavia."51 Kozyrev was admittedly 
pushed toward this judgment not only by internal 
Russian politics. Serb attacks on Bosnian targets had 
increased substantially around this time and had made 
Russia's previous calls for easing sanctions look 
foolish.
The Role of the Legislature
As the memorandum published in Den' showed, the 
chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as 
well as the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Relations, had been listed as 
addressees, thus indicating that the Supreme Soviet had 
been consulted, formally at least. Kozyrev himself 
pointed this out -(also thereby effectively
50Interview with Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 29 April 1993, p. 1. 
Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 29 April 1993,
transmitted via Internet.
51Interfax, 25 April 1993.
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authenticating the cable) and complained that if the 
Supreme Soviet had not developed a mechanism for 
dealing rapidly with urgent foreign policy questions, 
it was not the fault of the Foreign Ministry.52 It might 
have been Kozyrev's cavalier attitude toward deputies, 
whose support he only infrequently attempted to enlist, 
which caused them to make the sanctions question a 
Leitmotiv for legislation.
The original UNSC sanctions resolution caused the 
Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee to hold 
hearings on the policymaking process leading up to 
Russia's vote in the UN Security Council. But deputies' 
complaints, which included an attempt to impose 
"personal responsibility" on Andrei Kozyrev for 
"inflicting serious damage to Russia's national 
interests, " were designed more with a view to 
sharpening the conflict with the Foreign Ministry than 
with finding a better working relationship on future 
foreign policy questions.53
In an attempt to undo Russia's original sanctions 
vote (Resolution 757), conservative members of 
parliament demanded on 26 June 1992 that.Russia suspend 
the sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro. In addition, 
the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Economic Relations accused the Foreign Ministry of 
excessive haste in taking the decision and demanded 
that in the future the committee be consulted on 
matters of Russian national interest. The feeling of 
that committee was that the Russian Foreign Ministry
52Kozyrev remarks in interview on "How Will We Live" program, 
Russian Television, 4 July 1992, Translated in FBIS Daily Report 
Central Eurasia, 4 August 1992, transmitted electronically.
53"From the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet," Pravda, 24 
February 1993, p. 1. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central 
Eurasia, 24 February 1993, transmitted electronically.
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had been unduly influenced by pressure from the United 
States.54
It appears that the Supreme Soviet's reaction 
derived in large part from the contents of the 
Vorontsov cable. It was there that deputies learned of 
the extent to which Russia's decision was indeed 
influenced by its relations with the West. In addition, 
deputies learned from the cable that the Foreign 
Ministry had assumed the right to take action unless 
instructed otherwise, as the "Kozyrev note" on the 
cable made clear. Given the unpopularity of the 
youthful Kozyrev, deputies must have been angered to 
discover the breadth of his decisionmaking powers.
Despite the Supreme Soviet's failure to achieve a 
change in policy, it continued to pen resolutions 
demanding, in one form or another, that UN sanctions be 
lifted. These resolutions were typically passed by 
large majorities, indicating that these views were not 
held by a mere fringe group of deputies.55 In fact, the 
opposite was the case. Deputies who opposed the 
resolutions and spoke out about the illogic of them 
were few. Evgenii Kozhokin, a member of the pro-Yeltsin 
camp of the Supreme Soviet, remarked: "It is simply
stupid to try to dictate decisions to the UN Security 
Council."56 But his colleagues probably felt that they 
had no other recourse, owing to their perception that 
they had been excluded from any meaningful role in the 
policymaking process.
54"The Russian Parliament Explained to Kozyrev Why It was Not 
Appropriate to Rush with the Sanctions Against Serbia," Izvestiya, 
29 June 1992.
55The resolution of December 1992, for example, was passed by
a vote of 151 for, 5 against, and 13 abstaining. ITAR-TASS, 17
December 1992.
56Associated Press, 18 February 1993.
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The Foreign Ministry, for its part, did make some 
effort to undo the damage caused by its dismissive 
attitude toward the Supreme Soviet. As was discussed in 
chapter four, Kozyrev invited Evgenii Ambartsumov, head 
of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, 
to join the Russian delegation to the Bosnia conference 
held in London in August 1992.
Ambartsumov, who had visited the former Yugoslavia 
along with other members of the Supreme Soviet, was at 
first admittedly skeptical of the invitation:
At the beginning, I reacted to this 
proposal with hesitation. It was 
Kozyrev's initiative, supported by
Yeltsin, I wavered, because...I did 
not want to become a hostage to
[Kozyrev's] approaches.57
But after the conference, Ambartsumov praised the work 
of Russia's diplomats and claimed that Russian policy 
toward the former Yugoslavia had become "more 
adequate."58 Kozyrev's overture toward Ambartsumov
indicated that at some level, there was the kind of 
pushing and pulling between the legislature and the 
Foreign Ministry that had an impact on policy.
Ambartsumov remained a critic of the policymaking 
process, apparently an indication of his desire to 
continue having influence. He called for more control 
over the executive branch's foreign policy decisions, 
claiming, for example, that the economic impact of 
Russia's participation in the sanctions had not been 
thoroughly examined there.59
51Trud, 3 September 1992, p. 3.
56 Ibid.
59Rossiya, No. 47 (18-24 November) 1992, p. 5.
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The role of the legislature in determining 
Russia's stance on the sanctions issue seems to have 
been mixed. At terms of rhetoric exchanged during the 
problem recognition stage and the politics stage of the 
policymaking process, the legislature did have an 
impact. But at the level of practical policymaking, its 
influence seems to have been negligible. Some of the 
legislature's resolutions on the sanctions required no 
particular response from the government, and others 
that did were simply thrown out by a presidential veto. 
Deputies' visits to the former Yugoslavia and promises 
to do all in their power to have the sanctions lifted 
were decorative gestures with no immediate impact on 
Russian policy.
While it is true that deputies of the Supreme 
Soviet and then the State Duma were effective in 
keeping the sanctions issue on the agenda and in the 
headlines -- that is, in the problem recognition stage 
and politics stage -- it is difficult to know how much 
their concentration on the issue influenced the way the 
Russian public viewed the international handling of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the one hand, 
their resolutions might have been persuasive to some 
Russians. On the other hand, deputies' harangues may 
have been irritating enough to be dissuasive to the 
public. As for the impact of public opinion on the 
deputies' behavior, it appears to have been modest. As 
was discussed above, Russian deputies typically viewed 
themselves as trustees unbound by public opinion, and 
they met with their constituents infrequently.
The Role of Other Actors
Perhaps the most difficult area to gauge in 
Russian policymaking toward the sanctions issue between 
1992 and 1995 is the compliance issue. No matter what
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the official Russian policy toward the sanctions was, 
if Russian agencies were involved in breaking the 
sanctions either directly or indirectly, such behavior 
must be factored into the discussion of Russian 
policymaking on the sanctions issue.
The first claims that Russia was breaking the 
sanctions came within months of the first UN Security 
Council vote. In August 1992, the Russian MFA spokesman 
responded to news reports to this effect saying that 
while he had no information that Russia was violating 
the sanctions, "it is a difficult and complicated 
matter" and "it is not easy to control the situation."60 
Such a statement raised more questions than it answered 
about Russia's compliance with the sanctions. Reports 
of Russian violations surfaced regularly in the Russian 
and Western media either in the form of allegations or 
denials.61 One report said that "among Western 
diplomats, it is considered a certainty that Russia is 
providing material support to the Serbs, including 
military goods."62
The behavior of Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defense 
Minister, would coincide with the theory that the 
Defense Ministry was a willing participant in sanctions 
violations, although there is no incontrovertible 
evidence to this effect. Grachev made relatively few 
statements about the sanctions, but those that he did 
make were often supportive.63 He made these statements 
even in the context of rejecting the use of NATO
60AFP, 11 August 1992.
61Daniel Schneider, "Russia Denies Report of Arms Sales to 
Serbs," Christian Science Monitor, 2 March 1993, p. 6; Associated 
Press, 16 March 1993.
62"Back to the Future," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 16 August 1995.
63Associated Press, 10 May 1993.
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military force to stop Serb aggression, a situation in 
which one would not expect the expression of support 
for a policy unfavorable to Serbia. Grachev headed a 
Russian delegation of high-level Defense Ministry 
officials to meet with Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic in July 1994, thus indicating possible 
discussion of arms transactions.64 Moreover, Russian- 
Serbian military cooperation and consultation had 
continued throughout the war, suggesting that if any 
arms transactions were made, there were ample 
opportunities for servicing and training for any 
equipment sold.65
The behavior of the Russian military forces 
stationed as part of the international peacekeeping 
contingent suggested that some portion of the officer 
corps there was not neutral and was engaged in 
questionable activities. The United Nations dismissed 
Russian Major-General Alexander Perelyakin in April 
1995 for poor leadership and connivance with the Serb 
side. He was allegedly selling UN kerosene supplies to 
the Serbs, in addition to granting passage to a 
shipment of artillery and tank-destroying vehicles from 
Serbia into Serb-occupied Croatia.66 This marked the 
first instance of a senior officer in the peacekeeping 
force being removed from his post, an indication of the 
seriousness of the alleged offense.67
The Russian Defense Ministry resisted attempts on 
the part of the UN to quietly remove Perelyakin,
64Tanjug, 26 July 1994.
65Tanjug, 9 February 1996.
66"UN Ousts Russian From Croatia Forces," International 
Herald Tribune, 12 April 1995.
67"Sacked Russian General Refuses to Go," The European, 14 
April 1995.
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reportedly a close friend of Defense Minister Pavel 
Grachev. Furthermore, during the UN inquiry, Grachev 
promoted Perelyakin to the rank of Major-General, 
apparently in order to discourage the UN from pursuing 
his ouster.68 After initially refusing to leave his 
command, Perelyakin ultimately did so, but the incident 
strongly suggested that Russian peacekeepers were using 
their positions for personal profit by helping the Serb 
side.69
If this was the case, it would not have been the 
first incident of military free-lancing nor probably 
the first time that the uniform and position of a 
member of the Russian military were used to earn a 
profit. Whether there was an element of political 
support for the Serbs on the part of the Russian 
military remains unknown.
If the anecdotal evidence that Russia was in some 
way or another violating the sanctions against Serbia 
is accurate, this raises many questions, most 
importantly, whether the violations occurred with the 
knowledge of or under the direction of officials in 
Moscow. Such questions cannot be answered in the 
present study, owing to the absence of reliable, 
public-domain information on the matter. Given its 
presence in the international peacekeeping contingent, 
however, the potential for the Russian military 
establishment to aid in the violation of UN sanctions 
was great.
68"Diplomats: Russia Blocked Ouster," Moscow Times, 14 April
1995.
690ne of Perelyakin's predecessors remained in the region 
after his tour of duty was up to run a trading company with a 
Serbian military leader. "UN Ousts Russian From Croatia Forces," 
International Herald Tribune, 12 April 1995.
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Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition 
Models
Thus far, this study has found the bureaucratic 
politics model to be of diminished utility in 
understanding independent Russia's foreign policy 
choices and has proposed the transition model as an 
alternative to analyzing Russian foreign policy. The 
institutional chaos which began in the Gorbachev era 
and continued into Russia's second republic meant that 
key elements described by the model -- for example, 
standard operating procedures, action channels, and 
rules of conduct -- were not key features of Russia's 
foreign policy formulation.
Russia's handling of the sanctions question 
between 1992 and 1995 both supports and detracts from 
this overall conclusion. The Foreign Ministry's 
attempts to involve the legislature in Russia's 
sanctions policy were infrequent and inconsistent 
(albeit, understandably so, given the behavior of 
deputies) . The activities of the legislature, while 
frequent and vocal, did have an effect on Russian 
rhetoric, but did not play an influential role in the 
policy engineering stage of Russia's sanctions policy 
-- for example, the determination of its vote in the 
UNSC or its decision to resume trade with rump 
Yugoslavia. In other words, deputies' activities were 
frequently ignored by the executive branch when it was 
time to take a position directly affecting Russia's 
support or compliance with sanctions.
At the same time, deputies' sensitivities were 
accommodated at the level of rhetoric, that is, during 
the problem recognition and politics phases. Examples 
of this can be found in the April 1993 abstention and 
in Kozyrev's remarks about the feeling of kinship in
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Russia toward Serbia. Deputies' views are not to be 
discounted because, as their vocal protests 
demonstrated, they can conceivably influence public 
perception and debate. Yet, as the discussion in the 
previous chapters indicates, there is no definitive 
proof that deputies either represented or influenced 
public opinion.
The transition model discusses the contest between 
the executive and legislation over authority. This case 
study suggests that this conflict can have an impact on 
the rhetoric surrounding issues (the problem 
recognition stage and the politics stage) while not 
immediately affecting the policy engineering stage.
The behavior of the Foreign Ministry and its 
handling of the Vorontsov cable and the "Kozyrev note" 
certainly might be called Byzantine, but they were not 
necessarily in keeping with what the bureaucratic 
politics model stressed in terms of policy output. The 
Vorontsov cable and the "Kozyrev note" seemed designed 
to discourage participation of a wide spectrum of 
government elements, while the large list of addressees 
pretended to do just the contrary. But the exclusion of 
many participants meant that few people and 
institutions controlled decisions at the policy 
engineering stage. Therefore policy engineering did not 
so much represent a compromise based on competing views 
within the government, but, once again, the winner- 
take-all outcome characteristic of the transition 
model. The process was not the amalgam of competing 
views predicted by Allison, but the race to control 
policy engineering (the final stage of policymaking), 
irrespective of the views of other institutions and 
players.
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The anecdotal evidence of sanctions violations by 
Russian military officers further supports this study's 
finding thus far that the transition model offers more 
explanatory power than the bureaucratic politics model 
through the first years of Russia's second republic. If 
the Russian military was indeed taking actions in 
direct violation to Russia's official policy (with or 
without the knowledge of Moscow), this would indicate 
the existence of two Russian policy positions: one
supporting sanctions, the other violating them. Such a 
situation is not in keeping with Allison's model 
because it means that two different Russian foreign 
policy positions were active on the international 
state; Allison's model focused on the intragovernmental 
compromise which went into creating one foreign policy 
position -- the policy resultant. Such a situation also 
points to the problem of praetorianism discussed in the 
transition model -- that of a military which does not 
operate within the clear limit of guaranteeing the 
country's security against external threats and 
instead, becomes an instrument of and player in the 
domestic political process.
The problem of factoring in the unaccountable 
presidential branch of government described in the 
previous chapter may be affirmed in this case study. 
Yeltsin's letter to Clinton pressing for a delay in the 
sanctions tightening vote may have originated with the 
presidential apparatus, where Yeltsin's aides bridged 
the domestic politics and foreign policy divide. If 
this interpretation is correct, the fact that Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev regretted Russia's abstention offers 
supporting evidence that the Foreign Ministry was not 
fully behind this decision, if at all. Whereas the 
Foreign Ministry did manage to control the handling of
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the first sanctions vote, it appears to have been 
unable to prevail on the second one.
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Case Study Tw o :
The CFE Treaty's Flank Limits
There appears to have been broad agreement among 
the Russian elite that the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty required some sort of modification. 
But the way in which that modification was to be 
achieved was the point of competition among various 
segments of the Russian policymaking community.
The subject of this chapter has been selected, as 
was noted in chapter one, because of the level of 
agreement between Russian policymakers (on the policy 
goal, not the way to achieve that goal) . By selecting 
an issue in which basic agreement on the policy goal 
was present, the aim is to minimize problems associated 
with looking only at issues in which clashes of 
worldview are part of the policymaking process.
It should be noted that the selection of a topic 
which is less tendentious in Russia does not invalidate 
the test of the bureaucratic politics model. There was 
still enough disagreement over how to achieve the 
policy goal among Russian policymakers to accommodate 
the bureaucratic politics model's presumption of 
conflict in the policymaking process.
Background
In May 1992, Russia and the other former Soviet 
republics whose military holdings were affected by the 
CFE Treaty gathered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan to finalize 
the subdivision of the Soviet Union's entitlement under
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the treaty. This was already the second subdivision of 
treaty, an agreement which had originally been signed 
in November 1990. As written, the treaty effectively 
divided the reductions in specific categories of 
conventional armaments among NATO forces on one side, 
and those of the Warsaw Pact on the other.1 The
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact meant that the total
levels permitted for that side had to be divided up.
The same idea guided the subdivision of Soviet
forces after the USSR's demise. The sharing out of the 
Soviet quotas in the CFE Treaty was calculated 
according to a formula including the following
elements: the overall USSR quota, the area of the
territory of the new state, the size of its population, 
and the length of its land frontiers.2
The controversy over the CFE Treaty which later 
erupted concerned the limitations on equipment in so- 
called flank areas. At the time of the CFE's original 
drafting, the flanks referred to areas within Warsaw 
Pact and NATO territory which could be used to stage 
operations and concentrate equipment for quick resupply 
in the event of a major conflict in Central Europe. As 
one expert noted, the flank limits had been included in 
the CFE Treaty "largely owing to concern on the part of 
Norway and Turkey that the Soviet Union might divert 
forces squeezed out of Central Europe to their 
vicinities."3
1Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), 
published in U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 2, 
Supplement No. 4, September 1991.
2Evgeni Shaposhnikov, "The Armed Forces: To a New Quality," 
in Teresa Peltson Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds. Russian 
Security After the Cold War, (Washington: Brassey's): p. 202.
3Douglas L. Clarke, "The Russian Military and the CFE 
Treaty," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 42 (October 1993).
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The concern about Soviet pressure on the flanks 
had been a focal point of NATO discussions in the mid- 
and late 1980s4, and the inclusion of the flank limits 
in the treaty represented an attempt on NATO's part to 
calm concerns of Norway and east Mediterranean members 
that their security would not suffer for the sake of 
increasing the security of countries like Germany and 
the Benelux, the presumed primary targets of a Soviet 
attack in the event of a conventional European war.
When Russia raised the issue of changing the 
treaty in 1993, precisely these concerns prompted NATO 
members to react negatively. NATO members were thus
opposed to lifting the particular restrictions that
Russia inherited as the overall treaty limits were 
reapportioned, namely the flank limit on Russia's 
Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts.5
At the time of the treaty's negotiation, the
Warsaw Pact negotiators resisted NATO attempts to limit 
equipment on the flanks and sought either to increase 
the amount of treaty-limited equipment in these parts 
or to limit the geographical areas included in these
flank zones. The Warsaw Pact's resistance was partially 
successful, and NATO backed down from some of its 
demands several weeks before the treaty was signed. As
4See, for example, Bo Huldt, "The Strategic North," The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 8, Number 3 (Summer 1985): pp. 99-109 
as well as Jed C. Snyder, "Strategic Bias and Southern Flank 
Security," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 8, Number 3 (Summer 
1985): pp. 123-142.
5The fact that there was a single flank limit for these two 
seemingly unrelated geographical areas derives from the structure 
of the CFE treaty as originally written. It put one collective 
limit on the Northern and Southern Flank areas of Europe which 
included Norway, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria as 
well as all of the following Soviet Military Districts: Odessa, 
Transcaucasus, Leningrad and North Caucasus. Only the latter two 
were located in Russia.
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a result of the compromise reached, parts of the 
Ukrainian republic were excluded from the flank zone 
and special allowances for storage of treaty-limited 
equipment were made for the Leningrad and Odessa 
Military Districts.6 Ultimately, however, these 
concessions brought little benefit to Russia after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.
As Russians were later to argue, with particular 
emphasis on the flank limits, the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union meant that the bloc- 
to-bloc structure of the treaty rendered it 
incompatible with the new situation in Europe and in 
the war-torn Trans-Caucasus in particular. Western 
policymakers frequently agreed that the bloc-to-bloc 
structure was out-dated.7 But, as they were quick to 
point out, tampering with the basic structure of the 
treaty would threaten its existence, and achieving such 
ambitious reductions might not again be possible. 
Furthermore, Western policymakers were, unlike Russia, 
still negotiating as a bloc, and important members of 
that bloc (Norway and Turkey) were applying pressure 
against a renegotiation of the flank limits.8
At the time of the reallocation of Soviet CFE 
entitlements, Russian officials did not show signs of
6Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest 
Levels. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company) , p. 269 and Clarke, 
pp. cit. "The Russian Military and the CFE Treaty," p. 40.
7Suzanne Crow, "Major European Security Questions for 1995-
1996." A report on the 11-12 September 1995 conference held by the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the Institute for National 
Security Studies at the Atlantik Brucke, Bonn; and Sherman 
Garnett, Testimony Before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
April 29, 1997, transcribed in U.S. Information Agency Wireless
File, May 2, 1997, pp. 36-39.
8Suzanne Crow, "Major European Security Questions for 1995- 
1996," op. cit.
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being troubled by the flank limits. Moscow was 
undoubtedly worried that too much of the USSR1 s 
military equipment would end up in neighboring former 
Soviet republics which had suddenly become independent 
states, with soon-to-be independent military forces, 
although this was not definite at the time. But 
ultimately, the Russian military establishment came to 
realize that it could not use one formula for dividing 
up assets and another for dividing up treaty 
restrictions. Thus in Tashkent, Russia, Ukraine, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova -- all of the 
countries affected in whole or part by the flank limits 
-- adopted the limits in Table 1 (below) and codified 
them in the agreement to redistribute the CFE limits.9
9Reuter, 9 July 1992.
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Table 1: Flank Limits in Former USSR10
Tanks
Armored
Combat
Vehicles
Artillery
Russia (North Caucasus 
and Leningrad MDs)
700 580 1280
Armenia
220 220 390
Azerbaijan
220 220 285
Georgia
220 220 285
Moldova
210 210 250
Ukraine
(Odessa Military MD)
280 350 390
The ease of subdividing the treaty's limits was 
surprising not only in light of Russia's later actions 
but also in light of earlier responses to the treaty 
registered by the Soviet and then the Russian military. 
During its negotiation, Soviet military officials had 
been decisively opposed to the agreement and achieved 
concessions from NATO in exchange for agreeing to flank 
limits. Despite these concessions, the Soviet military 
establishment still considered the Treaty a bad deal 
for Moscow. In 1990, USSR Defense Minister Dmitrii 
Yazov greeted the completion of negotiations for the
10Source for Table 1: Source: Douglas L. Clarke, "The Russian 
Military and the CFE Treaty," op. cit., p. 39.
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treaty with the ominous pronouncement: "We have lost
World War Three without a shot being fired."11
At the end of 1990, one month after the CFE Treaty 
was signed, Soviet military leaders started to show 
reluctance to implement some of the treaty's 
provisions. They succeeded in convincing co-signatories 
to exempt some equipment from CFE limits by assigning 
it either to coastal defense forces or to naval 
infantry units, neither of which were covered by the 
treaty.
In addition, the Soviet Union violated the treaty 
by moving tanks out of the CFE Treaty's geographical 
range to the east of the Ural mountains instead of 
destroying them, as the treaty required. This abuse of 
the treaty on the part of the military was one of the 
prominent reasons for Shevardnadze's resignation.
NATO officials were disturbed in the fall of 1992 
when they discovered that Russian Federation military 
officials continued to restrict access of CFE Treaty 
inspectors, in violation of the treaty. High-level 
members of the Atlantic alliance believed Russia's 
behavior showed an "intent to codify the restrictive 
practice" started by Soviet military officials.12 While 
the problem was ultimately solved, the persistence of 
Soviet and Russian attempts to avoid full 
implementation of the treaty suggested strongly that 
from Soviet times onward, it was disliked by the 
military establishment.
11As reported by former chief Soviet CFE negotiator Oleg 
Grinevsky in Newsweek, 22 November 1993.
12Column by Evans and Novak, The Washington Post, 11
September 1992.
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In spite of these difficulties, the subdivisions 
of the CFE Treaty were accomplished. Just over one 
month after this agreement in Tashkent in July 1992, 
the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the treaty by an 
overwhelming majority.13 The lack of controversy 
surrounding the ratification is striking considering 
Russia's subsequent campaign to change the treaty. It 
can, perhaps, be explained by the pressure from other 
CFE signatories to conclude ratification expeditiously. 
Even these signatories, however, viewed the timetable 
as a challenge.14
The speediness of ratification, as well as the 
relative ease of agreement in Tashkent, can be 
explained by the political environment at the time. In 
the spring of 1992, the main order of business in 
Russia was coping with the divorce from the other 
former Soviet republics. The CFE allocations were, from 
that point of view, one of a number of assets to be 
divided. Furthermore, during these first days following 
the achievement of Russian statehood, there were far 
fewer voices than were later to be heard lamenting the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and advocating a 
reintegration of its former republics.
From a more practical standpoint, the ease of 
ratification can be explained by the prevailing 
attitude in the Russian parliament at the time. As one 
observer has noted:
...The Committee on Foreign Affairs (of 
the Russian Federation parliament) was 
one of the most-reform oriented.
. . . [A] t least initially, international
13ITAR-TASS, 8 July 1992.
14"Successor States Sign CFE Treaty: Already in Force in
July?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt-am-Main), 6 June 
1992.
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relations had not been an important 
battle-field in the war between Russian 
Federation reformers and communist 
hardliners. The latter preferred to 
concentrate on parliamentary committees 
dealing with economic matters, 
institutional reforms, etc.15
The members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
could have played a significant role in criticizing 
the agreement had they been opposed to it, but 
there was no evidence of significant opposition.
Nor was it the case that the Russian parliament as 
a whole had not developed a critical voice on matters 
of delivering advice and consent on international 
documents. Parliamentary opposition to agreement with 
the United States to pursue deep cuts in nuclear 
weapons in a second START treaty was in full swing in 
June 1992, even before the treaty was signed.16
No such criticism was heard from the Russian 
parliament about the CFE treaty. Far from being 
critical, parliament seemed intent on ratifying the 
agreement according to the schedule set by the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) , namely before the 9 July 1992 CSCE17 summit in 
Helsinki to commemorate the sealing of new security 
arrangements.
15M. Bezrukov, "Forging the Russian Federation Foreign 
Policy," Current Politics and Economics of Russia. Vol. 3 Nos. 1- 
2. p . 46 .
16See, for example, "Russian Conservatives Critical of 
Yeltsin's Concessions," The Washington Post, 19 June 1992; and 
Alexander MacLeod, "As US, Russia Cut Back Nuclear Weapons, 
Britain Forges Ahead with Arms Programs," Christian Science 
Monitor, 19 June 1992.
17The CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in December 1994.
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Following Russia's failure in November 1995 to
come into compliance with the flank limits of the
treaty, discussions among the signatories yielded 
tentative agreement to realign the map that is
associated with -the_.treaty in-order to assist Russia 
with complying with the treaty. Russia would also be
granted (with the consent of other signatories)
additional time to reduce its equipment in the
realigned flank area.18 Discussions did not move beyond 
this point by the end of Yeltsin's first term (the 
concluding point for this study).19
The Role of the M ilitary FHtablishment
By early 1993, this period characterized by a
generally sanguine attitude toward the CFE Treaty had 
been displaced by indications that the military elite 
was reassessing the country's strategic security 
requirements, especially to the south. In an interview 
with Russian Television, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev 
described Georgia's Black Sea Coast as an area of 
"strategic importance" for Russia:
Just imagine the Black Sea coast of the 
Caucasus and the section where our 
troops are stationed. ...I will only 
say that this is a strategically
important area for the Russian Army. We 
have certain strategic interests there 
and must take every measure to ensure
18CFE Treaty Issues Fact Sheet, United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, June 1996. Transmitted via Internet.
19CFE Treaty Fact Sheet on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1996. 
Transmitted via Internet.
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that our troops remain there, otherwise 
we will lose the Black Sea.20
The next day Izvestiya published an interview with 
Grachev in which he stressed the same point:
We are strengthening our southern 
borders, particularly the North 
Caucasus [area]. If a local conflict 
is a possibility, it will flare up in 
the south.21
As time would tell, Grachev's comments were meant to 
broach the subject of changing the flank limits. By 
stressing the strategic importance and vulnerability of 
the area —  one which would become the locus of armed 
conflict between Russia and Chechnya by December 1994 - 
- Grachev was establishing the need and justification 
for modifying the treaty.
The military establishment's re-thinking of the 
implications of the CFE Treaty's flank limits appears 
to have been occasioned by the broad discussions about 
Russian security that went into writing Russia's new 
defense doctrine. NATO enlargement was being considered 
in NATO capitals, and Chechen separatism and 
interethnic conflict were erupting at or near Russia's 
southern border. In general, the insecurity that came 
with the breakup of the Soviet Union went to the heart 
of the Russian military's concerns.
It was during this time, in early 1993, that the 
leadership of Russia's armed forces was determining the
20Russian Television, 22 February 1993, as transcribed by 
RFE/RL media monitoring unit.
21"Pavel Grachev: Things Are Hard for the Army Today, Just as 
They Are for the Whole People," Izvestiya, 23 February 1993, p. 1. 
Translated in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 
Daily Report Central Eurasia, 23 February 1993, transmitted 
electronically.
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country's new defense requirements and assets and 
apparently coming to some disturbing conclusions. As 
Pavel Baev, an analyst from the Russian Academy of 
Sciences Institute of Europe, described it:
In early 1993, the Russian General 
Staff discovered a very unpleasant 
problem, namely a deficit of combat- 
ready units... At the strategic level, 
the first requirement was the 
concentration of effort in certain 
regions. Accordingly, Russian military 
leaders decided that the withdrawal 
first from Lithuania and then from 
Latvia and Estonia was unavoidable and 
should be completed as soon as
possible. The strategic retreat from 
Central Asia was perhaps also decided, 
though with some compromises. The key 
strategic direction for the short term 
became Georgia and the North 
Caucasus...22
With a dearth of units in fighting condition, the 
military leadership reckoned, Russia would have to
narrow its focus and concentrate only on those areas 
which were deemed most critical. The south was
considered Russia's most vulnerable geographic region, 
and the CFE flank limits chafed.
That these were very plainly rational actor 
considerations does not automatically suggest that the 
rational actor model might represent a good alternative 
to the bureaucratic politics model in this instance. As 
becomes clear in the discussion below, the way that 
military leaders handled the issue —  taking advantage 
of the opportunities presented by Russia's deficit in
democratic development —  was more easily explained by 
the transition model.
22Pavel K. Baev, "Russian Military Thinking and the 'Near 
Abroad,'" Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1994, p. 532.
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Given that the military leaders viewed Russia's 
security needs from a global perspective, linking the 
Baltic troop withdrawals with future deployments 
elsewhere, they probably also calculated that the time 
to start pushing for a change in the CFE flank limits 
was in 1993, while Russian troops were still stationed 
in the Baltic states.23 Until their withdrawal, Moscow 
could use its presence there as leverage on states in 
the West concerned that the withdrawal be completed.
Further evidence of the concerns of the Russian 
military establishment was found in its activities in 
Georgia. The Russian military was putting pressure on 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to grant basing 
rights for Russian troops.24 As discussed in chapters 
four and five, the Abkhaz conflict pitted Georgian 
government forces against Abkhaz separatists receiving 
tacit and sporadic military support from Russia. For 
example, in the early fall of 1993, the Abkhaz launched 
an offensive to recapture areas under the control of 
the Georgian military, an attack which Shevardnadze 
accused Russia of instigating, organizing, and 
coordinating.25 His accusation was confirmed by a former 
Russian military intelligence commander, who offered
23For a discussion of Russian-Baltic security issues, see 
Elaine M. Holoboff, "National Security in the Baltic States: 
Rolling Back the Bridgehead," in Bruce Parrott, ed. State Building 
and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. 
(London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 111-133.
24For analysis of the role of Russia in Georgia's struggle 
with Abkhazia, see Dmitri Trenin, "Russian Peacemaking in 
Georgia," in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer and Andrei 
Zagorski, eds. Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia.
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995): pp. 129-142.
25Evgenii Kozhokin, "Georgia-Abkhazia," in U.S. and Russian 
Policymaking and the Use of Force, (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1996), p. 64. Transmitted via Internet.
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detailed data about equipment transferred to Abkhaz 
units by Russian forces.26
Russia's assistance to the Abkhaz rebels was 
designed, among other things, to prevent the 
involvement of other outside powers. It was around this 
time that press reports circulated in the United States 
about a document which discussed potential peacekeeping 
initiatives in the former Soviet Union. A confidential 
White House policy paper, Presidential Decision 
Directive 13 (PDD-13), indicated that the United States 
sought to play an active role in conflict mediation in 
the former Soviet Union and to increase the capacity of 
the United Nations to do the same, according to press 
reports.27 The Russian Foreign Ministry rushed to deny 
the accuracy of the PDD-13 leaks in the Western and 
Russian press, assuring that the US would be permitted 
to play no such role. Despite the MFA's denials, and 
Washington's attempts to control the damage, fears of 
US involvement in the region bolstered the arguments of 
those in Russia who pointed to the need for Moscow to 
be vigilant of the southern threat -- before some 
outside power would step in to fill the vacuum.
As Russia's position on the CFE Treaty flank 
limits gelled, the Russian military's strategy in 
dealing with foreign partners vis-a-vis the CFE 
question also hardened. The Defense Ministry did not 
stop short of issuing veiled ultimatums and threats. 
For example, Defense Minister Grachev linked the issue 
with the controversial issue of NATO enlargement, 
warning in September 1994 that were NATO to take on new
26Cited in Ibid, footnote 2.
27See, for example, "Administration Advisors Agree to Support 
Expansion of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations," The Washington Post, 
5 August 1993.
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members, this would "jeopardize our fulfillment of the 
CFE Treaty, especially its flank restrictions."28 This 
statement not only linked CFE and enlargement, it also 
called into question whether Russia would implement 
other aspects of the conventional forces treaty. Non- 
compliance with the flank limits was thus just one 
possible type of retaliation to an enlarged NATO.
In May 1995, the Russian military turned threats 
into practical measures as was seen when the chief of 
the Russian ground forces, General Vladimir Semenov, 
announced that Russia would establish a new 58th Army 
in the Caucasus as of 1 June, thus making a mockery of 
diplomats1 statements that Russia sought to preserve 
the treaty, albeit in an amended form. The new 58th 
Army meant that Russia, far from attempting to come to 
some sort of compromise and understanding with the West 
on the flank issue, was already taking steps that would 
mean never meeting the flank limits.
Thfi Rol of t~_he> Prpsidfinh
Starting in mid-September 1993, Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin became actively involved in the CFE flank 
issue. He wrote a letter to the leaders of the United 
States, Norway, Britain, France, Denmark, and Turkey 
requesting their understanding of Russia's position on 
the CFE Treaty. (At about the same time, he wrote a 
second letter to Western leaders asking for a 
rethinking of NATO enlargement.)
In the letter, Yeltsin called for the lifting of 
the flank limits on the grounds that Russia had assumed
28"Yeltsin Visit to U.S. September 1994, Defense Minister 
Grachev Assesses U.S. Talks," Komsomolskaya pravda, 28 September 
1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 28 
September 1994, transmitted via Internet.
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more than half of these limits and this disturbed the 
balance of the treaty. He also warned that a refusal to 
satisfy Russia's request to change the flank limits 
would threaten the implementation of the treaty.29 His 
tough approach showed that he was willing to push the 
issue to the fullest, not simply proposing a change but 
also threatening consequences if Russia's demands were 
not met.
The Yeltsin letter was a significant benchmark in 
the Russian decision to push for a change of the flank 
limitations for three reasons. First and most 
obviously, it indicated that the Russian desire to 
change the treaty went to the highest levels of the 
government and was not merely an example of foreign 
policy free-lancing on the part of the military.
Second, it showed that Yeltsin considered the issue 
important enough to be pursued by the president
himself, not merely by his ministers. Third, it
indicated that the Russian president was prepared to 
take full responsibility for the position, one which 
was sure to continue putting stress on Russia's
relationship with the dozens of co-signatories, some of 
whom were well on their way to completing their 
implementation of the weapons destruction required by 
the treaty.
Significantly, the timing of Yeltsin's initiative 
suggested that his sudden public interest in the CFE 
issue emerged as a result of his domestic political 
concerns. Yeltsin's popularity had plummeted in the 
summer due to his currency reform (the decision in July 
1993 to replace the old-type banknotes with new ones
29Wolf J. Bell, "Yeltsin Letter Throws European Arms 
Agreement Into Question," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 1 October 1993; 
and AFP, 15 October 1993.
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over a period of two weeks.) This measure had been 
poorly implemented and caused cash shortages, creating 
havoc in Russia and among Russian vacationers in other 
CIS countries. What is more, it recalled the even more 
unpopular currency reform undertaken under Gorbachev).30 
Yeltsin's economic reform policies, especially the 
economic shock therapy, had left the population sour 
and sick of reform.
The overriding political event in Russia in the 
fall of 1993 was Yeltsin's struggle with the Congress 
of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet. This struggle 
had its origins in the faulty division of power left by 
the much-amended Soviet-era constitution which was 
still in use by Russia, as discussed in chapters four 
and five.
The public's patience was being strained by the 
continuing struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament. 
Yeltsin claimed in his memoirs that he was concerned at 
the time that a continuation of the standoff would mean 
the population's loss of faith in the democratic 
system. Yeltsin and his advisers had tried in various 
ways to bring the recalcitrant legislature around in 
1993, but with no success. In April, Yeltsin claimed 
victory in his referendum, giving him a claim to the 
popular mandate he needed to justify taking severe 
action against the legislature.
The option of merely dissolving the parliament and 
voting in a new constitution and legislature was 
something that Yeltsin considered as early as March 
1993. As the Russian president states in his book, The 
Struggle For Russia, it was during German Chancellor
30Interfax, 24 July 1993.
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Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow in early March 1993, that 
Yeltsin raised the issue. Yeltsin asked the German 
leader about "a matter of fundamental importance for 
me: if I were to restrict the activity of the
parliament, how would the West react?" Kohl reportedly 
responded that he would support Yeltsin. He also 
expressed confidence that leaders of the United States, 
Japan, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy would 
sympathize with "harsh but necessary measures for the 
stabilization of Russia" at the upcoming meeting of the 
G-7.31
Several months later, during his visit to Poland 
in Yeltsin also considered the idea of dissolving the 
Congress attractive when Lech Walesa proposed it:
[Walesa] joked: 'Why don't you disband
your Supreme Soviet and elect a new one 
around them? Let those old deputies sit 
there and go on meeting and playing 
parliament. Everyone will very soon 
forget them.' I [Yeltsin] smiled at 
this appealing idea.32
Thus with these international assurances, Yeltsin 
decided to go forward with the dissolution of the 
Russian parliament. But to do this, he needed to make 
sure that the Russian military was on his side.
Yeltsin was in need of the military's support to 
retain his grip on power, and he was thus under 
pressure to give the military what it wanted. The time 
at which he took up the CFE issue suggests that his
31Boris Yeltsin The Struggle for Russia, Boris Yeltsin, The 
Struggle for Russia. Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. (New 
York: Times Books Random House, 1994, 1995), p. 135. Interfax of 1 
March 1993 also reported that the struggle between Yeltsin and the 
parliament was an item on the agenda for Kohl's brief visit.
32Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 139.
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need to cultivate the military determined his position, 
rather than his concern about the treaty.
Yeltsin appears to have exchanged his support of 
the military's wishes on the flank issue for assurances 
of their support during his dissolution of the 
parliament. This was evident in Yeltsin's letters 
regarding the CFE Treaty, which were dispatched in mid- 
September, before his dissolution of parliament. It was 
also evident in his attempt to gain favor among the 
lower ranks of the military in the weeks prior to the 
crisis, seeking to ensure maximum support. As he later 
recalled:
It was early September: I had made a
decision to dissolve the parliament... 
Throughout the remainder of September,
I reviewed all previously scheduled 
meetings, negotiations, and trips 
within the context of this forthcoming 
decree [to dissolve parliament]. Many 
appointments had been set as far back 
as June, July, or August. Some items I 
postponed, others had to be dealt with 
immediately; but I used these 
activities to better prepare myself for 
the coming events. For example, a 
preliminary schedule had included a 
visit to the army's Taman and Kantemir 
divisions. I had long been promising 
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to come 
and take a look at these elite military 
units. After work on the decree [to 
dissolve parliament] began, this visit 
took on new meaning for me. When I 
spoke with the soldiers and reviewed 
the fine professional work of the 
divisions, when I met with the officers 
and commanders after the exercise, I 
kept thinking of the enormous, 
worrisome event that loomed ahead. How
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would these military people behave? How 
would they react? (Emphasis added.)33
Yeltsin hastened to add that he felt confident that the 
military would support him and that "there would be no 
betrayal."
But events were far from clear cut during the 
crisis. The dissolution of the parliament was followed 
not by the quiet return of deputies to their homes but 
by their refusal to leave the White House and a 
deadlock in negotiations with Yeltsin. Not only did the 
popular Afghanistan war hero Alexander Rutskoi declare 
himself acting President in the crisis that followed 
Yeltsin's dissolution of parliament, signs of potential 
unreliability on the part of the armed forces came when 
top military officials were split on how to react to 
the armed standoff and whether to allow the army to be 
further politicized by breaking the siege on the White 
House and the television tower.34 Pavel Grachev wanted 
the responsibility for the military's actions to be 
assumed entirely by the political leadership, much to 
Yeltsin's irritation.35 Ultimately, when on October 4, 
the military did carry out the assault on the White 
House, the result was well over one-hundred dead.36
33Ibid. , pp. 242-243.
34Stephen Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow: The Army Backs
Yeltsin -- For Now," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No 42 
(September 1993).
35Grachev asked for explicit instructions from Yeltsin to use 
tanks in Moscow. Yeltsin responded by immediately drafting for the 
defense minister a written order to take action to lift the siege 
of the Russian White House. But he refused to say how it should be 
done. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, op. cit., p. 278.
36Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal 
Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996. 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p.
68 .
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The fact that Yeltsin's letter on the CFE flank 
limits was sent in the midst of what was to become a 
violent stand-off with parliament underscores the 
argument that the Russian president was attempting to 
use the CFE treaty to gain the support of the military. 
This argument is further supported by consideration of 
the fact that an acute domestic political crisis was 
hardly an appropriate time for a major foreign policy 
initiative, unless it was somehow linked to the crisis.
The Role of the Diplomatic Establishment
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev implicitly linked 
the issue of peacekeeping to the CFE Treaty in early 
1993, when he described Russia's security priorities in 
the post-Cold War environment. In response to a 
question on the US television news program "Meet the 
Press" about whether further nuclear arms cuts might 
hurt Russian security, Kozyrev said:
If there is something to care about, it 
is [the] economy and well-being and 
probably also [the] ability to deal 
with local crises, but you don't need 
nuclear offensive weapons to deal with 
local crises. Sometimes we feel totally 
helpless when we are confronted with 
situations like in Bosnia or in other 
places in the former Soviet space...
Some other techniques, some other 
weapons, probably persuasion, political 
skills, and other things are needed to 
respond to real changes, so I don't 
think it's something we lose.37
Three days later, Kozyrev's arguments seemed even more 
directed toward asserting the need for a reliable 
conventional weapons response toward inter-ethnic 
conflicts:
37US National Broadcasting Company television, 3 January 
1993. Transcript by Federal News Service, 3 January 1993.
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The real challenge to our security 
today lies in regional conflicts.
...[0]ur parity in security terms is 
fully maintained under [the START II] 
agreement. It is the challenge of local 
wars that we still have to find the 
answer to, and that has caught us
totally unawares... So, there is the 
real challenge to our security, and 
that's Where we should direct our 
efforts, attention, and resources to 
really equip these rapid deployment 
forces, so that we can make use of them 
in regional conflicts when necessary
and when it is possible (for
peacekeeping purposes, of course).38
The issue of increasing Russia's security in the 
south was also raised in the programatic statement on 
Russian foreign policy —  the Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept:
Russia's long-term interests... consist 
of ensuring the country's national 
security on the southern flank, 
preventing negative consequences of the 
conflict situations retained and 
emerging there for international and 
confessional relations within the 
confines of the CIS...
The Concept also called for promoting economic
relations aimed at the development of the region and 
Russian economy.39 The region was viewed by a broad 
spectrum in Russia, if not across the entire political 
spectrum, as critical to Russian security.
380stankino Television (Russia), 6 January 1993. Translated 
in FBIS Daily Report Central Eurasia, 6 January 1993, transmitted 
via Internet.
39"Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," 
Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as presented to 
the Committee on Foreign and Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian 
Federation Supreme Soviet, January 25, 1993, p. 46.
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It thus appears that between the Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs there was consensus at 
least on the point that Russia's greatest security 
challenges came from ethnic conflicts from the south, 
if not that the CFE flank limits needed to be changed.
By late March 1993, Russian diplomats were adding 
specific requests for changing the treaty to this basic 
argumentation about Russia's changed security needs. On 
23 March, during a meeting between Andrei Kozyrev and 
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington, 
aides to the two top diplomats discussed Russia's 
concerns about complying with the treaty. At issue, 
according to the Kozyrev aide, was that "planned 
redeployments of troops to Russian territory in the 
Black Sea region would conflict with their CFE flank 
zone limitations."40 In addition to discussing the 
matter bilaterally with the United States, Russian 
negotiators at the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna 
had also raised the issue.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Defense agreed that the CFE Treaty needed to be 
modified. The gap between their positions came in 
relation to how that modification should be achieved. 
For example, Kozyrev stressed that Moscow did "not want 
to jeopardize the CFE Treaty."41 Thus rather than 
threatening to unilaterally alter its provisions, 
Kozyrev stressed the positive side of the argument -- 
the preservation of the treaty.
40"Russia Wants Flank Changes," The Washington Times, 31 
March 1993.
41Department Of State Daily Press Briefing, 31 March 1993, 
Transcript by U.S. Department of State. Transmitted via Internet.
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The military, on the other hand, sought to 
convince international partners by using blunt threats 
and ultimatums, such as those about unilaterally 
disregarding certain limitations or seceding from the 
treaty. The Foreign Ministry then rushed to control the 
damage done by such statements and offer assurances 
that Russia sought to preserve the treaty, albeit in a 
slightly modified form.42
The difference in approach between the Defense and 
Foreign Ministry positions became more obvious as time 
went on. This was not because the Foreign Ministry lost 
enthusiasm for amending the treaty. On the contrary, 
when Russia sent a new ambassador to Turkey in 
September 1994, he declared his first priority to be 
convincing Ankara to accept Russia's position on the 
flank limits.43 Rather, the difference of approach 
became more evident because the Ministry of Defense had 
begun to increase its pressure for changing the treaty 
by linking the modification of the CFE flank limits to 
other issues.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was put in less 
and less tenable positions because of the military's 
increasingly rough handling of the CFE issue. The May 
1995 announcement that Russia would establish a new 
58th Army in the Caucasus, discussed above, was 
particularly disturbing for members of the diplomatic 
establishment: Just two weeks before the announcement, 
MFA spokesman Grigorii Karasin had tried to undo the
42See the comments of Mikhail Shelepin, head of the 
Conventional Weapons Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 
"Foreign Ministry's Shelepin: Moscow Seeks CFE Revision," Berliner 
Zeitung (Berlin), 7 October 1993.
43"New Russian Ambassador Kuznetsov Interviewed," Hurriyet, 
(Istanbul) 17 September 1994. Translated in FBIS Daily Report 
Central Eurasia, 17 September 1994, transmitted via Internet.
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damage done by the military's bluster by assuring that 
Grachev's threats not to fulfill the treaty should be 
taken as a sign of Russia's real concerns about 
security in the region.44
Whereas diplomats appreciated the kind of changes 
that could be accommodated by exploiting loose treaty 
language in some cases, the military community was 
intent on rejecting outright any objections to its 
demands. Western diplomats offered repeated assurances 
that a temporary deployment in excess of the treaty 
limits was explicitly allowed by the treaty and that 
the West would express some understanding for Russia's 
position because of the war in Chechnya. Such a 
position, after all, was in Western interests because 
it was widely believed among policymakers that a 
slightly modified CFE was far better than no CFE. 
Rather than taking this implicit concession for 
temporary deployments and quieting his demands, Pavel 
Grachev pushed even harder, swaggering: "Temporary is
forever minus one day."45
There are two ways of understanding the 
differences between the MFA and MOD approaches. They 
could either represent a division of labor or they 
could indicate stubborn unwillingness to compromise and 
pursue a common approach.
The notion of a division of labor is in some ways 
a persuasive argument. With the diplomats pursuing the 
soft line and the military taking the hard line, the 
role assignments certainly mimic the use of soft 
instruments and hard instruments. And indeed, if the
44ITAR-TASS, 18 April 1995.
45Suzanne Crow, "Major European Security Questions for 1995- 
1 9 9 6 op. cit.
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MFA and MOD agreed on the bottom line, it could also be 
argued that there was a certain logic in pursuing all 
available avenues of argument. This explanation breaks 
down somewhat in judging the effectiveness of the 
approach. By threatening to abrogate the treaty the 
Russian military elite was damaging Russia's reputation 
and potentially causing treaty partners to become less 
accommodating to Russian wishes. Western media reaction 
to the Yeltsin letter, for example, found fault with 
the tough approach, while noting that the request for a 
flank alteration had itself been nothing new.46
The other interpretation -- that the military and 
diplomatic elite simply could not find a way to 
compromise on a common tactic -- seems more persuasive. 
This is mainly because the military exercised its 
tactics via diplomatic channels, not simply on the 
ground, as would be in keeping with the division of 
labor theory. For example, the Yeltsin letter, as 
discussed above, shows all the indications of being 
driven by the military's wishes. There is no evidence 
that his diplomats were involved in the preparation of 
this letter.
Another example can be found in the military's 
presence at the negotiating table. Shortly after the 
September and October political struggle, Russia's 
diplomats appeared to be crowded out of international 
discussions of the CFE Treaty by Russian military 
officials. Two top generals appeared in Vienna at the 
Joint Consultative Group, the standing body charged 
with observing the implementation of the CFE Treaty, in
46See, for example, Wolf J. Bell, "Dangerous Wishes" and 
"Yeltsin Letter Throws European Arms Agreement Into Question," 
General Anzeiger (Bonn), 1 October 1993
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October 1993.47 Normally this standing body was the 
venue for discussions about CFE implementation 
questions among civilians, mostly diplomats and arms 
control experts. Thus the appearance of two uniformed 
officers gave the appearance that Russian arms control 
policy had been turned over to -- or usurped by -- the 
military establishment.
Overall, the September-October 1993 political 
crisis seems to have affected the military's standing 
in Russian politics -- and its relationship with the 
MFA. This is a point made by Adieh in his analysis of 
Russia's constitutional development. Addressing the 
issue of the impact of Yeltsin's attack on the White 
House on the legal consciousness of Russian elites, 
Adieh notes that in "its aftermath, the elites' safety 
and security appeared as tenuous under democracy as it 
had been under Stalinism. The stability of the 
bureaucracy. . . now seemed threatened."48 In other
words, the possession of the tools of violence by the 
military was making it a more potent player in Russian 
politics.
The Role of Research Institutes
Research institutes reflected a slightly wider 
spectrum of opinion on the CFE question than was 
present within the government. Aleksei Arbatov, both a 
head of a research center and a member of parliament, 
seized on the divergence between the Foreign and
47AFP, 15 October 1993.
48Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal 
Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996, op. cit., 
pp. 68-69.
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Defense Ministries1 approaches and warned of 
mishandling the CFE flank issue. Arbatov argued:
The first imperative of Russian 
security is that the [CFE Treaty] is 
in Russia's interest. The political 
and strategic advantages of the treaty 
outweigh its few flaws. Because of 
economic factors, and for many other 
reasons, Russia would be unlikely, 
even in the absence of this treaty, to 
be capable of maintaining larger armed 
forces than it envisages in the 
foreseeable future. Other states, on 
the other hand, with sufficient 
political motivation could quickly 
build up their armed forces and 
achieve colossal military superiority 
to Russia on the strength of their 
economic, military-technical, and 
demographic potential, convenient 
geostrategic locations, and ability to 
unite forces for collective defense.
It would be a sign of extreme 
imprudence if Moscow were to issue 
ultimatums and threaten to denounce 
the treaty, even if the rapidly 
changing situation were to put some of 
its provisions into question. (For 
example, there were disagreements over 
the quotas for the flank zones, which 
kept Russia from increasing its troop 
strength in the North Caucasian
Military District.) Incidentally, it 
is not completely clear whether these 
questions were that serious and could 
not have been settled by some other
means. Under favorable political
conditions, it would be possible to go 
further and conclude new agreements on 
more dramatic reductions of forces in 
Europe, in line with the new
geopolitical realities on the 
continent.49
49Arbatov is the director of the Geopolitical and Military 
Forecasting Center. This statement comes from his article, 
"Russia:’ National Security in the 1990s," Mirovaya Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 7 (July, August, September 1994), 
translated by FBIS.
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Arbatov's argument thus boiled down to this: Perhaps
the solution to the flank problem lies not in 
increasing Russia's quota but in further arms control 
to reduce the quotas of others.
Such an approach echoed the thinking of others who 
sought to view the solution to the flank problem in 
combination with solutions to other, larger problems. 
The notion that further conventional arms control 
regimes might help solve the CFE flank problem 
complemented notions prevalent in Russia that the CSCE 
should become a more important institution guiding 
European security issues.
Such a development would give Russia greater 
decisionmaking authority in European security questions 
than it would have if questions were handled solely by 
NATO and the European Union. For example, Sergei Rogov, 
the deputy director of the Historical Commission of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and the Deputy Director of 
the USA and Canada Institute, argued:
First, we need to update the arms 
control regime, which is based on the 
obsolete principle of parity between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Expansion of 
NATO must lead not to a new arms race 
but to a decrease of the persisting 
high level of militarization in Europe.
Rather than floundering in the wake of 
events, we need to take the initiative 
into our own hands, for example by 
proposing a new Treaty on Reduction of 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to 
replace the CFE Treaty. The CFE-2 
Treaty must substitute bloc-based arms 
levels by national limits. All European 
states, and not just members of NATO 
and the former Warsaw Pact, must become 
its participants.50
50Sergei M. Rogov, "Russia and the West," SShA: Ekonomika, 
Politika, Ideologiya, No. 3 (March 1995), translated by FBIS.
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By elevating the flank issue to the level of problem­
solving for major European security questions, Rogov 
was essentially trying to solve Moscow's perceived 
isolation from important European security 
decisionmaking.
Other think-tank voices focused on security in 
Russia's south -- a concern shared by the MFA and MOD. 
For example, the potential threats from the south were 
highlighted in the report of the Council on Foreign and 
Defense Policy, "A Strategy for Russia," discussed in 
chapter four. In the analysis of this report, the best 
approach for Russia would be to draw on assets in all 
areas, political and military.
[The threats'] military and political 
containment requires flexible power 
instruments which could support a
diplomacy of possible involvement in 
police operations aimed at encouraging 
divisions and peace-making operations, 
preferably coordinated within the 
framework of a common policy pursued by 
the Euro-Atlantic community. As a
whole, Russia's possibilities of 
controlling the situation in this 
potentially dangerous area are limited. 
Efficient control requires flexible
diplomacy and cooperation with the 
West. At the same time, cooperation 
with many countries in Asia is not only 
advantageous in itself but also could 
greatly contribute to the preservation 
and even strengthening of foreign 
policy opportunities in other 
directions. This particularly applies 
to India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Israel.51
Such thinking later underpinned Russian suggestions 
that a rapid reaction peacekeeping force controlled by
51"A Strategy for Russia," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 August
1992 .
349
Chapter 7 Case Study Two
Russia and outside of CFE Treaty limits would be the 
optimal solution to meeting the challenges of the 
south.
Other analysts focused on the argument that the 
changed world situation meant that the CFE Treaty no 
longer corresponded to reality. Boris Zhelezov, an 
expert at the Center for National Security and 
International Relations in Moscow, argued that Russia 
had shifted a great proportion of its defenses to the 
south and that the CFE flank limits did not correspond 
to these needs.52 Similar arguments were made by Anton 
Surikov, an expert at the Center for Military, 
Strategic, and Technological Studies of the USA-Canada 
Institute (Russian Academy of Sciences). He stressed 
the need to modify the CFE Treaty on similar grounds.53 
These arguments were similar to the shared MOD-MFA 
policy goal of securing a change in the treaty.
The Role of the Legislature
Throughout the discussions about amending the CFE 
Treaty, the Russian Supreme Soviet and State Duma 
stayed very much in the background. As was discussed 
above, the Supreme Soviet had ratified the treaty in 
1991, raising no concerns about possible damage to 
Russia's strategic interests.
The relative disinterest on the part of lawmakers 
(with the exception of Arbatov, quoted above) can, of 
course, be partially explained by the fact that they 
would appear foolish to criticize the treaty after they 
(or their predecessors) had ratified it. More 
importantly, their relative inactivity on the issue can
52ITAR-TASS, 18 April 1995.
53ITAR-TASS, 27 April 1995.
350
Chapter 7 Case Study Two
be attributed to their probable agreement with the 
executive branch's attempt to amend the treaty, one way 
or another.
Given the tendency of the Russian legislature to 
pursue nationalist and patriotic issues, support of the 
CFE Treaty's amendment would fit into the pattern of 
arguments frequently used by that body, such as those 
suggesting that Russia's interests had been too easily 
compromised in negotiations with Western powers, that 
Turkey and other powers were attempting to gain a 
foothold in the Transcaucasus region to challenge 
Russia's security, and, more generally, that Russia 
would be militarily threatened by the proposed changes 
in Europe's security structures and was thus required 
to boost, not cut, its conventional armaments.
The near silence on the part of the legislature 
suggests that lawmakers did not always demand a voice 
in policymaking simply for the sake of having input. As 
the CFE case demonstrates, members of the legislative 
branch were largely content not to involve themselves 
in an issue if they thought that policy undertaken by 
the executive branch was already aimed in the right 
direction.
Testing the Bureaucratic Politics and Transition
Models
As noted in chapter one, this case study was 
chosen because it presented an area of relative policy 
harmony within the Russian government. By examining an 
issue of comparatively weak policy conflict, it was 
hoped to minimize any bias inherent in examining only 
issues characterized by sharp bureaucratic conflict. 
This is in keeping with the bureaucratic politics 
model, for while it assumes that policy conflict is a
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regular feature of policymaking, it does not assume 
that each policy output represents the result of all- 
out battles between and within government agencies.
Some of the most difficult aspects of Russia's
foreign policy formulation to explain with reference to 
the bureaucratic politics model are those in which more 
than one foreign policy is active simultaneously. In
the case of the CFE Treaty flank limits, the basic
agreement among policymakers meant that one policy goal 
was being pursued. At the same time, there were clearly
different tactics at play and little sign of compromise
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defense. This is not in keeping with the bureaucratic 
politics model because the way that Russia pursued its 
goal on the international stage was not so much an
amalgam, but an assembly of different approaches.
The possibility that this assembly represented an 
intended division of labor has been considered and 
found to be less likely than interpreting it as a 
failure of the MFA and MOD to compromise. Had the
former interpretation (the division of labor) been 
valid, however, this could be explained by both the 
bureaucratic politics and the transition models. The 
dual approach would fit into the bureaucratic politics 
model's hypothesis that problems are cut up and
parceled out. In this case, the problem of taking the 
hard line had been parceled out to the MOD whereas the 
soft line had been parceled out to the MFA. The 
transition model, on the other hand, would explain the 
Russian armed forces' behavior as an example of 
praetorianism and the pursuit of two approaches as 
evidence of a deficit of procedures.
This points to the larger problem of utilizing 
this case study to understand the relationship between
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Yeltsin and the armed forces. By assuming control of an 
initiative or forum which would normally be the domain 
of diplomats, the military showed that it was using its 
possession of the instruments of force in order to 
acquire more control over policy.
The extent to which the domestic political crisis 
influenced Russia's CFE behavior suggests that the 
transition model is more appropriate for understanding 
Russia's dual approach. The clear linkage between the 
executive-legislative stand-off and the CFE issue 
cannot be explained by the bureaucratic politics model. 
On the other hand, this playing out of domestic 
politics on the international stage goes to the heart 
of the issues at stake in a democratizing state as 
discussed in the transition model.
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Russia In the 
Comparative Perspective
In some ways, Russia's style of foreign policy 
decisionmaking between the collapse of the USSR and the 
end of Yeltsin's first term as president looks like a 
caricature of foreign policy decisionmaking in Western 
states. The ministries in Russia are engaged in a 
struggle over control of policy, players are bitter when 
they lose a policy battle, and nothing seems to work as 
it should. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: Is Russia 
merely behaving the way that any Western state would if 
it had recently been reborn in the manifold ways that 
Russia has?
To address this question, this chapter compares the 
functioning of Russian decisionmaking with policymaking 
in the United States and, to a lesser extent, France, 
the countries on which some of Russia's most important
institutions (the Security Council and Federal Assembly,
for example) were modeled.1 It is hoped, that by 
comparing these systems, the distinctions in Russian 
foreign policy formulation can be brought into higher 
relief. The American president possesses something only 
remotely similar to Russia's presidential branch of 
government. The US president, like his Russian
counterpart, shows a tendency to seek an alternative to
his ministries and bureaucracies. Relations between the 
US president and his Cabinet (that is, the secretaries
1John T.S. Keeler and Martin A. Schain, "Institutions, 
Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France," in Kurt von 
Mettenheim, ed. Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 84-85.
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of key bureaucracies such as the Department of State, 
Department of Defense, etc.) often sour early in the 
president's first term. The American Cabinet quickly 
becomes a forum in which top bureaucrats argue and seek 
presidential mediation rather than one in which they 
work out solutions among themselves in a cooperative 
manner.2 Thus, instead of making the US president's job 
easier, by helping him with policy problem-solving, they 
make his job more difficult by adding questions about 
which bureaucracy deserves to win or lose a given policy 
battle.
The Executive Office of the President (commonly 
known by the acronym EXOP), is the US president's answer 
to this problem. EXOP consists of some 11 agencies or 
offices, the largest of which is the Office of 
Management and Budget. Other components of EXOP include 
the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security 
Council, and the Office of the US Trade Representative. 
Some of the approximately 1, 000 positions in EXOP are 
filled by permanent staffers which are carried over from 
one presidential administration to the next. But the 
most powerful positions are filled with the president's 
most loyal aides and advisers. They are expected to keep 
a low profile and to avoid open conflict with Cabinet 
secretaries. And, most significantly, EXOP officials are 
expected to deliver solutions, not add to the additional 
problems and inefficiencies caused by bureaucratic 
conflicts.
Significantly, the US president's EXOP has avoided 
compartmentalization and has retained a great deal of
2Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the
presidency: Institutional politics in a separated system.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 271.
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flexibility.3 This derives partly from the attempt to 
keep EXOP unburdened by bureaucratic subdivisions which 
might slow down its reaction to crises. At the same 
time, though, what is at play is an underlying
reluctance among US presidents to allow parts of the 
president's staff to develop bureaucratic identities of 
their own.
The American president is under political pressure 
both to make certain that EXOP maintains a low profile 
and to keep its size small. Presidents cannot afford to 
alienate Cabinet secretaries to the extent that their 
positions become decorative, with the departments under 
them becoming the tools of EXOP officials. In some 
situations, the policy preferences of the president's 
National Security Council will indeed differ from those 
of the Department of State and will indeed prevail. But 
cases of heavy NSC encroachment on the State 
Department's work stand out as exceptions, the most 
prominent example being found in the person of Henry 
Kissinger in the administration of Richard Nixon.4 A 
further political limitation on the role of the national 
security adviser derives from the fact that he is not 
subject to Senate confirmation, unlike the secretary of 
state. Thus, owing to his accountability, the latter 
enjoys greater legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Unlike his Russian counterpart, a US president does 
not normally grant his foreign policy aides a public 
role in the form of addressing foreign partners or 
heading delegations abroad. This is in keeping with the 
desire to keep aides largely out of the public eye and
3Ibid., p. 213.
4Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making 
Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," World Politics, 
Vol. 33, No. 2 (January 1981), pp. 242-243.
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to avoid trespassing on the role of the State 
Department. The public, international role would 
normally be performed by presidential envoys
prominent figures or career diplomats who are selected 
by the US president to tackle specific foreign policy 
missions or issue areas.
The political limits on the size of the staff 
derive from the legal ambiguity of EXOP. Until recently 
in US history, owing to the historical reluctance to
allow unchecked growth of the chief executive and the 
executive branch of the federal government, presidential 
staffs were exceedingly small. It was only in the 1940s 
that the staff of the president grew to what was
considered the swollen level of 50-some people.5 In 
order to avoid being criticized for creating a 
"presidential branch" of government, which is unelected, 
not confirmed by the Senate, and in many ways
unaccountable, American presidents have tended to keep 
their staffs small. This has been especially true in the 
wake of the Watergate scandal and the excesses of the 
Nixon White House EXOP.6 These political limits on the 
presidential staff are effective enough to obviate the 
need for legislative oversight of the presidential 
staff: There have been few attempts by the US Congress 
to subject EXOP to oversight or to challenge its 
actions. By the same token, each American president 
knows that the dubious legal basis for the EXOP means 
that he should be careful not to give the Congress any 
reason to probe.7
5ibid.
6 Ibid.
70n the initial regulations of the presidential staff, see 
John Hart, "The President and His Staff," in Malcolm Shaw, ed. 
Roosevelt to Reagan: The Development of the Modern Presidency.
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The Russian president's apparat is very different. 
It has grown rapidly, especially since the start of the 
second republic, after Russia's establishment of a 
presidential system of government. The Russian president 
is under little or no political pressure to keep his 
staff small. Some complaints have been registered by 
journalists in the Russian media about the growth of the 
presidential branch of government, but the 
constitutional provision granting the Russian president 
the right to form his presidential staff means that his 
actions are virtually beyond legal reproach.
Apart from being very large, the Russian 
president's staff is highly compartmentalized. The 
president is under no legal or political constraints 
with regard to creating agencies and departments within 
his apparat, and each new chief of staff has embarked on
a process of reorganization which has seen the creation 
of new agencies (along with the disposal of some, but 
not all of, the old ones) . Owing to its growth in size 
and compartmentalization, the Russian president's staff 
risks duplicating the struggles seen among the 
ministries rather than rising above them.
Problems in the Russian executive branch between 
the president's apparat and the ministries are frequent.
The Security Council under Yurii Skokov attempted to 
work contrary the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
president's chief of staff tried to make policy about 
Russian military bases in Latvia without consulting the 
Latvian government (discussed in chapters four and five, 
respectively), to mention only two.
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987), pp. 164-172; and Michael Foley and 
John E. Owens, op. cit. , 215.
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The Russian president's reliance on his staff has 
important elements in common with the US president1s 
recourse to his EXOP (the reluctance or inability to 
cope with bureaucratic infighting among the departments, 
and the tendency to feel more comfortable relying on 
trusted loyalists) . Yet the behavior of EXOP and the 
apparat are quite different due to the divergent
historical, legal, and political constraints on the 
Russian and American presidents. One example is the 
Russian president's reliance on aides, in addition to 
presidential envoys, to perform public and international 
roles in foreign policy. The Russian president is under 
no political pressure to limit or at least veil the 
power exercised by his aides, unlike the US president.
Much of the friction between the Russian executive 
and legislative branches of government over foreign 
policy, such as deputies' attempts to undermine the 
foreign minister with the aim of his dismissal, linkage 
of treaty ratification to unrelated issues, attempts to 
win over public opinion by taking emotional stances, not 
to mention the use of the budget weapon, are common to 
other countries as well.8 In the United States, despite 
periods of deference by the Congress to the president on 
foreign policy issues, the necessity to conduct 
negotiations between the executive and legislative 
branches over foreign policy issues has been common a 
feature of American politics, especially since the 
1970s. The 1990s saw the Clinton administration 
experience a sharp increase in Congressional use of
80n the occurrences of each of these, see the discussion in 
Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Diplomacy: Around the World and
along Pennsylvania Avenue," in Thomas E. Mann, ed. A Question of 
Balance: The President, The Congress and Foreign Policy.
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 175.
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trade sanctions as tools to isolate rogue states in 
international relations.
But the Russian system is different. While it has 
frequently been compared to the French Fifth Republic in 
terms of its division of power,9 this comparison is more 
misleading than enlightening. In Russia, it is 
relatively unimportant if the Federal Assembly is in the 
hands of the president's opponents. In France, on the 
other hand, no President can exercise power without the 
support of a majority party in the National Assembly.10
The French president enjoys far-reaching powers 
only to the extent that his party controls the National 
Assembly; his role in periods of cohabitation has often 
been to defer to his prime minister, even on foreign 
policy matters. This is because the French Fifth 
Republic's semi-presidential system effectively changes 
into a parliamentary system during periods of 
cohabitation.11 In Russia, the legislature serves very 
much at the pleasure of the president. This affects -- 
and in many cases defines -- the way the legislature 
behaves, no matter how much of it is controlled by 
parties opposing the president. The Russian president 
holds the fate of the Russian State Duma in his hands, 
enjoying the power to dissolve it if it becomes too 
obstreperous. There is no legal requirement to submit
9Yeltsin compared the current constitution to that the French 
Fifth Republic in an interview with Politique Internationale, 
reproduced in Rossiskiye vesti and Le Figaro on 30 April 1996. 
Translated by FBIS.
10Ezra Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in 
France, " in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of 
Presidential Democracy, op. cit., p. 151.
11Ezra Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in 
France, 1 in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of 
Presidential Democracy. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994), p. 151.
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his foreign minister candidate for a vote of approval. 
Furthermore, the Russian president has the right to 
write his own decrees.
In comparison, the US president's powers seem 
meager. The American president has the right to conclude 
executive agreements with foreign countries, without 
Congressional approval. But the atmosphere of executive- 
legislative relations is different in the United States 
because, unlike in Russia, no one side has enough 
constitutional power to regularly make foreign policy 
unilaterally. This is why, despite the fact that he is 
under no legal obligation to do so, the American 
president has frequently sought Congressional approval 
for executive agreements.12
In Russia, the uneven balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branch means that the 
legislature is disadvantaged vis-a-vis the executive 
branch (especially as a result of its oversized 
presidential apparat). The legislature, as an
institution, does not have enough legal levers to exert 
enough influence over policy. Russian deputies, even 
more than their comparatively better off (in the 
institutional sense) American counterparts, are also 
more likely to resort to emotional appeals which 
politicize foreign policy issues. Deputies apparently 
reason that if they do not have the means to influence 
policy directly, then they will do so indirectly by 
attempting to whip up public opinion with sensational 
foreign policy issues (such as the Duma's "USSR decrees" 
discussed in chapter five). Here as well, the
12 James Q. Wilson, American Government, (Toronto: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1980), p. 547.
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institutional arrangement has an immediate impact on the 
legislature's diplomatic initiatives.
What gives deputies' activities greater resonance 
is the possibility in post-Soviet Russia of linking 
foreign policy to national self-esteem, pride, and 
status in world politics. In this regard, Russian 
lawmakers, like other participants in Russian politics, 
have far more extensive opportunities to politicize 
foreign policy issues than their American counterparts 
do: Questions about the nature of the polity, its status 
in the world, and its territorial integrity do not 
figure into daily discussions in Washington as they do 
in Moscow.
The most basic difference between France and the 
United States, on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other, is the level of democratic development. This is 
not surprising given the length of time in which the 
American and French systems have developed. The more 
important consideration in Russia's case is the absence 
of a democratic history. Russia's deficit of democratic 
tradition suggests that it will take a long time to 
achieve the level of democratic stability enjoyed in 
France and the United States.
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T he Outlook for Russian Foreign Policy Formulation
This study has analyzed the utility of the 
bureaucratic politics and transition models in analyzing 
foreign policy formulation in the Soviet Union and 
Russia starting in the Gorbachev era and continuing 
through the end of Boris Yeltsin's first term as 
president. Whereas during the period of rule under 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko the bureaucratic 
politics model could be applied with some success 
(albeit differently than in the United States) the 
institutional breakdown of the Gorbachev era saw a 
deterioration of the model's explanatory power which 
continued in independent Russia.
The bureaucratic politics model stressed that 
actions performed by a nation in international politics 
were the resultant of bargaining among individuals and 
groups within the government. In Gorbachev's Soviet 
Union, this bargaining began to subside as more and more 
of the power traveled to the USSR presidency. It was 
also then that Soviet foreign policy began to look less 
like a series of "preprogrammed outputs," as Allison put 
it and more like lurches of policy in one direction or 
another, and perhaps back again.1 Soviet behavior on the 
CFE Treaty, discussed in chapter seven, is one example. 
Standard operating procedures, which had been a useful 
aspect of the bureaucratic politics model in studying 
the pre-Gorbachev period, had become more difficult to
1Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, op. cit., p. 81.
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identify in the Gorbachev period. For example, the 
division of labor between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Department shifted as the ID's 
role changed. It was, in short, less and less the case 
that a standardized way of "playing the game" existed in 
making foreign policy.
This declining utility of the bureaucratic politics 
model continued in independent Russia. Once again, 
foreign policy often represented not the resultant of 
bargaining, but the composite of various views. Even on 
an issue characterized by basic agreement among 
policymakers, such as the modification of the CFE 
Treaty, there were clearly different tactics at play and 
little sign of compromise among the players. This was 
not in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model 
because the way that Russia pursued its goal on the 
international stage was not so much an amalgam, but an 
assembly of different approaches.
Other aspects of the bureaucratic politics model 
were similarly unable to explain Russian foreign policy 
behavior. Policy was not so much a mixture or resultant, 
but a record of which personality or institution had won 
a given policy battle. An example can be found in the 
cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Japan (chapter four). 
Standard operating procedures were not a characteristic 
of independent Russia's foreign policy. Formalized 
procedures were laid out on the books, as the discussion 
of statutes in chapters four and five reveals, but these 
procedures were frequently ignored.
The transition model speaks to the deficiencies of 
the bureaucratic politics model. Excessive power accrued 
to the executive in Gorbachev's Soviet Union and in 
Yeltsin's Russia, especially the second republic. At 
various points in both cases, the division of authority
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between the executive and the legislature was contested. 
Similarly, procedures were ad hoc and not fixed. Or as 
was the case in the naming members of the Security 
Council, legal procedures were often simply ignored 
(chapter five).
Just as the bureaucratic politics model became of 
declining utility starting in the Gorbachev era, the 
transition model offered more illumination. This trend 
is connected with the sluggish development of democracy 
in Russia and the failure of new institutions to become 
established in place of those that had been eliminated. 
This indicates that the bureaucratic politics model 
cannot be expected to apply to states in transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.
The legacy of the Soviet Union's flawed political 
system has also hampered Russia's development as a 
functioning democracy. The tradition of parallel 
executive organs, one connected to the chief 
executive(s) and one consisting of the ministries, is 
strong in Moscow and a perfectly normal environment in 
which to function. It is therefore unlikely that 
political, legal, or political-cultural constraints,
broadly construed, will impinge on the behavior of 
Russia's executive in limiting the presidential branch 
of government in the near future, even though the
effects of the current system can be destructive.
The substitution of legalism for the rule of law 
meant that there was simply too little interest in
creating a culture supporting the respect for the rule 
of law. What is more, the pattern of hypercodification 
evident in Soviet times persisted in Russia, as could be 
seen in Russia's use of laws as ornaments of the
political system rather than as actual rules.
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The tendency of the military to expect a role in 
the political process was a feature of the Soviet system 
which has continued into independent Russia's political 
milieu. Many of the intrusions by the Ministry of
Defense into the work of the Foreign Ministry can be
explained by the lack of tradition in civilian control
over the military. In Russia, the Ministry of Defense
has been run by a uniformed military officer, not by a 
civilian. Such was the case for much of the Soviet 
period as well. The notion of Communist Party control 
over the military was flawed because the Party viewed 
the Soviet armed forces as its protector. Brezhnev, as 
was discussed in chapter two, was uninterested in 
denying the military anything. Gorbachev, who initially 
sought to reduce the role of the military in
policymaking and its receipt of state resources,
ultimately felt so vulnerable politically as to attempt 
to repair his relations with the military by giving in 
to its demands. The Soviet system, with the exception of 
the August 1991 putsch, was not susceptible to a
military coup because the military's wishes were largely
satisfied by the political leadership.
It has proven very difficult to get the Soviet and 
then the Russian military out of political life. As 
Russia's handling of the CFE Treaty case study 
demonstrates, the political leadership has required the 
support of. the armed forces to stay in power. The 
military has become more openly politicized by the 
political upheavals of the post-Soviet period and by the 
opportunity to serve as legislators, a novel feature of 
the Russian system which began during Soviet times.
Significantly, Yeltsin has shown an unwillingness 
to discourage the military from trespassing on 
diplomacy. Indeed, by calling in the military to help 
resolve a political conflict, Yeltsin caused grave
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damage to the already delicate process of creating a 
rule of law system in Russia. In the words of Fyodor 
Burlatsky, this was a "huge trauma to Russian legal 
consciousness."2 For Russian foreign policy, this meant 
that the process of stabilizing the Russian polity was 
set back.
Another aspect of the Soviet legacy can be seen in 
personnel policy. While Yeltsin gave the Foreign 
Ministry the right to coordinate the foreign policy 
actions of other Russian agencies, he did not give the 
MFA any means to exert this right, including, until 
1996, a foreign minister authoritative enough to do so. 
The MFA, like the diplomatic apparatus of any country, 
could not be expected to compete with a Defense Ministry 
that knew it could resort to the use of arms to achieve 
its own foreign policy aims.
The appointment of Primakov as foreign minister 
seemed to hold great promise for the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. While his time in office came at the end of 
the time period covered by this study, Primakov's 
prestige and authority in the Russian policymaking 
community suggested that his leadership of the MFA might 
bring that institution the prestige and clout that it 
needed to accomplish its task.
The Outlook
The question raised by these conclusions is: When
will Russia's foreign policy evolve from one which can 
be best explained by the transition model to one for
2Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia's Constitutional Revolution: 
Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy 1985-1996. 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1997), p. 68.
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which the application of the bureaucratic politics model 
can be useful?
In answering this question, it is useful to pause 
and consider the extent to which the patterns described 
in the bureaucratic politics model are ones to which a 
government should aspire. Clearly, Allison's discussion 
was aimed at highlighting the flaws in this pattern of 
policymaking.
As the same time, there is a middle ground to be 
achieved between the chaos of transitional Russia and 
the inefficiency often attendant to the type of 
bureaucratic foreign policymaking modeled by Allison. 
That middle ground is the development of a functioning, 
responsible bureaucracy based in a rule-of-law system.
Given the hurdles Russia still faces in its 
democratic development, and the frequency with which 
institutions, individuals, and procedures change in the 
upper echelons of the political elite, it appears that 
the transition model will retain significant explanatory 
power for many years to come.
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